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GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE TOURISM ALLIANCE (GSTA) PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FINAL REPORT



Scarves for sale at a roadside market in Dorze, Ethiopia, where GSTA supported the local weaving cooperative. *Photo: Joy Hecht*

April 2014

GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE TOURISM ALLIANCE (GSTA) PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

FINAL REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As part of the Evaluation Services IQC Task Order AID-OAA-TO-13-00040 awarded to International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI), an assessment of the Global Sustainable Tourism Alliance (GSTA) was conducted from October 2013 to March 2014. ECODIT was subcontracted by IBTCI to carry out this work.

The five-year Global Sustainable Tourism Alliance (GSTA) program ran from September 2006 to September 2011. A GSTA Management Group comprised of FHI360 (prime recipient of the Leader with Associates Award), George Washington University, The Nature Conservancy, and Solimar International promoted, implemented, and supported sustainable tourism interventions in USAID-presence countries, with an emphasis on fragile and transformational states as well as high-biodiversity areas. These interventions were carried out as collaborative efforts involving the private sector, development institutions, and USAID under a single, global mechanism that used tourism as a means to achieve USAID's objectives of poverty alleviation, economic growth, biodiversity conservation, and improved governance.

GSTA linked biodiversity conservation and ecological resilience to economic development through tourism in a way that had not been tried in USAID conservation or development projects. USAID decided to conduct this assessment to assess how well this model worked and whether the model could be replicated. It considered several specific aspects of the alliance, focusing on how the new approaches enabled GSTA to achieve its objectives.

The GSTA evaluation framework addressed how the program achieved its objectives as framed through five evaluation questions:

1. Did the differences in the GDA project development process have any specific effect in the outcomes of the project?
2. How was the SCALE methodology used and to what effect?
3. How did the use of new communication tools and the use of social networking analysis to measure host country collaboration impact results?
4. Were biodiversity conservation goals achieved?
5. Were there any gender-related differences or unintended consequences in impacts?

This evaluation focused on global issues and Washington core support for the GSTA Project. Information for the assessment came from key informant interviews with individuals within the GSTA partner institutions, a review of documents on both leader awards and country projects, and visits to two of the six countries, Ethiopia and Uganda, where GSTA field programs were implemented. Insights from the field were integrated into an assessment of the five evaluation questions.

The use of the Global Development Alliance (GDA) structure was essential to GSTA's effectiveness, as it was an appropriate mechanism to ensure that the institutions that developed its project concept would be able to implement it. The USAID requirements for financial matches that came from the GDA were regarded by many informants as imposing an excessive burden and unattainable target when they called for 100 percent cost sharing; however, when this was reduced to 15 percent, all key informants stressed the utility of cost sharing in ensuring that partners would collaborate with other actors in the field.

The use of the SCALE process contributed significantly to the success of GSTA. While it was not implemented fully, due to USAID's reluctance to cede control over project design—and, to the extent that it was implemented, it sometimes created unmet expectations—nearly all key informants believed that it was a positive force in GSTA country project implementation.

Social network analysis tools were used to analyze certain GSTA activities, but the results were not used in project design or implementation due to the timing of the research. This may be an interesting tool for strengthening projects in the future.

The impact of GSTA activities on biodiversity has probably been fairly limited. While some community activities are probably generating enough income to reduce pressure on the environment, they are operating on a small scale. While tourism-related jobs may replace resource-based incomes for a few people, there will not be enough work in this field to employ the next cohort of youth in search of jobs. While it is evident that some communities have benefited from GSTA activities, it is unclear that this will have a significant effect on biodiversity.

Gender was not an explicit a focus of any GSTA activities. That said, all community activities showed a clear differentiation of roles according to gender, which suggests that this may have been assimilated into project design as a matter of course. Gender differences did not lead to unintended consequences in projects; it was clear to all involved that the roles and impacts of men and women would differ in a way that integrated gender in their design.

ACRONYMS

AED	Academy for Educational Development (now part of FHI360)
AETS	Alianza Ecuatoriana para el Turismo Sostenible (Ecuadorian Sustainable Tourism Alliance)
ANCEDA	Arsi Nature Conservation and Environmental Development Association
CAP	Conservation Action Planning
CCA	Community Conservation Area (Ethiopia)
CI	Conservation International
CTE	Community Tourism Enterprise
DR	Dominican Republic
DSTA	Dominican Sustainable Tourism Alliance
ECOLAP	University of San Francisco de Quito Applied Ecology Institute
ESTA	Ethiopia Sustainable Tourism Alliance
FUNDEMAR	Dominican Foundation of Marine Mammals
FY	Fiscal year (from October through September in the U.S. Government system)
GDA	Global Development Alliance
GSTA	Global Sustainable Tourism Alliance
GWU	George Washington University
IGCP	International Gorilla Conservation Program
KATIC	Katwe Tourism Information Center
KWG	Kikorongo Women's Group (Uganda)
LAC	Limits of Acceptable Change
LTRM	Land Tenure and Resource Management
LWA	Leader-with-associates
OFWE	Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise
PCV	Peace Corps volunteer
PRRG	Property Rights and Resource Governance
QENP	Queen Elizabeth National Park (Uganda)
RUG	Resource user group (Ethiopia)
SCALE	System-wide Collaboration for Livelihoods and the Environment
SHG	Self-Help Group (Ethiopia)
SIMAVIS	Visitor Management System Mitigating Tourism Impact and Threats to Biodiversity
SOW	Scope of work
STAR	Sustainable Tourism in the Albertine Rift
T4B	Tourism for Biodiversity Project
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
TransLinks	Promoting Transformation by Linking Nature, Wealth and Power
UCOTA	Uganda Community Tourism Organization
Ush	Uganda shilling
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority
VEGA	Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance
WSR	Whole System in a Room (SCALE workshop)
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

A. INTRODUCTION

Based on the statement of work (SOW) for the Task Order Evaluation Services IQC, IBTCI, with subcontractor ECODIT, was commissioned to carry out performance evaluations for three program mechanisms supported by the Office of Land Tenure and Resource Management (LTRM) within USAID's Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and the Environment (E3): (1) Global Sustainable Tourism Alliance (GSTA), (2) Promoting Transformation by Linking Nature, Wealth and Power (TransLinks), and (3) Property Rights and Resource Governance (PRRG). The overarching framework of the LTRM evaluations addressed how each of the programs accomplished its objectives according to the evaluation questions set forth for each program. This report presents the evaluation findings for GSTA. The GSTA was implemented through a lead award from USAID/Washington to the implementing partners, with USAID field missions then initiating associate awards in six countries. It was structured in unfamiliar ways, as it was a global development alliance (GDA) contracted as a leader-with-associates (LWA) award and used the System-wide Collaboration for Livelihoods and the Environment (SCALE) stakeholder participation system as a key component for the design of country projects.

Due to these differences and the keen interest of USAID staff and implementing partners, USAID chose to conduct this assessment to determine how well the model worked and whether it was replicable.

The SOW for the GSTA assessment focused on five evaluation questions:

1. How did the use of new communication tools and the use of social networking analysis measure host country collaboration impact results?
2. Were biodiversity conservation goals achieved?
3. Were there any gender-related differences or unintended consequences in impacts?
4. Did the differences in the GDA project development process have any specific effect in the outcomes of the project?
5. How was the SCALE methodology used and to what effect?

The first question considered in this report is the fourth in the SOW: How did the GDA project development process affect the project's outcomes. This evaluation addresses it first, as the project's design preceded its implementation.

The second question in this report, the fifth in the SOW, concerns the SCALE methodology. SCALE is a trademarked approach to stakeholder participation and communications developed by AED (and later refined by FHI360) that was used in all GSTA country projects. Given that this was one of the first activities carried out in each country project, it made sense to discuss this issue before considering questions regarding project outcomes.

The third question in this assessment corresponds to the first in the SOW, on the use of communications tools and social networking analysis to measure host country collaboration impact results. This question relates to the effectiveness of SCALE, more specifically, to the use of a specific tool—social network analysis—to assess SCALE's impacts on communications among stakeholders. This tool is discussed in the third section of the report.

The fourth question in this report, the second in the SOW, relates to the impact of GSTA on biodiversity conservation and ecological resilience. Since this was the project's primary objective—with tourism as a means to that end—and as the GSTA was primarily funded out of biodiversity earmarks, this is a straightforward question about whether the project achieved its goal.

The fifth question, which appears third in the SOW, asks how gender considerations affected the project's impacts.

It is important to note that the assessment team was not asked to review the extent to which GSTA accomplished its objectives, or whether it was implemented effectively. The questions in the SOW focus on specific aspects of the program, most of which do not directly relate to its overall objectives. Only the fourth question appearing in this assessment—how the project affected biodiversity conservation—is partially related to the program’s goals. As a result, this assessment should not be viewed as a broad evaluation of GSTA.

Information for this assessment came from interviews with key individuals within the GSTA partner institutions; from a review of documents on leader awards and the country projects; and from visits to two of the six countries: Ethiopia and Uganda. While the evaluation was intended to focus on global issues and Washington’s support for GSTA, the actual work was largely implemented through the six country programs. As GSTA’s impacts have been felt at the country level, the assessment looks at how activities have played out there in the field. Insights from the field are integrated into the discussion of the five evaluation questions rather than structuring information around discrete discussions of the different country programs. As the team had a greater depth of information about Ethiopia and Uganda than the other four countries, the assessment focuses more on these two countries.

B. FINDINGS

I. HOW WAS GSTA AFFECTED BY BEING A GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCE?

Several distinct yet interrelated issues are important in addressing this question:

- How did the GDA structure influence the management structure of GSTA and how effective was that structure?
- How did the financial match requirements affect the outcomes of GSTA projects?

GDA Structure and GSTA Management

The project concept evolved out of a series of discussions among USAID, the faculty of The George Washington University (GWU) School of Business tourism program, and staff of The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and Conservation International (CI) on strategies for linking tourism, development, and biodiversity conservation. Once the concept began to emerge, it was clear to all involved that they wanted the project to be implemented by the institutions that had formed this partnership and had developed the ideas. These discussions resulted in a partnership among the institutions, with GDA emerging as the mechanism that could achieve the partnership's goals.

In accordance with the structure of GDAs, the institutions designing the project were guaranteed an implementation role, with USAID financial resources obtained to support project activities. If the institutions failed to secure leveraged funds, then they themselves were responsible for providing the matching funds. This posed a significant risk to the managing partners. Typically, GDAs involve one large development partner working with one large private sector partner, which provides all matching funds. The development partner is the implementer, responsible for carrying out most or all of the work; the association with the private partner provides expertise and additional funding. In contrast to this model, GSTA was organized around its four managing partners and there was no private firm providing expertise or matching funds. This significant difference between GSTA and other GDAs had important implications for project implementation.

The institutions engaged in initial discussions brought distinct skills to project implementation: GWU in tourism training, Solimar in ecotourism (replacing Nathan Associates, which had been involved early on), and TNC (and early in the discussions, CI) in conservation and tourism. These institutions recognized that they needed to bring in a partner with experience managing large USAID projects, as none of them had systems in place to handle USAID's administrative requirements. AED was brought in to take on this role as it possessed the necessary experience and management expertise. AED's SCALE process was an additional benefit of the organization's inclusion on the team.

All the initial partners had prior experience with USAID projects; they were concerned that GSTA's management structure would ensure that each partner would play an equal role in project implementation and the expertise of all partners would be fully maximized. The leader-with-associates (LWA) structure offered this flexibility and was perceived as an effective way to ensure the project would work as planned, according to one informant. Consequently, understanding the LWA's organization and management was an important element in assessing the effectiveness of the GDA mechanism in the case of GSTA.

The four initial partners, i.e. AED, GWU, Solimar, and TNC, referred to as the "managing partners," met regularly to steer the project. In addition to the four managing partners, GSTA included approximately a dozen implementing partners who undertook portions of the work without taking broader responsibility for the project. The LWA structure involved a lead financial award from USAID/Washington of about \$1 million, complemented by associate awards from six missions. The first associate award, for work in Ecuador, began at the same time as project start-up, while the others came on line over the course of the project.

