

IMPACT EVALUATION OF SUPPORTING TRADITIONAL LEADERS AND LOCAL STRUCTURES TO MITIGATE COMMUNITY-LEVEL CONFLICT IN ZIMBABWE

Final Report

August 2014

This publication was produced by Kate Baldwin and Shylock Muyengwa for review by the United States Agency for International Development.

Impact Evaluation of Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Community-level Conflict in Zimbabwe

Final Report

DISCLAIMER

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

This document is available in printed or online versions. Documents are also made available through the Development Experience Clearing House (www.dec.org). Additional information can be obtained from:

Social Impact, Inc. 2300 Clarendon Boulevard Arlington, VA, 22201 Tel: (703) 465-1884 Fax: (703) 465-1888 info@socialimpact.com

This document was submitted by Social Impact, Inc., with Kate Baldwin and Shylock Muyengwa, to the United States Agency for International Development under USAID Contract No. AID-OAA-TO-11-00057.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors of this report would like to thank many individuals and organizations for guidance, expertise, and support throughout this evaluation. We are especially grateful to Morgan Holmes, Victoria Gellis, and Ed Connerly of USAID's Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance for their leadership and direction. Melissa Williams, Sheryl Stumbras, and Vera Musara from USAID/Zimbabwe were instrumental in facilitating the development of this evaluation and provided vital support. We would also like to thank the International Rescue Committee team for their collaboration and flexibility in working with the evaluation team. From Social Impact, we are thankful to Mike Duthie for his technical guidance and Jordan Fulp and Kyle Block for their feedback and assistance. We would also like to thank Lauren Young for her assistance with the data collection, and Caroline Trigg and TARGET Research for their local insight and data collection services. Eric Mvukiyehe has played a key role throughout the project. Of course, we extend our upmost gratitude to the local leaders and citizens in Manicaland for participating in this evaluation.

ACRONYMS

CL	Community Leader
CMM	USAID Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation
DA	District Authority
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EGAP	Experiments in Governance and Politics Network
ELF	Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
HH	Household
IE	Impact Evaluation
IRB	Institutional Review Board
IRC	International Rescue Committee
LRF	Legal Resources Foundation
MDES	Minimum Detectible Effect Size
MP	Member of Parliament
MPOI	Mass Public Opinion Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
RCT	Randomized Control Trial
SI	Social Impact, Inc.
VH	Village Head
ZJC	Zimbabwe Junior Certificate
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ACRONYMSi
CONTENTSii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARYiv
1. BACKGROUND & PURPOSEiv
2. MAIN FINDINGSiv
3. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION1
II. BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT AND STUDY
1. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION OBJECTIVES
2. IMPACT EVALUATION DESIGN4
III. DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING SESSIONS
IV. FOLLOW-UP SURVEY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
1. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN
2. FOLLOW-UP SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION11
V. HYPOTHESES AND PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN13
VI. PROGRAM EFFECTS17
1. GOOD GOVERNANCE
2. LOCAL CONFLICT AND SOCIAL TRUST
VII. INTERPRETING THE RESULTS23
VIII. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
IX. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
X. CONCLUSION
APPENDIX A. REFERENCES
APPENDIX B. PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN
APPENDIX C. ALL EFFECTS
APPENDIX D. BALANCE STATISTICS
APPENDIX E. Household Survey Questionnaire
APPENDIX F: Village Head Questionnaire
APPENDIX G: Qualitative Research Protocol

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. BACKGROUND & PURPOSE

This report presents results from the follow-up survey carried out as part of an impact evaluation of the Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Community-level Conflict in Zimbabwe project. The evaluation is part of the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance's impact evaluation initiative and was co-funded with the USAID/Zimbabwe Mission. The project itself was jointly funded by USAID/Zimbabwe and USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) and implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC)/Zimbabwe. The project is a capacity building initiative targeting all traditional leaders at all levels of the traditional chieftaincy system (chiefs, headmen, and village heads) in two rural districts, Mutare and Mutasa, in Manicaland Province.

A rigorous impact evaluation was designed to provide evidence on the following policy questions:

- 1) Can training programs for traditional leaders improve their governance and reduce conflict?
- 2) What is the best way to implement training programs to reduce conflict and to promote positive relationships at the community-level? Specifically, are training programs more effective when other community leaders are also included?

This study addresses these questions focusing at the village level, the lowest level of traditional governance. The study uses a randomized control trial (RCT) design, in which villages are randomly assigned to receive project activities, which are rolled-out in two waves (year 1 and year 2). The study also examines whether training is more effective if structured in a way that creates social pressure on traditional leaders to change their behavior. This is done by randomizing villages in year 1 into either a "training only" group or "training plus horizontal pressure" group in which other community leaders, such as teachers, religious leaders, and women's group leaders, have been invited to the training. This design allows us to compare the outcomes between the two groups and attribute the changes to the key components of the project.

2. MAIN FINDINGS

We find that training traditional leaders alone does not have the expected positive effects on traditional governance and conflict management. Village heads who received the "training only" variant did not improve their knowledge of the law or attitudes toward human rights as a result of the training, and they did not become less partial or increase their legitimacy in the eyes of the community members

In contrast, we find positive governance effects of the "training plus horizontal pressure" variant in which community leaders were trained on the responsibilities of traditional leaders alongside the village heads. Villages in which community leaders were trained alongside village heads had significantly better governance indicators than villages in which village heads were trained alone; in particular, they became more knowledgeable. Village heads

exposed to this training variant also became more consultative. Qualitative research suggests that community leaders who were trained alongside village heads were both able to "remind" village heads of the legal framework after the training session, thereby checking abuses, and to disseminate information on the rule of law to other members of the community.

Yet, the positive effects of the "training plus horizontal pressure" variant on governance by village heads must be weighed against some unintended negative consequences of this training variant. This training variant did not substantially decrease the total number of disputes in communities, and it potentially increased some types of social tensions. Specifically, the "training plus horizontal pressure" variant corresponded with increased respondents' knowledge of threats of political violence and with decreased social trust. Qualitative follow-up research suggests this is probably due to citizens' increased willingness to express dissenting and critical views in these communities, rather than being due to greater latent divisions.

3. CONCLUSION

These results have important implications far beyond the Zimbabwean case. Donors and governments around the world often try to regulate the operation of traditional institutions. This study indicates two things. First, the effectiveness of these efforts depends on how the regulation is structured; training sessions for village heads by themselves are likely to have little impact, but they have greater impact when other community leaders are involved. In short, efforts to build the capacity of governing officials should also include mechanisms to strengthen accountability. Second, programs that are effective in changing the activities of traditional institutions may have divergent effects in different areas. On the one hand, if appropriately structured, these programs may be able to improve traditional leaders' knowledge and consultation if other community leaders; however, at the same time, these changes may increase inter-group conflict and reduce social trust in communities. In other words, there may be trade-offs between consultation and maintaining social cohesion.

۷

I. INTRODUCTION


This report presents results from the follow-up survey carried out as part of an impact evaluation of the Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Community-level Conflict in Zimbabwe project. The evaluation is part of the Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance's impact evaluation initiative and was co-funded with the USAID/Zimbabwe Mission. The project itself was jointly funded by USAID/Zimbabwe and USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) and implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC)/Zimbabwe. The project is a capacity building initiative targeting all traditional leaders at all levels of the traditional chieftaincy system (chiefs, headmen, and village heads) in two rural districts, Mutare and Mutasa, in Manicaland Province.

The project was motivated by pervasive tensions and violence at the community level, which many observers have attributed to the growing politicization and partisan behaviors of traditional leaders as well as their inability to deliver justice impartially. Thus this project sought to address critical knowledge gaps through training activities carried out by the IRC in conjunction with its implementing partner, the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) for a 24-month period. Its main objectives are to prevent violence and to promote positive relationships at the community level by strengthening traditional leaders' capacity to perform their role effectively, to make sound decisions, and to resolve conflicts peacefully.

A rigorous impact evaluation study was designed as an integral part of this project to ascertain the extent to which the project's objectives have been met. Specifically, the study seeks to provide evidence on the following policy questions:

- 1) Can training programs for traditional leaders improve their governance and reduce conflict?
- 2) What is the best way to implement training programs to reduce conflict and to promote positive relationships at the community-level? Specifically, are training programs more effective when other community leaders are also included?

This study addresses these questions primarily focusing at the village level, the lowest level of traditional governance. While the project targets all traditional leaders, the impact evaluation study primarily focuses on the Village Head (VH), the lowest authority on the traditional leadership system and first line of call in conflict resolution. The impact evaluation is not sufficiently powered to allow identification of the effects of training on each level of leaders (there are only 3 chiefs and 28 headmen in the study area). Figure 1 shows the traditional and elected governance structures in Zimbabwe.



The study uses a randomized control trial (RCT) design, in which villages are randomly assigned to receive project activities, which are rolled-out in two waves. This design allows us to compare the outcomes between the two groups and attribute the changes to the key components of the project.

Before year 1 of the training program, a baseline survey of village heads and community members was carried out in the communities targeted by the project in Mutare district.¹ These surveys sought to gather information on baseline conditions on the key outcomes of interest and on other important contextual factors that might interact with project activities. Follow up surveys were carried out in the same communities one year later following project implementation. This report provides a brief description of research activities that were undertaken as part of this impact evaluation and summarizes the main empirical findings.

The report is organized as follows: in section two, we provide background on the project as well as a brief description of the study design; in section three, we describe the core intervention, the training sessions for traditional leaders; in section four, we describe the follow-up survey instrument and the implementation of the survey; in section five, we describe the plan for analyzing the data and the process by which it was drawn up; in section six, we show the program effects on governance and conflict across the entire sample of villages (or, the intent-to-treat effects); in section seven, we measure the effects by previous exposure to training, with specific focus on the effect of the training on those village heads who had never previously been formally trained on their role; in section eight, we conduct secondary analyses to interpret the main effects; section nine considers the robustness of some of the results and alternative explanations; and section ten concludes.

¹ Initially, the plan was to carry out surveys in all study communities in both rural districts, Mutare and Mutasa. However, deteriorating security conditions on the ground in Mutasa interrupted fieldwork there.

II. BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT AND STUDY

1. PROJECT BACKGROUND AND EVALUATION OBJECTIVES

The project, "Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Communitylevel Conflict in Zimbabwe," aims to promote peace at the community level by training traditional leaders in human rights and mediation skills. This project targets traditional leaders because they are recognized as strategic agents of change at the community level. Per Zimbabwean law, they hold responsibility for good governance, land issues, and the resolution of civil disputes.² Traditional leaders are focal points for village activities and play an important role in community stability. In recent years, however, traditional leaders have become increasingly politicized and, in some cases, have been manipulated to serve party interests. Media reports indicate that some traditional leaders have been threatened, bribed, and used to rally villagers behind parties. Many observers feel the politicization of their office has compromised their ability to serve as impartial leaders, and partisan behavior on the part of traditional leaders has become a source of tension in the community.

The premise behind the project is that many traditional leaders have been susceptible to coercion due to gaps in knowledge and skills. According to the IRC's inception document, "If traditional leaders clearly understand their roles and responsibilities under the law and possess knowledge and skills in conflict dynamics and mitigation, then they will be more likely to perform their roles impartially and resolve conflicts peacefully in the community."³ The IRC program aims to strengthen traditional leaders' capacity to perform their role effectively, make sound decisions, and resolve conflicts peacefully. The initiative addresses critical knowledge and skills gaps through a comprehensive capacity building program and targeted support for key functions.

The core of this program is a comprehensive capacity building initiative that the IRC is running in conjunction with its implementing partner, the LRF. The capacity building program involves all traditional leaders (chiefs, headmen, and village heads) in Mutare Rural and Mutasa Districts in Manicaland Province. The centerpiece of this program is two 3-day training sessions for village heads that provide them with the tools and skills to perform their roles effectively, make sound decisions, and resolve conflicts peacefully. Topics covered in the training sessions include local government structure in Zimbabwe, roles of traditional leaders, traditional leaders and protection of the natural environment, conflict management and mitigation, gender and leadership.

The evaluation of the project is conducted through a randomized roll-out of the training sessions. Villages in the study area have been randomly assigned to one of two waves, the first of which received training in year 1 of the project, and the second of which did not receive training until year 2. The follow-up survey was conducted after year 1, at which time the year 2 villages had not been exposed to the program and could serve as a valid comparison group.

In addition to studying the effectiveness of training village heads, the study examines whether training is more effective if structured in a way that creates *social pressure* on traditional leaders to change their behavior. It is possible that providing information on the

² Traditional Leaders Act [Chapter 29:17]22/2001, and the Customary Law and Local Courts Act 1990.

³ Zimbabwe-International Rescue Committee-TECHNICAL-APS-OAA-11-000001, pg. 4.

proper roles and responsibilities of traditional leaders to these leaders alone would not be sufficient to change their behaviors. However, providing this information to village heads and other community members simultaneously would create an expectation that traditional leaders put into practice the information learned and produce a degree of accountability. As a result, the villages assigned to the first wave of the roll-out were randomized into two differently structured training sessions. In the first variant (training only), village heads were invited to attend a sequence of two 3-day training sessions run by the LRF and the IRC. In the second variant (training plus horizontal pressure), other community leaders, such as village health workers, farm group leaders and religious leaders, were invited to the same sequence of training sessions along with the village heads.

This evaluation speaks to the question of how to reduce conflict and improve governance in weak institutional environments. In the past decade, major donors have sponsored programs to train traditional leaders in contexts as diverse as Afghanistan and Zambia.⁴ For example, similar projects have been undertaken by DFID in Sierra Leone and USAID in Northern Nigeria,⁵ but this is the first project of its kind to be systematically studied through a rigorous impact evaluation via a RCT.⁶ The programs have been motivated in part by the recognition of the continued importance of traditional leaders in the governance of their communities, and in part by the fact that these customary leaders are not generally selected on merit and typically receive no training.

More generally, this evaluation has relevance for the broader question of the effectiveness of capacity building programs. Courses and training sessions are generally thought to be crucial to "sustainable development." But, there have been surprisingly few evaluations of the effectiveness of training sessions, and one recent impact evaluation in Liberia suggests that training workshops may not be very effective in initiating behavioral change.⁷ This study will contribute to this nascent literature, providing evidence on the extent to which capacity building in the area of traditional justice is effective, and whether the effectiveness of the capacity building depends on who is being trained.

2. IMPACT EVALUATION DESIGN

The design of the impact evaluation was originally conceived during a workshop with the IRC Zimbabwe team in Mutare in February 2012.⁸ In the initial impact evaluation plan submitted to USAID on March 22, 2012, the plan was to cluster all of the villages in Mutare Rural and Mutasa districts by ward (the geographic unit from which local government councilors are elected), and then to implement a randomized roll-out of the program by ward, with some wards receiving the training program in year 1 and some not receiving it

⁴ For example, UNDP is currently funding a traditional justice program in Afghanistan (Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan), and UNICEF has previously funded programs for traditional leaders in Zambia (Sensitization of Traditional Leaders on the Importance of Girl's Education).

⁵ See Richard Fanthrope (2006) "On the Limits of the Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Sierra Leone" *African Affairs* (418): 27-48.

⁶ Scholars at Yale University and Poverty Action Lab have conducted a RCT of a program to train people in conflict resolution in Liberia, but this program did not specifically (or exclusively) target traditional leaders. See Chris Blattman, Alexandra Hartman and Robert Blair.(2013). "How to promote order and property rights under weak rule of law? An experiment in changing dispute resolution behavior through community education." Working Paper. <u>http://chrisblattman.com/research</u>.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ For detailed information about the design of the impact evaluation study, please see the Technical Appendix and Impact Evaluation Design Report.

until year 2. In addition, within each year 1 ward, the IRC planned to implement three variants of the training program, which we referred to as "training only" (training sessions for village heads run by the IRC and its partners), "training with pressure from above" (training sessions for village heads run by the IRC and its partners with the involvement of the chief), and "training with horizontal pressure" (training sessions for village heads and other community leaders). Within each year 1 ward, villages would be randomly assigned to these three variants of the treatment.⁹

However, in July 2012, the design of the evaluation was changed as a result of deteriorating security conditions on the ground which prevented fieldwork in Mutasa district. As a result, real concerns were raised about the ability to collect the necessary data to evaluate the project in this district. On July 16, 2012, Social Impact sent a memo to USAID proposing a revision to the impact evaluation design and program roll-out so that, even if it were not possible to conduct the follow-up survey in Mutasa, the study would have adequate power. The revised design involved randomizing assignment to year 1 versus year 2 of the treatment at the village rather than the ward level in Mutare Rural district, and removing the "pressure from above" treatment.

Thus, the new focus of the impact evaluation was on Mutare Rural district. The lottery to assign villages to different years and different variants of the treatment was conducted in August 2012. At this point, the IRC still had some uncertainty about how broadly they would be able to roll-out the programming with Mutare Rural District. The IRC indicated they would like to be able to provide programming to all 433 villages in the district, but due to political uncertainties and resource constraints, there were some sets of villages that they were not certain they would be able to include. However, reducing the sampling framework to the smaller set of villages in which the IRC was confident it would be able to roll-out the evaluation would have dramatically reduced the power of the survey. As a result, the evaluation team decided to block randomize within clusters of villages, where clusters of villages were designated by ward and land type (new resettlement, old resettlement, small scale and communal). This technique ensured that within each ward-village type cluster, there should in expectation be balance between the treatment and control villages. Consequently, if some clusters had to be dropped because the IRC did not ultimately decide it possible to work in them, the rest of the sample should still be balanced.

The list used for the lottery indicated there were 280 villages in the clusters of villages in which the program was ultimately rolled out.¹⁰ As such, 139 villages were assigned to the notraining group, 71 to the village head only training group, and 70 to the village head and community leader training group. However, the lottery list was compiled from a variety of sources, including food aid distribution lists, and ultimately a handful of the "villages" included on the list were found not to be independent villages with their own traditional leaders but neighborhoods within villages (or, in a few cases, alternative names for the same village). Ultimately, our survey team found 270 of the 280 villages to exist. The planned and final distribution of these villages into the three study arms is described in Table 2.1.

⁹ In addition, the IRC initially had plans to implement a second ward level intervention in about 10 wards – an information campaign for community members. These wards were to be randomly selected from the year 1 wards.

¹⁰ The IRC later included a few additional clusters in the training, but they are not included in the evaluation.

VH Only VH + CLTotal No training Training Treatment 139 71 70 280 Assignment Actually 136 69 65 270 Surveyed Villages

Table 2.1: Comparison of lottery list and surveyed villages

Note: Several villages could not be identified by the survey team, including Mwateta, Murare, and Kubatana in the no training group, Himalaya and Ngomasha in the VH only group, and Dhindiri, Padera, Nyamhani, Garikai, and Muchabveyo in the VH + CL training group.

The quantitative follow-up survey was conducted at the end of the first year of the program. It involved surveying the village head, a randomly selected community leader and eight randomly selected household members in 270 villages, and it assessed the impact of both variants of the training relative to each other and the no training control group. In addition, at the completion of the project, the researchers conducted intensive qualitative research in 10 villages, four of which were assigned to the training for village head only variant in year 1 and six of which were assigned to the training plus horizontal pressure variant in year 1. The qualitative research complements the large-N survey by shedding light on the mechanisms by which community leaders changed the effects of training sessions and by helping interpret the quantitative measurements.

III. DESCRIPTION OF TRAINING SESSIONS

The training of leaders involved six days of training, divided into two separate three-day sessions conducted about three months apart. The training sessions were run by the IRC with a local Zimbabwean NGO, the Legal Resources Foundation, the Mutare Rural District Council and the DA's office facilitating sessions. The training sessions were divided into the following 6 modules: the local government structure in Zimbabwe, leadership and communication, conflict resolution and management, gender and traditional leadership, the district assembly and local leadership and natural resource management. Modules were delivered through lectures, role plays and group discussions.

The IRC grouped villages assigned to the same treatment together for the purposes of conducted the training sessions. Ultimately, they ran five training groups, two of which included village heads only and three of which also included community leaders.¹¹ (In addition, the IRC conducted a "mop-up" session for any village heads or community leaders who could not attend one of the other groupings.) Table 3.1 indicates the dates of each of the training sessions for villages in different wards and treatment assignments.

¹¹ These groups were not randomly assigned.

Grouping #	Wards	Variant	Session 1	Session 2
1	4,5,6,7,13,14,15,20,21,26,33,36	VHs	18-20 Sep 12	20-22 Nov 12
2	9,11,16,22,27	VHs, CL	25-27 Sept 12	26-28 Nov 12
3	9,17,18,19,22,23,24,25,27,28,29,30	VHs	02-04 Oct 12	22-23 Jan 13
4	4,6,7,13,14,15,20,21,26,33,36	VHs,CL	09-11 Oct 12	29-31 Jan 13
5	5,9,17,18,19,23,24,25,28,29,30,35	VHs, CL	23-25 Oct 12	05-07 Feb 13

Table 3.1 Training Groupings

Logistically, the IRC initially sent out invitations to the trainings through the respective headmen but later resorted to visiting the specific village heads a week prior to the scheduled training because of low turnout rates during the first week, and ultimately they achieved very high levels of compliance with training assignment, as indicated in Table 3.2. Of the 134 village heads assigned to be trained, 130 village heads attended at least some of the training, and 110 attended all of the training; if they could not attend a session, they typically sent a representative to attend on their behalf.¹² There were only two incidents where VHs assigned to year 2 attended training.

Table 3.1. Compliance with Treatment – Village Heads

Treatment Assignment	1	eatment Take-Up		
	No training	Some training	All training	
Control (No training)	134	1*	1*	
Treatment (Training)	4**	20	110	

*The VH from Muchineuta attended all the trainings even though he was not invited, and the VH from Machikiti attended some of the trainings even though he was not invited. It was not deemed politically feasible to turn away VHs who insisted on being trained.

**The four villages where the VH or acting VH was not trained were Gondo (VH rep attended instead because VH sick), Mabika (VH rep attended because the VH is formally employed), Gutukunhuhwa (VH rep attended because the VH was sick) and Chikurumadziya (according to the IRC, the village does not exist, though we have surveys from it).

In cases where villages were assigned to the training plus horizontal pressure variant of the training, village heads were instructed to invite another community leader to the training session. In cases where multiple leaders lived in their communities, the village heads had leeway over whom to invite, but the intention was for them to invite the leader of a local civil society organization. As Table 3.2 indicates, treatment compliance was also good among community leaders in the sense that only four community leaders attended training when their village was not assigned to this treatment, and there were only two communities where a community leader was assigned to be trained and ultimately was not.

¹² In one case of example, the village head was ill and he was requested send a representative for Cluster 2(VH Gutukunhuwa). In all cases where the VH was not present, representatives that usually act in VH capacity were present

Treatment Assignment	,		
	No training	Some training	All training
Control (No training)	201	3*	1*
Treatment (Training)	2**	5	58

Table 3.2. Compliance with Treatment – Community Leaders

*There are four villages where CLs attended the training even though they were not invited: Muchineuta (VHW attended), Muranda (village secretary attended first training), Manyaya (village secretary attended first training), and Mafurere (VHW attended first training) **There are two villages where CLs were not trained: Ndakaamba (CL did not attend sessions) and Chikurumadziya (according to the IRC, the village does not exist).

However, there were compliance problems in terms of the types of community leaders who initially showed up to the training sessions. Due to initial communication challenges, on the first day of the first group of training sessions including community leaders, almost all of the village heads brought village secretaries, who are members of the village dare (village court) and cannot be considered independent community leaders. At this point, the IRC clarified that they expected other community leaders, not other members of the village dare, to attend the trainings, and other community leaders were invited to attend the remainder of the training sessions, including village health workers, caregivers, religious leaders, and farmer group representatives.¹³

As a result, in the end, most village heads assigned to the community leader training group were trained with a civil society leader who led an organization outside the traditional hierarchy. Table 3.3 provides statistics on the attendance of leaders outside the traditional hierarchy of the village. Of the 65 villages assigned to the horizontal pressure treatment, there were two cases where no leader was trained, 8 cases where only the village secretary, treasurer, VIDCO or village committee member was trained, and 55 cases where a "non-traditional" leader trained.

e)	5.5. Altendance of Civil Society Leaders Ouiside Traditional Therarchy							
	Treatment Assignment	Treated Leader						
		No leader	Sec. or Village	Other Leader				
		Committee Only						
	Control (No training)	201	2	2				
	Treatment (Training)	2	8	55				

Table 3.3. Attendance of Civil Society Leaders Outside Traditional Hierarchy

Table 3.4 indicates the types of community leaders trained (excluding village secretaries from the list in cases where they were later replaced with another community leader). By far the most common types of leaders trained were village health workers and caregivers. In more than 60 percent of the villages assigned to this treatment, a village health worker or caregiver was trained.

¹³ Some village secretaries also continued to attend sessions, especially day two and day three of the sessions.

CL Type	No.
Caregiver / Village Health Worker	41
Church leader	4
Community Based Officer ¹⁴	1
Farmers group representative	6
HIV/AIDS Focal Person	1
Plan Focal person ¹⁵	2
School Development Committee member	3
Secretary, Treasurer, Village Committee	8

One of the authors attended the first three-day block of the training sessions in the first five groups (missing only the mop-up session). He noted that the sessions were generally well organized with effective facilitators, but there were a few hiccups during the training of the first group of village heads. The major challenge during the first week is that role plays were not properly structured in order to illustrate the key themes around arbitration, mediation and natural justice. As a result, in our robustness checks, we consider whether there are training order effects and whether the first session in particular was less effective than the others. In addition, the attending author noted some qualitative differences in the sessions based on the treatment variant and the type of community leaders present. In particular, he noted that the village-head only sessions were less vibrant, especially during role plays and discussions of human rights. A greater diversity of views was articulated in the training sessions attended by community leaders, and there was more creativity during the role plays in these sessions.

Some of the training sessions also generated resistance and anger from village heads. For example, some of the village heads were critical of the curriculum, claiming it did not reflect local values. In addition, village heads argued that some of the restrictions on their activities articulated in the letter of the law reduced their incentives to try cases at all; for example, they argued the restrictions on their ability to charge fines reduced their incentives with respect to conflict resolution. These observations point toward the possibility of unanticipated adverse effects of the training sessions on governance and conflict resolution.

IV. FOLLOW-UP SURVEY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

1. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

The program's goal is to change the attitudes, skills and behavior of village heads so that they are more effective at mitigating conflict, thereby reducing the amount of tension within villages and permitting citizens' to participate in the political process without fear of

¹⁴ Community based officers are elected by different non-governmental organizations to represent their community on development issues.

¹⁵ Plan Focal Persons are individuals that would have been trained by Plan International to mobilize for their programs at community level.

retribution. Thus, there are four main outcomes areas the program is intended to affect:

- 1) Good governance by village heads, including:
 - a. The village head's knowledge of the law
 - b. The village head's attitudes toward human rights and conflict resolution
 - c. The impartiality of the village head
 - d. The village head's legitimacy in the eyes of community members
- 2) Incidents of conflict in the village (violent and non-violent)
- 3) Citizens' interpersonal trust and social cohesion
- 4) Citizens' willingness to participate in community structures and local politics

We employed two sets of instruments to gather information about these outcomes: (i) an elite survey to be administered to the Village Head (VH) and one other Community Leader (CL) in each village; and (ii) a Household (HH) survey with a sample of villagers. The latter is the primary source of information on outcomes intended to capture conditions at level of the whole community (such as levels of trust or views on the legitimacy of the village head), while the former is the source of information on outcomes designed to capture the knowledge, behaviors and attitudes of traditional leaders (such as the village head's knowledge of the law).

The follow-up survey was largely based on a survey conducted in a smaller number of villages prior to the roll-out of the program. A few refinements to the survey were made on the basis of a small pilot conducted by one of the authors in rural Mashonaland¹⁶ in July 2013.

