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STRENGTHENING MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY: END-OF-PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT

FINAL REPORT

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Strengthening Multi-Party Democracy

**Prepared for
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACFODE	Action for Development
ADINGON	Arua District Non-Governmental Organization Network
ADS 203	Automated Directive System 203
ADS 578	Automated Directive Systems 578
AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
BYM	Bushenyi Youth Network
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CDOs	Community Development Officers
CEPPS	Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of State and Government
COL	Change Initiative Limited
CP	Conservative Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CV	Curriculum Vitae
DDP	Deepening Democracy Program
DEMGroup	Democracy Monitoring Group
DG	Democracy and Governance
DP	Democratic Party
DR	District Registrar
DVP	Development Partner
EC	Electoral Commission
EU	European Union
FAD	African Development
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOU	Government of Uganda
HIV	Human Immune Deficiency Virus
ICT	Information Communication and Technology

IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IPC	Inter-Party Coalition
IPD	Inter-Party Dialogues
IPOD	Inter-Party Organization for Dialogue
IRI	International Republican Institute
IUIU	Islamic University in Uganda
JEEMA	Justice Forum
KAS	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung
KIs	Key Informants
LCs	Local Councils
LCV	Local Council Five
LRA	Lords Resistance Army
LRM	Lords Resistance Movement
LTO	Long Term Observation
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MPs	Members of Parliament
MPD	Multi-Party Democracy
MUST	Mbarara University of Science and Technology
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NAWOU	National Association of Women Organizations in Uganda
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGOs	Nongovernmental Organizations
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NURRU	Network of Ugandan Researchers and Research Users
NUSUF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
PD	Program Description
PDG	Partners for Democracy and Governance
PDP's	Project Development Plans
PEAP	Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PPP	Peoples Progressive Party

PWDs	People with Disabilities
PYLT	Young Leaders Training Program
RYPLA	Regional Youth Political leadership Academy
SACCOs	Savings Credit and Cooperative Organizations
SMD	Strengthening Multi-party Democracy
SMS	Short Message Service
SOW	Scope of Work
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
TDF	Tanzanian Peoples Defense Forces
TDS	Transformational Diplomacy Strategy
ToTs	Training of Trainers
TV	Television
UBC	Uganda Broadcasting Corporation
UGX	Uganda Shillings
UJCC	Uganda Joint Christian Council
UK	United Kingdom
UMEMS	Uganda Monitoring Evaluation & Management Services
UPC	Uganda Peoples' Congress
URTAF	Uganda Roundtable Foundation
US	United States
USAID	United State Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
USG	United States Government
UWONET	Uganda Women's Network
VRA	Voter Registration Audit
WDN	Women's Democracy Network
Y+PN	Youth Plus Policy Network
YN	Youth Network
YSU	Youth Sport Uganda.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In response to Request for Application 617-07-005 (RFA), USAID/Uganda contracted the National Democratic Institute (NDI) as lead partner in cooperation with the International Republican Institute (IRI) as sub-contractor to implement the Strengthening Multi-Party Democracy (SMD) Program over a period of four years (December 2007 to December 2011) for a total program budget of \$7 million. The SMD program was one component of a multi-faceted democracy and governance (DG) response under the 2006-2011 USAID strategy. The SMD program, together with USAID's Strengthening Democratic LINKAGES and the Threshold Country Programs in the DG Portfolio, were intended collectively to promote linkages that would increase accountability between citizens and their government through the intermediate institutions of parliament, local governments, political parties, civil society, and government institutions such as the Inspector General of Government and the Attorney General. The SMD program was to complement these other interventions by encouraging accountability and transparency among political parties, their constituents, and government and to strengthen linkages among and within four sets of actors: the Ugandan Parliament, political parties, selected local government structures, and civil society groups.

Specifically, SMD was designed to contribute to the Mission's Governing Justly and Democratically Strategic Objective to '*increase democratic participation, transparency, and accountability in Uganda.*' The SMD RFA outlined the program objectives within two components – Component 1 focused on *Strengthening Multi-Party System[s]* and Component 2 on *Strengthening Electoral Processes.*

The task of this evaluation was to assess SMD's performance, specifically whether SMD achieved the planned results. The Evaluation Team relied on both primary and secondary sources of data. The secondary sources included program-specific and other literature. Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were used to obtain information directly from beneficiaries. At the conclusion of the fieldwork, USAID was provided a debriefing on June 2, 2011.

The SMD Program aimed to achieve results in supporting political parties (mainly through support from IRI); CSOs (through support from NDI) and the electoral process (through support from NDI) in Uganda against four Result Areas:

Result 1: Strengthened Environment for Peaceful Political Competition

- There was evidence that IRI achieved results at the district level, mainly through capacity building interventions with the four main parties: National Resistance Movement (NRM); Forum for Democratic Change (FDC); Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC); and Democratic Party (DP) and facilitating dialogue among parties, parliamentarians, police officials, and the Electoral Commission (EC). Inter-Party Dialogues (IDP) proved to be very successful in changing attitudes and preventing conflict.

Result 2: Increased Organizational Capacity for Representative Parties and CSOs

- There was evidence that IRI achieved results at both the national and district levels through capacity development interventions and technical support to political parties to draft strategic plans. At the district level, major successes were achieved through training in office management, resource mobilization, recruitment and retention, improving party

image, developing election and campaign strategy, message development and delivery, improving internal party communications, and mainstreaming marginalized individuals into political parties. The use of ICT (Facebook, Twitter, Blog, and SMS messaging) proved to be very successful in improving communication capacity.

- The political party internship program was highly successful.
- There was evidence that NDI achieved partial results at the district level by increasing capacity in CSOs with the assistance of national NGOs who act as mentors to district CSOs. Various local needs and priorities were addressed due to lobbying and advocacy work by beneficiaries of the SMD program.
- Attempts to increase the capacity of caucuses were unsuccessful.

Result 3: Improved Constituent Relations/Representation by Parties and CSOs

- There was evidence that IRI achieved results at both the national and district level due to capacity development interventions with parties and vulnerable groups (women, PWDs, and youth).
- The evidence shows that NDI achieved partial results at the district level through capacity development and advocacy work with CSOs.

Result 4: Increased Confidence in Electoral System

- There was evidence that IRI achieved results at the district level through capacity development of party and polling officials, radio talk shows and dialogues among EC, political parties, and police officials.
- Despite institutional challenges within the DEM-group, NDI achieved results at the national level and during election monitoring.

Lessons Learned

- The SMD program was too small and thinly spread in districts to have a real impact.
- A comprehensive M&E system was needed to ensure continuous monitoring of progress, results, and potential impact. There was a disconnect between the requirements of the Cooperative Agreement (CA) and activities implemented at the district level by some CSOs and an absence of clear targets.
- Unless the closing of political space is addressed at a diplomatic level, future programs will have little impact.
- Communication in the program has room for improvement.
- Key stakeholders should be included when activities are planned and beneficiaries are selected. Cultivating and maintaining positive relationships with stakeholders is crucial to the success of any future intervention.
- Timeframes of training interventions should be realistic to ensure internalization.
- Sustainability plans should be in place before the end of program implementation.
- Baseline studies and clear performance indicators will contribute to improved program management.

- Many CSOs, particularly at the local level, are reluctant to engage in what they perceive as political activities.
- NDI/IRI assumed beneficiaries had institutional capacity and adequate resources.
- Training material available in local languages will increase uptake of content.
- Coordination with other Development Partners (DVPs) and related USAID programs can create synergies.

General Recommendations:

Continue SMD. A foundation has been laid with this program but it needs to be strengthened to produce real outcomes and impact. To increase its potential for impact, any follow-up program should be built around Results Based Management with a comprehensive monitoring system in place. Specifically, emphasis should be put on the results and outcomes, not activities.

Focus more on the district and lower levels. The field visits clearly showed that the quality of results improved as the program reached lower levels. However, the program was too thinly spread at the district level to have a real impact. More sub-counties and parishes should be targeted in each district. The main activity at the national level should focus on diplomatic interventions to address the closing of political space and ensure basic principles of democracy and adherence to the constitution are applied.

Use technology and local radio stations to reach a larger audience. Education in the basic principles of a democracy, human rights, and awareness of citizens' rights are still critical and technology and the use of radio stations will be cheaper and have wider reach than training or workshop modalities.

Coordinate with other DVPs and improve overall communication. Synergies can be created with higher levels of sustainability and impact if coordination with related USAID and other DVPs programs can be established. Improved communication with beneficiaries, stakeholders, government structures, and DVPs will enhance results.

Support parliament to focus on oversight. Instead of supporting many processes in parliament, support should go to oversight functions only, such as budget oversight, anti-corruption, HIV/AIDS, and poverty reduction. Any future project should provide interns and research staff as support to legislative sub-structures. Any overlaps with other programs such as LINKAGES, should be coordinated.

Build on existing USAID interventions and priority issues. Future programs should focus on issues related to USAID support to the health, education, and accountability sectors as they are also priority issues at the district and local levels. It is also easier for CSOs to advocate for specific service delivery issues than be seen as being involved in politics. The majority of CSOs believe they would damage their relationships at the local level and may even lose the perception of neutrality if they get involved in politics directly. The focus should therefore be to use specific priority themes strengthening an environment for peaceful political competition.

Revise selection criteria and the process for CSO participation. The participation of national NGOs and NGO forums can assist with the selection process to ensure that only CSOs with relevant skills and capacities be included in the SMD program. Program funding should also make provisions for administrative and logistical support to beneficiaries.

1-INTRODUCTION

Political succession in Uganda has always been controversial. To date, Uganda has never experienced a peaceful transfer of power from one regime—elected or unelected—to another. Coups, counter-coups, and armed rebellion have been the norm.

As most African countries opted for multiparty politics in the 1990's, President Yoweri Museveni remained committed to preserving the Movement system¹ of governance in Uganda. The Movement system emphasized the desirability of political participation based on individual merit as the basis for a “no party” democracy. Although parties were not banned, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) prohibited most political party activities, including recruitment, political rallies, delegate conferences, and the establishment of country-wide party branches. The NRM justified the suspension of political party activities in the name of national unity, reconciliation, stability, and reconstruction based on a critique of political parties that suggested that parties generally organize around divisive issues such as religion and ethnicity rather than national issues and policies. The NRM remained the sole political organization free to organize on a national level until a 2005 referendum in which 92.5% of Ugandans voted for the return to multi-party politics.²

For USAID to appropriately respond to the changing political environment and the reopening of political space as a result of the constitutional referendum, USAID/Uganda commissioned a DG assessment in 2005.³ That assessment recommended that future DG support focus on demand-side programming geared toward civil society, the media, and political parties with limited and selective engagement on the supply-side to state institutions that have significant formal authority capable of resisting the predations of executive interference.⁴

1.1 BACKGROUND

Uganda's post-colonial political history contains a limited record of democratic governance. The current NRM political leadership has been in power for the past 25 years. Two referenda in 2000 and 2005 were instrumental in attempts to bring change in the country's governance. While the 2000 referendum affirmed the desirability of an all-embracing Movement system, the referendum in 2005 heralded a return to multi-party political competition. This was, however, undermined by a counter proposal to amend the constitution to remove the two five-year terms of the President, which accorded the incumbent president eligibility to stand for as many terms as he wishes. This constitutional amendment has since increased the power of the executive vis-à-vis other branches of government, parliament, and to some extent, the judiciary. Only two elections have been held under the multi-party system—in 2006 and 2011. Several parties and candidates, including direct presidential candidates, contested these elections.

¹Article 70 (1) of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda defined the Movement System as a broad-based, inclusive and non-partisan system of governance that conformed to the principles of participatory democracy, accountability, and transparency. As a system of governance, the Movement System was ostensibly based on the principle of popular participation, with leaders to be chosen on “individual merit” to occupy positions of authority in the state

² In July 2005, 92.5% of voters in a constitutional referendum voted to restore multi-party politics to Uganda.

³ USAID/Uganda has also recently commissioned another DG Assessment which was taking place during May/June 2011.