With this management structure established, two major issues had to be resolved: first, deciding which firm would carry out which tasks, and second, determining which partner would have ultimate legal liability for meeting the financial matching requirements. The four managing partners were assigned responsibility for meeting the matching fund requirements on the lead award; managing partners also had first right of refusal on associate awards, unless an implementing partner had primary responsibility for bringing it in, in which case it received the funding and was responsible for the match. This was the case in Ethiopia, where Counterpart International was brought into the project as an implementing partner and took the lead in implementing the effort even though it was not a managing partner.

Notwithstanding the agreement among the managing partners that each firm would be responsible for matching the funds it received from USAID, AED (and later FHI360) bore ultimate legal liability for the match as it was the firm with core management responsibility. This constrained the ability of the managing partners to fully share responsibility and authority within the project. Despite all intentions, AED ended up with greater financial responsibility and therefore had more authority over the operations of the project.

This management structure had significant implications for the project's outcome. In most of the country projects, key informants perceived AED (and later FHI) financial procedures as heavy-handed, creating major delays and forcing other partners to front significant costs out of relatively limited resources.¹ While AED (and later FHI360) staff believed that fulfilling its core management role required significant funds—especially to document how the project was meeting its financial match requirements—key informants at some of the other partners viewed AED as consuming too much of the project's funding. They also believed that decisions regarding resource allocation among the partners were not transparent. One person interviewed offered, as an alternative, the example of Volunteers for Economic Growth Alliance (VEGA, www.vegaalliance.org); in this LWA project, there was a bidding process among the partners to determine how each contract would be awarded. The project's core management served primarily as a pass-through for funds without consuming many resources. However, VEGA was not a GDA partner and did not have GDA's financial match requirements.

Financial Match Requirements

GDA's financial match requirements proved to be a mixed blessing in the view of most people involved with GSTA. The match was of two types, cost sharing and leveraging, with different rules applying to each. Matching funds had to meet strict criteria to be considered cost shared. The funds had to be provided directly to the project and had to be disbursed by the project following U.S. Government accounting and auditing procedures. Leveraged funds could fit much looser standards; this category included money spent by other organizations that complemented GSTA work and contributed to GSTA goals, but was not given directly to the project. When GSTA began, GDA requirements called for a 100 percent match of U.S. Government funds, all of which had to be cost shared. During the life of the project, this was changed: The match requirement was still 100 percent, but only 15 percent of it had to be cost shared and the rest could be leveraged.

Not surprisingly, the 100 percent cost-share requirement imposed a significant burden. Two organizations that had been part of the early discussions, Conservation International and Nathan Associates, dropped out due to this high bar requirement. The need to come up with 100 percent cost-shared matching funds for the lead award placed a significant strain on the managing partners, and the recognition that AED bore ultimate responsibility for 100 percent of the match if the other partners could not deliver complicated relationships among the managing partners. The match requirement also took much of the partners' time,

¹ In addition, AED's 2010 financial troubles, which culminated in USAID cutting off all of its funding, brought much of the project's work to a halt; when work could be continued, under FHI360, as in Uganda, it was substantially changed. This was unanticipated and entirely unrelated to the project's management structure.

both to find the money and to ensure that they could document it to the satisfaction of USAID auditors. This was particularly the case when the match took the form of volunteer labor. In this case it was necessary to document what the salary of each volunteer would have been had the volunteer been paid for his or her time.

The match requirement also limited the extent to which implementing partners could obtain work through GSTA. Most were small organizations that lacked the networks and scope needed to be certain they could meet the match, and also lacked the financial resources to manage the risk of not meeting it. When deciding which partner should carry out a given task, the management team took into account each partner's ability to meet the matching requirements, which made it difficult for most implementing partners to work on GSTA. The matching requirements ended up having some of the same effect, as small and more specialized implementing agencies were unable to participate due to their inability to provide the match.

At the same time, all informants interviewed for this assessment suggested that the match requirement also had a positive influence on the project. It forced project staff to creatively seek out and collaborate with other organizations working on related issues. At times, this led organizations to get involved with useful activities that they would not have otherwise undertaken. It also meant that organizations were more aware of other organizations working in the same field, with project activities designed in ways to ensure that projects were not working at cross purposes. This could have mixed effects. On the one hand, designing activities that collaborate with others working in the same area is, at face value, a good idea. On the other, project design could be driven more by the need to obtain matching resources than by the needs of beneficiaries, which could work at cross purposes with the project's goals.

The match requirement did bring additional money into the project, especially when the requirement was still 100 percent cost shared. However, that money could have been used to support the same objectives even without GDA match requirements; it simply would not have been accounted for as U.S. Government funds. This was an important consideration for USAID, at least in Ethiopia. The USAID staff member responsible for Ethiopia Sustainable Tourism Alliance (ESTA) at the project's start started indicated by email that the 100 percent match was the main reason he wanted USAID to buy into the project, as it would double the agency's resources for biodiversity conservation. Early in ESTA project implementation, when the requirement shifted from 100 percent to 15 percent cost share, he felt that there was no longer much point to the project, as it no longer significantly increased the resources available for conservation. When the staff member left the Ethiopia mission, no one else had much interest in the project. Then, because ESTA was partly funded with HIV/AIDS funding, it became the responsibility of the staff member responsible for PEPFAR, who seemed to be mostly interested in the phase-out of ESTA so he could focus on activities with more direct relevance to HIV priorities.

The impact of the match on project outcomes was clearly mixed. If the partners had the choice, they would not have wanted the requirement, and they were very much relieved when the cost-share portion dropped from 100 percent to 15 percent. This eased the financial pressure on them and freed them to spend their time working directly on the project, rather than seeking and documenting matching funds. That said, all agreed that the match did make them broaden their horizons and think creatively, which they saw in a positive light.

This combination of reactions suggests that the 100 percent cost-sharing requirement was probably excessive. The much less stringent leveraging requirement could have been sufficient to bring about the benefits of the match without placing a burden on partners that reduced their focus on the project itself and forced them to take financial risks that many organizations would not consider taking. Only one key informant—and one who works for USAID—voiced any argument against reducing the match; his objection was rooted in the desire to double the total level of funding available for USAID projects by obtaining funds from non-governmental partners. Other informants responded to this view by suggesting that it may be more appropriate for USAID to simply fund its projects at the level it considers necessary,

rather than funding them only partially and seeking the additional resources needed from the private sector through the GDA match requirement.

Conclusions

The use of the Global Development Alliance (GDA) structure was essential to GSTA's effectiveness, as it was an appropriate mechanism to ensure that the institutions that developed its project concept would be able to implement it. The structure was difficult to manage, given the objective of ensuring that no one partner would dominate the entire project. The management structure used was only partly successful, as almost everyone interviewed felt that AED/FHI360 played too large a role and consumed too much of the funding. The USAID requirements for financial matches that came from the GDA were regarded by many informants as imposing an excessive burden and unattainable target when they called for 100 percent cost sharing; however, when this was reduced to 15 percent, all key informants stressed the utility of cost sharing in ensuring that partners would collaborate with other actors in the field.

2. HOW WAS THE SCALE METHODOLOGY USED AND TO WHAT EFFECT?

The System-wide Collaboration for Livelihoods and the Environment is a process for stakeholder participation, network-building, and planning, as developed by AED and then further refined after the merger with FHI360. AED had been brought into GSTA in part because both USAID (Roberta Hilbruner) and the project's partners were interested in using SCALE in country activities as a way to ensure that they responded to the priorities of local stakeholders. The plan was that country projects would be carried out in two phases, with two distinct financial awards. The first involved using the SCALE process to determine what needed to be done in the project and to develop a proposal for USAID. The second phase involved implementing the actions that came out of the SCALE process.

When fully applied, the SCALE process involves the following series of steps:²

1. Identify all of the institutional actors that play a role in the sector of concern, in this case tourism. "Playing a role" is defined as broadly as possible; this is a key aspect of the SCALE approach. In the GSTA context, the actors included tour operators, hotels, transportation industry businesses, the ministry responsible for tourism, the ministry responsible for transportation, the national tourism office (typically an industry association), trade associations for the hotel or travel and tourism industries, regional and local governments, community organizations, handicraft associations, national parks, journalists and media organizations, educational institutions offering tourism training, domestic and international NGOs, other donors working in the sector, and other relevant specialized actors.
2. Interview representatives of these institutions to determine what they do, what their role is within the tourism sector, which other actors in the sector they interact with, and how.
3. Organize a workshop to which all of these actors are invited; this is referred to as the "Whole System in a Room" workshop, or WSR. The workshop involves a standard set of steps:
 - a. First, through a series of exercises, the participants identify and prioritize their goals for the sector. In GSTA's WSRs the goals shared by all participants included product development, improved infrastructure, destination marketing, and increased funding. Where goals were not shared by everyone—for example, equitable sharing of benefits from tourism—these were set aside, and not considered during the rest of the workshop. The process of working together to identify and prioritize goals serves a secondary objective of enabling stakeholders to meet each other and develop relationships that could be useful in the future.

² See, for example, "Putting SCALE® into Practice," AED 2009.

- b. Second, the participants develop action plans for achieving these goals (with different participants working toward different goals) over the short term (3 months) and the medium term (18-36 months).
 - c. Third, the participants make public commitments to others at the workshop to take specific actions to achieve these goals. This step helps create buy-in for the workshop's outcomes, since everyone is aware of what the other actors have agreed to do.
 4. After the workshop, the GSTA staff use the resulting priorities and commitments as the basis for determining the activities the project can realistically undertake. This forms the basis for a proposal to USAID for what Phase 2 of the project will do.
 5. The GSTA project makes a major effort to follow up with the participants after the workshop to ensure they carry out commitments made at the WSR; it also provides assistance with meeting commitments if needed and nurtures communications among actors that began at the workshop. This step is essential for SCALE to achieve its objective of building networks among actors within the sector, which they can use to help them carry out their commitments and achieve goals identified during the WSR.

Views on SCALE varied widely among the GSTA partners. For some people—including those from AED/FHI360, since SCALE is their creation—it was an approach to participation that really worked, unlike much of what is called participation in development projects. In its most complete formulation, the use of SCALE embodies a belief that development problems will be solved when all of the relevant actors work together to analyze problems, identify priorities, design solutions, and map out who will do what to implement them. One person interviewed referred to this as the “magical explosion of what happens when that many people are all working together in a holistic way.” From this perspective, the purpose of all development projects, irrespective of sector or objective, is to facilitate that kind of communication and collaboration. This means that neither the funder nor the consulting firm hired to implement the project decides what is to be done. Instead, the funder will decide which sector to support and the firm will facilitate the process through which everyone in that sector will assess the problems and find the solutions. The donor's resources are used to help the stakeholders continue to work together throughout the life of the project, and perhaps to help pay for activities identified by the stakeholders, but the neither the donor nor consultant will decide what those activities should be.

Of course, not many development stakeholders are willing to relinquish control to this extent. For individuals or institutions bringing a specific set of technical skills to the table, such as TNC and the U.S. Forest Service, the purpose of development funding was to make those skills available and the idea of turning the entire design of a process over to stakeholders did not make sense. Some of the environmental experts interviewed felt that SCALE was not that different from other participatory processes. They saw FHI's process as too rigid and not responsive enough to the specific context or to project aims. Others went further, suggesting that stakeholders sat through the WSR waiting for it to be over so they could get on with implementing the work they had planned to do.

Other partners criticized SCALE because of the ambiguity over whether it should be used to foster communications and networking and whether it was a functional planning process. As a planning process, some partners viewed SCALE as falling short because its emphasis on all actions emerging from stakeholders' priorities and commitments did not allow room for incorporating the expertise and analytical models emerging from the experience of project partners. Thus, for example, the SCALE workshop could not lead to a decision to apply TNC's Limits of Acceptable Change approach to analyze the impact of tourism on biodiversity, as stakeholders would generally not be aware that such a framework existed, as they are not experts in the field. Another managing partner was concerned because tourism development often calls for a comprehensive destination planning process, which SCALE could not accomplish. If a second phase of a country project were to emerge from a WSR, it would be inadequate to ensure effective tourism development.