Most questions on the questionnaires were close-ended and retrospectively self-reported. However, for sensitive issues such as those pertaining to political violence, food aid distribution or party affiliation, we employed innovative measurement strategies, including "list" experiments, which have are expected to elicit more accurate and reliable responses.¹⁷ In addition, because the survey was conducted immediately after the 2013 Zimbabwean election, we were able to instruct our enumerators to use direct observation to construct other measures of partisanship. For example, enumerators were instructed to code the presence of partisan paraphernalia outside of homes at the end of interviews.

Given the sensitive nature of some components of the survey, the study was designed and implemented with careful consideration for the protection of respondents and maintaining the support of the authorities to continue the survey. To protect respondents, we collected identifying information on separate cover sheets that could not be linked back to the main surveys in the field. To maintain confidentiality of village heads and villages as a whole, we used codes for different communities, which were filled out in advance before teams entered the field to avoid sending the codebook into the field.

¹⁶ Because the pilot occurred in the run-up to the 2013 elections, it was not possible to get permission to conduct it in the area around Mutare.

¹⁷ The survey also included an "endorsement" experiment designed to measure partisanship. Toward the beginning of our surveys, we asked respondents to answer a question about their opinion of the role of education in development. Then, towards the end of our survey, approximately 30 to 40 minutes later, we asked respondents to answer the same question except that it now mentioned that *President Mugabe* believed education was the key to development. We hoped to measure attitudes toward Mugabe by seeing whether people's views moved toward or away from their initial response. Unfortunately, we saw a lot of ceiling effects and little movement, and so we did not ultimately use this measure in our analysis.

In order to maintain the support of the authorities (who were required to approve the questionnaire), we were prevented from directly asking many questions of interest. Instead, we relied on open-ended questions with prompts. For example, instead of asking about the presence of political divisions in the community, we asked about the presence of divisions, with enumerators trained to follow-up by asking of the types of divisions. We used alphabetic and numeric codes to code information about attitudes toward politics and specific political parties in order to further protect respondents and reduce suspicions about the survey.

2. FOLLOW-UP SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION

Social Impact contracted Target Research, a local research and consultancy firm to collect follow-up data in Mutare. Target Research recruited and trained locals based in Mutare. It hired all team leaders and project supervisors from Harare. In total, the survey team consisted of 6 team leaders, 39 enumerators, 2 advance team members, 5 standbys, in addition to the supporting members of Target Research and the project managers. All teams were trained extensively for six days on both appropriate research skills and research ethics.

The research team provided Target with training guidelines for asking questions. Two research team members assisted Target with training on how to ask list experiments, how to use agreed-upon codes on sensitive questions, and completing complex tables. The research team also created the individual level and community codes, oversaw the assembly of questionnaires, and facilitated the training on sampling.

The research team initially planned to collect panel data but reverted to a random sample due to logistical challenges. The intention of the team was to pretest the panel before training but permission to visit the villages could not be secured in time before the roll-out of the follow up survey. Sampling eventually followed the sampling protocol established during the baseline, i.e. 8 adults in each village (4 females and 4 males) chosen from randomly selected households. In addition, the Village Head and another community leader were selected for the Community Leader Survey.

Community leaders were selected using randomly drawn cards.¹⁸ The enumerator was asked to write on cards all types of community leaders present in the community and then randomly draw a card. A replacement protocol was also established in case they could not locate the first respondent randomly drawn. If the selected community leader was not available to be interviewed, the enumerators were instructed to randomly select another community leader. While informative, the community leader survey does not figure prominently in the data analysis below.

After a village head, community member or community leader had been selected, they were asked to give informed consent by the enumerator. If they agreed to participate, the enumerator proceeded to ask survey questions. If consent was not provided, the enumerator informed the supervisor for further instructions on selection of a replacement.

¹⁸ The alternative would have been to always interview the trained community leader in community leaders where one was trained. But the concern was that this could have resulted in different types of community leaders being interviewed across treatment variants.

Training of enumerators for the follow-up survey took place from 17th-23rd August, 2013 and data collection commenced on 26th of August, 2013. The survey teams originally proceeded smoothly; however, on the 2nd of September, 2013, the District Authority (DA) raised questions about the questionnaire (despite providing prior approvals). Specifically, he insisted that fieldwork should not proceed until the following questions were removed:

- 1. D20new. My own political views are very similar to those of my village head.
- 2. D22new. The village head acts independently of other government officials in making decisions about how to govern this village
- 3. D22bnew. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 is a lot and 0 is not at all, how much do you believe the promises that politicians make to bring benefits to the country in general?
- 4. F6. Remove the words "including the president"
- 5. F7a. During the last 12 months, did you contact an elected official or vote in an election?
- 6. F7b. If not, what was the main reason?

The Assistant DA subsequently accompanied the teams to the field the next day. The Assistant DA did not raise any issues during her visit and the teams were allowed to proceed with data collection without asking the removed questions. The removal of these questions did unfortunately hinder the evaluation team's ability to explore the role that partisanship and political attitudes play in explaining programmatic impact.

Surveys were checked for completeness and logic in the field. Where issues were identified, the fieldwork supervisor and the interviewer were notified and the issues corrected. Once corrected or if no issues were identified, the questionnaires were then sent to the data entry team. Data entry was set up in CSPRO and data was entered using a double-entry method. Teams were split into pairs, and each pair was responsible for first and second entry for a complete sampling point/village with village head, community leader and adult questionnaires. Cleaned data was then backed up on a daily basis. The Data Manager compiled error reports comparing the first and second entry files for each pair using CSPRO. The CSPRO entry files were then converted into SPSS where all the errors were then corrected by the team supervisors. The cleaned files were sent to the Data Manager who merged the data files, conducted a final logical check, and then forward the cleaned data to the Project Coordinator. The cleaned SPSS files were submitted to Social Impact, who also checked the data for logic and consistency.

Ultimately, the survey team was able to conduct household surveys in 270 villages. However, in 23 of these villages, it was not possible to interview the village head because he or she was not present in the village on the day the team conducted the interview (See Table 4.1). In 13 villages, community leaders were not present on the day the team conducted the interview. It is important to note that the omission of village heads from the data set does not appear to be at random. Village heads assigned to the community leader training session were significantly more likely to be away.

VH Only VH + CLTotal No training Training 270 Villages with 136 69 65 HH surveys Villages with 128 (94 %) 64 (93 %) 55 (85 %) 247 VH surveys Villages with CL 129 (95 %) 64 (93 %) 64 (98 %) 257 surveys

Table 4.1: Non-response of VHs and CLs to survey

V. HYPOTHESES AND PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN

Prior to receiving the follow-up data, the research team developed a plan for testing the program's primary hypotheses. The "pre-analysis plan" specified in advance the measures to be used to test specific hypotheses, the models specifications to be used to measure effects, and the methods by which to correct for multiple outcomes.¹⁹ Because of the challenges associated with the data collection for this project (including the threat that permissions would not be forthcoming for the follow-up survey and the removal of key questions from the follow-up survey mid-way through data collection), we only completed and registered the plan after the follow-up survey was completed. However, registration with the Experiments in Governance and Politics Network (EGAP) occurred before the principal investigators had received the follow-up data. Social Impact acted as a clearing house, only releasing the data to the principal investigators once the plan had been registered with the EGAP's research design registration.²⁰

The advantage of a pre-analysis plan is that it increases transparency by specifying in advance the effects of interest and how they will be measured. In the absence of a pre-analysis plan, there is the danger of scholars selecting a subset of results for presentation because they believe this will make the results more "publishable".²¹ In the case of impact evaluations, there is also the possibility of pressure from donors or implementing organizations. In order to prevent this type of "fishing" for results, the principal investigators developed a pre-analysis plan. The IRC and Social Impact both provided feedback on the plan, and adjustments were made based on this feedback before the plan was registered.

Due to the sensitive and challenging nature of the working environment in Zimbabwe, we recognized the need to build some flexibility into our pre-analysis plan. In particular, we were concerned that sensitive questions could result in response bias. Furthermore, interventions by the authorities to eliminate some important survey questions part way through the survey meant that our ex ante preferred measures of key variables, such as

¹⁹ See Miguel, E, Casey, K and R. Glennerster(2012). "Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Pre-Analysis Plan" *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (127/4): 1755-1812.

²⁰ http://e-gap.org/design-registration/

²¹ See Macartan Humphreys, Raul, Sanchez de la Sierra and Peter van der Windt, "Fishing" *Political Analysis* 21 (1): 1-20.

partisanship, were not available for all respondents. As a result, the plan pre-specified strategies for detecting response bias and rank-ordered possible measures of partisanship.²²

The pre-analysis plan was not intended to rule out any exploratory research. Indeed, the report contains a section in which we have conducted further research, not included in the pre-analysis plan, in an attempt to interpret the report's main findings. In our view, the purpose of a pre-analysis plan is not to prevent this type of exploration, but to draw clear lines between the pre-specified and the exploratory aspects of the analysis, as there is a greater possibility for confirmation bias in the latter type of analysis compared to the former.

The IRC's programming was initially hypothesized to have four broad effects:

H1: Training for traditional leaders will improve their governance (specifically, their knowledge of the law, attitudes toward rights, impartiality in decision-making, and legitimacy in the eyes of community members).

H2: Training for traditional leaders will allow them to resolve conflicts more effectively and fairly, reducing conflict within their villages.

H3: Training for traditional leaders will allow them to resolve conflicts more effectively and fairly, improving social cohesion within their villages.

H4: Training will reduce barriers to participation within communities, increasing participation in local and national affairs.

However, these different effects were thought to be sequential to one another and, as a result, to have different likelihoods. The effect of the program on governance by the village head was the most proximate to the programming, while the effect of the program on political participation was the most distant. Also, during the discussions surrounding the preanalysis plan, the IRC emphasized that aspects of the planned intervention they believed would most directly impact community participation had not been included in the randomized control trial, and so the program should not be evaluated on the basis of its effects on collective action in the community and citizen participation. As a result, we have not considered these variables in the analysis, although they are presented in Appendix C. We keep the discussion of the effects of the program on community integration and trust in the main text of the document because these two outcomes are more closely related to conflict reduction; furthermore, the program appears to have an unanticipated but potentially important effect on social trust.

For each outcome of interest (good governance, conflict, and social cohesion/trust), we included multiple measures in our survey instrument. We grouped these measures into indices of closely related outcomes, as specified below (and in the pre-analysis plan).²³ In a

²² A third concern was lack of variation in some outcomes, which could reflect insensitive measures rather than a lack of effect, and the plan also specified that we would drop measures without a specified amount of variation in the control group.

²³ By pre-specifying the indices, we prevented fishing. However, this limited the amount we could consider the empirical correlation between variables when specifying the indices. Where sub-indices are intended to capture an underlying latent variable (such as attitudes toward human rights, legitimacy and social trust), we have also tested the internal consistency of each index using Cronbach's alpha. In both the case of the human rights index and the legitimacy index, we found one variable (on deference to the village head in the former case and

few places, variables that we indicated would be included in the index in the pre-analysis plan failed the pre-specified test for lack of variation in outcomes or response bias, and so were excluded from the indices.²⁴ Following Kling, Liebman, and Katz (2007) each variable was given equal weight in each sub-index and equal weight was given to each sub-index in each index.²⁵ In cases where data was missing on a particular variable or sub-index for a particular observation, the index was constructed by weighting equally the available variables or sub-indices. Where sub-indices are intended to capture an underlying latent variable (such as attitudes toward human rights, legitimacy and social trust), we have also tested the internal consistency of each index using Cronbach's alpha. Table 5.1 lays out each of the evaluation indicators and explains how each is operationalized using the household and village head surveys presented in Appendix E and F. With the exception of the last two indicators, political intimidation and social cohesion, the unit of analysis is the village. When the data comes from the household survey but the unit of analysis is the village, household responses are aggregated to create a village level summary statistics. As such, if 4 of 8 households report that most people in the village are influenced by their village head's opinions, then that village would have a score of .5 on this indicator.

whether the respondent would take crop destruction disputes to the village head in the latter case) to correlate weakly with the overall index. As a result, we also created indices excluding these measures and tested the effects of the training variances on these indices. In both cases, the results are very similar to those reported in the main text.

²⁴ Specifically, our rule was that we would exclude variables for which more than 95 percent of villages and more than 90 percent of village heads in the *control* communities gave the same response (though note – due to a typo, the pre-analysis plan indicates we would make exclusion decisions based on variation in the treatment rather than the control communities).

²⁵ Alternatively, Michael Anderson (2008) proposes using the GLS weighting procedure, which gives outcomes that are less correlated with other outcomes (and therefore provide more new information) more weight. However, because the outcomes we group together should be correlated with the same latent variables but we are concerned about response bias in some cases, we do not adopt this approach.

Table 5.1	: C	perationaliz	ration	of	evaluation	indicators
	• •	p		~J	••••••••••	

Good governance indicators	Operationalization
Village Head's Knowledge of Law	Whether VHs give correct response to "knowledge" questions such as "Individuals have the right to appeal fines from primary courts"? (Specifically, F1, F2, Fbnew, Fcnew, Fdnew and F3 on VH survey in Appendix F.)
Village Head's Attitudes toward Human Rights and Conflict Resolution	Whether VHs <i>strongly agree</i> with statements such as "A widow should have the right to inherit land"? (Specifically, F4 , F5 and F6 on VH survey)
Village Head's Impartiality	Estimated % of respondents in village who are aware of "people being excluded from food aid lists based on political views," as calculated from list experiment (F2 on HH survey in Appendix E), % of respondents who say most of the outcomes from taking disputes to the village head are fair (C15 on HH survey) (also % of non-family members of the VH who received maize food aid, subsidized maize seed or grain loans (constructed from z8b and d23, d24 & d25 on HH survey), % of respondents with different political views than the chief who received maize food aid, subsidized maize seed or grain loans (constructed from d20new and d23, d24 & d25 on HH survey), % of MDC supporters who received maize food aid, subsidized maize seed or grain loans (constructed from B2B and d23, d24 & d25 on HH survey) ²⁶
Village Head's Legitimacy	Proportion of respondents who say most people in the village are influenced by the village head's opinions (D20 on HH survey), Estimated proportion of respondents who have or say they would take crop destruction disputes to the VH first (C2(B) on HH survey), Proportion of respondents who say they always trust their VH to do what is right (D9 on HH survey), Average rating respondents give to the quality of their relationship with the VH, on a scale of 10 (D14 on HH survey) ²⁷
Conflict indicators	
Domestic Conflict	Number of incidents per household of marital disputes, domestic and sexual violence (domestic violence, adultery, marriage disputes, roora/bride wealth dispute, rape) (C5, C6, C7, C8, C9 on HH survey, constructed using women's responses only)
Physical Assault	Number of incidents per household (D10/B3 on VH survey ²⁸ ; C10 on HH survey)
Burglaries and Theft	Number of incidents per household (D3/B3 on VH survey and C3 on HH survey)
Land and Livestock Disputes	Number of incidents per household (D2/B3 and D3/B3 on VH survey, C2 and C3 on HH survey)
Witchcraft	Number of incidents per household (D4/B3 on VH survey and C4 on HH survey)

²⁶ These last three measures not included in the index of impartiality because each of these measures is likely to be very noisy at the village level since the measure will be constructed from the answers given by a subset of the HH respondents in any village (and in some villages, there might not be any individuals who fall into this subset).

²⁷ Latter two combined into trust index first, as specified in pre-analysis plan.

²⁸The pre-analysis plan did not explicitly state that the village head responses would be weighted by population before being averaged with the number of incidents of conflict reported village members in the household survey, but this is necessary to put the two sets of responses on the same scale.

Political Intimidation and Violence	Estimated proportion of respondents who are aware of people being injured or threatened with violence because of politics, as measured by list experiment (F1 on HH survey)
Social cohesion indicator	
Social Trust	Whether respondents say that most people can be trusted (versus you have to be careful in dealing with people) (B3 on HH survey), Whether respondents report that there are groups within their village who they would not trust with something they own (B8b on HH survey), Whether respondents report that there are issues that divide them in the community (B9a on HH survey)

As specified in the pre-analysis plan, we estimate the program effects through simple comparisons of mean outcomes between different experimental groups.²⁹ Specifically, we estimate the effects through an equation of the following form:

$$y_{iv} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T O_v + \beta_2 T H_v + \epsilon_{iv} \tag{1}$$

where, y_{iv} is the outcome for individual i in village v; TO_v is an indicator for the "training only" intervention; TH_v is the dummy for the "training with horizontal pressure" intervention; and ϵ_v is the disturbance term for the regression assumed clustered at the village-level. We measure our good governance and conflict outcomes at the village level rather than the individual level, in these cases replacing y_{iv} with y_v in the equation above.

VI. PROGRAM EFFECTS

In this section, we consider the effects of the programming on the three main outcomes of interest:

- 1) Good governance by village heads, including:
 - a. The village head's knowledge of the law
 - b. The village head's attitudes toward human rights and conflict resolution
 - c. The impartiality of the village head
 - d. The village head's legitimacy in the eyes of community members
- 2) Incidents of conflict in the village (violent and non-violent)
- 3) Citizens' interpersonal trust

The analysis that follows is based on the pre-analysis plan drafted by the principal investigators prior to receiving the follow-up data. We report only the effects on the main indices specified in this plan. However, a variable-by-variable report is available in appendix C.

As discussed above, there was generally good compliance with treatment assignment. However, two features of the programming and operating environment must be considered when interpreting the results. First, the baseline survey suggested that almost half of all village heads had previously received some training on their role in resolving conflict.

²⁹ The data from the baseline survey suggests good balance across the various experimental groups (see tables 7.1 & 7.2 in the baseline report); however, the baseline data does not include all of the villages included in the follow-up survey.

Although the content of the previous trainings were unlikely to have been exactly the same as the content of the training sessions organized by the IRC, we may not expect to observe large effects of the programming on village heads who have previously been trained. In addition, during the roll-out of the program, there was some miscommunication with village heads about the type of community leader who was supposed to attend alongside them. As a result, some village heads brought village secretaries with them rather than independent community leaders on the first day of the first training session. The IRC subsequently made adjustments, and in all but 10 villages assigned to the community leader variant of the treatment, an "independent" community leader was ultimately trained. However, the inclusion of these "non-independent" leaders may depress the observed effects of the community leader training. In the main body of this report, we present the intent-to-treat effects of the program, which capture the amount of effect the program actually had in the villages it was intended to benefit. While we do not present the results here, we find very similar findings if we use instrumental variable models to measure the effect of the treatment on the treated, or those villages that actually benefited from the program.

For each outcome of interest, we report three things: the effect of training village heads only (compared to no training), the effect of training village heads and community leaders (compared to no training), and the difference in the effectiveness of the two treatment variants. This third quantity can be interpreted as the additional effect of training community leaders given that village heads are being trained. The effect of training village heads only is equal to β_1 in equation (1), the effect of training village heads and community leaders is equal to $\beta_1 + \beta_2$, and the difference in the effectiveness of the two treatment variants is equal to β_2 . We have measured all outcomes reported in the following section at the village level, except for social trust, which is measured at the individual level.³⁰

1. GOOD GOVERNANCE

First, we consider the effects of the programming on good governance by the village head. Our overall index of good governance equally weights four sub-components of good governance: the village head's knowledge of the law, the village head's attitudes toward rights, the village head's impartiality, and the village head's legitimacy. In table 6.1, we first report the effects of the programming on the overall index and then on each sub-index.

Column 1 in table 6.1 shows that training the village head by himself (or, in rare instances, herself) does not have a positive effect on any of the indices of good governance. The village head only training does not even appear to have increased the knowledge of village heads. As shown in table 6.1, the effects of training only the village head are consistently negative but small and statistically insignificant.

In contrast, column 2 shows the effect of the "training plus horizontal pressure" variant in which both village heads and community leaders were trained. The total effect of training both leaders is consistently positive, and the effect on the village head's knowledge is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Substantive interpretation of the estimated effect of the intervention is complicated by the fact that the variables of interest are indices. For example, as shown in Table 6.1, the Knowledge Index ranges from -1.052 to .770 with the average value of the control villages approximately at zero and a standard

³⁰ We specified that this variable would be measured at the individual-level in the pre-analysis plan; the results are virtually identical if we instead aggregate this variable to the village level before running the analysis.

deviation of .521. We estimate that the effect of training the village head and community together produces a positive increase of 0.173 on this knowledge scale, or 33.2% of one standard deviation change in the Knowledge Index, a modest estimated effect.

Finally, column 3 in Table 6.1 shows that training sessions also attended by community leaders had a significantly more positive effect on good governance by the village head than training sessions attended only by village heads. The additional effect of training a community leader on the overall index of good governance is positive and statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The effect of training community leaders on the village head's knowledge is also statistically significant at the 95 percent level, suggesting village heads learn better when other community leaders are also trained. The additional effect of training a community leader on the other measures of good governance is consistently positive but not statistically significant.

			(1)	(2)	(3)
Outcomes	Ν	Control Mean	Effect of	Effect of	Difference
		(sd)	VH	VH + CL	between
		[min, max]	Training	training	variants
			β_1	$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	β_2
Good	270	-0.008	-0.038	0.080	0.117*
Governance		(0.389)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.066)
Index		[-1.052, 0.770]	p=0.5091	p=0.165	p=0.075
Knowledge	245	-0.001	-0.021	0.173**	0.193**
Index		(0.521)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.091)
		[-1.538, 0.746]	p=0.788	p=0.033	p=0.036
Attitudes Index	247	-0.000	-0.021	0.017	0.038
		(0.582)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.102)
		[-1.198, 0.927]	p=0.807	p=0.847	p=0.709
Legitimacy	270	-0.000	-0.085	0.047	0.132
Index		(0.626)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.103)
		[-1.638, 1.582]	p=0.336	p=0.605	p=0.203
Impartiality	270	-0.000	-0.054	0.035	0.089
Index		(0.728)	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.124)
		[-1.402, 1.560]	p=0.612	p=0.745	p=0.474

Table 6.1. Effects of Training on Good Governance by VH

2. LOCAL CONFLICT AND SOCIAL TRUST

Next, we consider the effects of the programming on the amount of conflict in the village and social trust. In particular, for each village, we have generated a measure of the total number of incidents of conflict reported per household. This measure was constructed by averaging the number of incidents of conflict as reported by the village head (divided by the number of households in the village) and the average number of incidents of conflict reported by households in the household survey. ³¹ We examine the effects of the programming first on the total amount of conflict in the village and then on five sub-classes of conflict, since the effects of the training could presumably be different for different

³¹ As explained in the pre-analysis plan, we used this method for all measures of conflict

classes of conflict. The five sub-classes of conflict were domestic conflict, physical assault, burglaries and theft, land and livestock conflicts, and witchcraft. In particular, the training focused particularly on gender rights, and so we might expect to find the training sessions resulted in more acknowledged domestic conflict even while it reduced other forms of conflict in the village.

Table 6.2 shows that training the village head by itself also does not reduce total reported conflict. The estimated effect of training the village head is tiny and statistically insignificant. Column 2 shows that training community leaders and village heads had a larger negative effect on total incidents of conflict, but the effect is also not statistically significant. Overall, the training appears to have had little effect on incidents of conflict in villages. In addition, neither the village head training nor the community leader training had a statistically significant effect on any of the sub-indices of specific types of conflict.

ole 6.2. Effects of 1 rat	ning on	inclums of Confuct			
	-		(1)	(2)	(3)
		Control Mean	Effect of	Effect of	Difference
	Ν	(sd)	VH Training	VH + CL	between
		[min, max]	viii Iianning	Training	variants
			β_1	eta_1+eta_2	β_2
Total Conflict	270	2.088	-0.011	-0.346	-0.336
		(1.654)	(0.339)	(0.346)	(0.397)
		[0.188- 9.875]	p=0.975	p=0.318	p=0.398
Domestic	270	0.564	-0.064	-0.270	-0.206
Conflict		(0.877)	(0.253)	(0.257)	(0.296)
		[0.000 - 4.500]	p=0.801	p=0.296	p=0.486
Physical Assault	270	0.093	-0.005	-0.008	-0.003
		(0.196)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.031)
		[0.000 - 1.875]	p=0.865	p=0.773	p=0.915
Burglaries and	270	0.279	0.006	0.018	0.012
Theft		(0.301)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.052)
		[0.000 - 2.250]	p=0.890	p=0.698	p=0.825
Land and	270	1.017	0.083	-0.028	-0.111
Livestock		(0.854)	(0.121)	(0.124)	(0.142)
Disputes		[0.002- 4.975]	p=0.496	p=0.822	p=0.436
Witchcraft	270	0.136	-0.031	-0.059	-0.027
		(0.391)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.053)
		[0.000 - 3.823]	p=0.493	p=0.207	p=0.607

Table 6.2. Effects of Training on Incidents of Conflict

The IRC's programming was also particularly concerned with reducing conflict surrounding elections. However, as discussed above, it was not possible to ask a direct question about this on the survey (and we would have expected respondents to underreport this type of conflict if we had). Instead, the survey included a survey experiment to measure cases of threats of violence against supporters of particular political parties. The effects of the training variants on threats of political violence are indicated in Table 6.3. Interestingly, although training the village head by him or herself has little effect, training community leaders and village heads has a moderate positive effect on the proportion of the population that is aware of threats of political violence; this effect is statistically significant at the 95

percent confidence level. Furthermore, the difference in the effects of the two training variants on political intimidation is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

	N	Control Mean	Effect of VH	Effect of VH	Difference
		(sd)		$\Gamma_{raining}$ + CL betw	between
		[min, max]	Training		variants
			β_1	$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	β_2
Political	270	0.357	0.038	0.178**	0.140
Intimidation and		(0.459)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.089)
Violence		[-0.750 - 1.500]	p=0.624	p=0.023	p=0.118

Table 6.3. Effects of Training on Threats of Political Intimidation

Finally, we consider the effects of the training sessions on an index of social trust. Table 6.4 shows the effect of training the village head by him or herself on social trust is negative but not statistically significant at conventional levels. There is some evidence to suggest that training village heads alongside community leaders may result in lower levels of social trust, although the effect size is very small and is not quite statistically significant.

Table 6.4. Effects of Training on Social Trust

		Control Mean	Effect of	Effect of	Difference
	Ν	(sd)	VH Training	VH + CL	between
		[min, max]	viii inanning	Training	variants
			β_1	$\beta_1 + \beta_2$	β_2
Social Trust	2154	-0.001	-0.049	-0.076*	-0.026
Index		(0.677)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.036)
		[-1.323 – 1.606]	p=0.203	p=0.087	p=0.565


The results presented in the tables above are displayed visually in Figure 6.5. The red dots indicate the estimated effect, and the grey error bars around them indicate the 95 percent confidence intervals. The red lines down the center of each plot indicate 0. Dots to the right of the center line indicate positive effects. Dots to the left of the center line indicate negative effects. The further the red dots from the line, the larger the magnitude of the effect (in a positive or negative direction). The smaller the error bars around them, the more precisely the effect estimated.

The grey lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Thus, a dot to the right of the line with grey error bars that do not cross the line is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Conversely, a dot to the left of the line with grey error bars that do not cross the line would be negative and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. The left plot shows the effects of the training for the village heads only. The middle plot shows the effects of training village heads and the community leaders together. The right plot shows the difference in the effectiveness of the village heads and community leaders training relative to the village heads only training.

 Figure 6.5 Effects of "Training Only" and "Training Plus Horizontal Pressure"
 Difference

 VH Only
 VH+CL training

 between variants



The analysis above captures the intent-to-treat effects. Because compliance with treatment assignment was very high but not perfect, we have also estimated the effect of the treatment on the treated. We did this using an instrumental variable framework in which assignment to the "training only" and the "training plus horizontal pressure" variants were used as instruments for the receipt of each of these treatments. While the results are not presented here, they are very similar to those reported in this section.