⁴ Ard., Inc. Democracy and Governance Assessment: Republic of Uganda 2005, November 2005

1.2 SMD INTENT AND RATIONALE

The SMD program was designed as a component of the U.S. Government's strategy for *Governing Justly and Democratically*. The program was also intended to support the development goals of the USG's Transformational Diplomacy Strategy (TDS) '*to help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.*'

USAID/Uganda's strategy for 2006-2011 describes the **Governing Justly and Democratically** Strategic Objective as '*to increase democratic participation, transparency and accountability*' in Uganda. The strategy was also designed to provide support to the GOU commitment to multi-party democracy and the priorities outlined in the governance pillar of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2005-2008) (PEAP).

The development hypothesis of SMD was that increasing citizen participation in the development of political parties would improve the overall quality of political participation, representation, response, and interactions. A basic tenet of effective democratic governance is the need to involve as much of the public as possible in democratic decision-making through representative institutions of government. In so doing, the public assumes a greater role in decisions made by elected officials. In addition, by ensuring that these decisions reflect the greater collective public will, they are more likely to gain the support of the majority of the population over the longer term, making it less likely that individuals or groups of individuals can disrupt or deter the democratic process.

SMD initially identified seven districts⁵ that would receive support through program activities, increasing the districts to 12 in early 2010.⁶ The selection criteria utilized by SMD looked both at regional balance, with a particular focus on Northern districts, the spread of political party support, and political diversity.⁷ The 12 districts (including the original seven) were selected based on a history of electoral violence and/or election malpractice. A map of these districts is found in **Annex 2**.

2-EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHODS

2.1 EVALUATION PURPOSE AND KEY QUESTIONS

The purpose of the evaluation is defined in the scope of work (SOW), which appears as **Annex 1**. It includes, but is not limited to, what USAID and partners are obtaining from this activity, what is going well and what is not, and how lessons can be applied to future programming.

The SOW listed the following key evaluation questions to be answered during the evaluation:

- 1) To what extent have the intended results of the SMD program been achieved? Were there

⁵ The original seven districts were Arua, Apac, Bushenyi, Iganga, Kasese, Kumi and Masaka. *SMD Work Plan for January 2, 2008 through April 30, 2009*, submitted April 2008.

⁶ The 12 districts are Arua, Apac, Gulu, Lira, Kumi, Kasese, Masaka, Rukungiri, Tororo and Kamuli. See, *Cooperative Agreement Modification AID-617-A-00-08-00002*, dated 11th March 2010 at pg.3.

⁷ The Partnership would select a higher number of districts in the north, as the geographic distance between districts and development needs are comparatively greater in that region. Selection criteria for choosing districts would include comparatively high population density, existence of CSO partners with absorptive capacity, political diversity and USAID concurrence. NDI/IRI Technical Proposal, August 2007, at pg. 10

any positive or negative unintended results, including the factors that led to them? Reviewing specific SMD interventions at the national and local level, the evaluation should establish their effectiveness in supporting (as appropriate) political parties, party caucuses, party foundations, independent public interest groups, policy issues-oriented CSOs, civil society, parliament, local government, youth, and women (facing various challenges).

- 2) Analyze the nature and effectiveness of partnerships, collaborations, and synergies with other government/development partners and USG initiatives in achieving the program objectives.
- 3) Is the original program design appropriate to address the objectives of the activity? Was the design flexible enough to meet the needs of all parties involved? Which implemented activities led to outcomes (or meaningful changes in knowledge, attitudes, and practices)?

2.2 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The Evaluation Team relied upon both primary and secondary data sources.

2.2.1 Primary Sources

The Evaluation Team obtained data from key informants (KI) at the national, local government, and sub-county levels to ensure representation from all levels at which the Program is implemented. Primary data was collected from 82 respondents at the national level and 247 respondents spread across the seven districts visited. The districts for the evaluation were the original seven districts in which the SMD program was implemented given that those were where project impact would most likely be found. The list of KIs is attached as **Annex 11**.

Two categories of informants were targeted. The first was comprised of the implementers of the SMD Program—office holders within NDI and IRI. The second category was comprised of beneficiaries. These were the institutions—political parties, parliament, caucuses, interns, and CSOs—targeted for capacity enhancement by the SMD Program. In addition, interviews were conducted with institutions and individuals outside the scope of the SMD Program who could provide an independent and authoritative perspective on SMD impact. These included interviews with local government officials, police officials closely involved with monitoring elections, media representatives, and other CSO networks. This was done as a quality assurance measure.

2.2.2 Secondary Sources

The evaluation relied on two classes of secondary data. The first was SMD Program-generated literature. This included program documents, annual reports, progress reports, Performance Management Plans (PMPs), and M&E reports. The second was literature that helped establish the status of multi-party democracy (MPD) prior to implementation. Although this was not baseline data, it provided the context of MPD in Uganda before 2007 and as it developed up to 2011. A total of 54 program reports and documents were reviewed. Details of the literature reviewed are attached as **Annex 15**.

2.2.3 Data Collection Methods

SMD Program effectiveness was measured against the intended objectives as documented in the Cooperative Agreement (CA) between USAID and NDI/IRI, which was used as the base document. Two methods of data extraction were employed: in-depth interviews with KIs and focus group discussions (FGDs). Tools for data collection varied but included a generic questionnaire developed at the inception stage and attached to the Inception Report. Detailed

questionnaires were developed for each target group of beneficiaries and were also attached to the Inception Report. These questionnaires are included **Annexes 3–9**.

2.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE EVALUATION

Certain constraints impacted timeframes and access to information. Lack of comprehensive baseline information made it difficult to measure successes and impact, especially of the *post-hoc* development hypothesis relating to levels of electoral violence and SMD’s interventions.

The contracts of the two senior local consultants were only approved a week after the starting date of the evaluation and they therefore missed the initial briefing sessions and meetings. They had to catch up with reading material and information already gathered that caused delays in the evaluation schedule. The workload and visits to the districts were divided between two sub-teams. Due to the late start of the local consultants, there was not sufficient time for in-depth discussions among the team members before they split up to conduct the fieldwork.

The timing of the evaluation mission was not ideal in that data collection efforts were often frustrated due to the presidential inauguration ceremony and the swearing in of the 9th Parliament. Additionally, political unrest in Kampala had a negative effect on the availability of KIs. The late announcement of Thursday, May 12 as a public holiday necessitated rescheduling some appointments. The evaluation was also conducted too close to the end of elections to get reliable information on the relationship between participation, violence, and the impact of SMD.

3-EVALUATION FINDINGS

The Evaluation found that the SMD Project realized some achievements (a summary of the results is attached as **Annex 13**) but suffered some significant challenges as well. While some of the wounds the Project suffered were self-inflicted (at the project design stage), others were the result of a lack of full understanding of the Ugandan context, perceptions that could not be anticipated, and organization and communication missteps that could not be overcome before the end of the Project.

In this section, the Evaluation responds to the three key questions outlined in the SOW.

3.1 ACHIEVEMENT OF THE INTENDED RESULTS OF SMD PROJECT

3.1.1 EVALUATION FINDINGS FOR POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT

The development hypothesis of this activity is that increasing citizen participation in the growth of political parties will improve the overall quality of political participation, representation, response, and interactions. This was premised on the assumption that more professional and competitive political parties would contribute to an improved system of checks and balances on executive power and increased demand for accountability and transparency in government. These results would lead to or significantly contribute to the attainment of the ultimate goal of improved service delivery for constituents. Within this component, three results were anticipated.

- a) Greater engagement among political parties, CSOs and Government
- b) Increased organizational capacity of representative political parties
- c) Improved constituent relations and representation by political parties

IRI’s political party component consisted of targeted support to the four main parties – NRM, FDC, UPC and DP with intermittent engagement of CP and JEEMA. Support encompassed *inter*

alia capacity building to political parties; dialogues at the national, regional, district, and sub-district levels; the electoral process; inter-party dialogues; increased outreach to constituents; and improved involvement and engagement of marginalized groups including youth, women, and PWDs.

Political Context of SMD's Program Support for Political Party Development

This component must be seen within the context of where political parties were in 2006 and the political situation leading up to 2011. For the most part, the party activists and officials interviewed believed that a great deal had changed since the 2006 elections in terms of individual and collective political awareness and engagement. Respondents pointed to a less conflicted political environment, better organization of the elections, and public awareness of the issues under debate by the different parties as indicators that the multi-party system was being strengthened. Respondents also highlighted the emergence of more educated and aware public better able to hold government accountable. Greater access to and use of public information was seen as an important tool that enabled the opposition to effectively act as watchdogs over public policies and the electoral process. Some respondents observed that the government had encouraged the existence of a multi-party environment by opening up the space for greater information flow and public debate. It was further observed that it is this greater access to information that had created different government platforms to address grievances—even if at times this was only cosmetic. During the interviews, police officers expressed appreciation of the lessening of tensions leading up to and during the elections. Another important change between 2006 and 2011 is the emergence of youth as important political actors. Dynamic actors have emerged here because political parties are far more aware now that they really do have the capacity to bring about change.

These positive observations about political trends over the last five years notwithstanding, the opposition parties believed the political environment in 2011 displayed signs of even greater government control over politics and a shrinking of the political space for political competition. According to some key informants, the elections in 2006 were much better because there was widespread belief that this was the last term for the President and therefore there was an air of political expectation and optimism. For his part, the President also believed that the people did not want to return him and therefore tried very hard to be politically believable and persuasive. The 2011 elections, on the other hand, were seen as entirely driven by money, further distorting an already uneven playing field⁸. The observations the opposition parties made were not limited to the increase in the level of electoral corruption, including bribery, intimidation, and harassment. They observed that while the 2011 elections had been largely free of the type of violence experienced in 2006, this may have also had as much to do with maturing politics as with the level of military presence that may have kept voters away as well as the significant increase in the amount of money used to bribe voters. National and local DP party officials felt that there was a sliding back as the NRM government became more dictatorial. As an illustration, the first act of the new parliament was to amend the constitution to abolish bail for demonstrators while the second item on parliament's agenda is to curtail the freedoms of speech and of the press.

⁸ Ken Lukyamizi, Leader of CP interview. 16.05.2011

Overall Results Achieved

Party officials from across the political spectrum reiterated that the benefits of the SMD program were mostly evident in the change in the perceptions of politics and the rules of political engagement that significantly lowered the levels of violence in areas previously seen as trouble spots; providing skills in critical areas of resource mobilization and office management; the use of ICT for political mobilization; awareness raising through radio shows; and the internship program that allowed youth to become part of the party processes to equip them in politics and in addressing resource gaps within parties in the areas of ICT. Training provided by IRI boosted the confidence of groups that were traditionally disadvantaged to engage more meaningfully in politics and provided them with practical skills. However, notwithstanding the admirable efforts exerted by the more capacitated parties, the reality of the political situation in Uganda nullified the real impact when the ruling party distributed record amounts of money, utilized state machinery and resources, and monopolized the press and security forces during the elections.

The positive contribution of the IRI projects to promoting multi-party dialogue especially at the local level did not proceed without challenges.

The suspicions raised about the IRI project were partly due to what some parties, (specifically DP and NRM) believed to be a lack of transparency. Specifically, this concerned knowledge about the objectives of the program. NRM party officials thus believed that IRI was working with the opposition parties to undermine it and opposition parties believed that IRI was possibly working with the government or had a hidden agenda. For the opposition, the failure by IRI to work through the existing party structures to identify participants and interns created this suspicion. These suspicions were present despite IRI's continuous efforts to communicate the purpose of the SMD program and were largely the result of intra-party breakdowns in communications.

The other important challenge faced by the project was the lack of clarity on how the project's overall objectives fit with party interests, as well the "high handed" way in which participants were seen to be selected. As a result, some parties did not take full advantage of all of the different components, such as the web page. Again, this occurred despite IRI helping parties implement their own strategic plans. IRI received frequent requests to support activities that were neither in the strategic plans nor within SMD's mandate and in fact tried to include what was feasible.⁹

The political parties' input into the program was minimal and this made it difficult to monitor its progress and impact. Dialogues tended to be attended by the same group of people and for the most part the program did not trickle down to the lower levels, notwithstanding the availability of a candidate handbook.