In many countries USAID had more fundamental concerns about SCALE due to the premise that project activities would be chosen by the stakeholders. While some USAID staff, including Roberta Hilbruner, came to believe that this was in fact how development should be done, it was not how USAID operated. USAID missions may seek the views of the communities they serve, but in the final analysis, it is the U.S. that decides how its money will be spent, not stakeholders. Moreover, many GSTA associate awards fell under the biodiversity earmark, which meant that very tight restrictions applied to what could be funded. In Ethiopia, the responsible USAID staff member explicitly stated that he could not allow stakeholders participating in the WSR to determine how funds would be used. USAID knew what it wanted to fund and knew how it would comply with biodiversity earmark requirements; this could not be changed to fit the SCALE process. Moreover, the Ethiopia mission was not willing to put substantial ESTA resources into facilitating ongoing communications among stakeholders after the workshop; they mission wanted its funds to go to community tourism activities, not to an ongoing national-level communications process. Across USAID missions, views on these issues varied. Some USAID staff found ways to let stakeholders steer project activities through SCALE, whereas others, as in Ethiopia, focused on the federal regulations that determined how they could spend their money and did not see stakeholder control as an option.

More operational criticisms of SCALE emerged among people who were interested in the process but felt it was not implemented well enough. One major concern was that, by bringing together all stakeholders and asking them what they wanted, the WSR created expectations that could not be met by the subsequent project. This problem emerged clearly from the first GSTA WSR, held in Ecuador in May 2007, less than two months after the Alianza Ecuatoriana para el Turismo Sostenible (Ecuadorian Sustainable Tourism Alliance) or AETS project began. In this case, the work did not begin with a first phase to identify key stakeholders and their relationships to each other; participants were not provided with guidelines on the project's aims or expected activities. As a result, the workshop led many groups to believe that AETS would provide the funding they requested to address their priority problems. After the workshop ended, there was a significant delay before the project's second phase began as USAID and the project partners came to an agreement on what to fund and worked through the Phase 2 award process. These delays led some stakeholders to assume that there would be no Phase 2, a considerable disappointment in light of the high expectations that had been created by the workshop. When the design of Phase 2 did emerge, those whose priorities were not funded were further disappointed, exacerbating the sense of unfulfilled expectations.

The Ecuador experience served as a clear lesson for subsequent GSTA country projects, but despite good intentions the problem was never really solved. Even in Uganda, regarded as the best country project and where most people felt SCALE had been helpful, there was a clear sense that the WSR had created expectations that were not met when funding plans became clear.³ It is unclear whether there was a solution to this problem. On the one hand, as the assessment team frequently heard in interviews in both Ethiopia and Uganda, SCALE's clear strength was that it brought all actors together, enabling stakeholders to meet and develop working relationships with people and institutions they otherwise would never have had access to. This was a particular benefit for groups with limited resources working at the local level, without the status and clout that could have enabled them to directly contact journalists, national officials, and other well-funded and educated people. But in countries where everyone is scrambling for funds and almost any contact with a donor agency includes an implicit or explicit request for financial support, any stakeholder who donates three full days to the WSR is doing so in the hope that something will come out of it—and that something is money, not communications.

Another operational problem with SCALE implementation arose because many USAID missions did not want to fund support for the ongoing communications functions of the process. They saw the workshop as a starting point for the project, providing input for decisions on Phase 2 activities, but did not see any reason to continue funding the process once it had been used as an input for planning. As a result,

³ This concern was expressed by the Uganda Community Tourism Association (UCOTA), Nature Uganda, and USAID staff.

stakeholders did not experience the full benefits of the process because there was no reinforcement of the contacts and networks formed during the workshop. Even without fully shifting the role of development funders and consultants into that of communications facilitators, providing support for networking could have resulted in significant benefits for stakeholders. Instead, they missed out on an opportunity to develop strong networks that would survive the end of the project.

An interesting practical question related to SCALE was the extent to which the commitments made at the end of the WSR provided any of the financial matching resources required by the GDA. Although one key informant suggested that this was the case, in fact it probably was not. Many of the commitments made at the workshops had no financial implications at all; where they did, the amounts involved came nowhere near the amounts required for the GDA match, even when the cost share was reduced to 15 percent. This should come as no surprise, since the country organizations making the commitments simply would not have had enough money to offer anything on the scale of USAID's funding for the GSTA projects. While these commitments may have been important to project success, they did not help meet the GDA match.

Even within countries, views on SCALE varied widely, as was clearly the case in Uganda. Kaddu Sebunya, who led the first (GSTA) phase of STAR as an AED employee, led STAR's subsequent phase (Forest Service/Solimar) that was hastily set up when AED was suspended as a Solimar employee. He now leads the follow-on Tourism for Biodiversity (T4B) project as an African Wildlife Foundation employee and is very positive about SCALE. Mr. Sebunya believes that the benefits of bringing everyone together—particularly journalists who could give much-needed media attention to environmental tourism—greatly outweighed the risks of creating high expectations that could not be met. Moreover, the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) staff who participated in the WSR saw it as a good model for local action. The WSR considerably broadened its park-level stakeholder discussions by including many government and non-governmental actors that had not previously been viewed as actively involved in national park issues.

While those benefits were realized in both phases of STAR, no resources have been available for similar communications work under T4B. Mr. Sebunya believes this has greatly hindered the effectiveness of the current project. On the other hand, one of the Forest Service consultants to STAR Phase 2 felt that his Ugandan colleagues saw SCALE as “old wine in a new bottle,” and that the WSR involved a rigid process that was imposed on them rather than actually being participatory. In his opinion, this reaction was partly due to the personality of the key SCALE facilitator, whose demeanor could be interpreted as either inspiring and enthusiastic, or as overbearing, depending on one's point of view.

USAID staff in Uganda supported the use of SCALE during STAR and were willing to let the WSR be a major determinant of project activities. STAR included resources to allow for significant follow up after the WSR to ensure that communications were maintained and strengthened among stakeholders. However, although USAID was willing to use the approach, it dropped it from the follow-on project, much to the regret of the project manager. The USAID employee responsible for T4B was not there during the previous projects and did not even know what SCALE actually was. Clearly USAID/Uganda has not joined the ranks of the SCALE converted.

Conclusions

The SCALE process significantly contributed to the success of GSTA country projects. Although it created unmet expectations and was not fully implemented—and although not everyone is convinced of the effectiveness of the fullest version of the process advocated by FHI360—it still seems to have been a positive force in GSTA. Future projects considering this approach will need to consider how to do it better and avoid the problems encountered in GSTA, but will probably benefit from incorporating it.

3. USE OF NEW COMMUNICATION TOOLS AND SOCIAL NETWORKING ANALYSIS

The SCALE process used in designing GSTA associate award activities included surveys that mapped the connections among stakeholders in the tourism sector. One of SCALE's objectives was to strengthen those connections by bringing people together and enabling them to figure out how they could collaborate. Such collaboration was expected to lead to new activities that would increase tourism, raise incomes, and create incentives to protect the environmental assets that attract tourists.

A key question is how successful this was. The terms of reference for this assessment asks "How did the use of new communication tools and the use of social networking analysis to measure host country collaboration impact results?" There are three aspects to this question. First, did the SCALE process and the resulting project activities actually lead to increased communication among stakeholders? Second, did that increased communication (if in fact it occurred) contribute to achieving the various objectives of the project? Third, how has social networking analysis shed light on these questions?

The use of SCALE has been discussed in some detail in the previous section. Based on the available information (which is more detailed for Ethiopia and Uganda than for the other countries) it clearly increased communication among stakeholders over the life of the project. Even in countries where USAID was not fully supportive of the process and resources were not available to reinforce the networks created at the WSR, the sense was that the workshop did help stakeholders make new contacts that were useful in carrying out project activities. In Ethiopia, for example, where USAID refused to fund SCALE after the WSR due to its national focus, ESTA Director Bedilu Shegen said that the SCALE work had been very useful in raising national awareness of the project. While Mr. Shegen agreed with the USAID decision to end SCALE work after the WSR, he said that if it had been his choice, he would have carried out the initial phases of the process because it helped stakeholders identify partners to work with and clarified the roles of the different actors in the sector.

The communications facilitated by SCALE clearly did contribute to the success of some project activities. Again, this is easiest to see in the countries visited by the team. In Uganda, for example, many project partners expressed their view that the increased attention to tourism as a result of the SCALE stakeholder assessment and the workshop facilitated other project activities, as the partners were able to take advantage of the connections they had made. The fact that STAR invested resources in helping stakeholders stay in touch with each other and ensuring they lived up to the public commitments made at the workshop further strengthened SCALE's impact on project outcomes. The fact that UWA was inspired by the WSR to broaden its own park-level participatory process also contributed to the success of STAR. Two of the most effective community groups, KATIC and the Kikorongo Women's Group, relied heavily on Peace Corps volunteers they met through UWA participatory processes. They were connected to STAR by those volunteers; this was an outcome of SCALE.

As for the third question, work is at a beginning stage. As of early 2014, FHI360 is working with researchers at the University of California, Davis Center for Environmental Policy and Behavior about strategies for applying tools for social network analysis to track how SCALE links among stakeholders change with the WSR over the life of the project and perhaps after the project is completed.⁴ The research team has proposed a series of data-collection activities during the project to determine how networks evolve over time, using non-participants as a control group. Their data focus on questions such as the strength of relationships between pairs of organizations and how often they communicate or collaborate. The relationship data are complemented by attribute data about the organizations, particularly the type of organization (e.g., NGO, government, donor), size (number of employees, which serves as a proxy for budget), and sector of operations.

⁴ Lubell et al., January 2011.

Using the results, they can analyze the network to identify organizations with many ties to others and organizations that are outliers. They can assess whose ties are strong and whose are weak. Because each organization is asked about each other in the survey, they can observe differences in what two organizations say about each other, e.g., one group could say that it frequently communicates with a second, but the second may say that it rarely communicates with the first. Using these data, researchers can identify clusters, determine which groups most often disseminate information, and which groups receive it.. The assessment of the network focuses on several issues:

- **Its density:** Are there many links among members of the network or relatively few?
- **How reciprocal its relationships are:** If A says it is related to B, does B say the same about A? Some networks are characterized by many one-way relationships, whereas others may be highly reciprocal.
- **Its transitivity:** If A is connected to B and B is connected to C, is A likely to be connected to C as well? If so, then the three nodes are transitive. In a network characterized by high transitivity, everyone knows the “friends of their friends,” whereas in a relatively intransitive network connection pairs are more discrete and people don’t “introduce their friends to each other.”
- **How much clustering is in the network:** A network with a high clustering score will be characterized by the presence of tight subgroups with relatively weak connections among them; one with low clustering will show a more even distribution of relationship strengths (or presence of relationships) across the whole network.
- **Distances:** The distance between two institutions is equivalent to “degrees of separation” in common friendship. If I know you, we have one degree of separation; if I know your friend we have two; if I know a friend of your friend, we have three. The distance measure is based on all the distances between nodes across the network; if everyone knows everyone, it will be low, whereas if many degrees of separation separate many organization pairs, the distance measure will be high.

The research team applied this approach to analyze data collected in connection with the VSRs in the Dominican Republic (DR) and Uganda, illustrating how those data can be used to understand the initial network structure and identify the most useful opportunities to strengthen communications links during the project.⁵ In both countries, data were only available for one time period, before the VSR, so it was not possible to analyze how communications networks changed over time as a result of GSTA activities. The analysis instead focused on the initial patterns, identifying central players and flagging outliers that might be brought closer to the center through project activities. They looked at the “ego-networks” of a few key institutions: that is, how those significant players related to all other actors in the network. In both countries the position of the project itself was of considerable interest, since its centrality or lack thereof could have significant implications for its success in working with other groups.

In Uganda, this analysis showed high levels of clustering, with fairly tight subgroups among local government, environmental NGOs, and local tourism groups. The data show STAR itself to be a relative outlier; this is not surprising, since it was a new actor when the data were collected and had not yet begun to make significant connections through the VSR and subsequent project activities. The researchers also identified several key organizations in the communications network; the ministries responsible for tourism, internal affairs, and environment, the National Water Authority, the Uganda Tourism Board, UWA, and New Vision Printing and Publishing Company, a key newspaper publisher. They suggest that these patterns highlight opportunities for STAR to link outliers to central players and establish communication across the subgroups rather than allowing them to remain relatively insular within the network.