3. CONCLUSIONS

To summarize, the results suggest that training village heads by themselves has little effect on good governance, conflict or social trust. On the other hand, training community leaders alongside village heads results in significantly better scores on governance indicators compared to situations where the village head is trained alone. However, although training community leaders alongside village heads results in significantly better governance outcomes than training village heads by themselves, the full effect of training village heads and community leaders on governance is positive but not statistically significant at conventional levels. Furthermore, training village heads and community leaders appears to correspond with higher levels of political intimidation (statistically significant at the 95 percent level) and might have slight negative effect on social trust.

The above results are not clear-cut in their policy recommendations. Certainly, training village heads by themselves appears not to have the intended positive effects; but it is difficult to conclude on the basis of this analysis that training community leaders alongside village heads is fully justified because of the potential harmful effects of training community

leaders and village heads on political intimidation and social conflict. We discuss this at greater length in the next section.

VII. INTERPRETING THE RESULTS

This section moves beyond the analysis outlined in the pre-analysis plan in order to try to interpret the findings presented in the previous section. In particular, it probes the earlier finding that when training sessions incorporated community leaders they were both more effective in improving governance by the village head and created tensions within communities.

We interrogate these findings by looking at three types of outcomes. First, we consider the effects of the two training variants on the procedures used by the village head to make decisions. This allows us both to verify that the "training plus horizontal pressure" really did improve good governance in a concrete way and to understand the types of effects it had on decision-making. Second, we consider the effect of the two training variants on the village head's perceptions of their authority in their community, and third, we consider the effect of the two training variants on community member's perceptions of their authority in their community. This allows us to assess whether either of the training sessions might have unintentionally decreased the ability of village heads to resolve tensions and govern their communities; in other words, it allows us to assess whether "good governance" as defined in the context of this program might equate to "ineffective governance."³²

First, we consider the effect of the different training variants on the procedures by which village head's make decisions. In particular, the top section of Table 7.1. considers whether the training variants 1) decreased the proportion of the population that does not pay a fee to the village head before a case is heard (because these fees are illegal), 2) increased the percentage of village heads who said dare (village court) records were public, 3) increased the percentage of women on the village dare, 4) increased the village head's consultation with a council of women, and 5) increased the village head's consultation with the village's resource management committee. Table 7.1 confirms that training village heads alone had little effects on good governance – this treatment increased consultation with resource management committees, but its effect on the other procedural outcomes were statistically insignificant and even negative in some instances. However, when community leaders were trained alongside village heads, the training sessions results in changes in decision-making procedures and, in particular, greater consultation of women and other community organizations. Thus, this additional analysis confirms that the "training plus horizontal pressure" training variant had procedural effects.

Did these procedural changes make village heads more or less effective in exerting authority within his (or her) community? The middle section of Table 7.1 considers the effect of the training variants on the village heads' perceptions of their influence within their community. Here, we find interesting differences in the effect of the "training plus horizontal pressure"

³² On the potentially perverse effects of formalizing and regulating informal institutions, see Jean-Philippe Platteau (1996), "The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment," *Development and Change* 27 (1): 29-86; Peter Leeson (2005) "Endogenizing Fractionalization," *Journal of Institutional Economics* 1 (1): 75-98; Anthony Carilli, Christopher Coyne and Peter Lesson (2008) "Government Intervention and the Structure of Social Capital" *Review of Austrian Economics* (21): 209-218.

training variant on how the village head responded to different questions about his or her authority. Specifically, village heads exposed to this training variant were *more likely* to strongly agree with the statement that *most people* in the village were influenced by their opinions (row 6); the effect of the VH+CL training variant relative to no training is positive and close to statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level and the effect of the VH+CL training relative to the VH only training is positive and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. However, they were also *less likely* to think that *all groups* in the village respected their authority and all groups in the village took their disputes to their dare (row 7 & 8); neither of these effects is quite statistically significant, but the effects are sizable. One possible explanation for these divergent responses is that the horizontal training differentially affected the VH's perceived influence with different groups. The training made them believe their influence had increased among the village majority, but also drew attention to divisions within their community and the existence of minorities within the community who did not respect their authority.

Row 9 shows that neither training variant had a significant effect on the village head's perceived independence from the government, and row 10 shows that neither training variant increased or decreased their appetite for further training. This suggests that the village heads did not feel their power to have been excessively curbed by the training sessions.

The bottom section of table 7.1 considers the effects of the training sessions on community member's knowledge of the laws surrounding traditional governance, and their perceptions of their village head's authority. Interestingly, when community leaders were included in the training sessions, the knowledge provided therein also permeated down to the community more generally; this effect is both moderate and statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level (row 11). In contrast, when community leaders were not included, the training sessions did not increase the knowledge of community members. However, the "training plus horizontal pressure" variant did not, on average, change community member's likelihood of taking their disputes to the village head, their perceptions of the village head's influence on the majority of the community, or their perceptions of the village head's independence from the government (rows 12, 13 and 14). Thus, on average, the village head's authority was not perceived to decrease as a result of the training sessions. However, it remains possible that this average effect hides differential effects of the training sessions on the perceptions of the village head's authority among different groups, and it is possible that the training sessions made community members more aware of other community member's differing opinions on the authority of the village head.

	N	Control Mean (sd) [min, max]	Effect of VH Training	Effect of VH + CL Training	Difference between Variants		
Procedures							
1) No	257	0.329	0.043	0.070	0.028		
Payment to		(0.309)	(0.0356)	(0.047)	(0.054)		
VH		[0.000 -	p=0.356	p=0.137	p=0.608		
		1.000]					
2) Dare	239	0.645	-0.113	-0.004	0.109		
Records		(0.480)	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.091)		
Public		[0.000 -	p=0.138	p=0.964	p=0.232		
		1.000]					
3) % Women	236	0.262	0.014	0.053*	0.038		
on Dare		(0.190)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.035)		
		[0.000 1.000]	p=0.262	p=0.084	p=0.269		
4) Consult	238	0.225	-0.067	0.127*	0.194**		
with		(0.420)	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.079)		
Women's		[0.000 -	p=0.305	p=0.071	p=0.015		
Council		1.000]					
5) Consult	241	0.389	0.159**	0.215***	0.055		
with RMC		(0.489)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.092)		
		[0.000 -	p=0.038	p=0.008	p=0.038		
		1.000]					

Table 7.1 Effect of Training Variants on VH's Procedures and VH's Authority

	-	Control Mean	Effect of	Effect of	Difference		
	Ν	(sd)	VH Training	VH + CL	between		
		[min, max]	viii Iianning	Training	Variants		
VH's View of Authority							
6) VH's View	242	0.532	-0.103	0.129	0.232***		
On Influence in		(0.501)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.092)		
Community		[0.000 -1.000]	p=0.179	p=0.114	p=0.013		
7) VH's View on	247	0.586	-0.070	-0.113	-0.043		
Authority Over		(0.494)	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.092)		
All Groups		[0.000 1.000]	p=0.358	p=0.161	p=0.640		
8) VH's View on	247	0.656	0.016	-0.093	-0.108		
Use of Courts		(0.477)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.088)		
By All Groups		[0.000 1.000]	p=0.832	p=0.234	p=0.222		
9) VH's View	244	0.432	-0.041	0.041	0.082		
Independence		(0.497)	(0.076)	(0.080)	(0.091)		
Government		[0.000 -1.000]	p=0.589	p=0.613	p=0.370		
10) VH's Desire	246	0.984	-0.016	-0.003	0.013		
for More		(0.125)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.026)		
Training		[0.000 -1.000]	p=0.472	p=0.900	p=0.628		
		HH's View	of Authority				
11) HH's	270	-0.001	-0.021	0.173**	0.193**		
Knowledge		(0.521)	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.092)		
Index		[-1.538 -0.746]	p=0.788	p=0.033	p=0.036		
12) HH takes	270	0.435	0.028	-0.037	-0.064*		
case to VH		(0.221)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.039)		
		[0.000 1.000]	p=0.406	p=0.282	p=0.100		
13) HH's View	270	0.409	-0.016	0.007	0.023		
on VH		(0.213)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.037)		
Influence in		[0.000 -0.875]	p=0.546	p=0.831	p=0.546		
Community							
14) HH's View	270	0.495	0.025	0.021	-0.004		
on VH Indep.		(0.213)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.035)		
Government		[0.000 -1.000]	p=0.397	p=0.487	p=0.487		

Table 7.1 (cont)

VIII. ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

In this section, we present some additional analyses from the pre-analysis plan that add further nuance to our analysis. First, we consider the effect of training the village head on all measures of impartiality included in the survey. Second, we discuss the heterogeneity of the treatment effects across different types of villages. Finally, we examine whether some of the training clusters were more effective than others in affecting governance, conflict and social trust.

	Desired Effect	N	Control group Mean (sd) [min, max]	Effect of VH Training β ₁	Effect of VH + CL Training $\beta_1 + \beta_2$	Difference between two training variants β_2
	-	-	Included in Ind	dex		
Political	-	270	0.467	0.055	-0.025	-0.080
exclusion from			(0.636)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.109)
food aid (List			[-1.250–	p=0.558	p=0.789	p=0.463
experiment)			2.000]			
VH's dare not	-	270	0.402	0.004	-0.006	-0.011
fair			(0.202)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.036)
			[0.000 -	p=0.885	p=0.844	p=0.767
		_	1.000]			
			Excluded from	n Index		
Prop. non-	+	256	0.616	0.081*	0.058	-0.023
family members			(0.328)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.055)
assisted			[0.000 -	p=0.087	p=0.231	p=0.681
			1.000]			
Prop. with	+	152	0.681	0.022	0.054	0.033
different			(0.333)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.080)
political views			[0.000 -	p=0.745	p=0.448	p=0.683
assisted			1.000]			

Table 8.1. Effects of Training on Impartiality of VH (All Measures)

Table 8.1 examines the effects of the programming on several additional measures of impartiality that we included on the follow-up survey but decided in advance not to include in the main impartiality index because they are noisy measures, denominated by the number of people in a village with a particular attribute (and therefore not available in villages where no one has this attribute). In particular, the survey collected information on the receipt of food and agricultural aid by groups against which village heads are often thought to discriminate -- people outside the village head's family and people with different political views from the village head who received aid.³³ We find that the training of the village head has a positive effect on the proportion of non-family members who are assisted, and this effect is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level; however, the training of the village head does not affect the proportion of people with different political views who receive aid. The additional effect of training a community leader on the distribution of aid to both non-family members and people with opposing political views is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero in both cases.

³³ The second measure is only available for half of the villages in the sample, because the authorities removed the question asking whether respondents shared the political views of their village head halfway through the survey. In the appendix, we examine the effect of the training sessions on the receipt of food aid by individuals supporting the MDC and find a positive effect of training the VH. However, the number of reported MDC supporter is so low that we excluded this measure from the main body of the report (following the criteria outlined in the pre-analysis plan) In addition, the number of people who said they would support the MDC is higher in places where the VH was trained, making it difficult to interpret the third effect.

These results slightly complicate the results presented in Table 6.1 on the effects of training village heads along and training village heads alongside community leaders. Although we specified the construction of the impartiality index in advance and did not choose which variables to include based on the extent to which they matched the patterns in the rest of the data, the results suggest that training village heads alone may have a more positive effect on impartiality (but not the other indicators of good governance) than originally estimated.

Next we consider whether the effects of training variants are different in different types of communities. Specifically, we consider whether the effects of the trainings differ depending on how "modern" the village is (as measured by an index of education, age and years in power), whether the village is on communal land or not, how geographically remote the village is, whether the village has historically had strong social divisions, and the chiefdom in which the village is (Zimunya or Marange). All of these interaction effects are reported in Appendix D. The most important finding is that the positive effects of the training plus horizontal pressure variant only exist in villages that have not historically had social divisions.

Finally, we consider whether some of the observed effects are attributable to the quality and or dynamics of a specific training sessions. Village heads assigned to the village head only training were trained in two different training sessions (which were geographically defined), and the village heads assigned to the village head plus community leader training session were trained in three different sessions (which were again geographically defined). The training sessions were not equal in size – session 1 included 45 villages, while the other sessions contained between 19 and 24 villages. As discussed earlier, the order of the training sessions was juggled so that some of the village head and community leader training sessions occurred before the second village head only training session and some occurred after.

Table 8.2 examines the coefficients on training session dummies in order to assess whether the negative effects of the village head only training or the positive effects of training an additional community leader could be driven by one specific training session. It is important to note that this analysis is just suggestive and cannot identify the effects of particular training sessions because assignment to training sessions (rather than treatment conditions) was not random. As a result, the training session dummies could be reflecting the background attributes of a particular subgroup of villages that make them more or less subject to good governance and conflict. Still, the analysis highlights training session 2 as being associated with particularly negative outcomes and training session 4 as being associated with particularly positive outcomes. The first observation is particularly interesting because, if anything, the quality of the training in session 2 was judged by observers to have been better than in session 1. This suggests that any negative effects of the village head only training cannot be attributed to poor organization or unfamiliarity with the materials. Again, it is also important to note that the training sessions were not randomly assigned, so the session dummy could partially be picking up attributes of the group of villages assigned to that session.

	-	VH Only			VH + CL	
		Group 1	Group 2	Group 3	Group 4	Group 5
Good Governance	270	0.031	-0.172*	0.064	0.134	0.041
Index		(0.067)	(0.077)	(0.092)	(0.090)	(0.071)
		p=0.642	p=0.027	p=0.484	p=0.138	p=0.558
Knowledge Index	245	0.037	-0.138	0.091	0.304***	0.134
		(0.092)	(0.119)	(0.112)	(0.090)	(0.118)
		p=0.689	p=0.246	p=0.420	p=0.001	p=0.257
Attitudes Index	247	0.071	-0.195	-0.077	0.013	0.139
		(0.010)	(0.121)	(0.110)	(0.153)	(0.118)
		p=0.479	p=0.109	p=0.489	p=0.934	p=0.239
Impartiality Index	270	0.033	-0.219	0.051	0.093	-0.037
		(0.115)	(0.164)	(0.217)	(0.177)	(0.107)
		p=0.776	p=0.183	p=0.814	p=0.601	p=0.734
Legitimacy Index	270	-0.040	-0.178*	0.082	0.073	-0.034
		(0.113)	(0.104)	(0.121)	(0.135)	(0.127)
		p=0.724	p=0.086	p=0.497	p=0.589	p=0.789
Total Conflict	270	0.089	-0.206	-0.158	-0.722**	-0.281
		(0.399)	(0.461)	(0.424)	(0.340)	(0.521)
		p=0.823	p=0.655	p=0.710	p=0.035	p=0.590
Political	270	0.080	-0.088	0.174	0.165	0.068
Intimidation and		(0.089)	(0.115)	(0.119)	(0.127)	(0.122)
Violence		p=0.368	p=0.445	p=0.145	p=0.195	p=0.578
Social Trust Index	2154	-0.079*	0.009	-0.053	-0.170**	-0.014
		(0.043)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.076)	(0.065)
		p=0.071	p=0.864	p=0.387	p=0.387	p=0.829

IX. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

Results from the follow-up survey suggest that training for village heads can improve their knowledge of the law and make their decision-making more inclusive, but only if community leaders are trained alongside village heads. However, this variant of the training simultaneously increased certain types of social tensions. In order to better understand the degree of change in these different outcomes and the mechanism by which community leaders affected the impact of the training sessions, we conducted qualitative research in ten villages in May and June 2014.

In each of the ten villages, the qualitative research involved conducting three focus group discussions. The first focus group comprised the village head alongside advisors of his or her choosing, the second focus group was with a group of about 8 villagers organized by the village head, and the third focus group was with the random sample of 8 villagers included in the follow-up survey. In addition in each village, we conducted a one-on-one interview the community leader included in the training sessions (or, in cases where no community leader was trained, the community leader the village head would have liked to have include in the training sessions). In total, 30 focus groups and 10 one-on-one interviews were conducted as part of the qualitative research. The interviews and focus groups were led by Shylock

Muyengwa, with the assistance of a local research assistant. Both researchers took notes on both the content and dynamics of the discussions, allowing cross-validation of all information collected. We subsequently analyzed both the substance of the answers provided and created behavioral measures of consultation, disagreement and willingness to criticize authority (and the village head specifically) based on the dynamics of the discussion.

Our main goals for the qualitative research were twofold. First, we wanted to examine the persistence and quality of effects over time, and validate and qualify the measures obtained from our quantitative survey instruments. Second, we wanted to understand the mechanism by which the inclusion of community leaders affected the program's goals. We focused on understanding the differences in the effects of training both the village head and a community leader versus only training the village head; this is because these effects are the most significant and theoretically interesting, but also because the program had been rolled out in the year 2 villages by the time of the qualitative research, making a comparison to randomized control villages impossible.

These goals are best accomplished through qualitative analysis of cases that are "on the regression line."³⁴ Specifically, we chose the 10 villages in which to conduct qualitative research as follows. First, we limited ourselves only to communal villages. Then we identified cases that were close to the regression line – i.e. if the village head was trained, there was little improvement in governance and little change in social trust relative to the control (year 2) villages in the same geographic block, but if the village head and a community was trained, there were improvements in governance but decreases in social trust relative to the control (year 2) villages in the same block. Once we had identified all of the on-the-line cases, we looked for cases where a positive on-the-line case was paired with a negative on-the-line case in the same geographic block, and we selected these pairs for qualitative research. In the end, we selected four villages exposed to the training for village heads only treatment in year 1 and 6 villages exposed to the training plus horizontal pressure treatment in year 1 in four different geographic blocks.³⁵

1. PERSISTENCE AND QUALITY OF EFFECTS

First, we consider the persistence and quality of the effects measured in the quantitative survey. We re-asked a number of the questions from the follow-up survey as part of our interviews, and we compared the responses elicited in May/June 2014, more than a year after the training sessions finished, to those given in August/September 2013, just three months after the training sessions finished, to examine effect persistence. Reassuringly, we find the legal and procedural improvements measured in the follow-up survey have persisted in this small sample of villages. Village heads still answered the legal knowledge question we posed to them correctly. ³⁶ The increase in the number of women on the village head's dare caused

³⁴ See Evan Lieberman (2005), "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research," *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 435-452.

³⁵ In two geographic blocks, one VH only training village was paired with two VH plus CL training villages. We did this because there were multiple "on-the-line" VH plus CL training villages in these geographic blocks, and we felt that interviews with community leaders who attended training sessions (which only existed in this treatment arm) were going to be a particularly valuable source of information.

³⁶ All of village heads in the VH+CL training variant got this answer right when asked in both 2013 and 2014. Interestingly, more villages heads in the VH only training variant got this answer right when asked in 2014 than in 2013.

by the community leader variant of the training sessions has also persisted. Finally, the fees charged by the village head remained lower in villages where a community leader had been trained.³⁷

But how deep are the effects of these procedural changes? Has the inclusion of women on the village dare made the village head consult them more often? Is there really greater transparency in these villages? In order to assess this, we constructed behavioral measures of consultation and transparency based on direct observation in meetings and on a comparison of responses given to the same question by leaders and citizens in different settings.

On the one hand, the behavioral measures suggest that village heads exposed to the village head plus community leader training variant are not in practice more consultative or more inclusive of women and minority view points. To see this, we asked the village head to bring some of his closest advisors to his meeting with us and then looked to see who he invited and how much they spoke in the subsequent discussion. In cases where a community leader was trained alongside the village head, the village head was no more likely to invite women to this meeting, and he invited fewer community members from outside his immediate family.³⁸Women were no more likely to participate in the ensuing discussion, and people were no more likely to contradict the village head. Furthermore, in the focus group discussions organized by the village head in these villages, respondents were less likely to express critical opinions; this is even though the focus groups with a random sample of people in these villages were as critical as their counterparts in the villages exposed to the other variant of the treatment, suggesting there was not greater satisfaction with the system of governance in these communities. This suggests village heads trained alongside community leaders have not become deeply committed to inclusive and consultative governance; in fact, village heads exposed to this treatment may have become savvier about surrounding themselves with people of similar views, choosing family members and people who do not express critical views to attend meetings.

On the other hand, the behavioral measures confirm the increased level of transparency in the villages exposed to the village head plus community leader variant of the training sessions. As part of the qualitative research, we separately asked the village head, the community leader and members of the focus groups to tell us the fees charged by the village dare. By comparing the responses across focus groups and interviewees, we can assess the extent to which the village head and community leaders misrepresent practices when questioned. In cases where only the village head was trained, the village head or the community leader stated the village head charged fees that were lower than the fees mentioned by the focus groups very frequently (4 of the 8 leaders interviewed).³⁹ In cases where both the village head and the community leader were trained, none of the six village heads and just one of the six community leaders interviewed stated a figure that was lower than the number provided by the focus groups. Thus, the checks on the power of leaders in the villages exposed to the community leader variant of the training are real.

³⁷ This is according to our most reliable measure of fees from our focus group discussions; in contrast, village heads sometimes reported different fee structures, as we discuss further below.

³⁸ Villages heads exposed to the horizontal pressure treatment invited an average of four non-family members, while village heads not exposed to this treatment invited an average of six.

³⁹ In cases where the two focus groups gave slightly different responses to this question, we compared the responses given by the leaders to the average of these two numbers.

The qualitative research also examined the extent to which social distrust and political intimidation were higher in the villages in which a community leader was trained alongside the village head. In none of the thirty discussion sessions we organized did we note any incidents of political intimidation, but there were slightly more incidents in which people used political rhetoric in villages exposed to the "horizontal pressure" variant of the training.

In addition, we asked the discussion groups whether there were any divisions in their communities, a potentially contentious topic, and we noted whether people were willing to express views that dissented from previously expressed views, and whether people were willing to express views that criticized the authority structure in the community or the country more generally. For each village, we also have measures of how much public opinion diverges on this question and willingness to express critical views in private from the followup survey. In each village, one of our focus groups was with the same respondents interviewed as part of the follow-up survey a year earlier, and by comparing the responses given by respondents in public and in private settings, we can unpack willingness to express dissenting or critical views in public from the extent to which these views exist. Interestingly, in communities in which a community leader was trained, we found that were more willing to express dissenting and critical views in public in our focus groups, even though they were not more dissenting or critical in private during the follow-up survey. This suggests the higher levels of social distrust in these villages is, at least in part, a function of respondents' greater willingness to express critical and minority views on contentious topics. There may not be greater latent social divisions in these villages.

2. MECHANISMS BY WHICH COMMUNITY LEADERS AFFECT OUTCOMES

The qualitative research also sheds light on the mechanism by which the inclusion of community leaders in the training sessions resulted in changes in governance. The interviews suggest community leaders were able to do two things to improve the effectiveness of training. First, they were able to act as a check on abuses of power by the village head after the training session. Second, they were able to disseminate information about the legal framework governing the village head's leadership to other community members.

The community leader who was trained alongside the village head became a more powerful local leader in their own right after the training sessions. In almost all instances, the village head subsequently included them in the group of close advisors they invited to meet with the research team.⁴⁰ They all reported being delegated tasks by the village head, including the resolution of cases, and making presentations to community meetings. They all reported that the training sessions had made them closer working partners of the village head.⁴¹

The village heads trained alongside community leaders also universally agreed that this had made the program more effective. For example, village heads described the inclusion of the community leader as beneficial because:

⁴⁰ Two thirds of these community leaders were included in the group of advisors that met with us. In contrast, individuals whom village heads in the community leader treatment named as potential community leader trainees were unlikely to be included in the group of advisors that met with us and the village head (just one quarter were included).

⁴¹ Again, in contrast, the individuals in the village head only villages who were designated as potential community leader trainees did not report these types of changes.

- "I now have an aide who reminds, guides and informs me of the best practices to lead the people"
- "I am reminded of some crucial issues that I would have forgotten since age is catching up with me"
- "Some issues that I did not understand, she helps clarify to the people"
- "We are not closely related so that also helped people accept the message that came from the training."
- "It became an effective training in that there is someone younger who exhorts my teachings and advises the people in the community."

The main points emphasized by the village heads were that the community leader helped "remind" them of the law, thereby checking their powers, and the community leader effectively disseminated information on the legal framework, especially to groups – such as youth -- over which the village head had limited influence.⁴²

The focus group respondents also emphasized both the ability of the community leader to act as a check on the village head and to help disseminate information on laws and procedures to community members. For example, respondents noted that:

- "The training of two people was a modest [sic] idea in that they counsel each other and remind each other of the things to be done in the community. The inclusion of a community leader was essential."
- "He reminds the village head of different outcomes reached at the training session."
- "This helped a lot since he has helped improve the village head's behavior. He now works as an advisor to the village head."
- "The training of two people was helpful in that they share responsibilities in disseminating information."
- "When two people are trained, they explain the same thing differently and people apprehend in different ways. Thus, [the community leader] has helped in transferring knowledge."

Although a number of respondents also complained that the community leader had not done enough to disseminate the information from the training sessions, in general, community members in villages exposed to this variant of the treatment thought the inclusion of the community leader had been very valuable.

In contrast, in villages where no community leaders were trained, focus group respondents remarked on the limits of the effectiveness of the training:

- "[The village head] was taught several things... the problem is that he has a hearing problem."
- "No community leader was trained but if they can be included, it will help our community."

⁴² It is also noteworthy that in the communities where a community leader had not been trained, the focus group attendees were overwhelmingly female (75 % female, 25 % men). In contrast, significantly more men attended the focus groups in the communities exposed to the village head plus community leader training (44 % female, 56 % men). Community meetings in Zimbabwe are often made up of mainly women, so this could be a sign of the improved ability of the village head to mobilize diverse groups.

Thus, the training of community leaders did two things to make the training sessions more effective in changing traditional governance. First, it created an individual within the village who could act as a check on the power of the village head. Second, the community leader was able to inform a larger number of community members of the legal framework governing traditional leaders. In contrast, we found little evidence that the community leader's main effect was in the classroom, causing the training session to function better... Village heads did not better internalize the lessons of the training sessions in these cases, as evidenced by the fact that they were not more consultative or inclusive in our discussion sessions. Pressure from community leaders and other citizens after the training sessions is necessary for traditional governance to change. In addition, we found no evidence that antagonistic or competitive relationships between community leaders and village heads could be driving the increased social tensions in villages exposed to the horizontal pressure variant; these leaders always said they have improved relationships as a result of jointly attending the training sessions. This suggests the measured increases in social tensions were the result of the training being more effective in changing governance procedures in these cases, not the direct result of empowering another community leader.

X. CONCLUSION

We have found that training traditional leaders alone does not have the expected positive effects on traditional governance and conflict reduction. In contrast, we find beneficial effects of training other civil society leaders on governance by traditional leaders. Villages in which community leaders were trained alongside village heads had significantly better governance outcome indicators than villages in which village heads were trained alone. Furthermore, our qualitative research suggests that many of the positive effects of the training sessions on governance procedures continue to persist more than a year following the completion of the sessions.

However, there is also evidence to suggest that communities exposed to the horizontal pressure variant of the treatment simultaneously saw increases in certain types of social tensions. This suggests there may be trade-offs involved in trying to change the decision-making procedures of traditional leaders. Involving other community leaders in order to create horizontal accountability might have made governance more transparent, but in doing so made citizens more aware of social tensions and differences in opinions amongst them.

These results have relevance well beyond the Zimbabwean context. Recognizing the importance of traditional dispute resolution in particular, many governments and donors around the world have taken steps to "formalize" and regulate the operation of traditional institutions. They highlight trade-offs involved in altering traditional institutions so they accord better with ideals of transparency, consultation and good governance. Inevitably such policy changes have differential effects on different people, creating winners and losers. In this case, changes in procedures may have increased social tensions (and, at a minimum, increased awareness of them).