Despite being a component of the original design,¹⁰ it is unclear why the Inter-Party Dialogues (IPDs) were not implemented from the outset. The evaluation revealed that they were a very important and successful component of the program. This is particularly important because of the finding of the **Review of USAID Support to the Ugandan Parliament, Political Processes and**

⁹ IRI maintains that it did try to remain flexible and on several occasions responded to requests which were not anticipated including holding trainings for party participants in districts that were initially not planned to be targeted. Examples include FDC's request to conduct trainings in Yumbe and UPC's request for Nebbi.

¹⁰ See, SMD Program Design, pg. 6

Elections from 2002-2006, and Recommendations for Future Assistance of Jan 29, 2007 which stated that “critical to the continued evolution of the multiparty system is agreement and consensus among the major political parties and actors on the basic processes, systems, and legal framework for multiparty democracy. Many constitutional, legal, procedural and process type issues concerning electoral systems, divisions of power, political financing, role of the oppositions, etc. remain to be addressed and decided upon. The USG, through USAID, can help to foster discussion and dialogue among the political parties so that difficult decisions can be achieved through compromise and negotiation before they result in conflict and stalemate. One example would be for USAID to assist the Electoral Commission (EC) in holding discussions and dialogue on electoral reform among the different political parties and actors. There is a specific, Constitutional body that is supposed to be constituted within, and chaired by, the EC that would serve as a forum where all parties come together to discuss major issues of relevance to them all. This body is not yet functioning but it could play an important role in helping to strengthen the transition to multi-partyism. USAID should provide support to the EC and the parties to develop the functioning of this Constitutional body well before the 2011 elections so that there will be an established and respected forum for discussion of critical election-related issues both now and in the immediate lead-up to the 2011 elections.”

3.1.1 Evaluation Findings for Capacity- Building of Parties at Their National Headquarters

Under the prior CEPPS CA, *Strengthening Political Pluralism*, IRI provided capacity building support to the major political parties including technical support to draft 2006-2011 strategic plans. Much of IRI’s continued support under SMD focused on the implementation of priorities identified in these plans. National party secretariats received much of the same training as the district offices, which included office management; resource mobilization; recruitment and retention; party image; election and campaign strategy; message development and delivery; internal party communications; and mainstreaming marginalized individuals into political parties. The national secretariats also benefited from increased human resources through the IRI internship program; increased communication and outreach capability through the ICT program; technical support with policy development; and increased outreach and participation of youth and women as party activists, voters, and candidates.

All the parties indicated that they had benefited from the capacity building support provided by IRI. Parties, especially UPC and FDC, pointed to improved and more transparent management practices and improvement/creation of membership databases. UPC and FDC made constitutional changes supported by IRI that were approved at their delegates’ conference.¹¹ UPC senior management indicated that capacity within the party structures had been increased as a result of the SMD program, revealing that prior to the intervention, if a member of the secretariat staff were asked to prepare a budget “...you might wait about a month! However, now a similar request would bear fruit within 20-30 minutes due to the training provided by IRI.”¹² There was more transparency and accountability at the UPC headquarters through the creation of a system for recording staff attendance, which greatly improved as a result.

IRI and media experts also worked with the NRM party to improve their communication capacity with specific emphasis on the use of new and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogs. NRM learned how to analyse and respond to negative portrayals of the party in the

¹¹ SMD, Quarterly Report, January-March 2009 pg 20

¹² Focus group discussion with UPC secretariat staff including UPC Secretary General.

media while its Communications Bureau developed plans for monitoring key media outlets, such as the Monitor Newspaper.

IRI experienced challenges working with all six initially selected parties and eventually reduced the support to focus on the major parties: UPC, NRM, FDC, and DP. In the 8th Parliament, both CP and JEEMA held only one seat each, and IRI made the decision to concentrate resources on the four larger parties. The program support focused 75% of the technical assistance on the party structures at the district level and 25% at the national level, which was a valid distribution given the results shown in this evaluation. IRI also experienced some initial difficulties due to the lack of engagement and inaccessibility of the NRM Secretary General that was eventually resolved by working directly through the NRM's Communication Secretariat led by Ofono Opondo.¹³

3.1.2 Evaluation Findings for Capacity-Building of Parties at the District Level

IRI provided capacity building assistance to 28 party offices working initially to identify key weaknesses and draw up action plans prioritizing solutions. Many of the weaknesses and challenges cut across the political parties and concerned the lack of resources and low capacity of party officials; lack of communication with national headquarters; low membership recruitment and retention levels; and low youth, women, and PWD membership.

The greatest impact was felt in those districts where both the political party support and the IPD program were present.¹⁴ Here, there was a significant change in the capacity and viability of the district offices and a change in attitudes towards political competition. Across most parties, there was a tangible change in capacity and a visible improvement in the quality of the secretariat staff and the work they produced.¹⁵

Sizeable outcomes resulted from the improved capacity of party offices. Increased registration of members meant that parties were able to field more candidates and spread the word on the increased benefit of having multiple political parties. NRM-Arua was able to add 7,000 members to its register; NRM-Kumi conducted a huge registration drive recruiting more than 10,000 new members; and NRM-Apac opened three new offices. FDC-Apac was able to open an office and mobilized resources from the local community to pay for office rent. UPC-Apac was able to generate contributions from members and register a substantial number of new members. UPC-Kumi established a resource mobilization committee and held recruitment events.¹⁶

More effective mobilization and recruitment drives were realized. Both FDC and DP in Bushenyi had a 75% increase in the number of candidates they were able to field.¹⁷ In addition, respondents reported increased numbers of women and youth candidates.¹⁸ FDC was able to field candidates for 80% of the district seats whereas in 2006 they only managed to field candidates for 20% of the seats. A review of the full nomination data set shows that on average 8,8 candidates were nominated in SMD-supported districts compared to 4,9 in non-SMD districts.

¹³ Ofono Opondo is the NRM Party Spokesperson.

¹⁴ Masaka, Kasese ----

¹⁵ NRM Masaka and DP Headquarters. In particular DP party officials indicated that there had been noteworthy improvement in the party offices of Kasese, Bushenyi, Masaka and Arua

¹⁶ SMD, Quarterly Report: January-April 2009 at pg.6

¹⁷ FDC-Bushenyi fielded 20 candidates in 2006 and 80 in 2011. DP fielded 3 in 2006 and 12 in 2011.

¹⁸FDC Bushenyi.

Greater synergy and information sharing occurred between political parties and CSOs resulted from IRI providing parties and CSOs with a platform for dialogue and cooperation.

Parties reported some dissatisfaction with the fact that IRI selected the districts without the participation of the parties. This may explain why not all the support provided by IRI to district party structures yielded positive results. Many of the district offices were not motivated and/or assisted in making necessary improvements. For instance, UPC district structures in Bushenyi, Masaka, Iganga and Kumi/NRM in Bushenyi failed to make significant progress due to low levels of commitment and coordination between leaders and members.¹⁹ Additionally, according to IRI, DP ‘registered few successes’ in most districts due to party infighting and limited commitment from leaders and members.²⁰

Additionally, IRI intended that not only would its interventions impact the functioning of the district office but that they would also allow the party officials to disseminate information and train cadres at the sub-country and parish levels. Although some parties managed to do this, most party officials said this was difficult or impossible to achieve due to lack of resources to conduct activities at the grassroots level.

3.1.3 Evaluation Findings for Inter-Party Dialogues (IPDs)

As a result of an increase in funding received in preparation for the 2011 elections, IRI’s earlier work in four districts was expanded in 2010 to 12 districts. The criteria used for selection of the districts were: a) a history of electoral violence or b) a high likelihood of closely contested elections or limited political space.²¹

The dialogues were held on a quarterly basis on issues that had been identified as challenges by the stakeholders, including voter registration, display processes, and the election campaign process. They were often the only source of information on the electoral process for constituents at the local level, despite the fact that respondents indicated that the lack of knowledge among grassroots constituents vis-à-vis the election process and multi-party politics remains high. The EC District Registrars also admitted that the IPDs carried out much of the voter education the EC District Office should have provided but could not due to a lack of resources.²²

IRI, with the support of CSO partners at the district level, conducted IPDs at district, sub-country, and parish levels, bringing challenges raised that could not be resolved at the grassroots level to the national level.²³ The national level IPDs were often attended by ECs and dealt with critical issues such as lack of information vis-à-vis transfer of voters in Northern Uganda as they are resettled from internally displaced persons camps back to their home villages. IRI also held 30 dialogues in 10 districts/sub-counties/parishes on the role of security forces in the electoral process.

“For the first time we were able to criticize each other, complement each other, advise each other, and finally see how to work together”

EC- Kasese

19 SMD, Quarterly Report, April-Jun 2009

20 Id pg. 7

21 See, SMD Cooperative Agreement Modification AID-617-A-00-08-00002, dated 11th March 2010, pg.3.

22 Key informant interview with former EC DR from Masaka.

23 At the conclusion of district level dialogues on voter registration, IRI hosted a national dialogue among EC, political parties, CSOs and the media on April 12th, 2010. See SMD 2nd Quarter Report 2010 at pg.4.

Importantly, the IPDs were generally followed by local radio talk shows where issues discussed and challenges raised in the IPDs were the subject, enabling broader dissemination and constituent engagement. The radio programs not only disseminated critical information regarding the electoral processes, including voter registration, display, and campaigning, but also provided key information vis-à-vis the role of the different actors including the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), Member of Parliament (MP), Local Council Five (LCV), and the EC's DRs.

A large majority of district-level respondents reported that stakeholders from competing parties were historically seen as enemies, due to the lack of understanding of multi-party politics. Stakeholders overwhelmingly reported astonishment at IRI's ability to bring historically combative parties together around the same table to engage in constructive dialogue. This is particularly significant in light of the fact that IPD districts were selected due to the historic presence of election violence. This was probably the greatest achievement of the SMD Program and one that is a reason for optimism about the nature of political competition in Uganda.

District Police Officers found that the IPDs provided them with a unique opportunity to dialogue with their communities since, like the EC, they did not have a budget for community outreach activities. Some district police officers said that prior to the dialogues, many stakeholders believed that the police were partisan. The police also indicated that historically, the opposition parties and the police had an antagonistic relationship. However, respondents reported that the IPDs changed this and *'we now communicate easily [with the opposition]'*.²⁴ Respondents also reported that they believed the image of the police had improved as a result of the IPDs.

Respondents agreed that members and officials from competing parties no longer viewed each other as enemies but rather had an improved understanding of multi-party politics. Particularly complementary were the participants in Masaka who indicated that prior to the IPDs the environment was hostile.²⁵ *"[N]ow there is a brotherhood"* reported one DP respondent. FDC party officials in Kasese indicated relationships between the opposition parties, the EC, and police had been *"fundamentally improved"* because of the IPDs.²⁶ For instance the NRM LCV Chairman in Kasese indicated that prior to the IPDs individuals from competing parties viewed themselves as enemies, *"but since these programs that is no longer the case."*²⁷ The EC Headquarters credited the SMD program with changing the 'enemy' view of politics in the IPD districts.²⁸ Additionally, EC staff acknowledged that for the first time as a result of the IPDs they witnessed party officials from competing parties travelling to activities together in the same vehicle, which was previously unheard of.²⁹

The weakest aspect of the IDPs was that they were not taken up to the national level. There was, thus, a disconnect in the minds of the local political leadership between the inroads perceived to be made at the local level in terms of reconceptualising political competition and the failure to find this reflected within the national political leadership.

Although the IPD activities were identified by all stakeholders as having strengthened the environment for peaceful political competition, they also lamented that 2011 elections continued

²⁴ Community Liaison Officer, Masaka District Police.

²⁵ Key informant interview with DP Secretary General, Masaka.

²⁶ Focus group discussion with FDC district party officials, Kasese.

²⁷ LCV Chairman, Kasese

²⁸ Interview with EC Chairman Kiggundu.