⁵ Lubell et al., February 2011.

The analytical process for the Dominican Republic (DR) was similar, though the results were somewhat different. The DR sustainable tourism network (DSTA) was relatively sparse, with few of the possible connections among players already made. Consistent with that finding, both reciprocity and transitivity were low as well. On the other hand, the central government was central to the network, with distances between actors relatively low, often running through key government ministries. Although the Dominican tourism industry is structured around 10 geographic clusters, the analysis found relatively weak communications among them. This suggested that the project might contribute to a strong tourism industry were it to strengthen communications among actors within the clusters; in this way, they could more effectively develop and implement destination tourism strategies. Strengthening communications within the tourism clusters was, in fact, a key component of DSTA. Presumably, this was based at least in part on the WSR's results, though not on the Lubell et al. research as it was completed after most DSTA work was wrapping up.

This analysis is quite interesting, and it would be even more so if the data had permitted time-series analysis to consider how the networks changed due to GSTA activities. This research was conducted after both projects were well under way and therefore did not in itself contribute to project design. In Uganda, while the SCALE process included support to strengthen post-WSR communications, project activities largely seemed to focus more on community development and tourism than on the meta-level infrastructure of communications. The emphasis on communications within the tourism clusters in the DR, however, does suggest that the analysis of the network data gathered for the WSR may have influenced project design and outcomes.

Conclusions

The real results of this research about the use of social network analysis in conjunction with SCALE are likely to be felt in the future. Projects now under way in FHI360 are taking this work further, using the results of this research to design initial data collection along with planning for collection of time series data with which to assess how the networks evolve over the life of the project and perhaps beyond. Although the benefits to GSTA of social network analysis may have been limited, this should prove to be an interesting tool to strengthen other projects in the future.

4. WERE BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION GOALS ACHIEVED?

GSTA's overarching goal was to leverage the commercial demand for tourism as a vehicle for achieving USAID objectives of poverty reduction, economic growth, and biodiversity conservation. Goals such as increasing rural income from nature-based tourism were both ends in their own right (increasing income) and a means to the end of protecting biodiversity (since those who earn a living from nature-based tourism will have a financial incentive to protect that nature). GSTA's focus on strengthening community tourism enterprises (CTEs) and building human capital in the tourism sector were the means to accomplishing the broader goals of increased sustainable income and thus biodiversity conservation. Much of the money that went into GSTA was attributed to the USAID biodiversity earmark, so the question of whether or not conservation was actually strengthened is an important one.

Measuring whether biodiversity and ecological resilience is actually being conserved better now than in the past is extremely difficult. To accurately track the ultimate objective, we would need to gather time series data on natural habitat, on wildlife counts for key species, or even on species composition within ecosystems; this would require massive investments in data collection. Simpler methods for direct measurement of the state of biodiversity could involve tracking the extent and "quality" of habitat; for example, using satellite imagery to track changes in land use and land cover, using vegetation extent, density, and type as a proxy for availability of habitat. This assumes that if the vegetation is present, the animals that depend on it will also be present.

All of this goes beyond what could be done to measure the impacts of GSTA, both within the six country projects and in this assessment; this is the case for many USAID projects that aim to support biodiversity

conservation and ecological resilience. Instead, projects typically focus on showing that they have reduced the threats to biodiversity, assuming that if threats are reduced, biodiversity will benefit.

This evaluation considered this question in several ways: through discussions with GSTA staff in Washington, through a review of documents for the countries that were not visited, and, most interestingly, through detailed interviews with CTEs in Ethiopia and Uganda. The document review provides very little actual information on this issue, unfortunately. The available documents, including those reporting on indicators, were produced by the firms carrying out the work and were written to demonstrate that the projects did what was expected and achieved their objectives. They are not analytic assessments of what worked and what did not, nor do they consider what succeeded and failed. Even the indicators data, which in principle should provide objective measurement of project outcomes, are not explained and in many cases are difficult to interpret. The most valuable information on conservation impacts, therefore, comes from interviews, primarily those carried out in Uganda and Ethiopia. This chapter therefore focuses largely on those two countries, although it does consider the conservation issues in other countries as well.

Ecuador⁶

The major focus of AETS work was the introduction of new or strengthened national approaches to conservation. To a large extent, these efforts were designed to address the impact of tourists on the resource base itself. In eight protected areas, AETS introduced the TNC's Limits of Acceptable Change (LAC) and Thresholds of Sustainability methodologies for assessing and reducing impacts of tourism on sensitive areas. In two areas (Machalilla and Cotacachi-Cayapas), the project also introduced a system for visitor management developed by Conservation International and the University of San Francisco de Quito's Applied Ecology Institute (ECOLAP), called SIMAVIS (Visitor Management System Mitigating Tourism Impact and Threats to Biodiversity). The AETS final report describes a wide range of activities designed to strengthen protected area management; however, it does not provide any way to assess whether these activities actually led to more effective conservation of Ecuador's biodiversity.

AETS also worked with local communities to increase their earnings from tourism to make it financially possible and create incentives to reduce the pressure they place on the natural resource base through logging, grazing, farming, and fishing. The project supported the creation of three community enterprises which began offering such tourism activities as bike tours, kayaking, hiking, and so on. These activities were expected to reduce threats to biodiversity not only by generating alternate livelihoods, but also by bringing more eyes and attention to the region, thereby strengthening the political clout of the communities in fighting other illegal activities in protected areas.

The key words here, however, are "were expected to reduce threats." AETS was in operation for two and a half years. Although the project met its indicator targets⁷ (related primarily to the number of hectares of land under improved management), the project ended too soon for its indicators final report to shed light on whether its objectives were actually achieved. According to one person interviewed, a key achievement of this short-lived project was making sure that the work it began would be continued through government funding to the Ministry of Environment. However, it is not possible to determine how those resources were used or whether AETS actually has had a sustained positive impact on biodiversity.

⁶ Based on the AETS final report and discussions with several managing partners.

⁷ Based on the final report; the full monitoring report was not available.

Dominican Republic⁸

The Dominican Sustainable Tourism Alliance's work in conservation focused on assessing whether tourism posed a threat to biodiversity in protected areas and providing training management to address such threats where they existed. This was done in the Isla Catalina using the Conservation Action Planning (CAP) approach, implemented by the Dominican Foundation of Marine Mammals (FUNDEMAR) and by the Nature Conservancy's local partner in the DR. In two other protected areas, Los Haitises and Salto el Limón, the Limits of Acceptable Change approach was applied to assess visitor impacts. In addition, the project helped community enterprises implement environment-based tourist activities in three national parks in an effort to strengthen local earnings from ecotourism. It is clear how all these activities were expected to influence biodiversity conservation in and around the national parks. However, no information was available from either the documents or the GSTA partners to assess whether this impact was actually achieved.

DSTA also funded two small grant programs, one for investments in sustainable tourism activities and the other for tourism innovations. Both of the programs ran into administrative and managerial problems that led to fewer awards being given than initially anticipated. This coincided with the suspension of AED, which further complicated the award process. Eventually, seven sustainable tourism grants and three innovation grants were actually implemented. The lessons learned from this process, which are presented in the DSTA final report, emphasize the need for environmental mitigation and monitoring to be an integral part of the activity design rather than an afterthought. Although it is not explicitly stated, this suggests that the activities funded were in fact primarily tourism businesses and not directly focused on strengthening biodiversity conservation. Moreover, the grantees were liable for the 100 percent cost-share match that is part of all of GSTA, which was difficult for both of them to achieve and document to the satisfaction of USAID auditors. These observations suggest that while these grants may have helped support activities that became viable businesses, the direct impact on biodiversity conservation is unclear.

Montenegro⁹

GSTA's work in Montenegro was oriented toward general business development, general development of environment-based tourism, and agricultural development. The available information on the project (the final report was the only document available) makes no mention of conservation. The project did not continue after the WSR, so it is not surprising that it had little impact; however, the final report does provide detail on a range of other activities, suggesting that no biodiversity work was anticipated. In any case, we must conclude that it did not have any impact in this area.

Mali

The GSTA project in Mali focused on tourism and resource management in the Dogon Region, an area of cultural and architectural interest, striking physical landforms, and threatened encroachment by the sands of the Sahara Desert. The project undertook activities related to dune fixation, greening the desert, regeneration of medicinal plants and other native species, protecting the caiman crocodiles threatened by invasive species in the village of Borko, and encouraging tourism in the area. Unfortunately, almost no information was available about the Mali work and the project terminated early, so it was not possible to assess how successful these activities have been in conserving the biodiversity of the region.¹⁰

⁸ Based on the final report and discussions with several managing partners - Although extensive documentation was available on DSTA, it largely pertained to training.

⁹ Based on the final report.

¹⁰ The available documents were limited to the WSR report and a set of one-page publicity brochures on specific project activities.

Uganda

Uganda: Monitoring and Indicators

The Uganda monitoring and indicators system sheds some light on the effectiveness of STAR biodiversity conservation work. A few indicators in particular should be relevant:

- Hectares of land of biological significance under improved management because of the project. The targets were 10,000 for fiscal year (FY) 2010 and 80,000 for FY 2011,¹¹ while actual accomplishments were given in the Phase I final report as over 11 million and 66 million, respectively. As none of the communities visited reported any activities to change land management (see below), some explicitly stated that they were unable to convince community members to protect privately owned forests. It is not clear what these reported figures might have been based on.
- Instances of illegal activities in the protected areas adjacent to targeted communities. Unfortunately due to a lack of baseline data and incomplete data from the Uganda Wildlife Authority, it was not possible to tell whether the number of such activities was reduced.
- Number of partnerships formed in support of conservation and tourism policies. The target was 25 each year during Phase I, while the number achieved was 64 in FY 2010 and 89 in FY 2011.
- Implementation of conservation and tourism policies increased. The target was 2 in FY 2010 and 5 in FY 2011; the activities numbered 4 and 7, respectively.

While these indicators attempt to measure conservation impacts in a manageable way, they track data on threats or management rather than data on the environment. The connection between what is measured and biodiversity is, therefore, indirect at best. Moreover, the data for the two indicators that come closest to biodiversity are unclear or not available. This cannot tell us much about how Uganda's biodiversity has been affected by STAR.

Uganda: Community Work

Four sites were visited in the course of the Uganda fieldwork: the Ruboni community near Rwenzori National Park, the Kikorongo and Katwe communities near Queen Elizabeth National Park, and the Batwa community near Mgahinga National Park. The evidence from these four sites is mixed, so they are considered separately as follows:

Ruboni. Ruboni is a village on the dirt road to one of the gates to Rwenzori National Park. This is the park entrance where tourists planning a week-long trek in the mountains begin their hikes. The Ruboni community was inspired by the experiences of other community organizations to create their own group; they subsequently received support first from the Uganda Community Tourism Association and then from STAR. UCOTA helped them organize tourism activities and create the community camp, which provided a mix of lodging. STAR, working with UCOTA, provided training in business management and other skills.

The organization carries out a number of distinct activities:

- Lodging at the community camp.
- Guided walks through the forest outside the park and in the village, with the guides and the households visited receiving direct payments from these activities. Those whose land is crossed by the trails are not paid.

¹¹ Final report, p. 23.

- Guided two- to three-day walks on a new Mahoma Trail within the national park; that trail was created with support from STAR and community members were hired to build it and serve as guides.
- Handicraft sales; the artisans receive direct payments.
- Dance performances, either at the community camp or at the nearby upscale Equator Snow Lodge; the performers receive payments although in fact there have not been many such performances.
- School sponsorships; a certain number of children in the community receive revenues from the organization to pay their school fees and associated costs. These are supported out of donations to the organization.

In addition, Equator Snow purchases food from the community, so an increase in its occupancy rates has multiplier effects for the Ruboni community.

Threats to conservation in the area come from forest destruction, both in the park itself and, perhaps more significantly, on privately owned forest land outside the park. Forests are being cut to expand cultivation and to obtain fuel-wood and make charcoal. In some cases community members also kill animals, notably baboons, chimpanzees, and monkeys that steal crops.