APPENDICES

- A. REFERENCES
- **B. PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN**
- C. ALL EFFECTS
- **D. BALANCE STATISTICS**
- E. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY INSTRUMENT
- F. VILLAGE HEAD SURVEY INSTRUMENT

APPENDIX A. REFERENCES

- Anderson, M. (2008). "Multiple Inference and Gender Di§erences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 103(484):1481-1495.
- Blattman, C., Hartman, A., & Blair, R. (2011). "Can We Teach Peace and Conflict Resolution? Results from a randomized evaluation of the Community Empowerment Program (CEP) in Liberia: A Program to Build Peace, Human Rights, and Civic Participation." *IPA Policy Report.*
- Carilli, A, C. Coyne and P. Lesson (2008) "Government Intervention and the Structure of Social Capital" Review of Austrian Economics (21): 209-218.
- Fanthrope, R. (2006). "On the Limits of the Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in Post-War Sierra Leone". *African Affairs*, 105(418): 27-48.
- Fearon, J., Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. (2009). "Can Development Aid Contribute to Social Cohesion After Civil War? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Post-Conflict Liberia." *American Economic Review*, 99(2): 287-291.
- International Rescue Committee. Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local structures to Mitigate Community-level Conflict in Zimbabwe, Program Description (TECHNICAL-APS-OAA-11-000001).
- Kalungu, J. S. (2010). Evaluation of Sensitisation of Traditional Leaders on the Importance of Girls' Education. Lusaka: UNICEF.
- Kling, J., J. Liebman and L. Katz (2007). "Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects." *Econometrica* 75(1):83-119.
- Leeson, P. (2005) "Endogenizing Fractionalization," *Journal of Institutional Economics* 1 (1): 75-98
- Lieberman, E. (2005). "Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research," *American Political Science Review* 99 (3): 435-452.
- Parliament of Zimbabwe. Customary Law and Local Courts Act of 1990, Chapter 7, No. 5. Retrieved from <u>http://www.parlzim.gov.zw</u>
- Parliament of Zimbabwe. Traditional Leaders Act of 2001, Chapter 29, No. 17. Retrieved from <u>http://www.parlzim.gov.zw</u>
- Platteau, J.-P. (1996), "The Evolutionary Theory of Land Rights as Applied to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Assessment," *Development and Change* 27 (1): 29-86
- United Nations Development Programme Afghanistan (2011). Justice and Human Rights in Afghanistan (JHRA) Annual Progress Report 2011.

APPENDIX B. PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN

PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN FOR SUPPORTING TRADITIONAL LEADERS TO MITIGATE COMMUNITY-LEVEL CONFLICT IN ZIMBABWE

Kate Baldwin and Eric Mvukiyehe Yale University and the World Bank November 8, 2013

I. Introduction

This document outlines a pre-analysis plan for an impact evaluation study of the project titled "Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Community-level Conflict in Zimbabwe," jointly funded by USAID-Zimbabwe and USAID's Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) and implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC)-Zimbabwe in conjunction with the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF).⁴³ The empirical strategy herein specifies and pre-commits the authors to testing the primary hypotheses in a wide range of outcome areas as well as a set of secondary hypotheses about variation in treatment and heterogeneous effects.

The document is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the program intervention and study design; section 3 outlines our general empirical framework for estimating program effects; section 4 describes the key outcomes of interest in this evaluation (and the indicators we use to measure them) and specifies the primary hypotheses; section 5 presents a basic framework for estimating possible heterogeneity of program effects and identifies the relevant subgroups; section 6 briefly discusses some potential secondary uses of the data; and section 7 discusses how we will address potential measurement problems and response bias.

II. Intervention and Study Overview

i. Program overview

The Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Community-Level Conflict in Zimbabwe is a capacity building initiative targeting all traditional leaders at all levels of the traditional chieftaincy system (chiefs, headmen, and village heads) in two rural districts, Mutare and Mutasa, in Manicaland Province. The project was motivated by pervasive tensions and violence at the community-level, which many observers have attributed to the growing politicization and partisan behaviors of traditional leaders as well as their inability to deliver justice impartially. This program sought to addresses critical knowledge gaps through training on the substantive aspects of the law and increase appreciation of individual rights. The centerpiece of the program is a series of training sessions aimed to equip traditional leaders with the tools and skills on a wide range of issues, including roles and responsibilities, conflict mediation strategies, natural justice, gender equity, and resolving domestic disputes. In addition, the training program comprises two variants, which we referred to as "training

⁴³ The impact evaluation and ensuring data collection received IRB approval from the University of Florida's IRB as Protocol #2012-U-0410 in May 2012 (renewed May 2013). No one on the research team has received remuneration from the implementing agency for taking part in the research.

only" (training sessions for village heads) and "training with horizontal pressure" (training sessions for village heads and other community leaders).

ii. Impact evaluation design

An impact evaluation study has been designed (in close coordination with all stakeholders) to identify the effects of the program and its key components, focusing primarily at the village level, the lowest level of traditional jurisdiction.⁴⁴ The study targets 280 villages in Mutare district.⁴⁵ Specifically, the impact evaluation seeks to do two things. First, it aims to ascertain *the effects of any training program relative to a pure control.* To identify these effects, the study uses a randomized phase-in approach, whereby project activities are randomly assigned to different phases. Approximately half of the target villages have been randomly assigned to one of two waves, the first of which received training in year 1 of the project, and the second of which will not receive training until year 2.⁴⁶ The main outcomes of interest were measured after year 1, at which time the wave 2 villages had not yet been exposed to the program and could serve as the control.

Second, the impact evaluation also seeks to identify *the effect of different types of training interventions relative to one another.* We examine whether training is more effective if structured in a way that creates social pressure on traditional leaders to change their behavior. Thus, villages assigned to the first wave have been randomized into two differently structured training sessions. In the first variant, which we refer to as "training only," village heads have been invited to attend a sequence of two 3-day training sessions run by the LRF and the IRC. In the second variant, which we call "training with horizontal pressure," other community leaders (such as teachers, religious leaders and women's group leader) have been invited to the same training sessions along with the village heads.

iii. Data collection

Two rounds of surveys—a baseline and an endline—were carried out to gather information on the key outcomes of interest in both treatment and control villages. In June of 2012, prior to the roll-out of the project activities, a baseline survey was carried out in two thirds of the communities in Mutare district. We employed two sets of instruments to gather information about these outcomes: (i) a Village Head (VH) survey with village heads and (ii) a Household (HH) survey with a sample of ordinary villagers (8 respondents per village). The latter is the primary source of information on outcomes such as levels of trusts or incidences of violence that seeks to capture social conditions at level of the whole community, while the former is the source of information on outcomes such as the village head's knowledge of the law that capture the VH's knowledge and behavior. In addition, we conducted a Community Leader

⁴⁴ While the project targets all traditional leaders, the impact evaluation study primarily focuses on "Village Head" (VH), the lowest authority on the traditional chieftaincy system due to problems of power in identifying effects at higher levels. ⁴⁵ In the initial impact evaluation plan, the study targeted 600 villages in both Mutare and Mutasa districts. The plan was to

cluster all of the villages in Mutare and Mutasa districts by ward (the geographic unit from which local government councilors are elected), and then to implement a randomized roll-out of the program by ward, with some wards receiving the training program in year 1 and some not receiving it until year 2. But because we were prevented from conducting the baseline in Mutasa district, we revised the study design to ensure we would have adequate statistical power to complete the study (Power calculations are published in the baseline report). More specifically, the current design focuses on Mutare district, where the programming and evaluation teams were more confident about being able to complete the training programs and the data collection activities, omits a third variant of the intervention entitled "pressure from above" which was included in the initial design, and randomizes at the village versus the ward level within Mutare district.

⁴⁶ The implementing partner was not confident about being able to implement the program in all wards and on all types of land in the two districts at the time of the lottery, and so the randomization was done within wards/land types to ensure a "politically robust" experimental design if some areas were subsequently dropped from the evaluation. See King et al. (2007) for more details.

(CL) survey with one community leader in each village, and we will use this survey to assess the relative efficacy of the "horizontal pressure" treatment relative to the "village head only" treatment.

In August 2013, after the completion of the intervention activities in villages assigned to wave 1, we carried out a follow-up survey in both treatment and control villages. For the HH survey, respondents in baseline and follow-up surveys are not necessarily the same as we did not attempt to construct panel data. But the VHs will generally be the same individuals in both the baseline and follow-up surveys as there is only one village head per village and turnover is infrequent.

III. Empirical framework

In this subsection, we outline a general empirical framework to estimate treatment effects of the intervention outcomes in the four broad outcome areas: (i) good governance by the village head; (ii) local conflict; (iii) community integration and trust; and (iv) political participation. *This framework was decided on and written up before the Principal Investigators had been provided with any of the follow-up survey data.*⁴⁷

i. Regression Specification

If we find that the different experimental groups are well-balanced, we will estimate the program effects through simple comparisons of mean outcomes between different experimental groups.⁴⁸ Specifically, we will estimate an equation of the following form:⁴⁹

 $y_{iv} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T O_v + \beta_2 T H_v + \epsilon_{iv}$ (1) where, y_{ij} is the outcome for individual i in village v; TO_v is an indicator for the "training only" intervention; TH_v is the dummy for the "training with horizontal pressure" intervention; and ϵ_v is the disturbance term for the regression assumed clustered at the village-level. Note that we will measure our good governance and conflict outcomes at the village level rather than the individual level, in these cases replacing y_{iv} with y_v in the equation above.

If the experimental groups are not well-balanced, we will also analyze the data including the unbalanced covariates in the model above. Specifically, we will check for imbalance on each of the variables listed in table 7.1 in the baseline report, and we will include any variables that are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level in the model.⁵⁰

In addition to reporting the effects of the interventions on each outcome of interest, we will conduct "mean effects" estimation, estimating the effects of the intervention on indices of closely related outcomes. We group these families of related outcomes together in the discussion in the next section. We will give each related outcome equal weight in each sub-

⁴⁷ Social Impact acted as a clearing house, only releasing the data to the Principal Investigators once the plan was complete. ⁴⁸ The data from the baseline survey suggests good balance across the various experimental groups (see tables 7.1 & 7.2 in the baseline report); however, the baseline data does not include all of the villages included in the follow-up survey.

⁴⁹ "Intervention" here refers to both variants of the training program (training only or training with horizontal pressure." ⁵⁰ These variables are whether the village is communal, whether it is an old resettlement village (pre-fast track land reform), the number of households in the village, the number of community groups in the village, whether the village head is male,

whether the village head has more than primary education, the age of the village head, the number of years the village head has been in power, whether the village head had previously received training, whether the village head inherited their position, the average age of adults in the village, the proportion of the adult population with more than primary education, the proportion of households with most income from farming, the proportion of people who own plots of land, village-level ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the proportion of adults born in the village (versus migrants), the proportion of regular newspaper readers, the average number of groups to which community members below, and the average wealth of households as measured by a cattle ownership index.

index, following the approach pioneered by Kling, Liebman and Katz (2007), and equal weight to each sub-index in each index.⁵¹

For most (but not all) of the community-level outcomes, we have baseline data for two thirds of the villages in the follow-up survey. As a result, we can conduct a difference-indifference analysis on a subset of the villages in the program. However, because we do not have baseline data for all villages, this will be done only as a robustness check.

IV. Key outcomes of interest and hypotheses

The training component of the IRC's intervention seeks primarily to influence two outcome areas of interest: (i) good governance by the village head, and (ii) local conflict. In addition, the training component may have secondary effects on (iii) community integration and trust, and (iv) political participation.⁵² In our policy report, we will primarily focus on the effects of the program on good governance and local conflict, discussing the program's effects on community integration and political participation in the secondary analysis.⁵³ Below, we provide a brief description for each of these outcome areas, specify hypotheses suggested by the program's theory of change, and identify relevant measurement indicators.

i. Good governance by the Village Head

This outcome area captures various aspects of the village head's practice of "good governance," broadly defined in terms of adherence to the rule of law and positive attitudes towards liberal norms such as human rights and peaceful dispute resolutions.

Hypothesis 1. The training component of the Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Community-level Conflict in Zimbabwe program will have positive effects on good governance by the Village Head.

In this study, this category of outcomes involves four distinct components: a) the village head's knowledge of the law; b) the village head's attitudes toward human rights and conflict resolution; c) the impartiality of the village head; and d) the village head's legitimacy in the eyes of community members. We will consider each sub-component as a separate family of outcomes, each made up of multiple indicators. The indices will be created at the village level.

(i) Village Head's Knowledge of the Law

• Whether VHs give correct response to "knowledge" questions such as "Individuals have the right to appeal fines from primary courts"? (Specifically, **F1, F2, Fanew, Fbnew, Fcnew, Fdnew and F3 on VH survey**)

(ii) Village Head's Attitudes toward Human Rights and Conflict Resolution

• Whether VHs *strongly agree* with statements such as "A widow should have the right to inherit land"? (Specifically, **F4, F5 and F6 on VH survey**)

(iii) Village Head's Impartiality

⁵¹ Alternatively, Michael Anderson (2008) proposes using the GLS weighting procedure, which gives outcomes that are less correlated with other outcomes (and therefore provide more new information) more weight. However, because the outcomes we group together should be correlated with the same latent variables but we concerned about response bias in some cases, we do not adopt this approach.

⁵² The IRC also intends to implement programming designed to directly increase community integration and political participation subsequent to the follow-up survey; however, these parts of the program are not part of the randomized evaluation, which is why we consider these to be secondary outcomes for the purpose of our report.

⁵³ This decision was made via consultation with the IRC after the randomized roll-out of the program had been completed (but, naturally, before any data analysis had been completed). Although more attention was given to hypothesis (iii) and hypothesis (iv) in the impact evaluation plan and baseline report, the PI's judged the implementing partner's concern to be valid and therefore agreed to this adjustment in the policy report.

- Estimated % of respondents in village who are aware of "people being excluded from food aid lists based on political views," as calculated from list experiment (**F2 on HH survey**).
- % of respondents who say most of the outcomes from taking disputes to the village head are fair (C15 on HH survey).

In addition, the survey allows us to create a number of other measures of bias on the part of VHs in distributing food aid. However, each of these measures is likely to be very noisy at the village level since the measure will be constructed from the answers given by a subset of the HH respondents in any village (and in some villages, there might not be any individuals who fall into this subset). As a result, we will report the effects of the treatments on the following village-level outcomes, but we will not include these measures in our index measuring impartiality:

- % of non-family members of the VH who received maize food aid, subsidized maize seed or grain loans (constructed from z8b and d23, d24 & d25 on HH survey).⁵⁴
- % of respondents with different political views than the chief who received maize food aid, subsidized maize seed or grain loans (constructed from d20new⁵⁵ and d23, d24 & d25 on HH survey).
- % of MDC supporters who received maize food aid, subsidized maize seed or grain loans (constructed from *measure of political leanings*⁵⁶ and d23, d24 & d25 on HH survey).

We will also calculate the following interaction effect but – because we cannot reliably calculate the effect by village – we will not include this measure in our index.

• Effect of wealth on likelihood of receiving maize food aid, subsidized maize seed or grain loans (We will calculate the effect of each treatment on the relationship between wealth and food aid by regressing the likelihood of receiving aid (as measured by d23, d24 and d25 in household survey) on an interaction between a wealth index (based on a23⁵⁷) and the treatment dummies.).

(iv) Village Head's Legitimacy

We measure three sub-components of the concept of legitimacy: (a) The disposition of villagers to obey the village head

⁵⁴ As a robustness check, we will also look at this statistic in the subset of communities where *at least some individuals received maize food aid, subsidized maize seed or grain loans* AND *the VH was involved in some part of the registration, mobilization or distribution process.* However, because this could be affected by the intervention, we prefer not to subset the data before conducting this analysis.

⁵⁵ Unfortunately, although this question was on the survey questionnaire initially approved by the Zimbabwean authorities, they requested we remove this question mid-way through the follow-up survey. As a result, we will try to construct a second measure of political differences based on the questions remaining in the survey.

⁵⁶ We are not able to specify exactly how we will measure political leanings in advance. The Zimbabwean authorities would not allow us to include a direct measure of this on our survey, and even our indirect measures caused some controversy and were removed midway through the follow-up survey. In the final section of the plan, we outline how we will determine the best measure of political leanings.

 $^{^{57}}$ We will use the following measure of wealth, based on the livestock index proposed by Hans Hoogeveen (2001): cattlewealth = .71*cow + .57*heifer + .83*bull + toxen + .59*yoxen + .3*calf + .18*donkey + .08*sheep + .06*goat + .06*pig,

- Proportion of respondents who say most people in the village are influenced by the village head's opinions (**D20 on HH survey**)
- Whether the VH reports that there are people who do not respect their authority (**E15a on VH survey**)
 - (b) Compliance with the decisions made by the VH and the institutions he oversees
- Estimated proportion of respondents who have or say they would take crop destruction disputes to the VH first (**C2(B) on HH survey**)⁵⁸
- Whether the VH reports there are people who rarely bring their disputes to the VH's court (**D26a on VH survey**)
 - (c) Trust in the village head
 - Proportion of respondents who say they always trust their VH to do what is right **(D9 on HH survey)**
 - Average rating respondents give to the quality of their relationship with the VH, on a scale of 10 (**D14 on HH survey**)

ii. Community-level conflict

The second category of outcomes measures the prevalence of various forms of conflict and violence, including vandalism and physical aggression.

Hypothesis 2. The training component of Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Community-level Conflict in Zimbabwe program will reduce community-level conflict.

We measure outcomes in this category both in terms of average number of times a village experienced a particular type of conflict (as reported by village heads) and the average number of times respondents reported that members of their household experienced a particular type of conflict (as assessed during the household survey).⁵⁹ We group the various forms of conflict and violence in the following sub-families of outcomes, with each sub-index calculated at the village level.

- Marital disputes, domestic and sexual violence (domestic violence, adultery, marriage disputes, roora/bride wealth dispute, rape) (D5, D6, D7, D8, D9 on VH survey; C5, C6, C7, C8, C9 on HH survey)
- (b) Physical assault (physically harmed by others, murder) (**D10, D11 on VH** survey; **C10, C11 on HH survey**)
- (c) Property destruction (**D12 on VH survey, C12 on HH survey**)
- (d) Burglaries and theft **(D3 on VH survey and C3 on HH survey)**

⁵⁸ We focus on crop destruction disputes because – according to the baseline survey – they are by far the most frequent kind of dispute and the VH has the authority to settle them (while, under Zimbabwean law, there are some types of disputes they do not have the legal authority to settle).

⁵⁹ The reliability of the measures reported by the VH may be affected by the training protocol, but the measures constructed from the household survey may underreport rare forms of conflict. As a result, we will include both measures in our mean index effects.

(e) Land and livestock disputes (**D2 and D3 on VH survey, C2 and C3 on HH survey**)

(f) Witchcraft (D4 on VH survey and C4 on HH survey)

In addition, we consider the impact of the programming on the estimated proportion of political violence

(g) Estimated proportion of respondents who are aware of people being injured or threatened with violence because of politics, as measured by list experiment (**F1 on HH survey**)

iii. Social cohesion

The third family of outcomes tries to capture the level of social cohesion, broadly defined as a set of behaviors and attitudes that reflect the propensity of community members (or different communities) to work together (King et al. 2010; Fearon et al. 2009). **Hypothesis 3.** The training component of the "Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Community-level Conflict in Zimbabwe" program will increase the level of social cohesion.

We focus on social trust and collective action, which are arguably the most important dimensions of social cohesion.

- (a) Social trust
 - Whether respondents say that most people can be trusted (versus you have to be careful in dealing with people) (**B3 on HH survey**)
 - Whether respondents report that there are groups within their village who they would not trust with something they own (**B8b on HH survey**)
 - Whether respondents report that there are issues that divide them in the community (**B9a on HH survey**)
- (b) Collective action
 - Average number of non-religious groups to which respondents currently belong (**B1a on HH survey**)
 - Average amount of times household members had participated in collective work groups (known as "nhimbe") (**B4 on HH survey**)
 - Average amount households had paid to other community members following deaths in their families (known as "chema" payments) (**B5 on HH survey**)

iv. Political participation

The last outcome area concerns political participation, broadly defined in terms of citizens' engagement in public life as well as their attitudes towards politics and societies. **Hypothesis 4.** The Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Community-level Conflict in Zimbabwe program will increase the level of political participation.

We use a variety of indicators of political participation, typically employed in comparative research (e.g. Afrobarameter). We distinguish between community-level participation directed

by or at VHs, community-level participation directed by or at other CLs, and national-level political participation.

(a) Community-level participation (directed by or at VH)

- Whether attended dare hearing (D32)
- Whether attended community meeting (**D34newc**)
- Whether spoke at community meeting (D36)
- Whether contacted VH to raise issue/ask for assistance (D1a)

(b) Community-level participation (directed by or at other CL)

- Whether met with local councilor to raise issue/ask for assistance (D4a)
- Whether met with any other local leader to raise issue/ask for assistance (D5a)

(c) National-level participation⁶⁰

- Whether belong to any other organizations/"masangano" in this country, and if so, which ones (**B2=membership in national political groups**)
- Whether contacted an elected official or voted in an election (F7a)

V. Heterogeneous treatment effects

As with many interventions of this kind, we expect the *Supporting Traditional Leaders and Local Structures to Mitigate Community-level Conflict in Zimbabwe program* to interact with a wide-range of individual- and village-level factors. That is, the program may differentially affect individuals (and villages) of different characteristics and such heterogeneity might also be different in different outcome areas. Based on baseline results and on previous studies, we identified a number of factors (or subgroups) that might interact with the program (see listing below). We model heterogeneous treatment effects by the following equation:

 $y_{iv} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T O_v + \beta_2 T H_v + \beta_3 T O_v Z_v + + \beta_4 T H_v Z_v + \beta_5 Z_v + \epsilon_{iv}$ (2) Where, y_{ij} is the outcome for individual i in village v; TO_v is an indicator for the "training only" intervention; TH_v is the dummy for the "training with horizontal pressure" intervention; $TO_v Z_v$ and $TH_v Z_v$ are interaction terms between the treatment dummies and important contextual factors highlighted below; Z_v are the contextual factors; and ϵ_v is the disturbance term for the regression clustered at the village-level. Below we discuss a number of contextual factors likely to interact with the program and specify hypotheses for select outcomes of interest.

Previous training interventions: Results from the baseline survey revealed that this program is not completely novel. Over a third of village heads had previously received training from either a government ministry or an NGO, while over half of all village heads had never received any training at all. We anticipate that prior training on the part of village head will weaken the effects of this new intervention (**G6a on VH survey**).

Characteristics of the Village Head: In addition, the baseline survey suggested older chiefs with longer tenure in office had larger gaps in their knowledge but less conflict and less violence in their communities. As a result, the effects of the programming may be

⁶⁰ Unfortunately, these questions about national-level political participation were removed halfway through the survey by the Zimbabwean authorities. As a result, the index of national-level participation will be available for only half of the treatment communities.

different in communities with younger and newer chiefs. In addition, we suspect the independence and political leanings of the chief may influence their receptiveness to the program messaging (**02, A3 and D22new on VH survey**).⁶¹

Land Type: The implementing agency suspected the programming was likely to be more relevant in communal land areas (vs. resettlement areas). (B2 on VH survey)

Geographic Isolation: The effects of the program may be different in more remote areas, as measured by an index of distance from Mutare, travel time from Mutare, quality of the road leading to the village and whether the town has cell phone coverage (*from supervisors and advance team checklist*)

Chiefdom (Zimunya vs. Marange) The program was conducted in two different chiefdoms, and the program effects may plausibly differ depending on the chiefdom. **History of Divisions/Conflict within Community:** The effect of the program should be larger in places with more divisions and conflict before the intervention. Unfortunately, we do not have baseline data for all of the villages in the follow-up survey, so we will examine this two ways – first, by restricting our analysis to the subset of communities for which we have baseline data and running a panel specification with interactions, and second, by using

questions that ask individuals to recall the amount of past conflict in their communities (A12 on VH survey, B10a on HH survey).

Effects on Women: The training sessions gave particular emphasis to women's rights and the treatment of women by traditional leaders and, as a result, it is interesting to consider the effects of the program on women's attitudes toward traditional leaders. Specifically, we will consider the effects of the program on the proportion of women who say they always trust their VH to do what is right (D9 on HH survey), the average rating women give to the quality of their relationship with the VH, on a scale of 10 (D14 on HH survey), and whether the VH shares the preferences of the majority of women (constructed by comparing answers to a question forcing respondents to state which is a bigger community priority, boreholes or subsidized seed. See F4 on the HH survey and G2 on the VH survey). In addition, we will examine the effects of the program on women's rates of political participation (using all of the political participation indicators listed in section 4.4).

Training Order and Training Session Effects: We will examine whether the effects are larger or smaller in communities who were trained later in year 1 of the programming. We might find larger effects on this subgroup because (a) the training sessions ran more and more smoothly with time and (b) there was a shorter lag between completing the training and the data collection for this subgroup. On the other hand, we might expect smaller effects on these communities because they had less time to change their habits. In addition, we will test to see if some training clusters were particularly effective in changing behaviors through training cluster dummies.

VI. Other Analysis

After we have analyzed the effects of the program on our main outcomes of interest, we will be able to use our data to study the mechanisms by which the interventions had (or did not have) effects. This is where we will use the Community Leader (CL survey). Specifically, the CL survey will allow us to test whether the knowledge and sensitization provided in the training sessions that included community leaders (the "training plus horizontal pressure" variant of the intervention) was transmitted to community leaders (section G on the CL survey) and whether it changed their relationships with the VH (F3-F10 on the CL survey).

VII. Measurement Problems and Response Bias

⁶¹ We discuss how we will measure political leanings in the final section.

Lack of Variation in Outcomes: We will exclude outcome variables for which more than 95 % of villagers or more than 90 % of VHs *in the treatment communities* give the same response from our indices assuming that these are poor measures subject to ceiling effects. **Response Bias:** There are a number of variables in our analysis where we are concerned about response bias. Many of the questions we asked were sensitive, and we are concerned about accurate reporting. One way to identify possible response bias is to look at rates of response; in particular, we will consider any variable with more than 10 percent of responses missing to be potentially subject to response bias and we will remove it from our indices. In addition, we discuss other diagnostics we will use to assess response bias in particular questions below. If a measure fails one of these tests, we will throw it out of our indices. List experiment failures (Underreporting of sensitive item/ceiling effects):

- % of respondents in village who are aware of "people being excluded from food aid lists based on political views"
- % of respondents in village who are aware of "people being injured or threatened with violence because of politics"

Test: We will look for ceiling effects for both of these questions using the methods suggested by Blair and Imai (2012) and we will not use these questions in our indices if we estimate that more than 5 percent of the population is "liars" (or, more specifically, "ceiling liars")

Over-reporting of the VH's legitimacy by the VHs themselves:

- Whether the VH reports that there are people who do not respect their authority (E15a on VH survey)
- Estimated proportion of incidents of crop destruction by livestock in the village that were successfully resolved by the village head in the past twelve months (D2(G)/D2(A) on VH survey)⁶²
- Whether the VH reports there are people who rarely bring their disputes to the VH's court (**D26a on VH survey**)

Test: We will examine the correlation coefficients between these measures and the measures constructed from HH survey data in the same sub-index. If there is a weak correlation between the VH's responses and the responses of HH members (r<.4), we will not use the VH's responses in the index. Under-reporting of domestic violence and marital problems:

• Individual reporting of marital disputes, domestic violence, adultery and rape

Test: We expect greatest risk of underreporting when the interviewed respondent is a male. Using household level data, we will test whether there is significantly lower reporting of this type of violence when the interviewed respondent was male. In addition, using village level data, we will test whether there is a strong correlation between the VH's responses and the responses of males in the community and the responses of females in the community. If there is a significant difference in the reporting of this type of conflict for males and females, we will create aggregate measures using only female respondents' responses. If there is a weak correlation between the VHs' responses and the responses of females in their villages (r<.4), we will not use the VH's responses in the index.

Under or overreporting of membership in political organizations and under or overreporting of voting:

 $^{^{62}}$ We focus on crop destruction disputes because – according to the baseline survey – they are by far the most frequent kind of dispute and the VH has the authority to settle them (while, under Zimbabwean law, there are some types of disputes they do not have the legal authority to settle).