²⁹ Key informant interview at EC Headquarters.

to be marred by intimidation and vote buying on an unprecedented scale, which served to nullify much of the impact from SMD support. SMD support on its own will not be successful unless it is supported by diplomatic influence

Additionally, in some districts there was confusion amongst the beneficiaries whether activities had been provided by IRI or the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS).³⁰

3.1.4 Evaluation Findings for Party Research and Policy Development

IRI provided sub-grants to party think tanks including the Uganda Roundtable Foundation (URTAF), the policy think tank for the NRM and Change Initiative Limited (COL) – the FDC’s policy foundation – to conduct policy research on issues including land ownership and electoral reform. Additionally, IRI provided technical expertise to support UPC’s policy research on national employment policy and the Foundation for African Development (FAD) were supported to undertake policy research on agriculture. Capacity building support was also provided to the think tanks including support for Strength-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) analyses and development of strategic plans.³¹ IRI facilitated strategic planning retreats for the three main political parties (FDC, NRM and DP) to develop their research foundations

UPC indicated that the support in developing policy documents through the SMD program was extremely important. FDC, DP and UPC all indicated that the support from IRI in the development of policy documents was crucial in the development of their manifestos.³² In May of 2009 the UPC presented proposals for electoral reform in parliament based on IRI-supported electoral reform research completed by Change Initiative. IRI also supported opposition party leaders to develop a position on the proposed amendment to the Political Parties and Organizations Act (2005).³³ The support provided on developing policy documents through the Change Initiative, meant that parties, such as the UPC in May 2009, were better able to present proposals for electoral reform.

Party respondents said IRI should have focused on building the capacity of parties to develop their own policies so that they are sustainable rather than working with external agencies.³⁴ Moreover, they felt IRI should have supported broad consultation and debate between the parties and their voters on policy formulation. However, given the funding available for this component such broad consultative efforts and debates were not feasible.

3.1.5 Evaluation Findings for Identification and Training of Candidates

IRI provided extensive technical assistance to the parties to develop strategies for candidate identification and communication techniques with a particular emphasis on identifying youth and women candidates. Once candidates were identified, IRI provided training to the candidates on *inter alia* how to be a good politician, public speaking, campaigning and fundraising techniques.

³⁰ Interviewees in Kasese on multiple occasions confused IRI with KAS activities 9th May 2011.

³¹ URTAF developed a three-year strategic plan, CIL developed a strategic plan (time-frame not indicated) and FAD developed a one year strategic plan. See *SMD Quarterly Report, July 1-September 31st 2008* at pg 11.

³² FDC, UPC and DP all acknowledged the importance of the policy development support to the development of their manifestos. See, UPC Party Manifesto at <http://www.upcparty.net/manifesto/UPC%202010%20Manifesto%20highlights.pdf>. FDC’s 2011 Manifesto was not available on their website at <http://www.fdcuganda.org/>. Interestingly, the DP manifesto cannot be found on the DP website but instead located at <http://www.norbertmao.org/downloads/DPManifesto2011.pdf>.

³³ The bill provides for inter-alia public financing for all political parties in parliament.

³⁴ DP Focus group discussion.

IRI and party secretariat officials worked together with district party leaders to develop plans for generating publicity through local media and community outreach. IRI also provided technical assistance to political parties on the SMS election tally system by training party agents on how to use the system.

UPC indicated that the support in developing policy documents through the SMD program was extremely important. The strategic planning workshops enabled members of the think tanks to discuss and decide what they would like to accomplish for their respective parties. FDC, DP and UPC all indicated that the support from IRI in the development of policy documents was crucial in the development of their manifestos.^[1]

In May of 2009 the UPC presented proposals for electoral reform in parliament. The published list of proposals was developed based on IRI-supported electoral reform research completed by Change Initiative. IRI also supported opposition party leaders to develop a position on the proposed amendment to the Political Parties and Organizations Act (2005).^[2]

The major parties (FDC, NRM and DP) were frustrated that IRI conducted candidate training prior to the time when the parties had identified their candidates and that IRI generally planned activities according to their own timeframe, which was not always convenient or timely for the parties. However, IRI disputes this assertion and claims that it ‘consulted extensively’ with the parties regarding timelines and activities. This could be resolved with the combination of an advisory committee and a participatory annual work planning session.

3.1.6 Evaluation Findings for the ICT Project for Political Parties

Beginning in 2009, IRI supported the creation of an ICT project for the major political parties. The project involved several components including a series of radio programs, a website and a set of phone and Short Message Service (SMS) hotlines. For the radio component, the DP, FDC, JEEMA, NRM and UPC were all sponsored for a one hour radio talk show per month to reach out to their constituents. A second component of the program was the creation of dedicated hotlines for each of the five participating political parties so that the public could interact directly with party leaders via hotlines or SMS. Party leaders could thereafter respond to the feedback on their respective radio programs. The third component was the website (www.parties.ug) which hosted a page for each of the political parties including DP, FDC, JEEMA and UPC, NRM and PPP.³⁵ Additionally, IRI provided technical support to design a system whereby parties could automatically generate polling results from text messages sent by their agents in the field. The system was used successfully in several by-elections to report vote counts electronically and generate an instant tally from different polling stations

Parties updated their webpage on the website, posts were received and opinion polls utilized. FDC, JEEMA and UPC were some of the most active participants and continue to update their webpage. In 2010 the EC also took a page on the website and in 2010-2011 time period the

^[1] FDC, UPC and DP all acknowledged the importance of the policy development support to the development of their manifestos. See, UPC Party Manifesto at <http://www.upcparty.net/manifesto/UPC%202010%20Manifesto%20highlights.pdf>. FDC’s 2011 Manifesto was not available on their website at <http://www.fdcuganda.org/>. Interestingly, the DP manifesto cannot be found on the DP website but instead located at <http://www.norbertmao.org/downloads/DPManifesto2011.pdf>.

^[2] The bill provides for inter-alia public financing for all political parties in parliament.

³⁵ NRM and People’s Progressive Party (PPP) joined the website later in the 3rd quarter of 2009. See, *SMD, Quarterly Report July-September 2009*.

website led with stories containing information on the elections. For example, Youth Stand Up Uganda, which consists of youth from both ruling and opposition parties, used the website to organize workshops, meetings and demonstrations and to urge youth to register to vote.

The parties also frequently accessed the bulk texting facilities to reach out to their party officials and or members regarding meetings and activities. UPC indicated that without IRI the party would not have been able to access this level of communication both due to lack of resources and lack of capacity. There was a feeling among many of the opposition parties that if they had tried to solicit airtime as a party they most likely would have been rejected but because IRI was the intermediary the stations were more reluctant to refuse. The achievement here is that IRI provided access to communication which the parties used to conduct opinion polls, disseminate information on elections, organize workshops etc which was vital to reaching more people and different parts of the country.

As elections grew nearer some of the ICT programming became more challenging because of the perception that the government was filtering outgoing SMS messages for certain words, which severely hampered and slowed the system. According to IFES, users trying to access their polling stations overwhelmed the mobile communication system. Is this likely more of the case and not filtering, even though the perception might be one that the GoU filtered SMS. In addition, the entire system was shut down or overloaded for a period of time on Election Day which rendered the IRI vote tallying activity moot and called into question its credibility.

The parties also said they were not fully comfortable with some of the ICT initiatives such as the website and were somewhat suspicious about how party information was to be used. Specifically, DP complained that the website was managed from the IRI offices and at times interns were uploading documents to the party page without coordinating with the party, sometimes resulting in inappropriate information being loaded onto the party webpage.

3.1.7 Evaluation Findings for the Political Party Internship Program

The purpose of the internship program was to support youth engagement in political party activities and improve human resource capability in political parties. Within this component one result was anticipated in the SMD PD: *Increasing Youth Political Participation within Political Parties*. Twenty interns were identified in collaboration with party leaders from among hundreds of applicants through a national solicitation process. They were trained on research, office administration, record keeping and media relations.³⁶ The internships were designed to last for three months but the top performers were given the opportunity to extend their internship for an additional three months, sometimes longer. Their assigned tasks ranged from developing and populating party websites, creating membership databases, organizing district level party outreach activities, research and organizing the bulk SMS messaging systems.

A former IRI intern, now the general-secretary of the party for Kasese district, and 2011 candidate for a seat in parliament described the IRI program as a “curtain raiser” and said that the program helped link DP with the other parties and with CSOs.

“The IRI program also gave us an entry point to government offices including EC and the police which did not exist before.”

Party leadership, staff and interns interviewed for this evaluation unanimously indicated that the

³⁶ See, SMD Quarterly Report: April 1 to June 30, 2008 at pg 8.

internship component of the political party program was in the words of the UPC leadership “*very beneficial to the party.*”³⁷ Interns provided critical human resources to the party offices and often found themselves providing senior level-support to the gaps in party structures. The achievement was improved e-communication because of increased human resource capacity through the internship program.

Results achieved included UPC and JEEMA interns establishing a computerized membership database at the party secretariats and helping revive party websites. An intern at the UPC party secretariat developed a database of party donors and prospective CSO partners. Other interns worked to support political party caucuses in Parliament; provided research support to party MPs and district level interns for UPC, an NRM intern drafted a concept paper on improved office procedures for NRM party caucus secretariat which was adopted³⁸, and DP opened up students’ clubs in schools to attract youth to join the parties.³⁹ Additionally, interns were able to mobilize resources for the party. Examples include an FDC intern who raised resources for the party youth account by selling t-shirts, membership cards and pens. The account had previously nearly been closed due to lack of resources.⁴⁰ Results include membership database; party websites; blue print of improved office procedures; mechanisms for increasing party membership; resource mobilization.

A focus group discussion with selected interns revealed that the internships had also been important capacity building and networking opportunities. Many admitted to not being very computer literate at the beginning of their internships but were soon developing and populating membership databases, managing the party websites and organizing the SMS bulk messaging system for the parties. At least four of the party interns have been hired as full-time staff with their political parties following the completion of their internships. Florence Mbabazi now works for the UPC national party secretariat, Willingstone Nsubuga became IT administrator for FDC, Patricia Alaroker is an administrative assistant for FDC and Robert Lukumbuka is a DP party administrator. Robert Lukumbuka also ran for the Youth MP seat for Western Uganda in the 2011 elections. Some interns were also identified by their parties to participate in international conferences. Constance Osuru was nominated by UPC to participate in party leadership youth forums in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.⁴¹ The absence of a baseline and performance indicators for this result, however, means that there is no quantitative measurement of its success.

Internships enabled those who were already politically active to have an entry point to their party of choice, access to the party leadership and structures and, in some cases, a rapid rise through the ranks. Other participants had not previously been politically active and saw the internship as an opportunity to change career paths or become involved.⁴²

Interns felt that SMD’s stipends were insufficient and sometimes were paid late. Conversely, there was a misconception by the parties that the interns were well facilitated with a resulting

³⁷ UPC focus group discussion 3rd May 2011

³⁸ Margaret Bakuvi.

³⁹ Id., pg 13.

⁴⁰ Paga Glorious, FDC intern.

⁴¹ Focus Group discussion with SMD interns 4th May 2011.

⁴² Margaret Bakuvi was a teacher by profession and prior to the internship not involved in politics. She was deployed to the office of the NRM Chief Whip. Internship focus group discussion 4th May 2011.

tendency to give them heavy workloads. Additionally, the interns reported their frustration that at the end of the internships there was no graduation or certificate to indicate their participation and completion of the internship.

Interns participating in the focus group discussion also identified challenges with gaining the trust of the parties particularly in the heightened sensitivity of the pre-election period. In particular, NRM and FDC were very suspicious of competing parties placing spies in their offices. This appears to have resulted from shortcomings in IRI's identification and selection procedures that did not ensure interns receive the party leadership's sanction. Because the IRI process for selection did not incorporate a mechanism for sanction by the parties, the parties were suspicious of the interns. Recommendation – parties must be an integral part of intern selection and help incorporate party accountability mechanisms into the internship program. Interns also indicated that the requirement by IRI for the submission of monthly reports often placed them in difficult situations and a position of potential conflict of interest. In the heightened sensitivity of the election period the parties became increasingly concerned about what information the interns were sharing with IRI.