The organization's activities are designed to benefit conservation in two ways. First, increased tourism-based income should help the community perceive a financial interest in the sector, ideally making a connection between their own preservation of forest resources and revenues from tourists. Second, the provision of school support gives the organization a positive reputation, increasing interest in its environmental message. In addition, UWA is working with the community on reducing human-wildlife conflict, in particular by experimenting with buffer-zone plantings that may discourage primates from crossing to cultivated fields.

The Ruboni camp employees interviewed were not positive about their impacts on biodiversity conservation. Forested land outside the national park is privately owned, and owners are not willing to give up the option of cutting their trees simply because some tourists might prefer for the village to appear as heavily forested as the park. The villagers whose land is traversed by the community's forest trails do not receive any compensation from tourism, so they do not see this as sufficient reason to protect their forests. Although the trails in question have always been publicly accessible, only local residents used them in the past and no one earned any financial reward for them. The camp's staff indicated that the trails cross too many parcels for it to be realistic for them to compensate every land owner. Moreover, the amount of money for each owner would probably be trivial compared to the potential revenues from selling the wood or cultivating the land.

The overall revenues of the Ruboni organization are sufficient to cover its operating costs, but not to generate a surplus or cover maintenance of the facilities. Most community members do not see any financial reward from their activities, as they are neither employed as camp staff or tour guides nor do they sell handicrafts. This suggests that financial incentives are not likely to have a major impact on whether people in the community conserve the resources under their control.

The Rwenzori National Park staff offered a somewhat different perspective on the impact of STAR support on conservation. STAR provided direct support for conservation by training UWA staff on trail design, construction, and maintenance. This should ensure that new trails will pose less direct, physical threat to the environment through which they pass. The availability of better trails may also bring in more tourists, whose financial support can help UWA to better manage its parks. STAR worked with UWA on creation of the Mahoma Trail. Based on that experience, UWA staff constructed the new Chimp Trail, a day hike through another part of the park where there is a reasonable chance of seeing chimpanzees. This suggests that the STAR support was effective in building UWA capacity and should have a positive impact on biodiversity.

Interestingly, UWA staff discussed at length their efforts to train their own trail guides. They indicated that although the community guides accompany groups on the Mahoma Trail, this is more appropriately a responsibility of the UWA staff; community guides are expected to pay park entrance fees even though they are not tourists. The UWA staff also said that the new Chimp Trail would divert visitors away from the Ruboni community trails and into the national park.

UWA is engaged in other activities that should support biodiversity conservation and resilience, although STAR was not involved in them. These activities include work with buffer-zone communities to reduce poaching, provide alternate livelihoods for “reformed poachers,” and develop living fences (e.g., onions, garlic, and hot peppers) designed to prevent wildlife from leaving protected areas and straying into cropland. From the Ruboni perspective, these are all part of the conservation package; while they usually know who paid for what, the fact that STAR supported some activities and UWA or other groups supported others is of little importance. For this assessment, however, they must be distinguished, and UWA’s impact on conservation does not mean STAR was successful.

Kikorongo. The Kikorongo Women’s Group (KWG) was founded in 2007, prior to the involvement of UCOTA or STAR in the area. According to Jane Sabuni,¹² the group’s founder, KWG began working with USAID after she met Jennifer Krauser, then a Peace Corps volunteer (PCV) with Queen Elizabeth National Park (QENP). The initial problem motivating their discussions with QENP was wildlife conflict: Elephants were leaving the park and destroying crops in fields, in response to which villagers would sometimes kill the elephants. In addition, some village residents were cutting trees in the park to meet their fuel-wood needs.

The response to these problems was to develop a set of activities through which members of the women’s group (which is open to all community members, including men) could benefit from tourism, creating a financial incentive not to kill those animals that attract the tourists. These activities included:

- Music and dance performances conducted at the nearby Simba Safari Lodge and occasionally elsewhere
- Craft workshops in which tourists could learn how to make traditional baskets
- Percussion workshops in which tourists could learn how drums were traditionally used for communications
- Teaching environmental messages to the community, including in a nursery school created by the organization
- Growing tree seedlings that are provided to community members to plant in an effort to reduce encroachment into the park to collect firewood

Through STAR, KWG received UCOTA training in business management; STAR also built an office for the organization that, because of its pleasant location and shade, has apparently become something of a community hangout. KWG also continued to work closely with Jennifer Krauser until she returned to the U.S. Both the training and Ms. Krauser’s assistance helped them, among other things, to keep some records on their sales and revenues, although this was not done regularly until 2013. Their earnings are modest, typically between \$100 and \$200 per month, with a low of \$20 and a high of almost \$300. Of this, 20 percent goes to KWG’s operating costs, and a share (unspecified, although we asked) to the participants in their activities. The organization has no staff, so its costs are relatively low, although its revenues still may not be sufficient, as evidenced by its board having just introduced annual dues of Uganda shilling (Ush) 15,000 plus an annual Ush 5,000 contribution to an emergency fund, effective in 2014. The modest membership—30 women and 20 men in a community of about 800—combined with the modest revenues

¹² Because of language-related communication problems, some of the details of what Ms. Sabuni told us may not be entirely accurate.

suggests that their activities may not be creating a significant economic incentive to reduce their threats to QENP.

According to Ms. Sabuni, the tree-planting program is reducing encroachment into the park for fuelwood. In addition, she said that the park rangers are enforcing the ban on cutting in the park, which has a positive impact, and village residents are using fuel-efficient stoves that they can manufacture themselves. These two actions are not due to STAR support but would seem to complement the project's activities. Whether this has a significant effect on conservation is difficult to determine. According to Ms. Sabuni, the UWA funds were something of a mirage. Regarding elephant-induced conflict, she said that the KWG has requested UWA support from its community development funds for construction of a trench to keep elephants in the park, but has had no response; they also requested funding to construct a hostel and a restaurant adjacent to the KWG office, but have had no response to that either. Although the KWG is an active organization thanks in part to STAR, it would seem that STAR did little, if anything, to alleviate the wildlife conflicts that first prompted KWG's involvement with the project.

Katwe. The Katwe Tourism Information Center (KATIC) was founded in 2005 through the merger of two community groups, the Kanyanginya Women Drum Actors and the Ruwenzori Lands Environmental Conservation and Tourism Services. The former included women engaged in entertainment and dancing, while the latter included men who served as tour guides. They united to form KATIC when Nature Uganda, a national NGO with a strong interest in birds, offered to support them, providing training and building an office for the new group.

A number of environmental threats are of concern in the Katwe area. One is the threat to the freshwater lake from cattle, who cross nesting areas at the shore and crush nests and eggs. The loss of trees along the steep slopes above the area's lakes also causes erosion that in turn leads to sedimentation of the lakes. The need for fuelwood is causing villagers to cut trees in nearby Queen Elizabeth National Park. A fourth concern is human-wildlife conflict: crocodiles that threaten people collecting water, children hunting Egyptian geese to gather meat for their families, and villagers using catapults to kill wildlife in the park.

KATIC is engaged in a number of activities to address these issues:

- Bird walks to the freshwater Lake Munyanyanga, which harbors flamingos during the summer months
- Guided tours to Lake Katwe ¹³ to see the salt mining operations; these are of considerable interest to Ugandan school groups as well as to foreign tourists
- Dance and music performances at area lodges
- Educational theater performances providing environmental and other social development messages
- Planting trees on the slopes above the lakes to prevent erosion
- Purchasing handicrafts from village artisans for resale in the KATIC shop

In addition, STAR has apparently¹⁴ tackled the crocodile problem head-on by constructing cages in which people can stand while filling water jugs; these protect them from crocodile attack and protect crocodiles from human retaliation for past attacks.

¹³ There are three lakes in the Katwe area. Lake Edward is a very large freshwater lake providing a home to crocodiles and hippos that threaten villagers. Lake Munyanyanga is a very small freshwater lake that dries up seasonally and hosts flamingos. Lake Katwe is the fairly small salt lake where mining operations take place.

¹⁴ "Apparently" because KATIC members first said STAR had built the cages, but later said UWA had.

The KATIC walks are quite popular, bringing in hundreds of international visitors and thousands of Ugandan students (data for 2012 include more than 33,000 Ugandans in the second and third quarters, the peak period for students). Annual revenue in 2012 was over Ush 45 million (about \$18,000). Of this, 40 percent of the guide fees go to the tour guides, 30 percent of revenue goes to KATIC operations—which includes one paid employee, the cashier—and 20 percent goes to community activities, such as cleaning, protecting trails against damage caused by salt trucks, and so on. Use of other funds was not clear; some portion goes into dividends paid to all organization members and some is presumably used for other activities. For some reason (which the people we met could not explain) the (male) tour guides are paid based on how much revenue their walks bring in but the (female) performers are not paid for performances for tourists but only receive the dividends paid to all members. Most performances are in fact educational in nature and no one pays to see them. These are perhaps reasonably considered part of the volunteer efforts of the performers, though it is not clear why this logic would also apply to paid performances for tourists.

KATIC members feel that many of their conservation efforts have been met with success. The watering cages are a straightforward technical fix that resolved the crocodile problem. The educational messages about hunting Egyptian geese and killing wildlife in the park have, according to KATIC, eliminated that problem as well, although it is not clear how the affected families are replacing this source of food and protein. The trees planted on steep slopes above the lakes have taken root and begun to grow; some other plants are beginning to form underbrush that can hold the soil in place, so there is reason to be optimistic about the effectiveness of this strategy. The only issue that is clearly still unresolved is that of the cattle walking over bird-nesting areas in order to drink. The village is working with Nature Uganda (with whom this issue was discussed while in Kampala), but a technical solution to this problem has not yet been identified.

It is not clear from the information collected on KATIC that the impact on biodiversity resilience can be directly attributed to the financial incentives created by community tourism. Indirectly, though, it is clear that STAR support strengthened the organization financially and institutionally, enabling it to put time and money into reducing some of the threats that the community was placing on its environment.

Batwa Trail at Mgahinga National Park. The case of the Batwa outside of Mgahinga National Park is completely different from the other three communities. The Batwa lived in the forest until about 1989, when they were forced to leave their ancestral lands with gazettement of the national park. They moved onto adjacent land owned by other people and had no reliable way to make a living. They have survived through occasional jobs laboring for other communities or for UWA. Their children are getting some schooling, according to the four Batwa men (all trail guides) interviewed, but do poorly in school and are bullied by other children. Batwa are apparently considered what in other cultures might be called lower caste or outcast; other people will not eat off dishes used by Batwa or touch things they have touched. At the same time, some Batwa girls are marrying other men, although the other communities will not let their daughters marry Batwa men.

The Batwa group near Mgahinga lacks a community organization; they are represented by OBUDU, a group working for broader Batwa development in Uganda. The Batwa Trail was apparently the idea of UWA and the Kisoro District Tourism Office, which felt an obligation to do something to help this community. The trail was created by the International Gorilla Conservation Program (IGCP), which is a collaborative activity of the Africa Wildlife Foundation, Fauna and Floral International, and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). Steven Asuma of ICGP worked with the Batwa to determine how and where they had lived in the forest as the basis for mapping out a trail walk that could provide an opportunity to showcase the Batwa's lost way of life. ICGP also trained about a dozen Batwa men to serve as trail guides (10 are still working) and the trail opened in 2010.

The trail is managed by UWA, under a tripartite memorandum of understanding between them, the Kisoro District Tourist Office, and OBUDU.¹⁵ Tourists pay \$80 to take the walk. Each group (up to eight visitors) is accompanied by four Batwa guides, an UWA translator (none of the Batwa speak English or other foreign languages), and an UWA escort to protect against possible wildlife attack. At the end of each walk, a group of Batwa gives a music and dance performance. Half of the revenue goes into a fund for the Batwa and the other half goes to cover UWA expenses. Out of the Batwa's share, each guide is paid Ush 8,000 per walk; each performer receives Ush 6,000. They receive their payment at the end of the month, the amount reflecting the number of walks they worked on that month. Tips are shared among the guides or performers, according to the Batwa men interviewed. Most of the money is held in the fund rather than paid out to the workers; the fund now has about Ush 46 million (\$18,400). UWA staff are looking into how that money could be used, possibly to buy land.