- Whether belong to any other organizations/"masangano" in this country, and if so, which one
- Whether contacted an elected official or voted in an election

Test: We expect that reported membership in ZANU-PF or MDC party organizations in a community should correlate (at least weakly) with political support for them. If reported membership in ZANU-PF organizations and MDC party organizations does not correlate at all (r<.2) with whether the ZANU-PF or MDC candidate won the local election for ward councilor, we will not use this measure in the index. Unfortunately, we do not currently have data on turnout rate by ward, but if this data becomes available, we will construct a similar test of the validity of the contacting and voting measure.

Measuring Partisanship: One of the primary concerns about village heads in Zimbabwe is that they are partial in a partisan sense. However, the Zimbabwean authorities would not allow us to include a direct measure of partisanship on our survey, and even our indirect measures caused some controversy and were removed midway through the follow-up survey. As a result, we will need to analyze the follow-up data before determining which of the indirect measures of partisanship remaining on the survey correlates best with actual partisanship. This section outlines, in broad strokes, how we plan to do this.

Measures of Partisanship included in HH survey						
Measure	Notes					
Endorsement experiment measure,	Only available for half of the sample (then					
which is equal to the difference in response	removed by Zimbabwean authorities). Also					
to questions A27new and F6. Both	may be ceiling or floor effects (many people					
questions ask how important electricity is as	answering 0 or 10 to A27new, so these					
a means of tackling rural poverty in	responses cannot move in one direction in					
Zimbabwe on a scale of 0 to 10, but the	response to the information that Mugabe					
latter notes that Mugabe thinks irregular	thinks irregular electricity is a crucial					
electricity is a crucial impediment, while the	impediment).					
former does not.						
Open-ended question about whether feel	Only available for half of the sample. Pre-					
close to any other masangano in this	testing suggested people do think about					
country and, if so, which ones (B2b & B2c).	political parties following his question.					
Open-ended question about whether feel	Available for other half of the sample					
close to any other organizations in this	(following request by Zimbabwean					
country and, if so, which ones (B2b & B2c).	authorities to change wording). Pre-testing					
	suggested people <i>do not</i> think about political					
	parties following his question.					
Open-ended question about whether there	Available for full sample. But a rather					
are any groups who you would not trust	extreme measure of partisanship.					
with something you own, and if so, which						
ones (B8b & B8c).						
Question about whether own political	Only available for half of the sample.					
views are similar to those of the village						
head (D20new).						
Enumerators report on whether any	Available for full sample. But a rather					
partisan paraphernalia was visible at the	extreme measure of partisanship.					
home of the respondent (X6).						

Questions about readership of independent	Available for full sample and may be useful
newspapers (a26b), participation in peace	in developing a model that predicts
committees (b1), how much meet with local	respondent's partisanship.
councilor (d4a), how much trust local	
councilor (d12), how much trust MP (d13).	
Questions about how good village head's	Available for full sample and may be useful
relationship is with the local councilor (d16)	in developing a model that predicts VH's
and whether problems ever arise because of	partisanship.
tensions between the village head and the	
local councilor (d19).	

Measures of Partisanship included in VH survey						
Measure	Notes					
Endorsement experiment measure, which is equal to the difference in response to questions 022new and G4. Both questions ask how important electricity is as a means of tackling rural poverty in	Only available for half of the sample (then removed by Zimbabwean authorities). Also may be ceiling or floor effects (many people answering 0 or 10 to 022new, so there response cannot move in one direction in					
Zimbabwe on a scale of 0 to 10, but the latter notes that Mugabe thinks irregular electricity is a crucial impediment, while the former does not.	response to the information that Mugabe thinks irregular electricity is a crucial impediment).					
Open-ended question about whether feel close to any other masangano in this country and, if so, which ones (B11b & B11c).	Only available for half of the sample. Pre- testing suggested people <i>do</i> think about political parties following his question.					
Open-ended question about whether feel close to any other organizations in this country and, if so, which ones (B11b & B11c).	Available for other half of the sample (following request by Zimbabwean authorities to change wording). Pre-testing suggested people <i>do not</i> think about political parties following his question.					
Whether indicate, in response to an open- ended question, that partisan groups do not bring disputes to the dare, are always causing problems, partisan groups do not respect his authority or partisan leaders do not respect his authority (d26b, e14b, e15b, e16b).	Available for entire sample. An extreme measure of polarization within community (rather than partisanship of village head).					
Name of the most senior person they know in government and could contact in the case of a problem (e20). Enumerators report on whether any partisan paraphernalia was visible at the	Available for entire sample. Measure of political networks rather than partisan affiliations.Available for full sample. But a rather extreme measure of partisanship.					
home of the respondent (X6). Readership of independent newspapers (022b), ranking of relationship with local councilor on a scale of 0 to 10 (e40d), participation in peace committees (b1).	Available for entire sample and may be useful in developing a model that predicts respondent's partisanship well.					

Measures of Partisanship included in CL survey						
Measure	Notes					
Whether the surveyed community leader	An extreme measure of partisanship.					
was a war veteran (X1)						
Endorsement experiment measure , which is equal to the difference in response to questions 022new and G4. Both questions ask how important electricity is as a means of tackling rural poverty in Zimbabwe on a scale of 0 to 10, but the latter notes that Mugabe thinks irregular electricity is a crucial impediment, while the former does not.	Only available for half of the sample (then removed by Zimbabwean authorities). Also may be ceiling or floor effects (many people answering 0 or 10 to 022new, so there response cannot move in both directions in response to the information that Mugabe thinks irregular electricity is a crucial impediment).					
Open-ended question about whether feel close to any other masangano in this country and, if so, which ones (B11b & B11c).	Only available for half of the sample. Pre- testing suggested people <i>do</i> think about political parties following his question.					
Open-ended question about whether feel close to any other organizations in this country and, if so, which ones (B11b & B11c).	Available for other half of the sample (following request by Zimbabwean authorities to change wording). Pre-testing suggested people <i>do not</i> think about political parties following his question.					
Enumerators report on whether any partisan paraphernalia was visible at the home of the respondent (X6). Whether indicate, in response to an open-	Available for full sample. But a rather extreme measure of partisanship. Available for entire sample. An extreme					
ended question, that partisan groups do not bring disputes to the dare (d26b).	measure of polarization within community (rather than partisanship of village head).					

The preferred measures of partisanship on the VH and HH survey are the endorsement experiment and the open-ended question about membership in other masangano, but they are only available for half of the villages due to an intervention by the Zimbabwean authorities during the survey. A third measure of partisan differences between the VH and a particular HH is also available for only half of the sample. Of the measures available for the entire sample, the question about the presence of partisan paraphernalia (coded by the enumerators) is the most reliable, but we fear it is an extreme measure of partisanship (even though the survey was conducted just after an election), and that very few HHs and VHs will actually have partisan paraphernalia outside their homes. Assuming this is the case, we intend to proceed as follows in constructing a measure of partisanship. First, we will examine the face validity of the endorsement experiment and open-ended questions about "other masangano" for the subset of the sample for which we have this data. Are there ceiling and floor effects for the endorsement experiment? Do many people report affiliations with other masangano? If one (or both) of these measures appears valid, we will attempt to construct a model that predicts partisan affiliation using the measures mentioned above that are available for the entire sample and basic demographic variables (i.e. age, gender, religion, education, wealth, occupation, ethnic group). If this model has high enough predictive power (r-squared>.7), we will use it to create a variable measuring predicted partisanship across the entire sample. If not, we will run the political analysis on only the half of the sample for which we have more reliable measures of partisanship. We will also try to model

whether individual respondents have different political views from their village head using the half of the data for which we have this outcome variable, and we will use this model to predict respondents' likelihood of sharing their village head's political views if the model has high enough predictive power (r-squared>.7).

VIII. References

Anderson, Michael (2008). "Multiple Inference and Gender Di§erences in the Effects of Early Intervention: A Reevaluation of the Abecedarian, Perry Preschool, and Early Training Projects." *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 103(484):1481-1495.

Blair, Grame and Kosuke Imai (2012). "Statistical Analysis of List Experiments." *Political Analysis* 20 (1): 47-77.

Hoogeveen, Hans (2001). Risk and Insurance in Rural Zimbabwe PhD Dissertation, Thela Thesis Amsterdam.

King, Gary, Emmanuela Gakidou, Nirmala Ravishankar, Ryan T Moore, Jason Lakin, Manett Vargas, Martha María Téllez-Rojo, Juan Eugenio Hernández Ávila, Mauricio Hernández Ávila, and Héctor Hernández Llamas (2007). "A 'Politically Robust' Experimental Design for Public Policy Evaluation, with Application to the Mexican Universal Health Insurance Program." *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 26: 479-506.

Kling, Jeffrey, Jeffrey Liebman and Lawrence Katz (2007). "Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects." *Econometrica* 75(1):83-119.

APPENDIX C. ALL EFFECTS

	Ν	Control	Effect of	Effect of	Difference
		group	VH Training	VH + CL	between two
		Mean	0	Training	training
		(sd)		0	variants
		[min, max]			
		_ L / J	B1	B1 + B2	B2
Knowledge					
Correct Answer	245	0.762	-0.043	0.038	0.081
F1		(0.428)	(0.065)	(0.069)	(0.079)
		[0.000 -	p=0.513	p=0.583	p=0.304
		1.000]			
Correct Answer	244	0.659	-0.158**	0.119	0.277***
F2		(0.476	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.072)
		[0.000 -	p =0.029	p=0.122	p = 0.002
		1.000]			
Correct Answer	244	0.584	0.041	0.088	0.047
Fbnew		(0.495)	(0.750)	(0.079)	(0.089)
		[0.000 -	p=0.585	p=0.263	p=0.596
		1.000]			
Correct Answer	245	0.833	0.010	0.093*	0.083
Fcnew		(0.374)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.064)
		[0.000 -	p=0.846	p=0.098	p=0.196
		1.000]			
Correct Answer	245	0.333	0.088	0.048	-0.040
Fdnew		(0.473)	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.088)
		[0.000 -	p=0.234	p=0.536	p=0.653
		1.000]			
Correct Answer	245	0.793	0.003	0.061	0.057
F3		(0.406)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.072)
		[0.000 -	p=0.958	p=0.342	p=0.428
		1.000]			
Attitudes					
Women Dare	247	0.684	-0.007	-0.030	-0.022
Rights (F4)		(0.479)	(0.073)	(0.078)	(0.089)
		[0.000 -	p=0.916	p=0.698	p=0.801
		1.000]		0.070	0.0.
Widow	247	0.703	0.047	0.079	0.031
Inheritance Rights		(0.459)	(0.068)	(0.082)	(0.082)
(F5)		- 000.0]	p=0.491	p=0.273	p=0697
		1.000]			0.0
VH's Not	247	0.336	-0.071	-0.027	0.043
Absolute Power		(0.474)	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.086)
(F6)		[0.000 -	p=0.324	p=0.712	p=0.612
т .' 1'		1.000]			
Impartiality					

	070	0.400	0.001	0.004	0.040
Proportion HHs	270	0.402	0.004	-0.006	-0.010
who don't say		(0.202)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.036)
most of VHs		[0.000 -	p=0.885	p=0.844	p=0.767
decisions fair		1.000]			
Proportion aware	270	0.467	0.054	-0.025	-0.079
of political		(0.636)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.108)
targeting of food		[-1.250 -	p=0.558	p=0.789	p=0.463
aid		2.000]			
Proportion of	256	0.617	0.081*	0.581	-0.023
non-family		(0.328)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.055)
members assisted		[0.000 -	p=0.087	p=0.231	p=0.681
		1.000]	-	-	-
Proportion of	152	0.681	0.021	0.054	0.033
people with		(0.333)	(0.066)	(0.071)	(0.079)
different political		[0.000 -	p=0.745	p=0.448	p=0.683
views assisted		1.000]	-	-	-
Proportion MDC	63	0.438	0.337**	0.098	-0.239
members assisted		(0.495)	(0.139)	(0.140)	(0.147)
		[0.000 -	p=0.018	p=0.492	p=0.108
		1.000]	1	1	1
Legitimacy					
Proportion who	270	0.409	-0.019	0.007	0.023
think most people		(0.213)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.037)
influenced by VH		0.000 -	p=0.625	p=0.831	p=0.546
,		0.875]	1	Ĩ	1
Proportion who	270	0.725	0.004	0.021	0.017
would report crop		(0.208)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.035)
destruction 1 st to		0.125 -	p=0.888	p=0.480	p=0.621
VH		1.000]	1	÷	÷
Proportion who	270	0.653	-0.030	0.017	0.047
always trust VH		(0.195)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.034)
		[0.000 -	p=0.301	p=0.573	p=0.169
		1.000	1	1	1
Average	270	8.140	-0.227	-0.073	0.154
relationship with		(0.916)	(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.161)
VH (scale of 0-10)		[6.000 -	p=0.101	p=0.603	p=0.341
		10.000	r	r	r
L	1	10.000		I	

	N	Control	Effect of VH	Effect of	Difference
		group	Training	VH + CL	between two
		Mean		Training	training
		(sd)			variants
		[min, max	D4	$\mathbf{D}1$ + $\mathbf{D}2$	Da
C C			B1	B1 + B2	B2
Conflict	070	0.010	0.000	0.010	0.400
Domestic violence	270	0.213	-0.099	0.010	0.109
		(0.451)	(0.070)	(0.072)	(0.082)
		[0.000 -	p=0.158	p=0.888	p=0.183
Marriage disputes	270	2.750] 0.281	0.019	-0.101	-0.120
Marriage disputes	270	(0.548)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.090)
		[0.000 -	p=0.803	p=0.199	p=0.182
		3.500]	p=0.005	p=0.177	p=0.162
Roora/bride wealth	270	0.070	0.013	0.061*	0.047
disputes	210	(0.192)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.036)
uisputes		[0.000 -	p=0.657	p=0.057	p=0.200
		1.500]	p 0.007	p 0.037	p 0.200
Physical Assault	270	0.164	0.000	-0.038	-0.038
HH		(0.389)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.059)
		[0.000 -	p=0.999	p=0.454	p=0.512
		3.750]	1	1	1
Physical Assault	247	1.328	-0.343	-0.437	-0.934
,		(3.510)	(0.461)	(0.486)	(0.554)
		[0.000 -	p=0.457	p=0.369	p=0.866
		30.00]	1	1	1
Burglaries and	270	0.475	0.033	-0.013	-0.046
Theft HH		(0.459)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.080)
		[0.000 -	p=0.628	p=0.851	p=0.563
		2.650]			
Burglaries and	246	2.290	0.001	1.601	1.600
Theft		(3.122)	(0.935)	(0.984)	(1.121)
		[0.000 -	p=0.999	p=0.105	p=0.155
		12.000]			
Land HH	270	0.340	0.037	-0.076	-0.144
		(0.642)	(0.772)	(0.781)	(0.090)
		- 000.0]	p=0.625	p=0.33	p=0.207
T 1	0.47	6.500]	0.204		0.(40
Land	247	1.101	0.304	0.952**	0.648
		(1.701)	(0.437)	(0.459)	(0.524)
		[0.000 -	p=0.486	p=0.039	p=0.217
Livestock HH	270	10.000]	0.096	-0.011	-0.108
	270	(1.043)	(0.158)	(0.161)	(0.184)
		(1.043) [0.000 -	p=0.539	p=0.942	p=0.555
		[0.000 - 5.000]	P-0.339	p=0.942	P-0.555
Livestock	246	2.938	1.016	0.432	-0.583
LAVESTOCIX	<i>4</i> f0	(3.981)	(0.873)	(0.926)	(1.054)
		[0.000 -	p=0.246	p=0.640	p=0.581
		20.000]		r 0.010	r
		20.000			

Witchcraft HH	270	0.232 (0.738)	-0.057 (0.083)	-0.103 (0.085)	-0.045 (0.096)
		[0.000 - 7.625]	p=0.485	p=0.223	p=0.640
Witchcraft	247	0.726 (1.980) [0.000 - 18.000]	-0.179 (0.286) p=0.531	-0.036 (0.304) p=0.906	0.144 (0.344) p=0.676
Political Intimidation and Violence	270	0.357 (0.360) [-0.750 - 1.500]	0.374 (0.076) p=0.624	0.178** (0.078) p=0.023	0.140 (0.089) p=0.118
Social Trust					
Don't say that they trust most people	2136	0.757 (0.439) [0.000 - 1.000]	-0.022 (0.286) p=0.451	-0.060* (0.347) p=0.08	-0.389 (0.377) p=0.303
Say there are groups they would not trust with their belongings	2144	0.189 (0.391) [0.000 - 1.000]	-0.019 (0.022) p=0.399	-0.017 (0.022) p=0.432	0.001 (0.025) p=0.973
Report divisions within their community	2105	0.435 (0.496) [0.000 - 1.000]	-0.025 (0.027) p=0.365	-0.020 (0.028) p=0.476	-0.004 (0.031) p=0.878
Collective Action					
Number of groups to which belong	1793	0.655 (0.970) [0.000 - 6.000]	0.076 (0.067) p=0.261	0.027 (0.066) p=0.687	-0.049 (0.074) p=0.517
Nhimbe participation	2140	0.671 (2.957) [0.000 - 48.000]	-0.112 (0.136) p=0.414	0.002 (0.154) p=0.991	-0.113 (0.155) p=0.464
Chema contributions	1943	7.570 (9.469) [0.000 - 71.000]	0.757 (0.581) p=0.897	-0.428 (0.531) p=0.421	-0.504 (0.605) p=0.406

	N	Control group Mean (sd) [min, max	Effect of VH Training B1	Effect of VH + CL Training B1 + B2	Difference between two training variants B2
Community-level			DI	$D1 \pm D2$	D2
participation					
Dare Attendance	2153	0.452	0.09	0.002	-0.009
		(0.498) [0.000 - 1.000]	(0.035) p=0.799	(0.324) p=0.993	(0.038) p=0.813
Meeting attendance	2151	0.741 (0.438) [0.000 - 1.000]	-0.09 (0.028) p=0.743	0.005 (0.275) p=0.846	-0.014 (0.032) p=0.743
Spoke at a meeting	1774	0.459 (0.499) [0.000 - 1.000]	0.010 (0.324) p=0.753	-0.004 (0.0356) p=0.892	-0.015 (0.040) p=0.708
Contacted VH to raise issue/ask assistance	2154	0.419 (0.494) [0.000 - 1.000]	0.023 (0.038) p=0.397	0.007 (0.030) p=0.808	-0.016 (0.032) p=0.618
Community-level participation (non- VH directed)					
Contacted councilor to raise issue/ask assistance	2151	0.257 (0.437) [0.000 - 1.000]	0.007 (0.029) p=0.793	-0.009 (0.305) p=0.760	-0.016 (0.034) p=0.621
Contacted other local leader to raise issue/ask assistance	2151	0.255 (0.436) [0.000 - 1.000]	0.001 (0.026) p=0.824	-0.026 (0.285) p=0.348	-0.009 (0.031) p=0.299
National-level participation					
Voted or contacted politician in past year	1286	0.813 (0.390) [0.000 - 1.000]	-0.001 (0.033) p=0.953	0.049 (0.341) p=0.150	0.051 (0.040) p=0.206
Supported opposition	2138	0.030 (0.170) [0.000 - 1.000]	0.026* (0.014) p=0.059	0.019 (0.012) p=0.132	-0.007 (0.016) p=0.676

Heterogenous Effects on Good Governance

Interaction	Ν	VH	CL	VH*	CL*
Variable				Interaction	Interaction
Previous	174	-0.289	0.277	0.348	-0.242
training		(0.101)	(0.113)	(0.131)	(0.151)
		p=0.005	p=0.015	p=0.009	p = 0.111
Index of VH	247	-0.055	0.105	-0.097	0.002
"Modernity"		(0.057)	(0.068)	(0.072)	(0.086)
		p =0.333	p = 0. 125	p=0.182	p= 0.976
Communal	244	-0.254	0.247	0.288	-0.198
		(0.106)	(0.125)	(0.126)	(0.149)
		p=0.018	p=0.049	p=0.023	p = 0.185
Geographic	265	-0.419	0.108	0.039	0.062
Isolation		(0.056)	(0.066)	(0.110)	(0.140)
		p=0.459	p=0.101	p=0.719	p = 0.659
History of	260	-0. 133	0. 185	0.303	-0. 203
Divisions		(0.082)	(0.095)	(0.186)	(0.203)
		p=0.106	p=0.054	p=0.105	p = 0.316
Chiefdom	270	-0.037	0.159	- 0.023	-0.090
(Zimunya=1)		(0.074)	(0.087)	(0.112)	(0.130)
		p=0.614	p=0.070	p=0.837	p = 0.490

Heterogenous Effects on Total Conflict

Interaction	N	VH	CL	VH*	CL*
Variable				Interaction	Interaction
Previous	174	0.461	-0.378	-0.678	0.709
training		(0.467)	(0.524)	(0.608)	(0.700)
_		p =0.325	p = 0. 473	p=0.266	p= 0.313
Index of VH	247	-0.088	-0.034	0.072	0.044
"Modernity"		(0.233)	(0.280)	(0.297)	(0.351)
		p =0.706	p = 0. 903	p =0.808	p = 0.900
Communal	244	-0.379	0.650	0.381	-0.960
		(0.432)	(0.506)	(0.510)	(0.603)
		p =0.380	p = 0.200	p=0.456	p= 0.113
Index	265	-0.017	-0.031	-1.338	0395
Geographic		(0.233)	(0.273)	(0.455)	(0. 580)
Isolation		p =0.939	p = 0. 909	p=0.004	p= 0. 496
History of	260	-0279	0.059	0.698	-0259
Divisions		(0.351)	(0.406)	(0.793)	(0.865)
		p =0.427	p = 0. 884	p=0.379	p = 0.764
Chiefdom	270	-0.120	0.027	0.312	-0.282
(Zimunya=1)		(0.309)	(0.365)	(0.466)	(0.542)
		p=0.698	p=0.940	p=0.503	p = 0.603

APPENDIX D. BALANCE STATISTICS

Variables	Year 1	Year 2	p value	VH Training	VH & CL Training	p-value
% Communal	71	71	0.92	72	69	0.74
% Old resettlement	0.17	0.17	0.94	14	20	0.39
Average no. of HH in Village	163	171	0.61	148	181	0.19
Average no. of community groups in village	4.5	4.1	0.07	4.4	4.6	0.43
% female VHs	4	8	0.22	4	5	0.95
% VHs with more than primary education	66	72	0.31	66	65	0.99
Average age of VH	65	64	0.56	65	64	0.74
Average no. of years VH in power	15	13	0.46	14	16	0.59
Average age of adults	43	43	0.51	44	42	0.11
% ppl with more than primary education	54	52	0.73	52	56	0.34
% ppl with most income from farming	100	99	0.17	100	100	0.53
% ppl who own plots	88	86	0.11	88	89	0.69
Village ELF by ethnic groups	0.60	0.59	0.62	0.60	0.60	0.90
% ppl.born in village	47	49	0.49	48	46	0.61
% of newspaper readers	0.20	0.20	0.90	0.22	0.18	0.11
Average # of groups to which community members belong	0.72	0.67	0.39	0.73	0.70	0.64
Average cattle wealth index	2.1	1.8	0.17	2.3	1.9	0.23

APPENDIX E. Household Survey Questionnaire

Section A. Background Information							
A1. How old were you at your last birthday?							
years							
88 DK -99 RF							
A2. What is your relationship to the head of the household?							
1 • Head 2 • Spouse 3 • Son/Daughter							
4 • Grandson/daughter 50 Son/daughter-in-law 60 Sibling							
70 Other relative							
80 Adopted/foster child							
9 ○ Not related 88□ DK -99□ RF							
A3. What is your current marital status?							
1 ○Single 2 ○ Married 3 ○Widowed 4 ○ Divorced 88□ DK -99□ RF							
A4. What is your religion? [If Christian, ask for denomination]							
1 • Traditional 2 • Roman Catholic 3 • Anglican 4 • Methodist							
50 Seventh Day Adventist 60 Pentecostal 100 Apostolic							
70 Other Christian: 80 Other:							
90 None 88□ DK -99□ RF							
A5. How often do you attend religious services each month?							
times per month 77 🗆 NA 88							
DK -99□ RF							
A6. What is the highest level or grade of education you have							
completed?							
$1 \circ No$ education/less than primary							
2 • Some Primary Education 30 Finished primary (Standard 5/Grade 7)							
40 ZJC (Zimbabwe Junior Certificate) 50 "O" Level 60 "A" Level							
⁷ ○ Diploma after secondary ₈ ○ University							
90 Other:							

66 🗆 NONE88 DK -99 RF	
11 • Other	
6 ○ Moyo 7 ○ Nzou 8 ○ Shava 9 ○ Shumba	
$1 \circ$ Beta $2 \circ$ Bonga $3 \circ$ Chihwa $4 \circ$ Chirar	ndu 5 o Dziva
A13. What is your mutupo (totem)?	
7° Chimaungwe 8° Karanga 9° Other:	
$1 \circ \text{English} \ 2 \circ \text{Manyika} \ 3 \circ \text{Zezuru} \ 4 \circ \text{Jindy}$	wiso Bocha so Ndau
<i>between dialects</i>	c. [1] Shona, aistingaish
<u>7○ Maungwes○ Karanga9 ○ Other:</u> A12. Which language is your home languag	
1 ○ Shona2 ○ Manyika3 ○ Zezuru4○ Jindwi5 ○ Be	
A11a. What is your ethnic or cultural group	
	88□ DK -99□ RF
outside the village?	
A10. Does anyone in this household current	ntly do wage labor
A9b. If so, what is the type of business? [m	rite in all]
1 ° Yes 2 ° No	88□ DK -99□ RF
	heir own business?
90 Other:	77 □ NA88□ DK -99□ RF
70 Piece work 80 Remittances	
$4 \circ$ Masonry $5 \circ$ Carpentry $6 \circ$ Builder	' '
$1 \circ \text{Teaching } 2 \circ \text{Civil servant} 3 \circ \text{Hawking/tradin}$	n
A8b. If something else, what?	88□ DK -99□ RF
something else? 1 • Farming 2 • Something else	
Aoa. Does this nousenoid get most of its in	icome from farming or
90 Other: A8a. Does this household get most of its in	
70 Diploma after secondary ₈ 0 University	
40 ZJC (Zimbabwe Junior Certificate)50 "O" Leve	
2 • Some Primary Education ₃ • Finished primar	y (Standard 5/Grade 7)
$1 \circ$ No education/less than primary	
completed?	ducation your rather
A7. What is the highest level and grade of e	ducation your father