3.1.8 Evaluation Findings for the Young Leadership Program

Electoral Commission statistics indicate that out of the 13 million voters in Uganda, 7.5 million are youth, defined in Uganda as individuals between the ages of 18 and 35. During the 2001 and 2006 presidential elections, a significant number of the youth supported the DP and the FDC. The support of the youth vote was therefore critical to all the parties and became a battle ground in the lead-up to the 2011 elections. All parties recognized the importance of soliciting the youth vote and through the SMD Program, IRI helped the parties improve their relevance to and engagement with the youth. In partnership with UYONET, IRI supported a series of regional youth fairs held at local universities that aimed to inspire youth leadership.⁴³ Political parties used the youth fairs to engage with and recruit young members to their parties. The youth fairs also provided the SMD with an opportunity to form public-private partnerships with organizations like MTN GTV, SMS Media, and Talent 256, Delta Petroleum, Multichoice Satellite TV, and Uganda Telecom.⁴⁴

On a national level, IRI worked with UYONET to identify a consultant to draft a position paper on youth employment and provide assistance to the UYONET and the Youth plus Policy Network (Y+PN) to develop a National Youth Manifesto. At the district level, IRI provided technical assistance through meetings and workshops to get youth involved in the district planning and budgeting process. Additionally, through UYONET, youth groups implemented an action point from their agreement to establish the Bushenyi Youth Network (BYM), a youth network which includes youth from political parties and civil society. Also, as a result of IRI's youth dialogues, district based CSOs assisted in conducting sensitization meetings on democratic participation and political pluralism for youth groups.⁴⁵

NDI also provided technical support to Youth Stand Up (YSU), an organization formed by youth political party members for the purpose of stimulating youth participation in the electoral

⁴³ The first fair 'Youth in Politics Fair' was held at Makere University, the second fair 'Inspiring Youth Leadership' was held in Gulu, Apac April 1st, 2009 and Arua May 20th 2009.

⁴⁴ See, SMD Quarterly Report: October 1st to December 31st 2008, at pg.13.

⁴⁵ ADINGON in Arua District held meetings in Arua district and five sub-counties including Ajira, Aroyi, Dadam Ogokor and Okolo

process. The DP, FDC, NRM, UPC, PPP, Social Democratic Party and the JEEMA were represented in the organization's leadership. YSU was initiated by graduates of NDI's Regional Youth Political leadership Academy (RYPLA), a separate program funded by NED. NDI provided technical assistance to YSU in developing a fundraising and communications strategy and a system for volunteer recruitment.⁴⁶

The most important achievement with respect to youth was the increased knowledge and skills transfer for understanding and advocating for democracy. This was achieved by building skills in proposal writing and strategic planning that leveraged and mobilized resources. Youth CSOs displayed a strong ability to sensitize others about their rights and are also able to conduct political and voter Education. The CSOs are able to advocate for the rights of the voiceless, train other youth to articulate their rights and demand appropriate services, able to lobby for increased resources to support advocacy issues, mobilize the community at grassroots and dialogue with local local leaders for effective services. Youth CSOs are able to leverage additional resources through the help of five year strategic plans that each district developed that have clear vision, mission, goal, objectives and good value.

Secondly, the youth CSOs mainstreamed youth issues in the political campaign ahead of the 2011 elections using the national youth manifesto as a tool for civic engagement beyond elections. Youth CSOs' engagement with the GoU, political parties and their own constituents increased. Engagement occurs with political parties at least three to seven times per year. In Bushenyi there was previously no engagement with political leaders while now there is very close engagement with the youth ministry and regular participation in policy reviews according to UYONET. Youth Plus Policy Network (Y+PN) reported that the youth unemployment agenda has reached a high policy and decision-making level and that is currently beginning to be addressed by the Government. The IRI supported the Y+PN to engage with the political parties. The parties responded by incorporating these issues into their manifestos and NRM has committed to tackling youth unemployment as a priority.

In partnership with the Arua District NGO Network (ADINGON), an action plan for more effective involvement in district planning and budgeting processes was developed. The Masaka District NGO Forum (MADINGOF) facilitated a working relationship between district leaders, PWDs and youth in Masaka. It was agreed that the youth organizations and youth leaders from political parties need to meet and identify priorities for youth and to explore avenues for financial support such as the National Agricultural Advisory Development Services (NAADS). As a result, the Buddu Transformative Network, coordinating the youth in the district, was able to organize meetings with youth groups to plan their engagement in the third budget cycle. Similar results were achieved in Apac. In Kasese District a working relationship between the youth and the district planning unit was established through the Kasese District Development Network (KADDENET). The participants developed an action plan to advocate for a more youth-friendly budgeting and planning process. YSU conducted a voter education campaign and a mobilization campaign to mobilize 2500 volunteers to help register over 1 million youth voters.

The USAID SO9 Team view was that development partner support, including USAID support, to the youth was a significant success and raised the significant of youth as a political force in the 2011 elections as all parties engaged more with youth and incorporate the youth agenda into their

⁴⁶ See, SMD 3rd Quarter Report, 2010 at pg. 4.

manifestos – youth is a game changer under the new Country Development Cooperation Strategy and hence the recognition that youth activities should be supported.

While all parties recognized the importance of youth as a political force, in reality they had limited access to party leadership positions and their ideas were filtered through party interests because the political leadership is old and not open to youth in leadership positions or being challenged by the youth. A further challenge to youth related to getting youth-specific interests and concerns on the political parties' agendas.

3.1.9 Evaluation Findings for Young Women In Leadership

In the original program design USAID articulated a desire to *increase women's political participation*⁴⁷. Both IRI and NDI contributed to this intended result by working with parties to increase women participation in political party activities by organizing eight regional multi-party forums where women and youth would be trained in networking, candidate identification, and resource mobilization. The partnership complemented forums for youth and women with a regional "women in politics" fair, co-sponsored with the Uganda Women's Network. These events brought together female political leaders, activists, political party workers and interested women to gain exposure to political activities, network with other women leaders and connect with CSOs and political parties.

IRI hosted a regional forum with the Women's Democracy Network (WDN) that enabled women leaders from Ghana, Kenya, Macedonia and Uganda to share experiences regarding political participation. The recommendations that emerged from the conference were utilized to identify SMD-supported activities targeting young women leaders.

At the core of SMD efforts to support young women in leadership IRI partnered with the Youth Plus Policy Network⁴⁸ to hold a series of 'Women in Leadership Debates' at various universities across Uganda. The debates supported young women university students to dialogue and debate about issues of women in leadership and challenges faced in accessing leadership positions.⁴⁹ As part of the series of debates IRI/Y+PN organized a mock parliamentary debate with four universities.⁵⁰ The debate was held in Parliament and engaged young women students in a debate on the controversial Marriage and Divorce Bill, which has yet to be passed despite a decade of debate.

IRI's Young Women in Leadership program inspired young women to engage with party politics and leadership by increasing women participation in politics as exemplified by Ruth Komuntale's role as student guild Minister of Culture and Social Development at Uganda Christian University, Judith Kiconco elected as Legal Advisor to the Ugandan Christian University student guild; Abuni Crispa elected as Deputy Speaker of the Kyambogo University build, Peris Nabyonga Kiddue became Minister of Health at Mbarara University of Science and Technology and Monica Atukunda, Gender Minister also at Mbarara.

IRI skills training in public speaking led to beneficiaries running for office, with one of the participants elected to office as the district women MP for Butaleja district. Unlike the 2006 elections, where almost 50% of women's seats went uncontested, very few women's seats went

⁴⁷ See, SMD Program Description, at pg.6.

⁴⁸ See, http://www.youthplusuganda.org/index_files/ywl.htm

⁴⁹ Debates were held at MUST and IUTU in February, 2010.

⁵⁰ Kyambogo University, Gulu University, Uganda Christian University and Islamic University of Uganda.

uncontested in 2011. There was a significant increase in the number of women the opposition was able to field. As a result of technical support provided by IRI and through the implementation of their strategic plan, UPC put women and youth at the center of its party.⁵¹

Although there was an increase in the number of women representatives in 2011 over 2006 among the different parties, as with the youth, women continued to feel marginalized within parties and unable to access leadership positions that would enable them to draft and advance an agenda for women different from the party lines.

The second set of challenges faced by women particularly at the local level was their lack of capacity to fully engage politically or be allowed to make a meaningful contribution to political dialog outside of what were considered “women’s” issues. Women at the local level tend not to meet the educational requirements of public office. Political parties failed to negate a perception among women voters that women’s interests were best served by the NRM, which had “liberated” Ugandan women. This identification of NRM with the advances of women in Uganda made it difficult for non-NRM party women to gain the confidence and the vote of women.

Attribution for all these changes to the SMD program alone is complicated by the fact that attitudes towards women have changed in intervening years since the last elections.

3.1.10 Evaluation Findings for People with Disabilities

People with disabilities (PWDs) credit the IRI program with taking advocacy and lobbying to new levels by making it part of governance. For PWDs, the first step to access political power is physical access to the very buildings where power resides. IRI also assisted district teams to lobby for the employment of PWDs and to sensitize them on their rights and the Disability law that is yet to be implemented. In addition, IRI helped PWDs to open offices and become part to the political landscape. The dialogues organized by IRI provided PWDs with an opportunity to question parties on their stand on various issues related to disability

The realization of the capacity of PWDs to participate in political processes was a prime accomplishment of this aspect of the program. In this regard, PWDs agreed that the training they received gave them confidence not only to contest in the seats reserved for them but for other seats as well. IRI also linked PWDs with the Electoral Commission and political parties. This enabled PWDs to actively participate in elections as candidates and election observers. The net result of PWD participation is that all positions reserved for PWDs in Kumi district were contested. In addition, in Kanyum sub-county a PWD contested against an able-bodied person and trounced him for the position of councilor. This contrasts with the 2006 elections when most positions for PWDs were not contested in Ngora and Kachumbali sub-counties. In Ngora sub-county, a person with disability gained confidence and in that sub-county defeated an able-bodied person to become councilor.

Advocacy work done by PWDs resulted in the district administration in Arua making a commitment to include them in government projects such as Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF II), PRDP, and National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). PWDs reported that they felt a sense of integration and recognition that their issues were seen as one of the key priorities. The implications are that the marginalized groups would gain from both the general budgetary lines as well as the specific line items. A specific law to cater for the needs of

⁵¹ Focus Group Discussion with UPC party secretariat staff.

the deaf was passed by Kumi Town Council in 2010. This is seen as a major landmark in the empowerment of PWDs. Railings and ramps were added to public buildings, including hospitals, schools, and local government buildings to assist PWDs with access to services. In Kasese, 80 percent of those with disabilities and unemployed have found employment as a result of changes in perceptions brought about by CSOs working with the district administration, private sector and service providers. They managed to get PWD-friendly bye-laws enacted and a 15 percent tax reduction for employers if they employed more than 10 PWDs.

In Atatur sub-county PWDs felt respected and integrated as they were involved in public activities, especially translating information in local language where EC provided voter education. They also participated with able-bodied persons in projects and applied jointly for funding through local council. Atatur sub-county also makes office space available for PWDs to hold their meetings.

PWDs are more disadvantaged than others when participating in projects due to difficulties with transportation. This is aggravated during elections as they have to travel to district towns to vote. Those candidates and parties with more funds available can influence elections by transporting disabled people to polling stations. Blind people require support to complete the ballot paper and allegations were noted during the interviews with these PWDs, that those who assisted them during the voting process did not always select the candidate indicated by the PWDs.

PWDs developed very innovative ideas as a result of the training but there was a lack of resources for implementation. PWDs have high expectations and if changes are too slow, they get discouraged and do not attend the subsequent meetings. As with women, it proved difficult to get PWDs into opposition party leadership positions because of the perception that the NRM had done the most to support their cause traditionally.

3.1.11 Evaluation Findings for Party Caucuses

As the representative body of government, Parliament has the potential to be an extremely effective institution for fostering and consolidated multi-party democracy. Legislatures are the guarantors of pluralism and can play a significant role in ensuring the proper workings of government while protecting the interests of minorities or disenfranchised groups (Taylor 2005, 105). While in different national contexts caucuses have proven to be useful mechanisms for building consensus across party lines, in Uganda the culture of crossing party lines to exchange ideas, to form collective platforms on particular policies is underdeveloped. SMD's work with parliamentary caucuses was intended to equip parties with the necessary tools to develop caucus structures and strategies, and increase communication between caucuses and the party leadership, caucus discipline and constituency outreach. The support to parliamentary caucuses was intended to enable them to find a balance between their parliamentary responsibilities and caucus rules, procedures and expectations in the political system. The four major parties in Parliament were intended to be the beneficiaries of the training.