The trail does seem to be helping the 34 Batwa who are directly involved (10 guides and 24 performers), but those benefits do not extend to others in the roughly 4,000-member community. If the fund is used to purchase land, it will be for the 34 households with members working on the trail. The men interviewed indicated that they would not let other Batwa squat on their land; this is clearly a personal rather than a community benefit. Other members of the community were interested in jobs working on the trail, but there is not enough work to train and hire more of them.

Although this project was not created to reduce threats to biodiversity, it may have led to less poaching in the national park. The District Tourism Officer, Richard Munezero, said that there was some poaching before the trail was created, which has diminished. One of the Batwa said they do not poach, but given that an UWA enforcement officer in military uniform was present and translating, his comment may reflect what UWA would want to hear, more than the truth. Another of the Batwa said that people do poach, but that all of the surrounding communities steal from the forest when they can, not just the Batwa. In conjunction with creation of the trail, UWA has established a policy of allowing Batwa to take resources from the forest in cases of need, if they make an informal request. An UWA staff member goes into the forest with them, so there is oversight on what they take (typically building materials or medicinal plants); this may have the effect of reducing poaching by Batwa.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia: Monitoring and Indicators

The Ethiopia indicators related to biodiversity were similar to those of Uganda, although some of the program data may be more plausible:

- Number of hectares in areas of biological significance under improved management as a result of U.S. Government assistance. The target over the life of the project was 21,865; the number achieved was 89,557. Because the Ethiopia work involved mapping out community lands and designating some for conservation (see below, on community work), we can assume that these figures include all land within the community conservation areas (i.e., all land under jurisdiction of the concerned communities); it is probably not limited to land specifically designated for conservation.
- Number of people with increased economic benefits derived from sustainable natural resource management and conservation as a result of U.S. Government assistance. The target over the life of the project was 4,256, and the number achieved 4,507. It is not clear how this was calculated,

¹⁵ Collaboration with OBUDU has been suspended for the past six months, as that organization has sued UWA for compensation for the displacement of their constituents from the park 25 years earlier. UWA said activities were going on as usual despite this.

although the figures suggest that this may be an estimate of the population of all households in which someone is earning direct income from the project.

- Number of policies, laws, agreements, or regulations promoting sustainable natural resource management and conservation that are implemented as a result of U.S. Government assistance. The target over the life of the project was 65 outputs or outcomes, and the actual number was 122. This is a very indirect measure of possible improvements in resource management and tells us little about actual impacts on biodiversity. Also, as is frequently mentioned with respect to this indicator, policies are difficult to quantify. The fact that there are more of them does not tell us anything about their impact.

Ethiopia: Community Work

Community work in Ethiopia took the same general approach in each of six villages. The project applied a previously unused provision of the Ethiopian protected areas regulation that allows for the creation of community conservation areas (CCA), under which a local community is given the right to manage and use natural resources that were previously not under its jurisdiction in return for a commitment to do so sustainably. In each place a community committee was established which identified individuals whose economic activity posed a threat to the environment; these individuals were formed into a resource users group (RUG). They received training in the newly authorized sustainable resource use, through which they could develop alternative livelihoods and reduce their pressure on biodiversity. In addition, each village formed self-help groups (SHGs), organized by trade, through which people working in new tourism activities learned skills and managed their activities.

Because of problems in the logistical arrangements in Ethiopia, the information gathered in the field was less comprehensive than in Uganda. The team visited four project sites—Dorze, Konso, Lephis, and Lake Ziway—and spoke with the NGO carrying out activities in Langano. No interviews were possible for the Maze site.

Dorze. Threats to biodiversity and the environment in the Dorze area come from deforestation on steep slopes and the resulting soil erosion. ESTA activities were designed to combat this in a number of ways:

- Young unemployed men were trained as tour guides. They offer village walks to tourists interested in understanding more about local culture and ways of life.
- Women were organized into a pottery cooperative to sell wares to tourists.
- Men were organized into a weaving cooperative to sell wares to tourists (in this area weaving is primarily a male activity).
- Some forests were planted to provide resources to the community without the destruction of natural forest.
- Animal-fattening activities were introduced as another source of alternate livelihoods.

The tour guiding in Dorze was unsuccessful due to a dispute involving two competing lodge owners and the woreda, or district. The details of this dispute are not entirely clear. ESTA apparently intended to train and certify tour guides and help them form an official guide association so that they could seek clients with a credential that ensured their legitimacy. However one of the lodge owners offered tours to his guests with guides whom he controlled. This allowed him to set both the fees paid by tourists and the portion of that fee that was passed on to the guides. According to ESTA-trained guides who spoke to the team, he used his connections to convince the responsible authorities not to certify the ESTA guide association. The woreda then created an alternate guide association for which no training or credentialing was required. When ESTA ended the conflict was not resolved, so the ESTA-trained tour guides were left without a functional mechanism for attracting clients.

The pottery and weavers cooperatives are operating today, but seem unlikely to generate much revenue for the artisans. A thriving market on the road to Dorze offers a wide selection of bright, colorful woven products from around the region; in contrast, the cooperative offers a very small selection, not readily visible to a tourist driving through. It seems unlikely to be able to compete with the roadside market. The potters offer a modest selection of products of moderate quality. They apparently sell only from their own studio, which would only be accessible to tourists who are brought there by the guides. There does not appear to be a market akin to the textile market where their goods could be sold. Neither the potters nor the weavers appeared to speak any English, and the guides were proposing very high prices for their goods (considerably more than imported crafts of the same type might cost in North America, in some cases). It seems reasonable to expect that the guides receive a significant cut of any revenues, even though they have already been paid for their guide services and the items are being sold by local cooperatives. Whether or not they take a cut, the revenue does go to community members; however, this probably was not anticipated in the design of the ESTA project.

It was not possible to determine whether the tree-planting or animal-fattening activities were having an impact. Some areas of young eucalyptus plantation were visible from the road, but there was no way to know whether they were ESTA activities. On the whole, the failure of the tour guide training and certification, and the weakness of the handicrafts activities, probably means that ESTA has had relatively little impact on conservation in Dorze.

Konso. Tourism in the Konso area is centered around the so-called Konso Cultural Landscape, a group of fortified settlements scattered across the hilly region. An earlier Dutch-funded (SNV) project organized local tour guides into an association and established a tourist office where visitors (including our team) can arrange for guides and pay the guide and visiting fees. A European Commission project built a well-developed cultural and training center in the town of Konso, possibly in order to support the UNESCO World Heritage Site designation.

ESTA activities in the Konso area included:

- Setting up of the Komaya Heart of Konso Cultural Handcraft Market, a handicraft center where crafts and snacks could be sold
- Planting of eucalyptus to help reduce soil erosion and pressure on natural forests, along with a “tree planting experience” for tourists through which they contribute to a fund for planting additional trees or purchasing solar stoves
- Animal fattening
- Creation of two watershed management groups for the Tegecha and the Konso/Gersale watersheds
- Establishment of a dance troupe in Gersale
- Creation of two beekeeping associations that specifically target individuals affected by HIV/AIDS

Due to logistical and communications problems, it was not possible to speak with anyone in Konso who was directly involved with ESTA activities. The team took a guide from the tourist office, who accompanied the team to the handicraft center and one of the fortified villages and provided some information on activities in the area; however, this did not provide a complete picture of the results of ESTA. No one in the tourist office was aware of any of the ESTA activities other than the craft market, which suggests that the activities were no longer effective. They did report that the project had gotten started but had then been terminated before its work could be completed.

The handicraft center is not operational. It is located in a scenic building atop a low but steep hill, accessed by a long flight of stone steps. While the site is visually interesting, it is perhaps half a mile off the road. It cannot be accessed by tour buses or by people unable to climb the hill. This may be one reason why it has not had much success. At the start, the guide association paid the salary of a full-time employee to

keep it open, but this did not pay off. Now the center can only be visited by prior appointment, making it even less likely to attract tourists. Since it is usually closed, artisans are not interested in placing their wares there for sale.

Lephis. The village of Lephis is adjacent to a commercial forest reserve managed by the Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise (OFWE), whose resources are threatened by direct encroachment and by use of wood for cooking fuel, construction, and manufacture of a popular local alcoholic beverage. ESTA supported the work of a local NGO, ANCEDA (Arsi Nature Conservation and Environmental Development Association) to address conservation of the Oromia Forest. The activities supported included:

- Handicraft production
- Beekeeping
- Cattle fattening
- Development of a trail to access a high waterfall in the forest
- Horseback rides to the waterfall and elsewhere in the forest
- Training local guides for both hikes and horseback excursions
- Establishment of a campsite adjacent to the forest, managed by local women

The Lephis Community Conservation Area negotiated with OFWE for the right to bring tourists into the forest, which gives the community a financial interest in protecting it from encroachment and deforestation. As elsewhere, unemployed young men were trained as tour guides, so they would have an alternate source of revenue that depended on conservation rather than exploitation of resources; however, ANCEDA staff indicated that they could not be sure these were the exact individuals encroaching on the forest.

The Lephis activities are still ongoing. The craft shop is open and appeared to have a good range of products for sale, although the women said that their membership has dropped from an initial 23 to the current 11 and revenues have dropped as well. The decrease in revenues was attributed to the end of the ESTA project and the departure of the Aid to Artisans staff person who had supported their work and assisted them with marketing.

ESTA supported the creation of a tourist reception center at the border of the forest where visitors can book guides or horse rides and check into the camping area. In a meeting with the assessment team, a group of guides and the center manager reported that the number of visitors has risen since the center opened, although it is seasonal. Most of the visitors come through tour operators rather than on their own. The guides indicated that they were unemployed before this project began. While they are not employed full time now, and the revenues available to each individual are not sufficient to meet all of their needs, it has added to their incomes. However the manager of the center is unpaid and the center still needs access to water and electricity to be fully operational. The termination of ESTA means they are unlikely to get that access.

The Lephis work may be having a positive impact on conservation of the Oromia Forest. The people involved do see that the forest attracts tourists and that tourists' enjoyment of the area is related to its pristine nature, the ability to visit the waterfall, and particularly the opportunity (unpredictable, of course) to see colobus monkeys or baboons on the trail. This may help maintain a community ethos of conservation, aided by the fact that some members of the community earn money from the tourists. Because legal access to the forest for tourism is conditional on a reduction in encroachment, OFWE may add to the pressure on the community to protect the resources.

Ziway. The village of Ziway is on the shore of Lake Ziway, dotted with islands and home to a considerable diversity of bird life. Village activities threaten bird-breeding areas, particularly where livestock trample

nesting areas on the shore of the lake. Conflict with hippos is also a problem; they can eat crops and, less frequently, directly threaten local residents.

ESTA work in the area has been of several types:

- Handicrafts
- Ecotourism
- Natural resource management
- Education about conservation
- HIV/AIDS

The team went to the island of Tulu Gudo and held a meeting with a number of members of the area Community Conservation Association and other community members. They explained how project activities are affecting local livelihoods and creating an incentive for conservation.

There was little or no tourist activity in Ziway before ESTA. Local boats were used only for fishing; baskets and other artisanal products were made for local use rather than for sale. ESTA helped the community organize boat operators to take tourists out and established a tourist office at the jetty in Ziway where tourists can book boat trips to the islands. As elsewhere, the prices for boats and guides are fixed, as are the shares going to each worker, the cooperative associations, and the tourist office. The guides were recruited from among young unemployed men living in the village or on Tulu Gudo and other islands. ESTA also built a new boat landing; however, it was placed in a spot that is regularly inaccessible due to flooding, so it is not used.

Handicrafts activities are under way in Ziway, Tulu Gudo, and other areas around the lake. Products are sold in a small craft shop on Tulu Gudo and in a larger shop at the Ziway jetty. The shop on the island was poorly stocked when the team visited, while the shop at the jetty was closed altogether. Apparently the employee at the jetty shop had left and a replacement had not been hired. Rather than staffing it temporarily with someone else, the shop was simply closed. The CCA members said that twice a year the artisans travel to Addis Ababa to sell their products in craft fairs, which provides considerable revenue. ESTA funded the artisans' first trip to Addis and apparently they have continued to pay for the trip themselves after ESTA ended. They now receive support from an Indian handicraft association, which enables them to solidify progress made under ESTA.