A14a. Were your parents living in this village when you were	A6. What is the highest level or grade of education you have
born?	completed?
1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No 88□ DK -99□ RF	$1 \circ$ No education/less than primary
A15. For how many years have you been living in this village?	2 ° Some Primary Education 3° Finished primary (Standard
	5/Grade 7)
Section A. Background Information	40 ZJC (Zimbabwe Junior Certificate)50 "O" Level60 "A" Level
A1. How old were you at your last birthday?	70 Diploma after secondary80 University
years	90
88 DK -99 RF	Other:
A2. What is your relationship to the head of the household?	DK -99□ RF
$1 \circ \text{Head} \square \square \square \square \square 2 \circ \text{Spouse}$ $3 \circ \text{Son/Daughter}$	
$4 \circ \text{Grandson/daughter}$ 50 Son/daughter-in-law $\Box 60$	
Sibling	
70 Other relative \Box	A7. What is the highest level and grade of education your father
80 Adopted/foster child	completed?
$9 \circ \text{Not related}$	$1 \circ \text{No education/less than primary}$
88 DK -99 RF	2 • Some Primary Education 3 • Finished primary (Standard
A3. What is your current marital status?	5/Grade 7)
$1 \circ \text{Single} \ 2 \circ \text{Married} \ 3 \circ \text{Widowed} \ 4 \circ \text{Divorced}$	40 ZJC (Zimbabwe Junior Certificate)50 "O" Level60 "A" Level
88 DK -99 RF	70 Diploma after secondary80 University
A4. What is your religion? [If Christian, ask for denomination]	90 Other:
$1 \circ \text{Traditiona} \square \square 2 \circ \text{Roman Catholic } 3 \circ \text{Anglican} \square 4 \circ$	88 DK -99 RF
Methodist	A8a. Does this household get most of its income from farming or
5° Seventh Day Adventist \Box 6° Pentecostal 10° Apostolic	something else?
70 Other Christian:	$1 \circ \text{Farming 2} \circ \text{Something else}$ 88
90 None 88□	DK -99 RF
DK -99□ RF	A8b. If something else, what?
A5. How often do you attend religious services each month?	$1 \circ \text{Teaching } 2 \circ \text{Civil servant3} \circ \text{Hawking/trading}$
\dots times per month $77 \square NA$	$4 \circ$ Masonry $5 \circ$ Carpentry $6 \circ$ Builder
88 DK -99 RF	70 Piece work 80 Remittances
	90 Other:

NA88□ DK -99□ RF

A9a. Does anyone in this household own their own business?									
$1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$									
88 DK -99 RF									
A9b. If so, what is the type of business? [write in all]									
A10. Does anyone in this household currently do wage labor									
outside the village?									
$1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$									
88 DK -99 RF									
A11a. What is your ethnic or cultural group? [do not prompt]									
1 ° Shona2 ° Manyika3 ° Zezuru4°Jindwi5 ° Bocha6 ° Ndau									
70 Maungwe80 Karanga9 0 Other:									
99 RF									
A12. Which language is your home language? [If Shona,									
distinguish between dialects]									
$1 \circ$ English $2 \circ$ Manyika $3 \circ$ Zezuru $4 \circ$ Jindwi $5 \circ$ Bocha									
$6 \circ \text{Ndau}$ 7°Chimaungwe 8° Karanga 9°									
Other:									
A13. What is your mutupo (totem)?									
1 ○ Beta 2 ○ Bonga 3 ○ Chihwa 4 ○ Chirandu 5 ○ Dziva									
$6 \circ$ Moyo 7 \circ Nzou 8 \circ Shava 9 \circ Shumba 10 \circ Soko 11 \circ Other									
$66 \square \text{ NONE88} \square \text{ DK} -99 \square \text{ RF}$									
A14a. Were your parents living in this village when you were									
born?									
$1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$									
88 DK -99 RF									
A15. For how many years have you been living in this village?									
88 DK -99 RF									

B1. I am goi	ng to rea	d you a	list of differe	nt gr	oups. For each						
group, pleas	se indicat	te whet	her one of the	ese g	roups is active ir						
this community, whether you currently belong to it, and											
	•		a leadership i	-							
Group	Exists?		Belong?		Leader?						
Religious	1 0 Yes	2 0 No	1 ° Yes 2 ° No)	1 ° Yes 2 ° No						
C C	88□ DK -99	🗆 RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□	RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF						
Village	1 0 Yes	2 0 No	1 ° Yes 2 ° No)	1 ° Yes 2 ° No						
Savings and	88□ DK -99	🗆 RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□	RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF						
Lendings											
Agriculture/	1 0 Yes	2 0 No	$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No)	$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No						
Farming	88□ DK -99		77□NA 88□DK -99□		77□NA 88□DK -99□RF						
Craft	1 0 Yes	2 0 No	$1 \circ \text{Yes} \ 2 \circ \text{Nc}$)	$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No						
	88□ DK -99		77□NA 88□DK -99□RF		77□NA 88□DK -99□R						
Develop-	1 0 Yes		$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No)	$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No						
ment	88□ DK -99		77□NA 88□DK -99□RF		77□NA 88□DK -99□RF						
Peace	1 0 Yes	2 0 No	$1 \circ \text{Yes} \ 2 \circ \text{Nc}$)	$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No						
committees	88□ DK -99		77□NA 88□DK -99□		77 NA 88 DK -99 R						
Women's	1 0 Yes		$1 \circ Yes \ 2 \circ Nc$		1 ° Yes 2 ° No						
groups	88□ DK -99										
B2a. Are the	ere any o	ther or	ganizations ac	tive i	in this village?						
For each gro	oup, plea	se indio	cate whether y	/ou c	urrently belong						
-	• • •		•		ship role in the						
	ictlici ye			uuci	sinp role in the						
group.											
$1 \circ \text{Yes} \ 2 \circ \text{N}$			-	т.	88 UDK -99 RF						
Group [writ	e in]	Belong	?	Lea	ader?						
		1 • Yes	s 2 0 No	1 0	Yes 2 O No						
77□NA 88□DK -99	□RF	77□NA 8	8□DK -99□RF	77□	NA 88□DK -99□RF						
		1 ° Yes	s 2 0 No	10	1 • Yes 2 • No						
77□NA 88□DK -99			8□DK -99□RF	77□	NA 88□DK -99□RF						
			s ₂ ○ No	1.0	$1 \circ \text{Yes} \ 2 \circ \text{No}$						
		10163		10	1 ○ Y es 2 ○ NO 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF						
77□NA 88□DK -99			8□DK -99□RF	77 🗆							

Г

B2b. Do you feel close to any other masang	<i>gano</i> in this
country?	
1 • Yes 2 • No	88□ DK -99□ RF
B2c. If so, which ones?[write in all mention	ed]
1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4° 6	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
B3. Generally speaking, would you say that	: most people can
be trusted or that you have to be careful in	dealing with
people?	
$1 \circ$ Most people can be trusted $2 \circ$ You have to be	e careful 88□ DK -99□ RF
B4. In the past twelve months, how many	times did you or
someone else in your household work on c	other farms as part
of a nhimbe?	
times	88□ DK -99□ RF
B5. In the past twelve months , how much	chema has your
household paid?	
dollars (US)	88□ DK -
99 RF	
B8b. Are there groups within this village w	ho you would not
trust with something you own, such as farr	ning equipment?
1 ◦ Yes 2 ◦ No	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
B8c. If so, which groups? [tick all that apply	/]
$1 \circ \mathbf{P}$ $2 \circ \mathbf{NP}$	
1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4° 6	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
B9a. Are there any issues that divide you ir	
	88□ DK -99□ RF
B9b. If so, what are they?	
$1 \circ P$ $2 \circ NP$	
B10a. [If over 45 ask] Think back three deca	-
period just after independence. At that tim	
issues that divided you within this commur	nity?
	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
B10b. If so, what were they?	
$1 \circ P$ $2 \circ NP$	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF

B11. If your family did not have enough food, who would you
turn to first for assistance?[do not prompt]
1 O Village head 2 O Headman 3 O Chief 4O Family member
B12. If they could not help you, who would you turn to
next?[do not prompt]
1 O Village head 2 O Headman 3 O Chief 4O Family member

Section C. Disputes in Community I will list a number of problems people sometimes experience. Please let me know if you or someone else in your household has experienced this problem. [NOTE: Questions B & D should be asked differently depending on whether they have experienced problems]

Type of problems	(A) # times in			•		·					nong	(C) Was the issue					-						(E) Was the issue
.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	past 12										you were to	resolved to your	(D) If the issue was not satisfactorily resolved , who did you take it to next? (If the issues had not been satisfactorily resolved, who would you have taken it to							resolved to your			
	months?										, ake it to first?)	satisfaction?							satisfaction?				
													nex	kt?) [a	do no	ot pro	mpt]						
	[Write "0" if																	t					
	no times. If		- L				Magistrate's court			L				Ľ.				Magistrate's court			L		
	more than one		mp	σ			s ci			cilo				member	σ			's ci			cilo		
	dispute, ask		me	/illage head	an		ate			ouno				me	hea	an		ate			councilor		
	about most	spu	j	ge	qui	÷	gistr	e	rch	al co			nds	j	ge	dmi	ų.	gistr	e	rch	al cc		
	recent.]	Friends	Family member	/illa	Headman	Chief	Mag	Police	Church	-ocal councilor			Friends	Family	Village head	Headman	Chief	Иа£	Police	Church	ocal		
C1. Boundary	times	-			_	Ŭ		-	Ŭ		Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No					Ŭ	-	1	0		Other:	$1 \circ \text{Yes } 2 \circ \text{No}$
disputes	 88□ DK -99□ RF										66□NONE	3 o Pending										66□NONE	3 o Pending
											88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF										88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -
62. 6											Othor	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No										Other:	99□RF 1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No
C2. Crop	times										Other: 66□NONE	3 o Pending										66□NONE	3 o Pending
destruction by livestock	88□ DK -99□ RF										88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF										88 DK -99 RF	77□NA 88□DK-99□RF
C3. Burglaries	times										Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No										Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No
and theft	times 88□ DK -99□ RF										66□NONE	3 ○ Pending										66□NONE	3 ∘ Pending
	881 DK -991 RF										88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF										88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -
																							99□RF
C4. Victim of or	<pre> times</pre>										Other:	1 ∘ Yes 2 ∘ No										Other:	1 ∘ Yes 2 ∘ No
accused of	88□ DK -99□ RF										66□NONE	3 · Pending										66□NONE	3 · Pending
witchcraft											88□DK -99□RF	77 NA 88 DK -99 RF										88□DK -99□RF	77 DNA 88 DK -99 RF
C5. Domestic	times										Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No 3 ○ Pending										Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No 3 ○ Pending
violence	88□ DK -99□ RF										66⊡NONE 88⊡DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF										66□NONE 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
C6. Adultery	timos										Other:	1 ∘ Yes 2 ∘ No											1 ∘ Yes 2 ∘ No
CO. Additery	times										66□NONE	3 ∘ Pending										66□NONE	3 o Pending
	88□ DK -99□ RF										88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF										88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
C7. Marriage	times										Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No										Other:	1 ∘ Yes 2 ∘ No
disputes	88□ DK -99□ RF										66□NONE	3 o Pending										66□NONE	3 o Pending
											88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF										88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
C8. Roora/ bride	times										Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No										Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No
wealth dispute	88□ DK -99□ RF										66□NONE	3 ○ Pending 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF										66□NONE	3 ○ Pending 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
CO D - - - - - - - - - -											88□DK -99□RF	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No										88□DK -99□RF	1 ° Yes 2 ° No
C9. Rape	times										Other: 66□NONE	$3 \circ \text{Pending}$										Other: 66□NONE	$3 \circ \text{Pending}$
	88□ DK -99□ RF											77□NA 88□DK -99□RF											77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
C10. Physically	times										Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No										Other:	1 ∘ Yes 2 ∘ No
harmed by	times 88□ DK -99□ RF	1									66□NONE	3 o Pending										66□NONE	3 o Pending
others											88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF										88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
C11. Murder	times	1	l			l			l		Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No	1			1					l	Other:	$1 \circ \text{Yes } 2 \circ \text{No}$
	88□ DK -99□ RF										66□NONE	3 o Pending										66□NONE	3 o Pending
		<u> </u>									88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF				<u> </u>						88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
C12. Property	times										Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No										Other:	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No
destruction	88□ DK -99□ RF										66□NONE											66□NONE	
											88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF										88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF

C15. Do you think m	ost, some or none of the	outcomes					
from taking disputes	s to the village head are f	air?					
$1 \circ Most \ 2 \circ Some \ 3 \circ Some \ 3 \circ Some \ 3 \circ Some \ So$	> None	88□ DK -99□					
RF C16. If someone had	stolen something from	vou nlease tell					
	nk taking the problem to						
	ould be better in terms	0					
things:							
Speed of solution	$1 \circ VH 2 \circ Police 3 \circ Same$	88□ DK -99□ RF					
Fairness of	$1 \circ VH 2 \circ Police 3 \circ Same$						
solution							
Cost	¹ ○ VH ² ○ Police ³ ○ Same	88 DK -99 RF					
Effectiveness in	$1 \circ VH_2 \circ Police_3 \circ Same$						
achieving solution							
C17. In an ideal world, would you prefer that the village head's dare had more, less or the same amount of power to							
	re, less of the same amo	unt of power to					
resolve disputes?	₃ o The same	88□ DK -99□					
RF	3 ° The Same	00 DK -99					
C18.When the villag	e head holds a hearing, o	loes he					
typically solicit advice	e from the general publi	c on the					
appropriate comper	isation?						
1 • Yes 2 • No RF		88□ DK -99□					
	head usually publicly just	stify the					
-	ation demanded in a cas						
1 ° Yes 2 ° No		88□ DK -99□					
RF							
Section D. Commun	· ·						
-	lve months, have you m	•					
-	issues or ask for assistar	ice with a					
problem?							
1 • Yes 2 • No		88 🗌 DK -99 🗌 RF					

D1b. If so, how many times?	
times	77 🗌 NA 88 🗌 DK -99 🗌 RF
D2a. In the past twelve months, have	e you met with the village
head from a neighboring village to rai	se issues or ask for
assistance with a problem?	
1 ° Yes 2 ° No	88 🗌 DK -99 🗌 RF
D2b. If so, how many times?	
times	77 🗌 NA 88 🗌 DK -99 🗌 RF
D3a. In the past twelve months , have	e you met with your
headmen to raise issues or ask for ass	sistance with a problem?
$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No	88 🗆 DK -99 🗌 RF
D3b. If so, how many times?	
times	77 🗌 NA 88 🗌 DK -99 🗌 RF
D4a. In the past twelve months, have	e you met with your local
D4a. In the past twelve months , have councilor to raise issues or ask for ass	e you met with your local istance with a problem?
D4a. In the past twelve months , have councilor to raise issues or ask for ass $1 \circ \text{Yes} \ 2 \circ \text{No}$	e you met with your local
D4a. In the past twelve months , have councilor to raise issues or ask for ass	e you met with your local istance with a problem?
D4a. In the past twelve months , have councilor to raise issues or ask for ass $1 \circ \text{Yes} \ 2 \circ \text{No}$	e you met with your local istance with a problem?
D4a. In the past twelve months , have councilor to raise issues or ask for ass 1 \circ Yes 2 \circ No D4b. If so, how many times?	e you met with your local istance with a problem? 88 DK -99 RF 77 NA 88 DK -99 RF
D4a. In the past twelve months , have councilor to raise issues or ask for ass 1 ° Yes 2 ° No D4b. If so, how many times?	e you met with your local istance with a problem? 88 DK -99 RF 77 NA 88 DK -99 RF e you met with any other
D4a. In the past twelve months , have councilor to raise issues or ask for ass <u>1 o Yes 2 o No</u> D4b. If so, how many times? <u></u>	e you met with your local istance with a problem? 88 DK -99 RF 77 NA 88 DK -99 RF e you met with any other
D4a. In the past twelve months , have councilor to raise issues or ask for ass 1 ° Yes 2 ° No D4b. If so, how many times? 	e you met with your local istance with a problem? 88 DK -99 RF 77 NA 88 DK -99 RF e you met with any other
D4a. In the past twelve months , have councilor to raise issues or ask for ass 1 \circ Yes 2 \circ No D4b. If so, how many times? 	e you met with your local istance with a problem? 88 DK -99 RF 77 NA 88 DK -99 RF e you met with any other assistance with a 88 DK -99 RF
D4a. In the past twelve months , have councilor to raise issues or ask for ass <u>1 o Yes 2 o No</u> D4b. If so, how many times? <u></u>	e you met with your local istance with a problem? 88 DK -99 RF 77 NA 88 DK -99 RF e you met with any other assistance with a 88 DK -99 RF

														٦								
Fo	r th	e	follo	owi	ng	pec	ple,	can y	/ou t	rust	ther	n to d	o the right									
						netir	-	rare														
D9	. Vil	lag	le he	ead				-		Some	etime	S 3 O	Rare $4 \circ$ Never		No	<i>w</i> l'm	goir	ng to	read	d you	a nu	umb
	0.1	1					88□ DK -99□ RF 1 ○ Always 2 ○ Sometimes 3 ○ Rare 4 ○ Never							-	like	you	to te	ell mo	e if y	ou st	rong	χly a
D1	0. H	lea	dma	an				-		Some	etime	S 30	Rare 4 ° Never			-				h the	-	
D1	1. C	hie	∽f					K -99□ Jwave		Some	time	S 3 0	Rare 4 o Never	-						his v		
	1. 0	/						K -99□		Cont	201110	J 5 5 0					•	-		1113 V	mag	2 010
D1	2. L	oc	al co	oun	cilo	r				Some	etime	S 3 0	Rare 4 ° Never			d's c	•		Aaro		iooar	
							88□ D	K -99□	RF						10.	Strong	iy agi		Agree	e3 o D	Isagie	364 0
D1	3. N	1P						$1 \circ \text{Always} \ 2 \circ \text{Sometimes} \ 3 \circ \text{Rare} \ 4 \circ \text{Never}$							D20)new	. My	owr	n pol	itical	viev	vs ar
						6.0.1		K -99□		<u>.</u> .				-	my	villa	ge he	ead.				
											-	-	and 0 is very		105	Strong	ly agr	ee 2 0	Agree	e3 o D	isagre	ee 4 0
							u thi	nk th	ne vil	lage	head	d's rel	ationship is		D21	new	. No	wada	avs v	ve fe	el fre	e to
wi	th t	he	he	adı	ma	n?		-				-				nmur			.,			
0	1		2	3		4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88□ DK -99□ RF					ee 2 0	Aaree	es o D	isaare	ее 4 с
D1	5. (Эn	a s	cal	e o	f 0 t	o 10	, whe	ere 1	0 is v	/ery	good	and 0 is very		-		.,					
											-	-	ationship is		D21	lfa	seri	0115.1	hroh	lem a	irose	in '
			ch			- / -		-	-	0-										nent		
0	1		2	3	- -	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88□ DK -99□ RF	-		•		•		es o D		
-		<u>ר</u>	-	_			-	-	-	-	-			-						t nee		
											-	-	and 0 is very				-			s vill		
			-			-		nκτr	ie vil	iage	nea	a s rei	ationship is		•		•	•			•	
	1	ne		-	1	uncil	1	1			1	1	r	4						es o D		
0	1		2	3		4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88□ DK -99□ RF						-	head		
D1	8. 0	Эn	a s	cal	e o	f 0 t	o 10	, whe	ere 1	0 is \	/ery	good	and 0 is very		-			OTTIC	lais i	n ma	KINg	, aec
ba	d, ŀ	0	N go	000	l is	the	villa	ge he	ead's	rela	tion	ship v	vith you?			villa	0			-		
0	1		2	3	- 1	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88□ DK -99□ RF	1						es o D		
-		n				nuni	-						ecause of	1						of 0 t		
							•	•					councilor?							ou be		
			0 N		Cel	i tile	~ viii	age I	cau	anu	uie i		88 DK -99 RF		ma	ke to	brin	g be	nefit	s to	/our	fam
10	100	2 و	~ 11	0											0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
															-			-	1		-	1 1

lov	/ I'm	goir	ng to	read	l you	a nu	ımbe	er of	state	men	ts, and I'd
ke you to tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree or											
tro	ngly	disa	Igree	with	n the	stat	eme	nt.			
20	. Mc	ost p	eople	e in t	his vi	illage	e are	influ	ence	ed by	the village
iea	d's o	pinio	ons.								
0 S	trong	ly agr	ee 2 0	Agree	es o D	isagre	$e_4 \circ s$	Strong	ly disa	agree	88□DK - 99□RF
020	20new. My own political views are very similar to those of										
ny v	villa	ge he	ead.								
• S	trong	ly agr	ee 2 0	Agree	e₃ ○ D	isagre	$\mathbf{e}_4 \circ \mathbf{s}_4$	Strong	ly disa	agree	88□DK - 99□RF
)21	new	. No	wada	ays w	e fee	el fre	e to	expr	ess c	our vi	ews in this
	mur	•									
° S	trong	ly agr	ee 2 0	Agree	e₃ ○ D	isagre	$\mathbf{e}_4 \circ \mathbf{s}_4$	Strong	ly disa	agree	88□DK - 99□RF
							• •				
			•						-		village head
	0		egov				•				
											88□DK - 99□RF
		-					ie vil	lage	head	r's as	sistance to
-		•	ple i			-		0 4	المراجع		
											88□DK - 99□RF
				-				-		-	other
			offic	ials i	n ma	king	deci	sions	s abo	ut h	ow to govern
	villa	0									
											88□DK - 99□RF
											and 0 is not
								•			t politicians
nak	e to	brin	g be	nefit	s to y	/our	fami	ly in	parti	cula	r?
)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	88□ DK -99□ RF
										0	

D22	2bne	w. O	n a s	cale o	of 0 t	o 10,	whe	re 10) is a	lot a	nd 0 is not at
all,	how	muc	h do	you l	oeliev	ve the	e pro	mise	s tha	t poli	ticians make
to b	oring	bene	efits t	o the	e cou	ntry i	in gei	neral	?		
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	88□ DK -99□ RF
										0	

Now I wou	uld like to ask	some question	ns about assista	ance some
household	ls receive.			
	In the past 12 months, how many times didyou receive assistance ?	If so, who was the assistance from?[choose multiple]	If so, who distributed it to you?[choose multiple]	If so, how much did you last receive?
D23. Maize food aid?	 88□ DK -99□ RF	10 PLAN 20 WFP 30 Govt 40 Other: 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	1 ° VH 2 ° PLAN 3 ° WFP 4 ° Councillor 5 ° Other: 77 □ NA 88 □DK -99□RF	kg 77⊡NA 88⊡DK -99⊡RF
D24. Subsidiz ed maize seed?	 88□ DK -99□ RF	10 Govt 20 Presidential present 30 NGO: 40 Other: 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	1 ○ VH 2 ○ GMB 3 ○ Councillor 4 ○ Other: 77 □ NA 88 □DK -99□RF	kg 770NA 880DK -990RF
D25. Grain Ioans?	 88⊡ DK -99⊡ RF	10 Govt 20 Other: 77⊡NA 88□DK -99□RF	1 ° VH 2 ° GMB 3 ° Councillor 4 ° Other: 77 □ NA 88 □DK -99□RF	kg 77⊡NA 88⊡DK -99⊡RF

D26a. In the past twelve months, did your ho	usehold pay a
development levy to the village head?	
1 • Yes 2 • No	88□ DK -99□ RF
D26b. If so, how much?	
dollars (US)	77□NA 88□DK -
99□RF	
D29. In the past twelve months , did your hou	isehold
contribute to brewing beer for the rainmaking	g ceremony?
1 ° Yes 2 ° No	88□ DK -99□ RF
D30a. Think back to the <i>last time a member o</i>	of your
household died. Did your household have to p	bay the village
head for the burial ground?	
1 • Yes 2 • No	88□ DK -99□ RF
D30b. If so, what was the payment? [approxir	nate value if in
kind]	
dollars	77□NA 88□DK -
99□RF	
D31a. Think back to the <i>last dispute</i> you took	to the village
head's court. Did you have to make a paymen	it to have the
dispute heard?	
1 ° Yes 2 ° No	88□ DK -99□ RF
D31b. If so, what was the payment? [approxir	nate value if in
kind]	
dollars (US)77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	
D32. In the past twelve months , have you att	ended a dare
hearing?	
1 • Yes 2 • No	88□ DK -99□ RF
D33. In the past twelve months, have you spo	oken at a dare
meeting?	
	88□ DK -99□ RF
D34newa. In the past twelve months, has you	ur village had a
village assembly?	
1 • Yes 2 • No	88□ DK -99□ RF

D34newb. If so, did you attend?	
1 ° Yes 2 ° No	88□ DK -99□ RF
D34newc. In the past twelve months , have you	attended a
community meeting of any type in this village?	
1 ° Yes 2 ° No	88□ DK -99□ RF
D35a. In the past twelve months , have you atte	nded a
community meeting in another village?	
1 ° Yes 2 ° No	88□ DK -99□ RF
D36. In the past twelve months , have you ever	spoken in a
community meeting?	
	7□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D37. Are you currently a member of the village l	nead's dare?
	88□ DK -99□ RF
D38. Are you currently a member of the VIDCO?	
1 • Yes 2 • No	88□ DK -99□ RF
Section E. Knowledge of Laws and Rights	
E1. According to the laws of Zimbabwe, do indiv	iduals have
the right to appeal fines levied by primary court	s?
1 ° Yes 2 ° No RF	88□ DK -99□
E2. If an individual appeals a primary court decis	sion, do they
have a right to a copy of the proceedings from t	he court?
1 O Yes 2 O No RF	88□ DK -99□
Eanew. In Zimbabwe, can traditional leaders be	removed
from office by anyone?	
1 • Yes 2 • No RF	88□ DK -99□
Ebnew. According to the laws of Zimbabwe, can	traditional
leaders preside over any case committed within	his or her
jurisdiction?	
1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No RF	88□ DK -99□
Ecnew. In Zimbabwe, should the police be inform	med of
every case of sexual violence?	