In 2009, SMD facilitated a series of consultations and meetings with the NRM Chief Whip, Daudi Migereko. At this initial meeting the revised NRM's whipping papers were reviewed and discussions were held about proper funding and staffing the office of the chief whip. SMD also decided to conduct capacity building support trainings with members of the opposition. While it was agreed in 2009 that SMD would organize a multi-party workshop for DP, FDC and NRM, such workshop did not materialized. The SMD quarterly reports for example, for five consecutive quarters did not report parliamentary party caucus activities. According the

interviews held with the DP and FDC, this training was not conducted. Opposition parties blamed the lack of transparency in Parliament for the lack of information on the different forms of capacity building activities supported by USAID, including its support to parliamentary caucuses.

A major challenge to IRI's work with parliamentary caucuses was the parties themselves. According to FDC, DP and UPC, there was no clear understanding of the work and importance of party caucuses. Furthermore, because of the entrenched party positions within parliament, there was apparently little interest in building the capacity of caucuses outside party lines. These challenges were well captured by Justice Kanyeihamba, who claimed in a newspaper article that the multi-party tradition of caucusing in Parliament was manipulated, especially whenever controversial issues come up. In this regard, MPs are prevented by party leadership from freely discussing issues in the House because of a caucus decision. It is therefore not surprising that little progress was made in building the capacity of parliamentary caucuses if parties stifle internal democracy.

3.2 EVALUATION FINDINGS ON THE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Article 59 of the Constitution guarantees the right to vote and entrusts the State to take steps to ensure that all citizens qualified to vote can register and exercise the right to vote.. To ensure that free and fair elections are achieved, the EC was established as an independent body, to ensure regular free and fair elections, demarcate constituencies, declare election results, maintain a voter's register, adjudicate election complaints and to implement voter education. Thus, in addition to working with political parties to strengthen internal party democracy and political party structures, IRI also worked with the EC to build its capacity to perform its mandated role, to be flexible, and demonstrate evenhandedness in dealing with complaints and concerns of political parties and the public at large. IRI hosted a series of dialogues with CSOs, representatives of the EC, political parties and district officials to discuss issues that have resulted in electoral violence. The outcomes were presented to national leaders in an effort to encourage reform leading up to the 2011 elections. National leaders were impressed with the success of the radio shows and were regarded by some as the most effective way of communicating in the districts.

Previously, there was a general mistrust of the EC that was compounded by the incompetence of those selected as polling agents. The work of polling agents was compromised by their expectation of financial rewards, the abandoning of polling stations and their inability to work together with others as a team. The resulting inefficiencies reflected poorly on the EC as a body and its capacity to objectively oversee the electoral process. Despite taking place just a week before polling, the training of polling agents is seen as having been very beneficial. While there may have been some abuses during polling, agents were able to moderate antagonistic groups such as those in Kasese. Furthermore, voters were able to tell agents about practical concerns that helped in reorganizing polling stations (for example, splitting those that were overpopulated and moving others where access would be problem), issues that the EC could not have identified alone. In updating the voter register, the EC was able to work with groups and stakeholders who were party to the dialogues that had enabled them to overcome residual mistrust of the EC. Overall, the training of the EC official and its participation in the dialogues was instrumental in improving the environment for more open discussions with the voters.

The EC admitted that the SMD Program had undertaken a significant part of the voter education

that it was mandated to deliver but that they could not deliver due to its budgetary constraints.

One of the challenges of working with the DRs of the EC is that SMD committed time and resources to building the capacity of the DRs and supporting the cementing of key relationships only to have the DR be rotated out to another district. That capacity remains and is transferred to another district office but the process of building relationships through the cooperative dialogues is lost.

The EC headquarters also indicated that they experienced a ‘rocky start’ with IRI as they went directly to the field and started working with the EC DRs without consulting the HQ.⁵² This situation arose from a misunderstanding regarding the interpretation of what constitutes ‘voter education’. Anything relating to voter education is within the mandate of the EC and the EC must first accredit any organization to undertake voter education. IRI did not consider the IPD process to be ‘voter education’ and therefore did not apply to the EC for accreditation. However, following several meetings with EC officials a compromise was reached and IRI and EC entered into a MoU. IRI thus erred in going to the field without prior consultations with the EC. The lack of formal links at the beginning was an implementation weakness that also led to misconceptions about the real motives of IRI in developing and implementing this component of its program.

3.3 FINDINGS ON ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

During the USAID in-briefing, the Evaluation Team was asked to examine whether there were lower levels of election-related violence in SMD districts. SMD implemented IPD interventions in districts where electoral violence had been high in 2006. This was confirmed by respondents who indicated that these districts in 2006 were very “hot” areas, but in 2011 thanks in part to the IPDs there were no issues.⁵³

Although election related violence in 2001 was extensively recorded, the 2006 elections were less well documented although the major incidents were recorded. The police election-complaints desk in 2011 was reluctant to provide the Evaluation Team with information regarding recorded incidents. No baseline had been put in place by SMD against which the impact of their interventions could be assessed. The Evaluation Team was therefore unable to obtain quantitative information from the police or the EC about the levels of violence either for the 2006 or the 2011 elections and therefore relied upon anecdotal evidence to answer this question.

CSOs, political parties, police officials and EC representatives interviewed said there was a significant reduction of election violence, compared with previous elections of 2001 and 2006. In Kumi district officials interviewed said the IPDs had increased political tolerance in the district and understanding of multi-party politics especially compared to neighbouring district Bukedea, which had not benefited from the IPDs and experienced high levels of violence and intolerance.⁵⁴ Stakeholders reported that they believed the reduction in violence in their districts was a direct result of the IPDs.⁵⁵ In Kumi, the police, political parties and the EC District

⁵² Key Informant interview with Dr. Kiggundu Chairman of EC

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Key informant interviews in Kumi.

⁵⁵ NRM party officials in Masaka indicated that “there was no election violence this time yet in 2006 there was a lot of violence. Even after the results people remained calm.” In Kasese the NRM LCV Chair indicated that he had

Registrar all agreed that there was far less violence in 2011 than in 2006.⁵⁶ Respondents also agreed that the dialogues had created increased confidence in the EC District Offices indicating that prior to the dialogues most stakeholders believed that the EC and NRM party worked in tandem to disenfranchise opposition voters.⁵⁷ Though serious violence was recorded in the Bubadiri West constituency of the current leader of the opposition, Nandala Mafabi, and the Kampala mayoral election, it was less than in the previous elections. In Kasese positive changes in the relationship between CSOs and the EC were attributed to the IPD. Due to trainings, elections were better organized and levels of violence were lower in Kasese not only because of a heavy military deployment but also because people were much more aware of how the elections should be run and what avenues they could use to rectify problems. The EC respondent in Kasese reported that the EC sat down with people to resolve issues related to cleaning up the voter's register and the location of polling stations. He felt the training had been very good in creating this level of transparency and trust.

Political parties, CSOs, police, the EC and local government officials agree that there was less violence in SMD districts compared to neighboring districts in which SMD was not implemented. The decline in tension between parties and party supporters was attributed to the SMD facilitated dialogues and attitude shifts among the youth.

Respondents felt the dialogues also improved the electoral processes on the ground. District dialogues often resulted in agreements between the EC and the stakeholders on how to improve the registration and display processes.⁵⁸ After IRI supported CSO monitoring of voter registration process, recommendations contained in the reports filed by the CSO partners together with district-specific concerns that had been raised through IPDs, were brought to the attention of the EC Headquarters. In response, the EC took corrective measures including agreeing to a further extension of the registration deadline; increasing publicity regarding the extension and dealing with problems of truant registration officers. In addition, at the district level, as a result of the CSO reports and dialogues, the EC registrars in Arua and Tororo increased the flow of information to the public about the extension of the registration process.⁵⁹ Also in Tororo, the DR removed the voter register display form the office after receiving a complaint that it was being displayed in the NRM party offices.⁶⁰ The dialogues also resulted in agreements regarding the polling officials and as a result, partisan officials were identified and removed.

3.4 EVALUATION FINDINGS FOR SMD'S PROGRAM OF CIVIL SOCIETY SUPPORT

The hypothesis informing the work of SMD with civil society was that, if civil society becomes a reliable source of public opinion through policy advocacy, political parties would benefit from the information supplied by CSOs and begin to craft issues-based policies and platforms. SMD assumed that if this critical party-civil society link were strengthened, citizens would start seeing

observed a big difference in the election violence in 2011 compared to 2006 – indicating that it was more peaceful with fewer confrontations and credited the change to the interventions of IRI and other actors including KAS.

⁵⁶ Key informant interviews in Kumi.

⁵⁷ Masaka Radio.

⁵⁸ SMD, Quarterly Report, January-March 2010

⁵⁹ SMD, Quarterly Report, April-June 2010, at pg 20.

⁶⁰ Interview with IRI Country Director, Jeremy Leibowitz, May 4th 2011.

the value of political participation, understand the dangers of patronage politics, and begin to appreciate the value of democratic politics. This then would ultimately promote issue and policy-based multi-party politics. Elections would become issue-based; competition would be policy-oriented and fairer. Moreover, those elected would be obliged to communicate with their constituents and the electorate on the basis of the same platforms upon which the citizens had elected them. Ultimately, principled and fair multi-party politics would start taking shape in Uganda.

The main purpose of the SMD program for the CSOs was to strengthen their various capacities and to support them to *increase democratic participation, transparency and accountability in Uganda*. SMD planned to contribute to this goal by ensuring that 1) consensus and coalitions were built among political parties and CSOs on issues of common interest and 2) by ensuring at least 70 percent of the identified constituents demonstrated an improved knowledge of multi-party democracy. The activity therefore intended to support at least 10 joint campaigns on raising awareness of the multi-party political system. The SMD program provided support to civil society at national and district/sub-county levels in the form of training workshops, mentoring and advocacy initiatives. In all, 24 CSOs were selected to participate in the program. See **Annex 11** for a summary of participating CSOs and key activities implemented.

3.4.1 Support to Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMGroup)

SMD provided support to the DEMGroup, a consortium of four civil society organizations who came together to contribute to freer, fairer and more transparent elections in Uganda. The members of the consortium are UJCC, ACFODE, Transparency International Uganda and the Center for Democratic Governance. SMD supported a range of activities ranging from support for recruitment, strategy development, planning, training, and ICT innovations. A full list appears as **Annex 14**.

The internal capacity of the DEMGroup was increased through the above activities that ultimately translated successfully into being able to monitor the elections effectively. The tests DEMGroup conducted to check the overall quality of the voter registry (including name duplication), the number of voters assigned to each polling station and anomalies in age or gender, were particularly successful and resulted in a wealth of information that was useful to political parties, CSOs and donors alike in honing their strategies and support for the elections. For example, although the accuracy level of individual voter's information (name, age, address, etc.) is over 90%, a total of 113,299 duplicate records were found. DEMGroup also found that 77 percent of the voting age population was registered with lower rates among some marginalized groups. Northern regions had lower levels of registration than others with the Karamoja region having the lowest registration rate at 39 per cent. The youth population also had a poor voter registration rate with only 13.2 percent of eligible voters between the ages of 18 and 23 registered. Although youth are defined as citizens aged 18 to 35 years, these figures captured mainly youth in high school and college. Most of them were unable to register because the exercise coincided with their term time. Citizens 55 years and older were over-represented with a registration rate of 139.4 percent⁶¹!

⁶¹ These figures were later cross-checked with Mr. J.M.. Odoy , the outgoing Executive Secretary of DEM Group, who confirmed they were derived from statistical calculations done by Wilsken Group, a consultancy firm hired by DEM Group. The figures were derived from voter registers of EC. We have no explanation either from EC or DEM Group as to why the figure for over-aged voters exceeded 100 percent. Our interpretation is that there were multiple

SMD's support for the training of DEMGroup's regional coordinators and the provision of checklists proved to be very effective and DEMGroup developed various reports, including, on the lack of public knowledge about the display and natural justice periods and low levels of participation from political parties. The citizen hotline that SMD's IT-interventions supported allowed citizens to call and text concerns about electoral irregularities and proved to be very popular and effective as it provided easy access for all citizens to raise concerns and report irregularities. Within a few weeks of the launch the hotline received over 300 text messages expressing concerns about a range of issues including the registration process, ghost voters and national ID cards. The hotline map shows that 4,191 reports were made by the public (www.ugandawatch.org).