Records on the numbers of tourists and revenue from these activities were not available, but the CCA members report they are getting a lot of visitors. The highest number of tours was in November 2013, when 41 groups came. Some groups have as many as 20 members, but usually they have substantially fewer. The tour guides receive between 125 and 150 Ethiopian birr per tour (approximately \$5.00–\$6.50 in U.S. dollars), depending on tour length; larger groups are accompanied by more guides, rather than a single guide getting paid more for leading a larger group. The tourist activities do not entirely replace other economic activity (fishing, farming) for those involved, but do provide a much-valued increase in income.

The actual impact of ESTA activities on conservation is unclear. Natural resource management activities involve fencing a sensitive area on the east side of the lake to protect the existing grasses and planting trees that will further hold the soil in place. Local residents can sell the grasses and are also engaged in beekeeping activities to supplement their income. The team did not visit that side of the lake, so it was unable to determine what exactly this has accomplished. CCA members indicated that the communities around the lake have been educated on the importance of protecting wildlife, so they no longer threaten them. Local residents have constructed cottages along the shoreline where they take shelter when they expect hippos to consume crops; this enables them to chase the hippos away before they get to the fields, rather than shooting at them once they are there. The team was unable to assess the actual effectiveness of any of these strategies, however.

Langano. While the team did not visit the Langano site, team members did interview staff at the Rift Valley Children and Women’s Development Organization, which implemented ESTA activities. Their work focuses on providing alternate livelihoods for individuals who now survive by selling fuelwood or charcoal. The project gave targeted individuals livestock—a cow or a few smaller animals—which were fattened and then resold. With the revenue, the project participants could buy more animals, providing a steady source of revenue to replace the sale of fuel, thus reducing pressure on the environment.

There is no tourism component to the Langano work, so it is not entirely clear how the project came to be involved in this region. Data provided by the NGO did suggest that the activity could be profitable, in that there is a significant difference between the purchase price of a young animal and the price at which it can be sold after fattening for a few months. Thus, this activity could provide enough revenue for those involved to stop cutting the forest.

However, this case clearly raises an issue that is important for all of the community tourism activities. Both ESTA and STAR seem to be doing well at identifying and targeting individuals who are threatening the forest and providing them with alternate ways to make a living. However, in five years these villages will have a new crop of unemployed young men: What is to keep them from moving into fuelwood and charcoal production to support themselves? In Langano, the initial animals are given to beneficiaries rather than the project lending them the funds to purchase their animals with an obligation to repay after fattening and selling the animals. Consequently, once there is no donor to fund the initial purchase of animals, there will be no alternative for the next group of young men to keep them from cutting trees.

Conclusions

On the whole, it seems that some GSTA community activities have been effective in creating alternate livelihoods and thereby reducing pressure on the environment. The project’s activities in Uganda have had the greatest economic success, although it is unclear whether the outputs will lead to more ecological conservation or resilience, nor is it certain that the links with tourism have created incentives for conservation. Activities in Ethiopia have suffered from unrelated practical problems—the conflict among lodge owners in Dorze, the apparent weakness of activities in Konso—but there too some places have realized economic success that could benefit conservation, albeit on a small scale.

That said, the Langano example makes it clear how limited this benefit may be over time. Providing an alternate livelihood for today’s crop of unemployed young men through a strategy that cannot be expanded to others in the community is likely to only prevent resource harvesting in the short run. In Langano, this might have been resolved by creating a revolving loan fund to buy animals for fattening rather than giving grants. Elsewhere, even if tourism thrives in communities like Ziway and Katwe, the demand for tour guides and other tourism services is not likely to grow fast enough to continue creating alternative job opportunities for the additional young men who will need them. Creating a community culture in which cutting forests and harvesting resources is not acceptable may be a step in the right direction; however, it could also lead to resentment fueled by the perception that a few people will benefit from the new jobs while the community as a whole is expected to pay for it by giving up their access to resources.

Although the Batwa situation is atypical in many respects, this phenomenon may already be happening there. Thirty-four people are earning money from the project and may be able to buy land with their earnings. The guides interviewed made it clear that others in the community would like to have those jobs as well. Others in the community would probably also like to be allowed to squat on the land that the chosen 34 buys, since the Batwa’s lack of land following their expulsion from the forest is their fundamental problem. Yet the men interviewed did not expect to share their land with the rest of the community. While this is not exactly mirrored in other communities, a situation where a few can earn new livelihoods while the rest of the community has to change its behavior is typical of all these projects. This reality may limit the effectiveness of the project’s strategy.

These limitations do not mean that GSTA activities have been entirely ineffective. The communities have reaped a variety of benefits from the project, including both direct revenue and training that may improve

their well-being in the future. Some specific problems have been resolved, particularly with respect to human-wildlife conflict. Even if the actual impacts on biodiversity are less than might be hoped, these activities have contributed to a number of the GSTA's overall objectives.

5. THE ROLE OF GENDER IN PROJECT IMPACTS

The terms of reference for this assessment asks whether there were any “gender-related differences or unintended consequences in impacts” of GSTA activities. The team raised this issue in all of its interviews, somewhat to the surprise of many of the respondents, who universally said that their work had not had an explicit gender focus. There are clear differences in the roles played by men and women in community tourism and all the projects included distinct activities that would benefit men and women separately. Perhaps it speaks well of the integration of gender awareness into project design that most respondents did not see this as involving explicit attention to gender. Rather, it went without saying that men would engage in one set of activities and women in another set, and that the projects would support all activities as needed.

At the community level, there were clear differences in the roles of men and women in GSTA activities. In Ethiopia and Uganda (for which, once again, the team has the most information), tour guides were always men and most handicraft work was done by women. In Ethiopia, men rather than women are weavers, but the other craft activities are the domain of women. The impression given in both countries was that women had too many other responsibilities for children and the home to take on the fixed time commitments required of tour guides, whereas the unemployed men targeted by the project did not have other work to occupy them. Where community enterprises were running lodgings, either men or women could be involved in managing them: The Ruboni Camp in Uganda was entirely staffed by men, whereas the campground at Lephis in Ethiopia was staffed by women. Where communities offered performances, the dancers were women, while some of the musicians may have been men. In Katwe, Uganda, where the community organization did a lot of theater, this was the domain of women.

One of the partners interviewed suggested that the managers of community tourism enterprises were often women. In his view, the communities trusted women with money more than they did the men. As he explained, the project would ask the community to select a manager for its activities; in most cases, a woman would be selected. As women took on these roles it sometimes changed the dynamic within their families. On the other hand, the same person indicated that the leaders of tourism clusters in the Dominican Republic were always men, even if it was women who brought people together as mediators, facilitators, or conveners.

While agreeing that the project did not have a specific gender focus, another interviewee pointed out that the tourism industry tends to be dominated by women. Most of the GWU students in tourism (who contributed to the project in a variety of ways) are women, as are most students in tourism programs in the developing world. However, data on individuals enrolled in available on-line training using GSTA tourism materials shows a balance of men and women, rather than dominance by either group. And substantial numbers of both men and women participated in project trainings.

In one area there did seem to be a significant difference between the benefits accruing to men and women. In Uganda, men working as tour guides in Katwe were paid for each day they worked, whereas women performing for tourists were not paid for each performance. The community members discussing this responded that the women received their share of the overall income of the community enterprise; however, the men receive that share as well in addition to being paid for each day worked. In the Batwa area, both performers and tour guides are paid, but the guides are paid more than the performers. The impression conveyed in discussing this issue was that men are expected to bring in money, whereas women are expected to undertake unpaid household labor, so it appeared to be more important that men be paid for their work than women. When questions were raised about this in Katwe, community members eventually seemed to perceive that there could be a discrepancy and said they would have to rethink the issue. However, they may have been humoring the (female) foreign consultant rather than taking it seriously.

All of the projects disaggregated their indicator data by gender, whenever appropriate. This was straightforward for all training programs, and most projects trained both men and women in significant numbers. The Ethiopia indicators disaggregate the earnings of community enterprises by gender as well, but the numbers are unclear. The data on earnings from handicrafts¹⁶ show the average earnings of men and women as identical, which suggests that the per-person earnings for each gender simply assumed that they sold the same amount. The data on “sales by men” and “sales by women” for tourism enterprises are totally inconsistent, with the sales by each gender far exceeding the total sales of the enterprise. Moreover, although the table header says that total sales are in Ethiopian birr, all the monetary figures have dollar signs, so it is not clear what is meant. For the Lephis Ecotourism Association, for example, total sales in FY11–FY13 are shown as \$6,300, while sales by men are reported as \$144,900 and those by women as \$37,800.¹⁷ These indicators must therefore be discounted.

On the whole, while GSTA did not include an explicit focus on gender, yet project activities have taken into account gender roles in different countries. Activities have been designed to ensure that both men and women reap their benefits. Gender differences do not seem to have led to unintended consequences in project implementation because they were taken into account as the different country activities evolved, despite this not having been a direct focus of GSTA.

¹⁶ ESTA Draft Final Report, p. 23.

¹⁷ ESTA Draft Final Report, p. 19. It should be noted that this is a draft report, as the assessment team was unable to access the final version of the report. It is possible that these figures have been corrected in the final version.

C. CONCLUSIONS

The Global Sustainable Tourism Alliance was an innovative project through which USAID tried a new approach to both economic development and biodiversity conservation, linking the two through the tourism industry and employing a number of creative approaches to achieving project aims. This assessment has considered several aspects of the alliance, assessing how effectively these new approaches have enabled GSTA to achieve its objectives.

The use of the Global Development Alliance (GDA) structure was essential to GSTA's effectiveness, as it was an appropriate mechanism to ensure that the institutions that developed its project concept would be able to implement it. The USAID requirements for financial matches that came from the GDA were regarded by many informants as imposing an excessive burden and unattainable target when they called for 100 percent cost sharing; however, when this was reduced to 15 percent, all key informants stressed the utility of cost sharing in ensuring that partners would collaborate with other actors in the field.

The use of the SCALE process contributed significantly to the success of GSTA. While it was not implemented fully due to USAID's reluctance to cede control over project design—and, to the extent that it was implemented, it sometimes created unmet expectations—nearly all key informants believed that it was a positive force in GSTA country project implementation.

Social network analysis tools were used to analyze some GSTA activities, but the results were not used in project design or implementation due to research timing. This may be an interesting tool to strengthen future projects.

The impact of GSTA activities on biodiversity has probably been fairly limited. While some community activities are probably generating enough income to reduce pressure on the environment, they are operating on a small scale. While tourism-related jobs may replace resource-based incomes for a few people, there will not be enough work in this field to employ the next cohort of youth in search of jobs. While it is evident that some communities have benefited from GSTA activities, it is unclear that this will have a significant effect on biodiversity.

Gender was not an explicit focus of any GSTA activities. However, all community activities showed clear differentiation of roles according to gender, suggesting that this may have been assimilated into project design as a matter of course. Gender differences did not lead to unintended consequences in the projects: It was clear to all involved that the roles and impacts for men and women would differ, and project activities were developed that made good use of this.