1 • Yes 2 • No RF	88□ DK -99□
Ednew. Who should chair the ward based committee	s such as
Ward Health Centre Committee and Environment	
Management Sub-committee ?[do not prompt]	
$_1 \circ$ Village Head $_2 \circ$ Headman $_3 \circ$ Chief $_4 \circ$ Councillor $_5 \circ$ Other $_{99}\square RF$	88□DK -
E3. According to the laws of Zimbabwe, what is the	legal age
of majority for women in Zimbabwe?	
years	88□
DK -99□ RF	
I'm going to read you a number of statements, and	then I'd
like you to tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disa	gree or
strongly disagree with the statement.	
E4. Women should have the right to speak in their	own
defense at dare hearings.	
1 O Strongly agree 2 O Agree3 O Disagree4 O Strongly disagree	88□DK -
99□RF	
E5. A widow should have the right to inherit land.	
$1 \circ$ Strongly agree $2 \circ$ Agree $3 \circ$ Disagree $4 \circ$ Strongly disagree 39 □RF	88□DK -
E6. Community members should always obey what	the
village head says.	
$_1 \circ $ Strongly agree $_2 \circ $ Agree $_3 \circ $ Disagree $_4 \circ $ Strongly disagree $_5 $	88□DK -
99□RF	
Section F. Community Development and Participa	tion
[Interviewer: Consult contact sheet to determine with	hich
version of the following questions to administer to	each
respondent.]	
I am going to read you a list of things that sometim	es
happen in communities. Please tell me, in the past	
how many of these things have happened in this vi	-
not tell me which ones, just how many.	5
· • /	

F1A. [Read 3-item list	ton	F1B. [Read 4-item list on					
card F1]		card F1]					
Number of items:							
		Number of items:					
F2A. [Read 3-item list	on	F2B.[Read	4-item list on card				
card F2]		F2]					
Number of items:		-					
		Number of	f items:				
Now I am going to rea	ad you a li	st of organi	izations that				
people sometimes ap	prove of.	Please tell	me how many of				
these things you appr	-		•				
how many.	0100.20		ee eee, je.ee				
F3A. [Read 3-item list	oncara	F3B.[Read 4-item list on					
F3]		card F3]					
Number of items:		N	. ()				
		Number of items:					
F4. What are the thre	e projects	that you w	vould wish for in				
this community in orc	ler of imp	ortance? [d	lo not prompt]				
Choice # 1	Choice #	2	Choice # 3				
1 o Borehole	1 o Boreho	ole	1 o Borehole				
2 • Toilets	2 • Toilets		2 • Toilets				
₃ ○ School	3 O Schoo		3 O School				
$4 \circ \text{Clinics}$			4 • Clinics				
5 • Other:	⁵ ○ Other:		5 O				
88□ DK -99□ RF	88□ DK -9	9□ RF	Other:				
		<u></u> .	88□ DK -99□ RF				
F5. Please tell me whi		-	-				
needed in this commu	unity – bo	reholes or :	subsidized seed?				
$1 \circ$ Boreholes $2 \circ$ Subsid	ized seed		88□ DK -99□				
RF							

ele in 1 10	ectrici Zimba is a le	ty is a abwe. ot <i>,</i> ho	ocruc On wmu	cial i a sca uch o	mpeo ale o of a p	dime f 0 to prior	ent t o 10 ity d	o tac , whe lo yo	klin ere (u th	g rura 0 is no 1ink	irregular Il poverty ot at all and lopment
									liiei	ueve	lopment
act	ivitie	s like	1	atio	I	d ne	alth	? 			
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88□ DK -99□ RF
F7	F7a. During the last 12 months, did you contact an elected									n elected	
off	icial d	or vot	e in a	n el	ectio	n?					
1 ○ RF	Yes 2	∘ No									88□ DK -99□
F7	b. If n	ot, w	hat w	/as t	he m	nain	reas	on?			
											88□ DK -99□
RF											
		-	-	-	-						oated in a
WC	orksho	op or	progi	ram	run l	oy ar	ו NG	iOs o	r ar	iy oth	er
		ations	?								
1 ○ RF	Yes 2	∘ No									88□ DK -99□
		o, wh		•)?					77	⊐NA 88□DK -
99□										//L	
Na	me:									77[⊐NA 88□DK -
99□ Na	RF me:									77	
1 va 99□										//L	⊐NA 88□DK -
Tir	ne Fir	nished	l:	:	_			Tł	HAN	IK YO	U!!
XX	xxxx	XXXX	XXXX	XXX	xxxx	XXX	XXX	xxx	XXX	XXXX	xxxxxxxx
ΧХ	XXXX										
то	BE F	ILLED	OUT	BY	ENU	MER	ATC	R AT	Γ EN	ID OF	SURVEY
[N		T PLA	ce oi		TERV	IEW]				
X1	. Wer	e you	able	to d	comp	lete	the	inte	rvie	w, and	d if not,
	iy not	-			•					•	·
	Yes 2										88□ DK -99□

X2. Where was the interview con 1 • Inside respondent's home	nducted?
2 • Outside respondent's home	
3 · Other RF	88□ DK -99□
X3. Were there any other people	e immediately present who
might be listening during the int	erview?
$1 \circ No one 2 \circ Children only 3 \circ Sponts Sponts 3 \circ Sponts Sponts 3 \circ Sponts$	
members 5 o Small crowd 60 Authori	ties $\tau \circ \text{Other}$:
88 DK -99 RF	
X4. Were there any other people	••
were participating during the int	
1 • No one 2 • Children only 3 • Spo members 5 • Small crowd 6• Authori	
88 DK -99 RF	
X5. Did the respondent seem co	mfortable answering all of
the questions?	-
$1 \circ Yes \ 2 \circ No$	88□ DK -99□
RF	
X6. Other Notes:	
1 • 3 2 • 4 3• 5 4• 6	

XXXXXX	

APPENDIX F: Village Head Questionnaire

Selection A. Position of Village Head				
A1. Is this your permanent position, or are you acting as				
reagent on behalf of someone else?				
1 • Permanent 2 • Acting	88□ DK -99□ RF			

A2a. Is this position conte	ested by anyone else?	
1 ° Yes 2 ° No RF		88□ DK -99□
A2b. If so, who?		NA88 DK -
99□ RF		
A3. When were you instal	led? [Indicate year,approxima	ite if needed]
		77□ NA
88 DK -99 RF		
A4. Did you inherit the po	osition, or were you select	ed another
way?		
1 o Inherited 2 o Elected by RF	y community 3 o Other:	… 88□ DK -99□
A5. Has your appointmen	t been recognized by the 1	ministry of
local government?		
1 ° Yes 2 ° No RF		88□ DK -99□
Do you have any family re	elation to the following lea	uders?
A6. Headman	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No 3 ○ Self RF	88□ DK -99□
A7. Chief	1 • Yes 2 • No RF	88□ DK -99□
A8. Local councilor	1 • Yes 2 • No RF	88□ DK -99□
A9. Previous village	1 • Yes 2 • No	88□ DK -99□
head	RF	

A10. When did the previous village head step down fr	rom
power? [indicate year, approximate if needed]	88□
DK -99□ RF	
A11. Why did the previous village head leave office?	
1 • Died natural causes 2 • Removed due to succession	dispute
30 Other:	88□ DK -99□
RF	
A12. Since independence, have there been any incider	nts where
people disputed the leadership of the village head of t	his
village?	
1 ° Yes 2 ° No	88□ DK -99□
RF	

A13. Since 1980, have any village heads been fired or demoted					
by the:	, ,				
A13a. District administration	1 0 Yes 2 0	No 880 DK -990 RF			
A13b. Chief	1 • Yes 2 •	No 880 DK -990 RF			
A13c. Headman	1 • Yes 2 •	No 880 DK -990 RF			
A13d. Members of this village	1 ° Yes 2 °	No 880 DK -990 RF			
A13e. Other:	1 ° Yes 2 °	No 88□ DK -99□ RF			
Section B. Background Infor	mation on C	Community			
B1a. When was this village four	ded? /Indicate	e year]			
	L				
88 DK -99 RF					
B1b. If do not know the exact y	vear, was the	village founded			
before or after 1980? 1 ° Before	1980 2 o Afte	r 1980 88⊡			
DK -99□ RF					
B2. On what type of land is this village?					
1 • Communal area 2 • Small-scale communal farming					
3 ○ Old resettlement area 4 ○ A1 5 ○ A2 88□ DK -99□ RF					
B3. How many households are in this village?					
88□ DK -99□ RF	11	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			
B4anew. How many households moved to this village in the past					
decade? 880					
DK -99 RF B4bnew. What were the main reasons for households moving to					
the village? [multiple answers possible] $1 \circ E = 2 \circ D = 3 \circ O$					
1 ○ E 2 ○ D 3 ○ O 1 ○ P 2 ○ NP 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF					
B5a. How many households moved from this village in the past					
decade?					
DK -990 RF		00			

B5bnew. What were the main reasons for households moving					
from the village? [mul			0		
$1 \circ \mathbf{E} 2 \circ \mathbf{D} 3 \circ \mathbf{C}$		pouring			
$1 \circ \mathbf{P}$ $2 \circ \mathbf{NP}$			77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF		
B6. What madzinza (to	otems) are p	oart of this v	village? List the three		
largest, and estimate t	heir size.				
1. Totem name:		Number	: 77□		
NA88□ DK -99□ RF					
2. Totem name:		Number	: 77□		
NA88□ DK -99□ RF			3. Totem		
name:	Numbe	er:	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF		
For each of the following	g services, I v	vould like to l	know if they are present		
in your village.					
Service		Present?			
B7a. Electricity		1 ° Yes 2 °	NO 88□ DK -99□ RF		
B7b. Piped water		1 ° Yes 2 °	NO 88□ DK -99□ RF		
B7c. Toilet		1 ° Yes 2 °	NO 88□ DK -99□ RF		
B7d. Radio signal		1 ° Yes 2 °	• No 88□ DK -99□ RF		
B7e. Cell phone cove		1 ° Yes 2 °			
For each of the followin					
in your village and, if no		ay the nearest			
Service	Present?		Distance?		
B8a. Market stalls	1 ° Yes 2 °	-	Distance:km		
B8b. Primary School	88 1 • Yes 2 ¢		77 NA 88 DK -99 RF Distance:km		
Bob. Fillinary School		□ DK -99□ RF			
B8c. Health clinic			Distance:km		
88□ DK -99□ RF 77□NA 88□DK -99□ RF					
B8d. Police station 1 ° Yes 2 ° No Distance:km					
		□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF		
B8f. Church	1 ° Yes 2 °	-	Distance:km		
88□ DK -99□ RF 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF					
	B8g. Magistrate's 1 ° Yes 2 ° No Distance:km				
court	88	□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF		

B8h. Headma	an's court	1 0 Ye	es 2 ° No	Distance:km	
		77□NA 88□ DK -99□ RF		77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	
B8i. Chief's c	court	1 0 Ye	es 2 ° No	Distance:km	
			88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	
B9. Is this y	village acce	essible	by road in the ra	inv season?	
1 ° Yes 2 ° I	0		,	88□ DK -99□ RF	
0	0	•		t groups. For each	
· · ·			er this group is a		
community	, whether	you <mark>c</mark> u	rrently belong to	it, and whether you	
currently ha	ive a leade	rship 1	ole in the group.	-	
Group	Exists?		Belong?	Leader?	
Religious	1 ° Yes 2	∘ No	$1 \circ \text{Yes} \ 2 \circ \text{No}$	1 • Yes 2 • No	
	880 DK -9	99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	
Village	1 ° Yes 2	∘ No	$1 \circ \text{Yes} \ 2 \circ \text{No}$	1 • Yes 2 • No	
Savings	880 DK -9	99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	
&Lendings					
Agriculture/	1 ° Yes 2	∘ No	$1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$	1 • Yes 2 • No	
Farming	88□ DK -9	99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	
Craft	1 ° Yes 2	∘ No	$1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$	1 • Yes 2 • No	
	88□ DK -9	99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	
Develop-	1 ° Yes 2	∘ No	$1 \circ \text{Yes} \ 2 \circ \text{No}$	1 • Yes 2 • No	
ment	880 DK -9	99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	
Peace	1 ° Yes 2	∘ No	1 ° Yes 2 ° No	1 ° Yes 2 ° No	
committees	88□ DK -9	99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	
Women's	1 ° Yes 2	∘ No	1 ° Yes 2 ° No	1 ° Yes 2 ° No	
groups	88□ DK -9	99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	

B11a. Are there any other organizations active in this village? For					
each group, please indicate wh	nether you current	ly belong to it,			
and whether you currently hav	ve a leadership rol	e in the group.			
1 ° Yes 2 ° No	-	88 DK -99 RF			
Group [write in] Belong? Leader?					
	1 ° Yes 2 ° No	1 • Yes 2 • No			
77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF			
	99□RF				

	1 ° Yes 2 ° No	1 ° Yes 2 ° No		
77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF		
	99□RF			
	$1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$	$1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$		
77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF		
	99□RF			
B11b. Do you feel close to any other masangano in this country?				
1 • Yes 2 • No		88□ DK -99□ RF		
B11c. If so, which ones? [check all mentioned]				
1 • 3 2 • 4 3 • 5 4 • 6	2	77□NA 88□DK -		
99□RF				

Section D. Disputes in Community

Type of problems	(A) How many	(B) How many of	(C) How many of	(D) How many of	(E) How many of	(F) How many of	(G) How many of
	times has this	these disputes	the disputes	the disputes	the disputes	the disputes	the cases that you
	problem	were originally	brought to you did	brought to you did	brought to you did	brought to you did	arbitrated were
	occurred in this	brought to you?	you send to the	you send to the	you send to the	you or your dare	successfully
	village in the		police?	headmen or chief's	magistrate's court?	arbitrate?	resolved?
	past twelve		1	court?	0		
	months?						
D1. Boundary disputes							
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D2. Crop destruction by							
livestock	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D3. Burglaries and theft							
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D4. Victim of witchcraft, or							
accused of witchcraft	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D5. Domestic violence							
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D6. Adultery							
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D7. Marriage disputes							
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D8. Roora/bride wealth dispute							
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D9. Rape							
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D10. Physically harmed by							
others	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D11. Murder							
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF
D12. Property destruction							
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF

D18. Now I would like to know what institutions exist in this					
village to help the village	e head with govern	ning.			
Institution Exists? How many times					
		per month do you			
		consult with it?			
Dare	$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No	times			
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF			
Council of women	$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No	times			
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF			
Resource Management	$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No	times			
Committees	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF			
Other:	$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No	times			
	88□ DK -99□ RF	77□NA 88□DK -99□RF			
[write in]					
D19. How many men as	nd how many won	nen are on your dare?			
men	women	77 □NA			
88□DK -99□RF					
D20. How many people from different totems are on your					
dare?					
Totem name: Number:					
Totem name: Number:					
Totem name: Number:					
77□NA 88□DK -99□RF					
D21. Typically, how many members of the public attend village					
dare meetings for common cases? How many men? How many					
women?					
total men	women	77 □NA			
88□DK -99□RF					
D22. Typically, how many members of the public speak at dare					
meetings for common cases? How many men? How many					
women?					
total men	women	77 □NA			
88□DK -99□RF					

D23. What is the fee for bringing a case before th [estimate value of fee if given in kind] dollars (US) 88DDK -99DRF	he village dare? 77□NA
D24. Are written records of the decisions made l publicly available? 1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No 99□RF	by the dare 77⊡NA 88⊡DK -
D25a. In this village, are there other places people their disputes besides bringing them to you and t dare?	
1 ° Yes 2 ° No RF	88□ DK -99□
D25b. If so, where? [do not prompt, tick al] 1 ○ Church 2 ○ Family courts 3 ○ Police 4 ○ Other:	77□NA 88□DK -
D26a. In this village, are there some groups of po	eople who
rarely bring their disputes to the dare? 1 • Yes 2 • No RF	88□ DK -99□
D26b. If so, who? $1 \circ P = 2 \circ NP$ $1 \circ 3 = 2 \circ 4 = 3 \circ 5 = 4 \circ 6$ 99 $\square RF$	77□NA 88□DK -
D27. In an ideal world, would you prefer that the dare had more, less or the same amount of power disputes?	0
1 o More 2 o Less 3 o The same RF	88□ DK -99□
D28a. In the past twelve months , have you org	anized any
community meetings? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No RF	88□ DK -99□

D28b. If yes, how many in total?		E5a. In this past tw
meetings	77□NA	assistance in the for
88□DK -99□RF		1 ° Yes 2 ° No
D28c. If yes, typically, how many people attend	led the	RF
meetings?		E5b. If so, who was
people	77□NA	1 O Government of Zi 30 Other NGO:
88DDK -99DRF		30 Other NGO
Section E. Community Leadership		E5c. If so, what role
E1. In this past twelve months, did you collec	t development	[tick all] 1 • None
levies?	1	4 o Distribution
$1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$	88□ DK -99□	99□RF
RF		E5d. If so, how wer
		$_1 \circ$ Village head's list
E2. If so, how much did you collect per house	hold?	99□RF
dollars (US)	77□NA	E6a. In this past tw
88□DK -99□RF		grain loans?
E3. In this past twelve months , have there be	en food	1 ° Yes 2 ° No
shortages in this village?		99□RF
$1 \circ$ Yes $2 \circ$ No	88□ DK -99□	E6b. If so, who was
RF	· 1	1 o Government of Zi
E4a. In this past twelve months , has your villa	ige received any	99□RF
maize food assistance?		E6d. If so, what role
1 O Yes 2 O NO RF	88□ DK -99□	[tick all]
E4b. If so, who was the assistance from? [do not	t prompt. tick. all]	$1 \circ$ None $2 \circ$ Regination
$1 \circ$ Government of Zimbabwe $2 \circ$ WFP $3 \circ$ PLAN $4 \circ$		
NGO: 50 Other		
77□NA 88□DK -99□RF		E6e. If so, how wer
E4c. If so, what role, if any, did you play in faci	litating this?	1 ∘ Village head's list
[tick all]		
1 ° None 2 ° Registration 3° Mobilization 4° Distribut	ion77□NA 88□DK -	
990RF		E7a. In this past tw
E4d. If so, how were the beneficiaries selected?	L I I J	from the governme
1 • Village head's list 2 • PRA 3 • Other	77□NA 88□DK -	$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No
99□RF		RF

5a. In this past twelve months , has your village received any	
ssistance in the form of seed?	
○ Yes 2 ○ No 88□ DK -99□	
5b. If so, who was the assistance from? [do not prompt, tick all]	
• Government of Zimbabwe 2 • Presidential present	
□RF	
5c. If so, what role, if any, did you play in facilitating this?	
<i>tick</i> all $1 \circ$ None $2 \circ$ Registration $3 \circ$ Mobilization	
□RF	
55d. If so, how were the beneficiaries selected? [do not prompt]	
○ Village head's list 2○ PRA 3 ○ Other	
□RF	
6a. In this past twelve months , has your village received any	
rain loans?	
• Yes 2 • No 77⊡NA 88⊡DK -	
66b. If so, who was the assistance from? [do not prompt, tick all]	
○ Government of Zimbabwe 2 ○ Other	
$\Box RF$	
6d. If so, what role, if any, did you play in facilitating this?	
ick all	
\circ None $2 \circ$ Registration $3 \circ$ Mobilization	
○ Distribution 77⊡NA 88□DK -	
6.6. If so, how were the beneficiaries selected? [do not prompt]	_
• Village head's list $2 \circ PRA_3 \circ Other$	
7a. In this past twelve months , did you receive an allowance	_
com the government?	
.,	
○ Yes 2 ○ NO 88□ DK -99□	

E9a. In this past twelve months , did you receive a	ny
payments, gifts or contributions from villagers?	
$1 \circ $ Yes $2 \circ $ No	88□ DK -99□
RF E9b. If so, how much in total (over 12 months)? /	estimate value
if answers given in kind]	csumane vanne
5 0 1	
dollars (US) 88DDK -99DRF	77 ⊡NA
E11a. In this past twelve months , did you give an	v gifts or
contributions of your own money/goods to other v	
$1 \circ \text{Yes}$ $2 \circ \text{No}$	88□ DK -99□
RF	88LI DK -99LI
E11b. If so, how much in total (over 12 months)?	[estimate
value if answers given in kind]	
dollars (US)770NA 880DK -990RF	
E12a. In the past twelve months, have you organi	zed
community members to make labor contributions?	
1 • Yes 2 • No	88□ DK -99□
RF E12b. If so, can you estimate what percentage of he	ouseholds in
the village contributed labor?	ousenoids in
times	77 □NA
CHILCS 880 DK -990 RF	//⊔NA
E13. In the past twelve months , has this village w	orked
together with people from other villages on a comm	
$1 \circ \text{Yes}$ $2 \circ \text{No}$	88□DK -
	00LDR -
E14a. Are there some groups of people in this village	ge who are
always causing problems?	
$1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$	88□ DK -99□
RF	

E14b. If so, which groups? [write in all mentioned] 1 $1 \circ \mathbf{P}$ $2 \circ \mathbf{NP}$ 1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4 ° 6 77□NA 88□DK -99⊐rf 2 \dots 1 \circ P 2 \circ NP 1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4 ° 6 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF 3 \dots 1 \circ P 2 \circ NP 1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4 ° 6 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF E15a. Are there some groups of people in this village who do not respect your authority? $1 \circ \text{Yes} \quad 2 \circ \text{No}$ 88□ DK -99□ RF E15b. If so, which groups? [write in all mentioned] 1 \dots 1 \circ P 2 \circ NP 1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4 ° 6 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF 2 $1 \circ \mathbf{P} \simeq \mathbf{NP}$ 1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4 ° 6 77□NA 88□DK -99⊓RF 3 \dots $1 \circ P$ $2 \circ NP$ 1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4 ° 6 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF E16a. Are there any influential leaders in this village who do not respect your authority? $1 \circ$ Yes $2 \circ$ No 88□ DK -99□ RF

E16b. If so, which ones? [write in all mentioned] 1 $1 \circ \mathbf{P} = 2 \circ \mathbf{NP}$ 1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4 ° 6 77 NA 88 DK -99⊓RF 2 $\dots 1 \circ \mathbf{P} \quad 2 \circ \mathbf{NP}$ 1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4 ° 6 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF 3 $\dots 1 \circ \mathbf{P} \quad 2 \circ \mathbf{NP}$ 1 ° 3 2 ° 4 3° 5 4 ° 6 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF Now I'm going to read you a number of statements, and I'd like you to tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the statement. E17. Most people in this village are influenced by my opinions. 1 • Strongly agree 2 • Agree 3 • Disagree 4 • Strongly disagree 88 DK -99 D RF E17new. People should be free to express their own opinions, even if they are in the minority. 1 • Strongly agree 2 • Agree 3 • Disagree 4 • Strongly disagree 88 DK -99 D RF E18. If a serious problem arose in this village, I could get the government to respond to it quickly. 1 ○ Strongly agree 2 ○ Agree 3 ○ Disagree 4 ○ Strongly disagree 88□ DK -99□ RF E19. The government needs my assistance to organize people in this village. 1 ○ Strongly agree 2 ○ Agree 3 ○ Disagree 4 ○ Strongly disagree 88□ DK -99□ RF E19new. As village head, I act independently of other government officials in making decisions about how to govern this village. 1 • Strongly agree 2 • Agree 3 • Disagree 4 • Strongly disagree 88 DK -99□RF

E20. Who is the most senior person you personally know in the government and could contact in the case of a problem? [Indicate name and position] Name:.... $1 \circ$ Local councilor $2 \circ$ District administrator $3 \circ$ MP 4 • **Other:** 88□ DK -99□ RF E21. On average, how many times per year do you exchange information with other village heads, including at events such as funerals? _ _ times 88 DK -99 RF E23. How many years ago were you first introduced to the headman? __ years 66 NEVER88 DK -99 RF E24. On average, how many times per year do you exchange information with the headman? ___ times 77 NA88 DK -99 RF E25.In the past five years, how many times have you asked the headman for assistance for yourself or your village? ___ times 77 NA88 DK -99 RF E26. How many times has he responded positively? _ _ times 77**□NA** 880 DK -990 RF E27. How many years ago were you first introduced to the chief? __ years 66 NEVER88 DK -99 RF E28. On average, how many times per year do you exchange information with the chief? ___ times 77 🗆 NA 880 DK -990 RF

	E20 II		·	1	1	_ /	.1			1.	1		12
E29. In the past five years, how many times have you asked	E39. How ma	any t	11116	es ha	as n	ie/s	sne	res	pon	aec	r bo	OSITIV	veryr
the chief for assistance for yourself or your village?	times												
times 77□NA	T7 \square NA88 \square DK -99 \square RF On a scale of 0 to 10, where 10 is very good and 0 is very poo												
88 DK -99 RF												l () 18	s very poor,
E30. How many times has he responded positively?	how would ra		our				-	-	-				T
times 77□NA	E40a.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1 0	88□ DK -99□
88□ DK -99□ RF	Villagers E40b.	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	RF
E32. How many years ago were you first introduced to the	Headman	0		2	5	7	5	0	'	0	3	Ó	88□ DK -99□ RF
local councilor?	E40c. Chief	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	88□ DK -99□
years												0	RF
66 DNEVER88 DK -99 RF	E40d. Local	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1 0	88□ DK -99□
E33. On average, how many times per year do you exchange	councilor											0	RF
information with the local councilor?	E41a Da yay		n fa	a 11 t	a a f			1.1	ha			ما ا	
times	E41a.Do you	eve	r iea	ar u	lat	you		uia	be	aer	nou	ed n	fom your
77□NA88□ DK -99□ RF	position?	1											
E34. In the past five years, how many times have you asked	1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No 88□ DK -99□ RF E41b. If so, who could demote you? [do not prompt, tick all] 1 ○ Villagers 2 ○ Headman3 ○ Chief 4 ○ Other 77□NA 88□ DK - 99□RF				88□ DK -99□								
the local councilor for assistance for yourself or your village?					ick. all]								
times 77DNA													
86 DK -99 RF													
E35. How many times has he/she responded positively?													
times 77□NA	E43a. During the past five years , has any new infrastructure or service been provided in your village?				istructure								
86 DK -99 RF													
E36. How many years ago were you first introduced to the	1 • Yes 2 • N					5		Ċ)				88□ DK -99□
district administrator?	RF												
years	E43b. If so, v												
66⊡NEVER88□ DK -99□ RF	1 • New boreh												
E37. On average, how many times per year do you exchange	5 • New bridge	60	ivev	w we	H 7	00	the	r:	•••••		•••	77]NA 88□DK -
information with the district administrator?	E43c. If so, v	who	11700	*00	nor	, cib	l_{0} f		2*01		n n i	i+2	
times	1 ○ National go												0
77 🗆 NA88 🗆 DK -99 🗆 RF	Community me												
E38.In the past five years, how many times have you asked	77□NA 88□DK -99□		-										
the district administrator for assistance for yourself or your			1 4	1	6 1	r		4	D,	1.			
village?	Section F. K	now	led	lge	of I	Law	vs a	Ind	. Ki	ght	S		
times													
UIIICS 77□NA88□ DK -99□ RF													

F1. According to the laws of Zimbabwe, do ind	
the right to appeal fines levied by primary court	:s?
1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No RF	88□ DK -99□
F2. If an individual appeals a primary court deci	ision, do they
have a right to a copy of the proceedings from	,
1 ° Yes 2 ° No RF	88□ DK -99□
Fanew. In Zimbabwe, can traditional leaders be	removed from
office by anyone?	
1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No RF	88□ DK -99□
Fbnew. According to the laws of ZImbabwe, ca	an traditional
leaders preside over any case committed within	
jurisdiction?	
1 • Yes 2 • No RF	88□ DK -99□
Fcnew. In Zimbabwe, should the police be info	ormed of every
case of sexual violence?	5
1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No RF	88□ DK -99□
Fdnew. Who should chair the ward based cor	nmittees such
Ward Health Centre Committee and Environn	nent
Management Sub-committee ? [do not prompt]	
$1 \circ \text{Village Head } 2 \circ \text{Headman } 3 \circ \text{Chief } 4 \circ \text{Councillor } 5$	Ofher 88⊓DK -
990RF	
F3. According to the laws of Zimbabwe, what i	s the legal age
of majority for women in Zimbabwe?	0 0
vears	
I'm going to read you a number of statements, a	and then I'd like
you to tell me if you strongly agree, agree, disag	
disagree with the statement.	0,
F4. Women should have the right to speak in th	neir own
defense at dare hearings.	
1 • Strongly agree 2 • Agree 3 • Disagree 4 • Strongly disa	gree 88□DK -
99□RF	