Funding delays slowed the start-up of the Secretariat. This interfered with work planning and orientation of staff as well as the recruitment of regional supervisors. As a result, SMD had to engage in short-term work planning and implementation support with DEMGroup as a stop-gap measure to keep activities moving along while not spending resources on broader training until permanent staff were in place.

With regard to investment in technology, the DEMGroup was poised to emerge as a regional leader in the deployment of these tools by combining new technologies in its traditional monitoring techniques with crowd sourcing data about the electoral process through the citizen hotline. However, due to the loss of critical human resources and the absence of a sustainability plan for the organization, this may be lost. Although SMD boosted DEM Group's technological capacity, this came as late as April 2010. There was also a multitude of directives from the various sponsors of DEM Group⁶².

Unfortunately, a number of factors ultimately undermined the very existence of DEMGroup of which the lack of a longer-term vision and planning were the most critical factors. Internal organizational challenges such as disagreements between member organizations and squabbling within the DEMGroup as well as inability to resolve its status as a legal entity caused difficulties related to financial and administrative procedures. Most of the trained staff and members of the Secretariat had to find employment elsewhere. Valuable capacity developed during SMD program implementation was therefore lost. The investment in building the capacity of the DEMGroup was therefore not sustained and opportunities for future impact are thus largely nullified.

3.4.2 National NGOs

The implementation framework adopted by SMD required the participation of selected national NGOs whose role was to serve as mentors to the 24 grassroots CSOs with whom SMD elected to work. They tailored the SMD-designed workshops and training to the needs of district CSOs. The NGOs selected were Action for Development (ACFODE), Network of Uganda Researchers and Research Users (NURRU) and Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC). The national partners were selected on the basis of their specific technical capacity and networks. They also had strong national networks and experience in project management and evaluation. National NGOs were appointed after the district CSOs were identified and selected by SMD and the

registrations or intentional duplications. This is given credence by the fact that EC refused to discuss these issues when DEM Group presented its report.

⁶² This was revealed to the Evaluation Team in an interview with DEM Group at their office on 5 May 2011. A view was expressed that though their main sponsor DDP, the other sponsor NDI tended to be pushy.

activities to be implemented by the national NGOs was already planned by SMD. The district CSOs were divided into three groups: i) district partners implementing small grant projects ii) district partners invited to apply for small grants and iii) district partners needing organizational and capacity support before they could be considered for small grants⁶³ so that appropriate support could be given to them. At the first stage of implementation, the national partners focused on assisting district CSOs to build capacity in monitoring and evaluation, data collection and advocacy strategies⁶⁴. For CSOs that needed more capacity to apply for grants, the national partners helped them with proposal writing and capacity building as part of their mentoring obligations, not only for NDI but also other funding agencies. Further, the grantee CSOs were invited by NDI to a workshop in Kampala where participants discussed use of data, targeting advocacy strategies⁶⁵. For example, at the regional meetings, those who did not win in the first round were brought together in regional seminars to improve their proposal writing capacity. In other words, there was a deliberate effort on the part of NDI and its national partners to bring district CSOs on board through a consultative process.

The mentorship and capacity development provided by the national NGOs helped CSOs improve their capacities in the areas of advocacy, resource mobilization, financial management, proposal writing, report writing and engaging with local government. More detail on the results achieved because of national NGO support to local CSOs is provided in Section 3.4.3 below.

National NGOs believed they could have played a more formative role in the SMD Program, starting with the selection process and helping to identify more suitable district CSOs for the program because most of the CSOs were engaged in service delivery type activities and not democracy or advocacy activities. However, they did not clearly articulate the criteria they would have used and so it is not possible to determine if they would have differed significantly from those applied by SMD in the selection of CSOs for participation in the program.

All logistical arrangements for visits to the districts were made by SMD, which provided huge challenges for the national NGOs that had to fit their resources within the arrangements since they have limited personnel. For example, national NGOs would have preferred to stay longer than one day at one place, spending up to five days to ensure that a solid understanding was developed and so that they could play their mentorship role better. They felt that the logistical restrictions negatively impacted the quality of the work they delivered. National NGO involvement in yearly work planning process could have addressed some of these challenges.

Although national NGOs were assigned to take responsibility for specific district CSOs⁶⁶, NDI also communicated directly with the CSOs and at times this resulted in conflicting messages being sent. National NGOs would have preferred taking greater responsibility for all aspects of the relationship with their CSOs, thereby strengthening their ownership and accountability for the work they undertook. It could also have increased suitability of support offered and strengthened sustainability of interventions beyond the life of the program.

Finally, payments made to NGOs were unpredictable and slow, placing an unnecessary burden

⁶³ NDI Review Report March 2010

⁶⁴ Ibid, NDI Report

⁶⁵ Working Sessions took place between December 10-11, 2009; This was attended by 23 participants (16 male and 7 female), each participant represented his/ her CSO

⁶⁶ For example, NACWOLA in Kasese ACFODE, NWASEA in Iganga NURRU, Awake Ankole in Bushenyi UJCC among others.

on them.

3.4.3 District Level Support

A fundamental assumption made by SMD in its work with CSOs was that they had a much greater capacity than they actually had. This assumption was based on an environmental scan done by USAID Mission in 2007. It was determined only after the selection process had run its course that most of the CSOs did not have the capacity and skills indicated by the scan or as presented in their profiles when putting forward their proposal for the grants. As such, SMD placed less emphasis on CSO organizational support, assuming that they were competent organizations simply in need of a top-up of funds. In fact, most of the CSOs were highly dependent on other donors' funding to whom they were answerable and they did not have the personnel or skills to take on SMD's program.

Interviews with the district CSOs revealed that although the support and mentoring they received from national NGOs had helped the district CSOs focus on advocacy, this was not part of their original mandate. Some CSOs agreed that that it strengthen their other activities and mobilize people around development issues, but others viewed it as an additional responsibility. This was also collaborated by other previous reviews⁶⁷. Although the view of SMD was that Ugandan CSOs could be transformed from working with communities on service provision to policy advocacy, it must be acknowledged that they had limited capacity and most of those interviewed did not have previous experience working with a rights-based approach. In fact, some of the CSOs equated advocacy with "politics" and expressed their dislike for it. The real challenge however is related to SMD's approach that did not emphasize ownership, accountability and sustainability strongly enough.

Organizational Capacity

Approximately 76 percent of the CSOs were trained in strategic planning, resource mobilization and advocacy. This training enabled CSOs to manage their affairs more effectively and engage political leaders and government structures on issues that affect society. At least 86 percent of CSOs interviewed self-reported that there was an increase in their organizational capacity as a result of SMD's interventions. SMD did not undertake any baseline measure of CSO capacity so it was not possible to make a formal assessment of these claims.

From Service Delivery to Advocacy

The objectives of CSOs in Uganda are traditionally more focused on service delivery and less on advocacy and promoting multi-party democracy. The SMD intervention influenced many more CSOs to get involved in advocacy. All of the CSOs interviewed are now involved in some kind of rights and/or policy-based advocacy ranging from the protection of the rights of vulnerable members of society like children, PWDs, youth, and women; gender mainstreaming/women's emancipation, property rights and gender-based violence⁶⁸. CSOs have generally embraced advocacy activities by relating them to service delivery of some kind. Many of the CSOs interviewed, feel that the right way to do advocacy is through delivering some kind of tangible service. For instance, in Apac, the CSO linked its advocacy to NAADS operations.

To illustrate the uptake of advocacy work by CSOs, the following are the Evaluation Team

⁶⁷ NDI/Uganda: Strengthening multiparty Democracy, Internal midterm evaluation Report, May 2010.

⁶⁸ CSO Questionnaire by the team May to July 2011

presents sketches of two types of CSOs – youth and PWD. Five Youth CSOs were investigated and the table below shows what types of work youth CSOs are involved in (note that multiple responses are possible and therefore the percentages do not sum to 100). A similar table is provided for CSOs involved in PWD issues.

Table 1: Youth CSO Activities

Type of Activity	% CSOs
Advocacy and lobbying to promote human rights	87
Capacity building programs	43
Information, education, and communication with a focus on civic rights.	43
Research on youth policy and other issues	28
HIV prevention, care and support	28
Resource mobilization.	14

The youth have also developed and presented the unemployment agenda that has now reached a policy level for discussion⁶⁹.

Table 2: Activities of PWD CSOs

Type of Activity	% CSOs
Advocacy and lobbying to promote human rights & PWD policy issues	80
Socio-economic empowerment for PWDs	71
Capacity Building	57
Awareness raising and sensitization	43

However, we caution against too optimistic an interpretation of the depth of this new understanding. Activities are only broadly considered through the rights-based lens but CSOs and their audiences still have a long way to go in terms of demanding accountability from leadership. An important step has been achieved but demands are still related to very specific activities. Thus CSOs are beginning to adopt a rights-based approach but still stop short of direct political engagement. CSOs did not want to be identified as political actors as it would detract people from listening to their messages as they became labeled with a political affiliation and it is important to bear in mind that many CSOs are dependent on service delivery grants and government funding that could also deter them from adopting a more overtly rights-based approach to their work.

⁶⁹ CSO Questionnaire by the team May to July 2011

Greater CSO Participation in the Development Planning Process

As stated above, most of the district CSOs were formed and operated initially on the basis of service delivery and not advocacy. The smaller CSOs were even more inclined to undertake service delivery projects that benefitted their own and limited membership.⁷⁰ Previously, CSOs were not able to significantly influence the governance and management of the development processes in their respective districts. SMD's training in planning and advocacy has changed this trend and advocacy training in particular has yielded positive results. Interviews with CSO management staff and the FGDs revealed that their members now realized they had the potential to influence the governance process. For example, in Kumi district, PWDs gained the capacity through improved research skills to engage the district council to make local laws that would result in providing camps at public buildings. The deaf have had a specific law enacted by the Kumi Municipal Council to increase their participation in public affairs, including politics, by providing training in sign language. This will help this category of the PWDs access justice, health, education and public offices⁷¹. CSOs also networked more with each other after the SMD program leveraging resources. For example, a West Nile network organization was active in organizing CSOs even though it was not funded directly by SMD as others worked through it to influence events. CSOs have therefore come to engage more productively with their districts.

Accountability

Evidence was found that grantee CSOs had empowered local constituencies to demand accountability in the delivery of public services⁷². This was particularly so in tracking usage of public resources expended on government programs, e.g., Universal Primary Education funds. The Kyamulibwa women's group of BUMAKWE gained the confidence to complain to the chairperson that the NAADS projects were given to friends and relatives. Community Initiative for Empowerment of Vulnerable People (CIFOVUP) in Arua has engaged Local Governments and trained local stakeholders and communities to demand participation in the planning processes for their areas. Subsequent interventions by CIFOVUP committed local government officials to involving ordinary people in the planning processes. Local leaders have also been committed and held to account.

Importance of Information

CSO participants interviewed said they realized the power of information in advocacy work and reported it had increased their negotiation capacities with the stakeholders, especially local governments⁷³. They also realized the importance of research through the baseline surveys that they carried out as part of their needs assessment exercises that were incorporated into the training workshops. There are plans in place to continue with research activities as it had been realized that evidence-based positioning resulted in positive outcomes for the organization.

Women's Rights

Women's issues were promoted by the CSOs with the support of NDI. Women in Uganda face

⁷⁰ CSO s Questionnaire compiled by the team May-July 2011

⁷¹ This is lauded by the leaders of UNAD as a major achievement in the PWDs fraternity.

⁷² IDI Iganga

⁷³ In Arua District, several of the CSOs reported a change in attitude as well as delivery of services by LG.