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APPENDIX 2: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

USAID/Washington

- Megan Hill, LTRM/USAID
- Roberta Hilbruner, retired, LTRM/USAID
- Mike Colby, formerly LTRM/USAID

GSTA Partners

FHI360

- Nick Wedeman, Senior Technical Manager, Center for Environment, Energy, and Economic Development, FHI360
- Jenny Barker, Acting Director, Global FISH Alliance, FHI360
- Rick Bossi, Director, Environment Programs, FHI360 (conference call)
- Patrick Papania, SCALE Lead, FHI360 (conference call)
- Counterpart International
- Jennifer Norfolk, Senior Environmental Program Manager, Counterpart International
- Shelly Hicks, formerly of Counterpart International (now Senior Program Design and Planning Specialist, Environmental Incentives)

Solimar

- Chris Seek, Director, Solimar (conference call)
- Shawndra Herry, Program Director, Solimar
- Simon Jones, Vice President, Solimar
- Matt Humke, Solimar (conference call)

TNC

- Andy Drumm, TNC (now Sustainable Tourism Specialist, Drumm Consulting; conference call)
- Jim Rieger, Senior Advisor for US Government Relations and Lead, Climate Adaptation, Latin America Region, TNC (conference call)

George Washington University

- Kristen Lamoureux, Director, International Institute of Tourism Studies and Assistant Research Professor of Business and Tourism, George Washington University School of Business

Other

- Matthew Edwardson, U.S. Forest Service consultant to STAR (now with TetraTech)

ETHIOPIA

National:

- Bedilu Shegen, Director, ESTA
- Mekonnen Egziabher, Tourism Specialist, ESTA
- Leykun Abunie, Biodiversity Conservation Specialist, ESTA

- Fisseha Merawi, AOR, USAID/Ethiopia
- Kevin Smith, formerly USAID/Ethiopia (email exchanges only)
- Mengistu Wondafrash, Executive Director, Ethiopia Wildlife Conservation Society
- Amare Siraw, Senior HIV/AIDS Advisor, International Medical Corps

Dorze Area:

- Mayor of Chenche, Dorze area
- Staff of Mekon Lodge, Dorze
- Guides trained by ESTA
- Members of Dorze Weaving Cooperative
- Members of Dorze Pottery Cooperative

Konso Area:

- Henok Alene, Cultural Center, Konso
- Staff of Konso Tourist Office

Lephis Area:

- Segni Hasso, Programme Officer, ANCEDA, Arsi Negele
- Basaznew Debale, Driver, ANCEDA (and former employee of Oromia Forest Concession)
- Azaria Jambo, Project Officer, ANCEDA
- Members of Lephis area craft cooperative
- Tujar Geda, Manager, Lephis Tourism Center
- Tour guides, Lephis Tourism Center

Langano Area:

- Terene Tadesse, Project Officer, Rift Valley Children and Women's Development Organization
- Gemedo Berissa, Project Officer, Rift Valley Children and Women's Development Organization

Ziway Area:

- Firaes Nebi, Manager, Boat Owner's Association
- Zewedie Kurkura, CCA Committee, Tulu Gudo
- Melaku Gebre Mariam, Local Priest, Tulu Gudo
- Bedhasa Gebru, Tulu Gudo Cooperative Manager
- Tesfaye Birhanu, Guide, Tulu Gudo
- Woldecherkos Turi, CCA Handicraft Association Committee, Weaver, Tulu Gudo

UGANDA

National:

- Kaddu Sebunya, Director, STAR phases 1 and 2 (now director of T4B, African Wildlife Foundation)
- Ingrid Nyonza Nyakabwa, Marketing Manager, Uganda Wildlife Authority
- Charles Tumwesigye, Deputy Director of Conservation, Uganda Wildlife Authority
- Stephen Sanyi Masaba, Business Development Manager, Uganda Wildlife Authority
- Dianah Nalwanga Wabwire, Research and Monitoring Coordinator, Nature Uganda
- Helen Lubowa, Director, Uganda Community Tourism Association
- Felex Kamalha, Field Officer, Uganda Community Tourism Association
- Rebecca Carter, USAID
- Sudi Bamulesewa, USAID
- Robert Senkungu, USAID

Rwenzori Area:

- Irumba Alfred Ferdinand, Manager, Ruboni Camp
- Owerangi Enock, Tourism Manager, Ruboni Community Association
- Masereka Felex Klaita, Ruboni Community Association
- Fredric K. Kizza, Senior Warden In Charge, Rwenzori Mountains National Park, UWA
- Joseph Muhindo, Guide and Trails Ranger, Rwenzori Mountains National Park, UWA
- Solomon Mbusa, Guide Ranger, Rwenzori Mountains National Park, UWA
- Alex Kibonge, Law Enforcement Ranger, Rwenzori Mountains National Park, UWA

Kikorongo Area:

- Jane Sabuni, Director, Kikorongo Women's Group
- Other members of the Kikorongo Women's Group

Katwe Area:

- Nicholas Kagongon, Guide, Katwe Tourism Information Center (KATIC)
- Kimulya Yokiasi, Member, KATIC
- Ouma Richardson, Member, KATIC
- M. Govetti, Member, KATIC
- Margaret Akol Komuruti, Member, KATIC
- Grace Kabugho, Cashier, KATIC

Kisoro Area (Batwa Trail):

- Richard Munezero, Kisoro District Tourism Officer
- Christopher Masaba, Warden in Charge, Mgahinga National Park, UWA

- Steven Serutoke, Guide, Batwa Trail
- Haguma Kanyabikingi, Guide, Batwa Trail
- George Pagazihe, Guide, Batwa Trail
- Gad Nybagaragaza, Guide, Batwa Trail

APPENDIX 3: ETHIOPIA AND UGANDA FIELD TRIP ITINERARIES

Performance Evaluation Itinerary, Ethiopia, December 2013 Ethiopia Sustainable Tourism Alliance (ESTA)

Date	Location (overnight)	Time	Activities
R 12-5	Addis Ababa	12:00 PM	AM: Arrival; Overnight at Intercontinental Hotel
F 12-6	Addis Ababa	6:00 PM	AM: Meeting with Meti Ketema
S 12-7	Addis Ababa	10:00 AM	AM: Meeting with Mekonen Egziabher
S 12-7	Addis Ababa	8:45 PM	JH: Arrival
SU 12-8	Addis Ababa		
M 12-9	Addis Ababa	9:00 AM	Meeting with Bedilu Shegan
M 12-9	Addis Ababa	4:30 PM	Meeting with Megistu Wondafrash, ED, EWNHS
T 12-10	Addis Ababa	9:00 AM	Meeting with Leykun Abunie
T 12-10	Addis Ababa	11:00 AM	Meeting with Amare Siraw
T 12-10	Addis Ababa	12:00 PM	Meeting with Mekonen Egziabher
W 12-11	Addis Ababa	11:30 AM	Car rental agreement: Tehwodros, Serene Toru and Car Rent
W 12-11	Addis Ababa	2:00 PM	Meeting with Fisseha Merawi, AOR, USAID/E
W 12-11	Addis Ababa	8:00 PM	Meeting with Bedilu Shegan
R 12-12	Arba Minch	6:30 AM	Depart Addis Ababa
R 12-12	Arba Minch	mid-day	Visit MAZE National Park & CCA; Meeting with Ato Alehegn, Park Warden
R 12-12	Arba Minch	pm	Arrive Arba Minch; Overnight at Paradise Lodge
F 12-13	Konso	am	Depart Arba Minch to KONSO
F 12-13	Konso	am	Visit DORZE CCA; Meetings with CCA Management Committee
F 12-13	Konso	pm	Brief visit: Nechisar National Park
F 12-13	Konso	pm	Arrive KONSO; Overnight at Kanta Lodge
F 12-13	Konso	pm	Meeting with Ato Kesene, Director of KDA
S 12-14	Konso	all day	Visit KONSO CCA; Meetings with CCA Management Committee; Overnight at Kanta Lodge
S 12-14	Konso	pm	Depart Konso for Arba Minch; Overnight at Paradise Lodge
SU 12-15	Lake Ziway	am	Depart Arba Minch
SU 12-15	Lake Ziway	pm	Arrive Lake Ziway; Overnight at Bethlehem Hotel
M 12-16	Lake Ziway	am	Visit LEPHIS CCA; Meetings with CCA Management Committee

Date	Location (overnight)	Time	Activities
M 12-16	Lake Ziway	pm	Visit EAST LAKE LANGGANO CCA; Meetings w/ CCA Mgmt. Committee
M 12-16	Lake Ziway	pm	Return to Ziway; Overnight at Bethlehem Hotel
T 12-17	Addis Ababa	am-pm	Visit LAKE ZIWAY CCA (incl. Tulu Gudo Island);
T 12-17	Addis Ababa	am-pm	Meetings with CCA Management Committee
T 12-17	Addis Ababa	pm	Depart Ziway
T 12-17	Addis Ababa	pm	Arrive Addis Ababa; Overnight at Intercontinental Hotel
W 12-18	Addis Ababa	am	Exit briefing at USAID/E
W 12-18	Addis Ababa	pm	Meeting with Ato Kumara, EWCA
W 12-18	Addis Ababa	pm	Meeting with Ato Grema, Ethiopia Tourism Board
R 12-19	Addis Ababa	9:35 AM	JH: Departure (via London) – arrival Newark 11/19 @ 10:00 pm; AM: In Addis
S 12-21	Amsterdam	5:10 AM	AM: Departure from Addis Ababa

Performance Evaluation Itinerary, UGANDA, January 2014
Sustainable Tourism in the Albertine Rift (STAR)

Date	Location (overnight)	Time	Activities
M 1-6	Kampala	15:00	Arrived Uganda; stayed at Metropole Hotel
M 1-6	Kampala		Kaddu Sebunya, Director, STAR phases 1 and 2
T 1-7	Kampala		Ingrid Nyonza Nyakabwa, Marketing Manager, Uganda Wildlife Authority; Charles Tumwesigye, Deputy Director of Conservation, Uganda Wildlife Authority; Stephen Sanyi Masaba, Business Development Manager, Uganda Wildlife Authority; Rebecca Carter, USAID; Sudi Bamulesewa, USAID; Robert Senkungu, USAID
W 1-8	Kampala		Helen Lubowa, Director, Uganda Community Tourism Association
W 1-8	Kampala		Felex Kamalha, Field Officer, Uganda Community Tourism Association
R 1-9	Kampala		Reading, writing, planning field work
F 1-10	Kampala		Dianah Nalwanga Wabwire, Research and Monitoring Coordinator, Nature Uganda; Reading, writing, planning field work
S 1-11	Ruboni		Drive to Ruboni; stayed at Ruboni Lodge

Date	Location (overnight)	Time	Activities
Su 1-12	Queen Elizabeth National Park	morning	Irumba Alfred Ferdinand, Manager, Ruboni Camp; Owerangi Enoch, Tourism Manager, Ruboni Community Association; Masereka Felex Klaita, Ruboni Community Association; Fredric K. Kizza, Senior Warden In Charge, Rwenzori Mountains National Park, UWA; Joseph Muhindo, Guide and Trails Ranger, Rwenzori Mountains National Park, UWA; Solomon Mbusa, Guide Ranger, Rwenzori Mountains National Park, UWA; Alex Kibonge, Law Enforcement Ranger, Rwenzori Mountains National Park, WA
Su 1-12	Queen Elizabeth National Park	afternoon	Nicholas Kagongon, Guide, Katwe Tourism Information Center (KATIC); Kimulya Yokiasi, Member, KATIC; Ouma Richardson, Member, KATIC; M. Govetti, Member, KATIC; Margaret Akol Komuruti, Member, KATIC; Grace Kabugho, Cashier, KATIC
Su 1-12	Queen Elizabeth National Park	afternoon	Drive to QENP; stayed at Simba Lodge
M 1-13	Mbarara	morning	Jane Sabuni, Director, Kikorongo Women's Group;
M 1-13	Mbarara	morning	Other members of the Kikorongo Women's Group
M 1-13	Mbarara	afternoon	Drive to Mbarara; stayed at Lakeview Hotel
T 1-14	Kisoro	morning	Drive to Kisoro; stayed at Traveller's Rest Hotel
T 1-14	Kisoro	afternoon	Richard Munezero, Kisoro District Tourism Officer
W 1-15	Kisoro	afternoon	Christopher Masaba, Warden in Charge, Mgahinga National Park, UWA; Steven Serutoke, Guide, Batwa Trail; Haguma Kanyabikingi, Guide, Batwa Trail; George Pagazihe, Guide, Batwa Trail; Gad Nybaragaza, Guide, Batwa Trail
R 1-16	Kampala		Drive to Kampala; stayed at Metropole hotel
F 1-17	Kampala		Kaddu Sebunya, Director, STAR phases 1 and 2
F 1-17	Kampala		Report preparation
S 1-18	Kampala		Departure from Uganda