F5. A widow should	have	the ri	oht t	o inh	erit	land		
1 ○ Strongly agree ₂ ○ Agree ₃ ○ Disagree ₄ ○ Strongly disagree 88□DK -								
F6. Community men	F6. Community members should always obey what the village							
head says				-		-	_	
1 ○ Strongly agree2 ○ Agree3 ○ Disagree4 ○ Strongly disagree 88□DK -								
99□RF								
G. Community Dev	elop	ment	and	Par	ticij	oation	l	
G1. What are the thr	ee pro	ojects	that	you	woi	ıld wis	sh for in this	
community in order								
Choice # 1		ice #			-	Choic	e # 3	
1 o Borehole	1 0 E	oreho	ole					
2 • Toilets	$_{2} \circ T$	oilets				2 0 Toi	lets	
3 O School		Schoo				3 o Scł		
$4 \circ Clinics$	4 ° C	linics				$_4 \circ Clir$	nics	
5 0	50					50		
Other:	Othe	er:				Other:		
88□ DK -99□ RF	88□ DK -99□ RF						88□ DK -99□	
G2. Please tell me wl		f the	folle	wind		RF nos is	more	
needed in this comm								
$1 \circ \text{Boreholes } 2 \circ \text{Subs}$	2		i enoi	C 5 01	sui	JSICIL	88□ DK -99□	
RF	Iuizcu	3000					88□ DK -99□	
G3. If a new borehol	le wer	e to l	se bu	ilt in	this	s villag	ge, what	
would be the best loo						-	·	
1 • Within 500 m from							1	
20 Further than 500 m f						und 88	□ DK -99□ RF	
G4. Many people including the president say that irregular								
electricity is a crucial impediment to tackling rural poverty and								
underdevelopment in Zimbabwe. On a scale of 0 to 10, where								
0 is not at all and 10	is a lo	t, ho	w mu	ich o	of a 1	oriorit	y do you	
think electrification s								
activities like education			-				rr	
0 1 2 3 4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88□ DK -99□	
							RF	

in resolving disputes? 10 Yes 20 No 88□ DK-99□ in resolving disputes? 10 Ministry of Justice 20 Ministry of Local Government 30 Headman in RC 50 Other NGO: 77□NA 88□ DK-99□ G7a. Would you like to receive training on your role in 88□ DK-99□ resolving disputes? 10 Yes 20 No 88□ DK-99□ G7b. If yes, who do you think should conduct the training? [Do not prompt] 10 Ministry of Justice 20 Ministry of Local Government 30 Headman in C 50 Other NGO: 60 Other: 77□NA 88□ DK-99□ G8a. Are there any NGOs or any other organizations currently working in this village? 10 Yes 20 No in Yes 20 No 88□ DK-99□ G8b. If so, which ones? [write in] 88□ DK-99□ Name: 77□ NA88□ DK-99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK-99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK-99□ RF Mase: 77□ NA88□ DK-99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other 77□ NA organizations organized events involving members of this 77□ NA willage in the past twelve months? 77□ NA	G6a. Have you ever previously received t	raining on your role
1 ° Yes 2 ° No 88□ DK -99□ RF G6b. If so, who provided the training? 1 Ministry of Justice 2 ° Ministry of Local Government 3 ° Headman 4 ° IRC 5 ° Other NGO: 6 ° Other: 77□ NA 88□DK -99□ 99□RF G7a. Would you like to receive training on your role in resolving disputes? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 88□ DK -99□ RF G7b. If yes, who do you think should conduct the training? [Do not prompt] 1 ° Ministry of Justice 2 ° Ministry of Local Government 3 ° Headman 4 ° IRC 5 ° Other NGO: 6 ° Other: 90□RF G8a. Are there any NGOs or any other organizations currently working in this village? 1 ° Yes 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 88□ DK -99□ RF G8b. If so, which ones? [write in] 88□ DK -99□ RF G8b. If so, which ones? [write in] Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months?		
RF G6b. If so, who provided the training? 1 • Ministry of Justice 2 • Ministry of Local Government 3 • Headman 4 • IRC 5 • Other NGO: 99□RF G7a. Would you like to receive training on your role in resolving disputes? 1 • Yes 2 • No RF G7b. If yes, who do you think should conduct the training? [Do not prompt] 1 • Ministry of Justice 2 • Ministry of Local Government 3 • Headman 4 • IRC 5 • Other NGO: 90□RF G8a. Are there any NGOs or any other organizations currently working in this village? 1 • Yes 2 • No RF G8b. If so, which ones? [nrite in] Name:	e i	88 DK-99
1 ○ Ministry of Justice 2 ○ Ministry of Local Government 3 ○ Headman 4 ○ IRC 5 ○ Other NGO:	RF	
4 ○ IRC 5 ○ Other NGO:	G6b. If so, who provided the training?	
99□RF G7a. Would you like to receive training on your role in resolving disputes? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 88□ DK -99□ G7b. If yes, who do you think should conduct the training? [Do not prompt] 1 ° Ministry of Justice 2 ° Ministry of Local Government 3 ° Headman 4 ° IRC 5 ° Other NGO: 99□RF G8a. Are there any NGOs or any other organizations currently working in this village? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No RF G8b. If so, which ones? [write in] Name:	$1 \circ$ Ministry of Justice $2 \circ$ Ministry of Local Gove	rnment 3 O Headman
G7a. Would you like to receive training on your role in resolving disputes? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 880 DK -990 G7b. If yes, who do you think should conduct the training? [Do not prompt] 1 ° Ministry of Justice 2 ° Ministry of Local Government 3 ° Headman 4 ° IRC 5 ° Other NGO:	4 • IRC 5 • Other NGO: 6 • Other:	
resolving disputes? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No RF G7b. If yes, who do you think should conduct the training? [Do not prompt] 1 ° Ministry of Justice 2 ° Ministry of Local Government 3 ° Headman 4 ° IRC 5 ° Other NGO:		
1 ° Yes 2 ° No 88□ DK -99□ RF G7b. If yes, who do you think should conduct the training? [Do not prompt] 1 ° Ministry of Justice 2 ° Ministry of Local Government 3 ° Headman 4 ° IRC 5 ° Other NGO:	G7a. Would you like to receive training o	n your role in
RF G7b. If yes, who do you think should conduct the training? [Do not prompt] 1 • Ministry of Justice 2 • Ministry of Local Government 3 • Headman 4 • IRC 5 • Other NGO:		
G7b. If yes, who do you think should conduct the training? [Do not prompt] 1 ° Ministry of Justice 2 ° Ministry of Local Government 3 ° Headman 4 ° IRC 5 ° Other NGO:		88□ DK -99□
[Do not prompt] 1 ○ Ministry of Justice 2 ○ Ministry of Local Government 3 ○ Headman 4 ○ IRC 5 ○ Other NGO:		1 1
1 ○ Ministry of Justice 2 ○ Ministry of Local Government 3 ○ Headman 4 ○ IRC 5 ○ Other NGO:		nduct the training?
4 ○ IRC 5 ○ Other NGO:		
99□RF G8a. Are there any NGOs or any other organizations currently working in this village? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 88□ DK -99□ RF 88□ DK -99□ G8b. If so, which ones? [write in] Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Trill NA88□ DK -99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months?		
G8a. Are there any NGOs or any other organizations currently working in this village? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 88□ DK -99□ RF G8b. If so, which ones? [write in] Name:		77□NA 88□DK -
working in this village? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 880 DK -990 RF G8b. If so, which ones? [write in] Name: 770 NA880 DK -990 RF Name: 770 NA880 DK -990 RF Name: 770 NA880 DK -990 RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? 		• .• .1
1 ° Yes 2 ° No 88□ DK -99□ G8b. If so, which ones? [write in] Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name:		rganizations currently
RF G8b. If so, which ones? [write in] Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 88□DK -99□RF	0	
G8b. If so, which ones? [write in] Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 88□DK -99□RF		88□ DK -99□
77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 77□ NA 88□DK -99□RF		
Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 88□DK -99□RF 77□NA	Name:	
Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 88□DK -99□RF 77□NA		
77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name: 77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF	77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF	
77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF 77□NA	Name:	
77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 77□NA 88□DK -99□RF 77□NA		
G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 77DNA 88DDK -99DRF	77□ NA88□ DK -99□ RF Name:	
G8c. If so, how many times have NGOs or other organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 77DNA 88DDK -99DRF		
organizations organized events involving members of this village in the past twelve months? times 77 DNA 880 DK -990 RF		
village in the past twelve months? times 77DNA 88DDK -99DRF		
times 77 _ NA 88 _ DK -99 _ RF	organizations organized events involving	members of this
88 DK -99 RF	village in the past twelve months?	
	times	77⊡NA
Time Finished:: THANK YOU!!	88□DK -99□RF	
	Time Finished:::	THANK YOU!!

Selection Q. Other Comm	nunity Leaders					
Q1. As part of this project, we would also like to interview						
	this village. Can you tell me, are					
5	eaders residing in this village, and					
how many?	success restancy in this vinage, and					
	$1 \circ \text{None} \ 2 \circ \text{One} \ 2 \circ 2 + 88 \square \text{ DK}$					
Farmer's group leaders	-99□ RF					
Religious leaders	1 ○ None 2 ○ One 2 ○ 2 + 88□ DK					
	-99□ RF					
Village health workers	1 ○ None 2 ○ One 2 ○ 2 + 88□ DK					
	-99□ RF					
Caregiver leaders	1 ○ None 2 ○ One 2 ○ 2 + 88□ DK					
	-99□ RF					
VIDCO chairperson	1 ○ None 2 ○ One 2 ○ 2 + 88□ DK					
	-99□ RF					
Village secretaries	1 ○ None 2 ○ One 2 ○ 2 + 88□ DK					
	-99 RF					
Q2a. Are there any other influential people living in this village?						
1 ○ Yes 2 ○ No 88□ DK -99□ RF						
Q2b. If so, who? [write in]						
Q3. Have any leaders in this community received training from						
the IRC in the past year? <i>[tick all]</i>						
$1 \circ$ Farmer's group leader $2 \circ$ Religious leader $3 \circ$ Village health						
worker $4 \circ$ Caregiver leaders $5 \circ$ War veterans $6 \circ$ VIDCO						
chairperson						
$7 \circ Village secretary 8 \circ Other RF$						

X1. Were you able to complete the interview, and if n	not, why
not?	
1 • Yes 2 • No	88□ DK -99□
RF Reason:	
X2. Where was the interview conducted?	
1 • Inside respondent's home	
	88□ DK -99□
RF	
X3. Were there any other people immediately present	: who
might be listening during the interview?	
$1 \circ$ No one $2 \circ$ Children only $3 \circ$ Spouse only $4 \circ$ Other far	
members 5 o Small crowd 60 Authorities 70 Other:	
88 DK -99 RF	
X4. Were there any other people immediately present	t who
were participating during the interview?	
$1 \circ No \text{ one } 2 \circ Children \text{ only } 3 \circ Spouse \text{ only } 4 \circ Other \text{ far}$	
members 5 ° Small crowd 6 ° Authorities 7 ° Other:	
880 DK -990 RF	11 C (1
X5. Did the respondent seem comfortable answering	all of the
questions?	
1 ° Yes 2 ° No RF	88□ DK -99□
X6. Other Notes:	
$1 \circ 3 \circ 2 \circ 4 \circ 3 \circ 5 \circ 4 \circ 6$	


APPENDIX G: Qualitative Research Protocol

MEETING WITH VILLAGE HEAD AND ADVISORS DISCUSSION FORM

Thank you for meeting with us today. We would like to speak with you about traditional dispute management and reforms to the traditional justice system in Zimbabwe.

Question 1. Can you tell us about the process for managing disputes in this village? [Follow-up: What are the benefits of this system and what are the problems with this system?]

Response:



9. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from female community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No

Question 2. Have there been any changes in the processes for managing dispute in this village in the past two years? If so, could you describe the changes? [Prompt: Has this change made the process better or worse?]

Response:

1. Did the village head speak in response to the	e question? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
--	----------------------------

2. Did anyone other than the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$

3. Did anyone speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$

4. Did anyone offer an opinion that differed from village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$

5. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No

6. Did any woman speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$

7. Did any woman speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$

8. Did any woman offer an opinion that differed from the village head? $1 \circ$ **Yes** $2 \circ$ **No**

9. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from female community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No

Question 3. Do you think the government is on the right track with regards to integrating customary dispute management into the justice system? [*Prompt: Can you explain why or why not*?]

1. Did the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
2. Did anyone other than the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$
3. Did anyone speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
4. Did anyone offer an opinion that differed from the village head? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
5. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
6. Did any woman speak in response to the question? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
7. Did any woman speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
8. Did any woman offer an opinion that differed from the village head? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
9. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from female community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No

Question 4. Are there any groups in the community that are dissatisfied by the current traditional justice system? If so, which groups and why are they dissatisfied?

Response:

1. Did the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
2. Did anyone other than the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
3. Did anyone speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$
4. Did anyone offer an opinion that differed from the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
5. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from community members? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
6. Did any woman speak in response to the question? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
7. Did any woman speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
8. Did any woman offer an opinion that differed from the village head? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No

9. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from female community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No

Question 5. Which of the following is more needed in this community – boreholes or subsidized seed?

1. Did the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes}_{2} \circ \text{No}$
2. Did anyone other than the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
3. Did anyone speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$
4. Did anyone offer an opinion that differed from the village head? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
5. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
6. Did any woman speak in response to the question? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
7. Did any woman speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
8. Did any woman offer an opinion that differed from the village head? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
9. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from female community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No

Question 6. If a new borehole were to be built in this village, what would be the best location for it?

Also tick to indicate if: O more than 500 m OR
O <u>less than 500 m</u> from VH's compound
1. Did the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
2. Did anyone other than the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
3. Did anyone speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$
4. Did anyone offer an opinion that differed from the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
5. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
6. Did any woman speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
7. Did any woman speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
8. Did any woman offer an opinion that differed from the village head? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
9. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from female community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No

Question 7. Are there any issues that divide you in this community? If so, what are they?

1. Did the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
2. Did anyone other than the village head speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
3. Did anyone speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$
4. Did anyone offer an opinion that differed from the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$
5. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
6. Did any woman speak in response to the question? $1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$
7. Did any woman speak without explicitly being called on by the village head? $1 \circ \text{Yes} 2 \circ \text{No}$
8. Did any woman offer an opinion that differed from the village head? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
9. Did the village head adapt his responses following inputs from female community members? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No

For the following questions, please write down the answer. *If the question was answered by someone other than the village head, please note this and whether the respondent was male or female.*

8. How many men and women sit on the Dare?

9. Which types of women's groups does the VH consult? How many times per month does the VH consult with it?

10. Is there a RMC [Resource Monitors]? How many times per month does the VH consult with it?

11. If an individual appeals a primary court decision, do they have a right to a copy of the proceedings from the court?

12. What is the fee for bringing a case before the village dare? [estimate value of fee if given in kind]

13. How much development levy per household did the village head collect last year?

14a. Did you attend training by the IRC in the past two years? [If answer no, interview ends]

14b. Can you tell us the things you liked best about the training?

14c. Can you tell us the things you liked least about the training?

14d. What do you think was the purpose of the training?

14e. Have you noticed any changes in this community since the training? If so, what changes have you noticed? [Follow-up: Would you say all of these changes since the training are for the better, or are there downsides too? Please explain.]

15a. Was anyone in your community trained alongside you? [If answer no, interview ends]

15b. If so, do you think this made the training more or less effective? [Prompt: Why?]

15c. Did your relationship with this individual change as a result of the training? If so, how?

Attendance Sheet

Person	Description	Age	Occupation	Relationship	Leadership
(Indicate first name)				to VH	position(s)
VH					
Male 1					
Male 2					
Male 3					
Male 4					
Male 5					
Male 6					
Male 7					
Male 8					
Female 1					
Female 2					
Female 3					
Female 4					
Female 5					
Female 6					

In villages where a community leader *was not* trained alongside the village head, ask the village head: "If it were possible for a community leader other than yourself to receive training on the role and responsibilities of the village head, who would you choose to receive the training? The only constraint is that this individual **must be someone with a leadership position in the village other than on your council**, so it cannot be your village secretary. Record answer here:

In villages where a community leader was trained alongside the village head, record the name of the person who will be interviewed here:

OTHER INTERVIEWER/NOTE-TAKER COMMENTS:

X1. Please note if there was any evidence of: $_1 \circ PP _2 \circ PR _3 \circ PI$

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION FORM

Question 0. Who selected the people to participate in this focus group?O Village HeadO Research team (previous interviewees)

Thank you for meeting with us today. We would like to speak with you about traditional dispute management and reforms to the traditional justice system in Zimbabwe. But first let us introduce ourselves.

Attendance Sheet

Person (Indicate first name)	Description	Age	Occupation	Relationship to VH	Leadership position(s)
VH					
Male 1					
Male 2					
Male 3					
Male 4					
Male 5					
Male 6					
Male 7					
Male 8					
Female 1					
Female 2					
Female 3					
Female 4					
Female 5					
Female 6					

Village code:_

Question 1. Can you tell us about the process for managing disputes in this village? [Follow-up: What are the benefits of this system and what are the problems with this system?]

Discussion:

Person	Describe	Spoke	Criticized	Disagreed	Notes
Male 1					
Male 2					
Male 3					
Male 4					
Male 5					
Male 6					
Male 7					
Male 8					
Female 1					
Female 2					
Female 3					
Female 4					
Female 5					
Female 6					
1. Which pa	articipant spoke the mo	st?			·
	participants express crit				
					er participants? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
					anner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
4b. If so, w	ere any of the disagreer	nents prese	nted in a frien	dly manner?	• Yes 2 • No
5a. If so, di	d any of the disagreeme	ents result in		ional respons sponse? 1 0 N	

Question 2. Have there been any changes in the processes for managing disputes in this village in the past two years? If so, could you describe the changes? [*Prompt: Has this change made the process better or worse*?]

Discussion: Person Describe Spoke Criticized Disagreed Notes Male 1	D: :								
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the	Discussion:								
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 1 Image: Constraint of the sequence of the									
Male 2Image: speed of the sagreementsImage: speed of	Person	Describe	Spoke	Criticized	Disagreed	Notes			
Male 3Image: space of the system of the disagreements presented in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the system of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the system of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the system of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the system of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the system of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the system of the system of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the system of the system of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the system of the system of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the system of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the system of the systements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the systements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the systements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the systements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the systements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the systements result in a friendly response? 1 \circ YesImage: space of the systements	Male 1		1		0				
Male 4 Image: Constraint of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 or Yes 2 or No Male 4 Image: Constraint of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 or Yes 2 or No Male 5 Image: Constraint of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 or Yes 2 or No	Male 2								
Male 5 Image: Second Secon	Male 3								
Male 6 Image: Second secon	Male 4								
Male 7 Image: Second Secon	Male 5								
Male 7 Image: Second Secon	Male 6								
Male 8 Image: Second secon									
Female 1Image: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsFemale 1Image: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsFemale 6Image: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreements1. Which participants poke the most?Image: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreements2. Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? Image: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreements3. Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? Image: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreements4a. If so, were any of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreements5a. If so, did any of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreements5b. If so, did any of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreements5b. If so, did any of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreements5b. If so, did any of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreementsImage: space of the disagreements5b. If so, did any of the									
Female 2 Image: space of the sequences of the									
Female 3 Image: Constraint of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 or Yes 2 or No Female 3 Image: Constraint of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 or Yes 2 or No Female 4 Image: Constraint of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 or Yes 2 or No									
Female 4 Image: Semale 5 Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 Female 6 Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 1. Which participant spoke the most? Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 2. Did any participants express critical views? 1 or Yes 2 or No Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 3. Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? 1 or Yes 2 or No Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? 1 or Yes 2 or No Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? 1 or Yes 2 or No Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 or Yes 2 or No Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 or Yes 2 or No Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6									
Female 5 Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 Image: Semale 6 1. Which participant spoke the most? 1 Yes 2 0 No 3. Did any participants express critical views? 1 0 Yes 2 0 No 2 No 3. Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? 1 0 Yes 2 0 No 2 No 4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? 1 0 Yes 2 0 No 2 No 4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? 1 0 Yes 2 0 No 5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 0 Yes 2 0 No 5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 0 Yes 2 0 No									
Female 6 Image: Second sec									
 Which participant spoke the most? Did any participants express critical views? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 									
 2. Did any participants express critical views? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 3. Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 									
 3. Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 				10 Yes 20	> No				
 4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 						er participants? 1 o Yes 2 o No			
4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? 1 o Yes 2 o No5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 o Yes 2 o No5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 o Yes 2 o No	< 1	1 1		,					
5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 or Yes2 or No5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 or Yes2 or No									
5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$									
5c. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a response that suggested compromise? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No									
	5c. If so, did	any of the disagreeme	nts result in	a response th	hat suggested	compromise? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No			

Village code:

Question 3. Do you think the government is on the right track with regards to integrating customary dispute management into the justice system? [Prompt: Can you explain why or why not?]

Discussion:

Person	Describe	Spoke	Criticized	Disagreed	Notes
Male 1					
Male 2					
Male 3					
Male 4					
Male 5					
Male 6					
Male 7					
Male 8					
Female 1					
Female 2					
Female 3					
Female 4					
Female 5					
Female 6					
	articipant spoke the mo			•	
2. Did any p	participants express cri	tical views?	1 • Yes 2 •	⊃ No	
					er participants? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
					anner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
4b. If so, we	ere any of the disagree	ments prese	nted in a frien	dly manner?	• Yes 2 • No
5a. If so, die	d any of the disagreem	ents result in	n a confrontat	ional respons	e? 1 • Yes 2 • No
5b. If so, di	d any of the disagreem	ents result i	n a friendly re	sponse? 1 ° Y	∕es 2 ○ No
	, 0			1	compromise? 1 \circ Yes 2 \circ No

Question 4. Which of the following is more needed in this community – boreholes or subsidized seed?

Discussion: Person Describe Spoke Criticized Disagreed Notes Male 1 Male 2 Male 3 Male 4 Male 5 Male 6 Male 7 Male 8 Female 1 Female 2 Female 3 Female 4 Female 5 Female 6 1. Which participant spoke the most? 2. Did any participants express critical views? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 3. Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? 1 • Yes 2 0 **NO** 4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$ 4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$ 5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 • Yes 2 0 NO 5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$ 5c. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a response that suggested compromise? 1 • Yes 2 0 **No**

Village code:

Question 5. If a new borehole were to be built in this village, what would be the best location for it?

Discussion:

Person	Describe	Spoke	Criticized	Disagreed	Notes
Male 1		-1			
Male 2					
Male 3					
Male 4					
Male 5					
Male 6					
Male 7					
Male 8					
Female 1					
Female 2					
Female 3					
Female 4					
Female 5					
Female 6					
1. Which pa	rticipant spoke the mo	st?			
2. Did any p	participants express crit	ical views?	1 ° Yes 2 °	⊳ No	
					er participants? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
					anner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No
4b. If so, we	ere any of the disagreer	nents prese	nted in a frien	dly manner? 1	• Yes 2 • No
5a. If so, die	l any of the disagreeme	ents result in	n a confrontat	ional response	e? 1 • Yes 2 • No
5b. If so, die	d any of the disagreem	ents result in	n a friendly re	sponse? 1 ° Y	
5c If so die	any of the disagreeme	ents result in	a response t	hat suggested	compromise? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No

Question 6. Do you think most, some or none of the outcomes from taking disputes to the village head are fair?

Discussion: Person Describe Criticized Disagreed Notes Spoke Male 1 Male 2 Male 3 Male 4 Male 5 Male 6 Male 7 Male 8 Female 1 Female 2 Female 3 Female 4 Female 5 Female 6 1. Which participant spoke the most? 2. Did any participants express critical views? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$ 3. Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No 4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$ 4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$ 5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$ 5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$ 5c. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a response that suggested compromise? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$

Village code:_

Question 7. Are there any issues that divide you in this community? If so, what are they?

Discussion:

Person	Describe	Spoke	Criticized	Disagreed	Notes		
Male 1							
Male 2							
Male 3							
Male 4							
Male 5							
Male 6							
Male 7							
Male 8							
Female 1							
Female 2							
Female 3							
Female 4							
Female 5							
Female 6							
1. Which participant spoke the most?							
2. Did any participants express critical views? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No							
3. Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No							
4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No							
4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No							
5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No							
5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No							
5c. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a response that suggested compromise? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$							

Question 8a. Do you know if your VH has attended any training sessions in the past two years? If so, what do you think was the purpose of the training? Do you know if any other CL has attended any training sessions alongside the VH? If so, do you think the inclusion of the other CL made a difference to the outcomes of the sessions? Please explain.

Discussion:

Person	Describe	Spoke	Criticized	Disagreed	Notes	
Male 1	Besense	opone	Gildemed	Disugreeu		
Male 2						
Male 3						
Male 4						
Male 5						
Male 6						
Male 7						
Male 8						
Female 1						
Female 2						
Female 3						
Female 4						
Female 5						
Female 6						
1. Which participant spoke the most?						
2. Did any participants express critical views? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No						
/ I				e views of oth	er participants? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No	
4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$						
4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$						
5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No						
5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No						
5c. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a response that suggested compromise? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$						

Village code:_

Question 8b. [If at least one person answers yes to 8a] Have you noticed any changes in your community since the training? If so, are they for the better or for the worse?

Discussion:

Person	Describe	Spoke	Criticized	Disagreed	Notes	
Male 1		opone	Gintelleu	Diougreea		
Male 2						
Male 3						
Male 4						
Male 5						
Male 6						
Male 7						
Male 8						
Female 1						
Female 2						
Female 3						
Female 4						
Female 5						
Female 6						
1. Which participant spoke the most?						
2. Did any participants express critical views? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No						
3. Did any participants present views that disagreed with the views of other participants? 1 • Yes 2 • No						
4a. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a confrontational manner? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$						
4b. If so, were any of the disagreements presented in a friendly manner? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$						
5a. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a confrontational response? 1 ° Yes 2 ° No						
5b. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a friendly response? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$						
5c. If so, did any of the disagreements result in a response that suggested compromise? $1 \circ \text{Yes} = 2 \circ \text{No}$						

For the following questions, please write down the answer and note: (a) who answered the question. (b) if anyone corrected the respondent.

9. How many men and women sit on the Dare?

10. Is there a council of women? How many times per month does the VH consult with it?

11. Is there a RMC? How many times per month does the VH consult with it?

12. What is the fee for bringing a case before the village dare? [estimate value of fee if given in kind]

13. How much development levy per household did the village head collect last year?

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

X1. Please take notes on the interactions between respondents before and after the focus group. Based on these interactions, which of the following observations best describes the group:

1 • Everyone greeted each other 2 • At least two people did not greet one another
 3 • People only greeted one another within but not across sub-groups

X2. Please take notes on seating arrangement

 $1 \circ$ Men and women on different sides $2 \circ$ Different seating arrangement

X3. Please note if there was any evidence of: 1 \circ PP 2 \circ PR 3 \circ Pl

Coding Scheme

There is one sheet to be filled out for each discussion question. Use the top part of the sheet (under response) to take notes on the points raised during the discussion of a particular question.

Use the middle part of the sheet to take notes on the comments made by each person. Each person should be represented in their own row of the table. For each person, you will take notes on (a) whether they spoke at least once in response to the question (b) whether they expressed a crucial view (i.e. acknowledging problems with the system or particular leaders, or acknowledging divisions within communities) and (c) whether the ever expressed an opinion that differed from a previously expressed view>

Use the bottom part of the sheet to answer a series of yes or no questions about the discussion.

INTERVIEW WITH COMMUNITY LEADER

1. Please tell me every leadership position you have had in this community in the past 5 years.

2. Please tell me about your interactions with the village head during the past year. How often did you interact with the village head? In what kinds of settings? On what kinds of issues?

3. Think back over the past two years. Has the way you interacted with the village head changed at all during this time period? If so, how?

4a. If you did not believe the village head was making decisions in the proper manner, is there anything you could do? If so, what?

4b. How likely do you think it would be that the village head would change his behavior in response any action you took? Please explain your answer.

5. Can you give me any examples the past year where you were able to influence the behavior of the village head?

6. Can you describe the process for managing disputes in this village? What would you say are the advantages of this system? What are the disadvantages?

7a. Have there been any changes in the processes for managing disputes in this village in the past two years? If so, could you describe the changes?

7b. If yes, have these changes made the process better or worse, in your opinion? Please explain your answer.

7c. If there have been changes, are there any groups in the community that have been upset by the changes? If there have not been changes, are there any groups in the community that have been upset by the lack of changes? If so, please explain why.

8. Are there any issues that divide you in this community? If so, what are they? Are they getting better or worse with time?

9a. How many men and women sit on the Dare?

9b. Which groups of women does the VH consult? How many times per month does the VH consult with it?

9c. Is there a RMC [Resource Monitors]? How many times per month does the VH consult with it?

10a. What is the fee for bringing a case before the village dare? [estimate value of fee if given in kind]

10b. How much development levy per household did the village head collect last year?

12a. Did you attend training by the IRC in the past two years? [If answer yes, skip to question 13; otherwise ask question 12b]

12b. Do you know if your VH attended training by the IRC in the past two years? **[If answer yes, skip to question 14. If answer no, interview ends]**

13a. Can you describe how you were invited to attend the training?

13b. Can you tell us the things you liked best about the training?

13c. Can you tell us the things you liked least about the training?

14a. What do you think was the purpose of the training?

14b. Have you noticed any changes in this community since the training? If so, what changes have you noticed?

14c. Were any people in the village happy about the training for the village head? If so, who and why?

14d. Were any people in the village unhappy about the training for the village head? If so, who and why?

14e. Has your relationship with the village head changed as a result of the sessions? If so, how?

OTHER INTERVIEWER NOTES:

X1. Please note if there was any evidence of: $_1 \circ PP _2 \circ PR _3 \circ PI$

Social Impact, Inc.

2300 Clarendon Boulevard Suite 1000 Tel: (703) 465-1884 Fax: (703) 465-1888 www.socialimpact.com