⁷³ A good example is LIDI in Iganga district, whose accountability programs in UPE schools has drawn the active participation of parents and pupils in schools, and improvement in school governance is reported.

multiple problems such as social-cultural marginalization, and political and economic disempowerment. Of particular interest to SMD was the issue of women's lack of access to resources such as land. Land rights are a critical issue in women's rights⁷⁴. Capacity was built in some CSOs to engage various stakeholders in land matters. Clan leaders, local councils, police and the judicial system tend to favor men. In Kumi, the Pentecostal Assemblies of God (PAG) embarked on a project to empower women on their property rights by putting in place para-legals on behalf of aggrieved women⁷⁵. As an additional bonus, it was reported in all the project districts that women who participated in the SMD training had gained confidence in public speaking and skills in effective communication, proposal writing and lobbying. For example, in Kumi, we found assertive women in leading roles in KUDIP that drove its membership

Challenges

SMD's Non-Participatory Planning Process

SMD was originally conceived by USAID as engaging in a participatory process. However, the necessary inputs from the intended beneficiary groups were not solicited. At times, pre-designed modules were not applicable at the local level, nor did they take into consideration local conditions and capacities. CSOs at national and district levels were selected on the assumption that they were already working in the field of democracy and that activities related to the SMD Program were simply supplementary to on-going organizational activities. This was incorrect as most CSOs had a service delivery orientation. As an extreme example, the Tweyambe (*We help each other*) Women's Club's activities focused on poverty and income-generating projects. They are not even service providers to the wider community but operate to support only their 50 members. They do not have the conceptual skills or knowledge to support a community with respect to service delivery, let alone on issues of governance

CSOs Goals at Variance with SMD Project Objectives

As already indicated, USAID and SMD worked under the assumption that CSOs were already working in the field of good governance and that USAID-funded activities would constitute simply an extension of their current work. In reality, it is new territory to them and they do not have resources for these activities. CSOs tended to fit the SMD program within their own objectives, which were mainly related to income-generating projects or local service delivery needs. In addition, funding to beneficiaries came in small tranches and sporadically. In fact, some final payments were still outstanding at the time of this evaluation with no clear feedback given to CSOs about the reasons for the delays. This has a negative impact since it leads to SMD activities being treated as a secondary activity

High Expectations of CSOs

In general, CSOs complained that SMD only funded specific activities but provided no funding for administrative support or logistics to facilitate such activities – was this crucial to organizational capacity building – how should future programs be structured. Recipients felt that SMD was expecting them to “subsidize” SMD's program. For example, SMD asked LIDI in Iganga District (LIDI provides services to the community related to governance in schools) to

⁷⁴ Though Land Act recognizes the rights of women to property, other laws necessary to operationalize the Act such as the Domestic Relations Bill has been pending in Parliament for a decade.

⁷⁵ Although PAG had a good proposal, it stopped at collection of preliminary data, but the project was not implemented.

implement projects in 10 schools instead of five as agreed initially, without additional funding. When LIDI refused, SMD terminated the funding.

Absence of a Baseline

No clear baseline had been set up by the project against which all partners could be assessed. SMD fielded young and inexperienced staff members to monitor the CSOs and overall there was an inadequate field presence for effective supervision. It would have been helpful if specific benchmarks for CSO progress were developed by the SMD Program.

People's Loss of Confidence in Institutions of Governance

The decline in participatory management at the district and lower levels, especially at the local government level despite decentralization has dampened ordinary people's trust in systems of governance, whether governmental or non-governmental. CSOs have lost confidence too. This is attributed to the failure of the local government system to respond to issues raised by communities and a mismatch between expectations and the reality of declining resource levels given that most local government funding is in the form of conditional grants. The lack of community oversight has permitted the "elite capture" of resources by local officials.

Short Time Frames

Respondents are of opinion that the time frames for training interventions were too short for participants to internalize the matter in which they were mentored. It was probably assumed that the participants were of a high academic level and had previous experience in democracy and governance issues.

Internal Institutional Capacity

Logistical challenges existed at the district, sub-county and lower levels. Insufficient funding to cover administrative costs of implementation at the district, sub-county and lower levels was reported as a hindrance to the realization of high-quality results.

Difficult Reporting Requirements

NDI used reporting formats that were different from those to which the CSOs were accustomed. They reported that they needed more time to understand the new formats of reporting for project narratives and financial reports. This led some CSOs to losing out on SMD funding, not because they failed to perform, but because they failed to comply with the required formats.

Exclusion of Community Development Officers

District CDOs who are the coordinators of district social programs were not informed about SMD program activities. Most CDOs expressed the view that they would be happy to include SMD activities in their development plans that could lead to improved sustainability.

3.5 PARTNERSHIPS, COLLABORATION AND SYNERGIES

There are other organizations engaged in working with the political parties in Uganda. An introduction and analysis of these organizations follows.

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS)⁷⁶

KAS' central focuses of support include: cooperation with selected parties in order to strengthen their ability to develop their own profile with regard to the major political debates and actively present the party positions to the public; strengthening the capacity of the youth members of selected parties to influence the party platforms and take up party functions; cooperation with political actors as multipliers, particularly at local level, in order to promote political pluralism, democratic participation and representation; and raising awareness of civic rights and responsibilities, particularly among women and youth, in order to enhance their active involvement in political and social formation and decision making processes.⁷⁷

Both IRI and KAS admitted to engaging in only intermittent attempts at coordination due to heavy workloads, particularly in the run-up to the elections. NDI/IRI did not report anything to USAID in this regard. This is unfortunate since IRI and KAS were supporting multi-party dialogues in some of the same districts. More earnest attempts at collaboration could have yielded improved results.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)⁷⁸

FES's key objectives in Uganda include strengthening political parties by conducting activities aimed at engaging political parties in political discourse. In addition to supporting analysis and informed debate on various policy issues, FES also assists political parties with their institutional reform processes. Another objective is to strengthen actors in civil society, especially women and youth. As part of its political program, FES also runs a Young Leaders Training Program (YLTP) as a way of building responsible leadership among young and potential future leaders. Through education and training, the YLTP seeks to nurture and promote value driven leadership with a regard for the responsibilities of public engagement.⁷⁹

The Evaluation Team found little evidence of regular coordination with FES. This is unfortunate, particularly given that both FES and SMD were working with the parties on policy development, focusing on women and youth, and supporting a youth leadership program. Improved coordination and pooling of both human and financial resources could have yielded improved results.

Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy (NIMD)⁸⁰

NIMD is relatively new to Uganda, having just established offices in December 2009. Although the evaluation team did not get an opportunity to meet with NIMD, its main objective seems to be support for the creation of and continued dialogue through the Inter-Party Organization for Dialogue (IPOD).⁸¹ The Evaluation Team found very little evidence of coordination between IRI and NIMD.

⁷⁶ See, <http://www.kas.de/uganda/en/about/>

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ See, <http://www.fes-uganda.org/>

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ See, http://www.nimd.org/documents/N/nimd_uganda_mou_casestudy.pdf

⁸¹ See, Memorandum of Understanding between six parties represented in Parliament at http://www.nimd.org/documents/N/nimd_uganda_mou_casestudy.pdf

*Deepening Democracy Program (DDP)*⁸²

DDP was launched in 2008 and will run until the end of 2011 with a budget of UgShs 36.5 billion. Six development partners from PDG contributed funding for the DDP, including Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, the UK, and the Netherlands. DDP's goal is to contribute to improved democratic governance in Uganda by increasing informed, active, pluralistic participation of Uganda's citizens in the political process.

The Evaluation Team found evidence of regular communication between SMD and DDP. The collaboration proved very effective, particularly with political parties where SMD provided the technical support and DDP provided financial resources through sub-grants, which resulted in leveraging of resources. In addition, collaboration yielded results during election monitoring efforts when DDP provided resources to DEMGroup to perform election monitoring and NDI supported DEMGroup with the necessary technical assistance. The DDP and the Political Institutes also provided support to some of the same civic organizations like Uganda Youth Network (UYONET) and others that would benefit from information sharing.⁸³

However, as mentioned above, there was confusion on the ground between the USAID-supported Strengthening Democratic LINKAGES program and SMD. The two projects worked in some of the same districts, often engaging some of the same stakeholders. It was not clearly communicated to the beneficiaries during implementation which one of the two they were dealing with. The Evaluation Team believes this was a missed opportunity to be better coordinated, pool resources, and avoid duplication.

In conclusion, the evaluation revealed some evidence of coordination between the various stakeholders, providing support to an improved political and electoral process in Uganda, particularly in the initial days of the SMD program. Unfortunately, the coordination attempts waned as SMD's implementation intensified. By the last two years of SMD, there was little evidence of collaboration and coordination by SMD with the exception of the DDP whose financial resources were leveraged for support to political parties and in respect of election monitoring. The overall lack of coordination with other donors constituted a missed opportunity for SMD and other actors to leverage other donor resources and increase synergies.

3.6 PROGRAM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT

The SMD Program was designed to build on results achieved through USAID's predecessor program, Strengthening Political Pluralism (SPP), which provided capacity building support to the legislature, political parties, civil society, and the Electoral Commission to strengthen the foundations of multi-party democracy during the transitional period.

The SMD RFA outlined the program objectives within two components – Component 1 focused on *Strengthen[ing] Multi-Party System[s]*– the multiparty system is one system – it may have multiple components and Component 2 on *Strengthen[ing] Electoral Processes*. Explicitly, SMD was intended to contribute to the following Intermediate Results (IRs):

IR 1: Strengthened Environment for Peaceful Political Competition

⁸²<http://ddp.ug/>

⁸³ See, http://www.uyonet.or.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18&Itemid=17

IR 2: Increased Organizational Capacity for Representative Parties And CSOs

IR 3: Improved Constituent Relations/Representation by Parties and CSOs

IR 4: Increased Confidence in Electoral System

NDI and IRI responded to USAID's RFA for the SMD Program by proposing a unique partnership between the two institutes. NDI would serve as the prime recipient, responsible for overall project management. Each Institute would serve as the lead organization in specific project activities, drawing upon the strengths of the other partner to achieve the results of the SMD Program. NDI would take the lead in supporting CSOs and electoral process strengthening activities while IRI would take the lead in supporting political parties.

Overall Findings about SMD Program Design

The overall design by USAID as described in the CA is broad and provision was made for interventions at the national and district level, initially seven districts and later expanded to a total of 12 districts. The original design was relevant to the needs and conditions in Uganda during the introduction of a multiparty political system, providing a window of opportunity to furnish support to ensure its consolidation. A participatory process was followed with development of the program description as well as with the technical proposal prepared by NDI/IRI.

The CA contains the parameters of the relationship between USAID and the IP for the program. Some shortcomings were identified that could have been addressed in the original design, as described below:

- Although all focus areas referred to in the IRs are relevant and need to be addressed, the resources available were not sufficient to cover such a broad spectrum of activities and the result was that the program was too thinly spread to have a real impact. A more focused approach, with fewer activities could have been more effective.
- A comprehensive monitoring system was needed to ensure that the Program complied with all conditions of the CA and that all role-players involved in program implementation have a common understanding of the objectives of the SMD Program and the results to be achieved. For instance, three national CSOs were appointed to provide mentoring and capacity development to local CSOs to contribute to IR's 2 and 3 (*Increased organizational capacity for representative parties and CSOs; and Improved constituent relations/representation by parties and CSOs*). Local CSOs were responsible for implementing specific activities at district and sub-county levels. These role-players did not necessarily share the same objectives and some CSOs followed their own organizational objectives that may not have been in direct support of SMD. A comprehensive system to monitor progress at all levels on a regular basis could identify gaps earlier. It could also identify delays and constraints that could have been addressed during implementation to ensure achievement of results.
- Program implementation was hampered by the time-consuming procedures that beneficiaries, NDI/IRI, and USAID had to follow. The program design could prescribe procedures and processes that could have been more conducive and flexible for program implementation, such as increased levels of decision-making and financial authorization by the IP.

3.6.1 SMD Program Management

NDI was mainly responsible for implementation of the program concerning civil society at the district level, with support to national NGOs who acted as mentors for local partners and also provided support to the DEMGroup for election monitoring activities. IRI was mainly responsible for supporting political parties at the national and district levels, support to the EC, PWDs, Women, and Youth organizations.

The Institutes prepared annual plans and were rooted in an environmental scan conducted in 2008 and further influenced by needs expressed by SMD's partners/beneficiaries. The Institutes recognized that they would need to make resource allocation decisions that were consistent with the SMD Program objectives, but designed activities in the work plans to allow for some degree of flexibility to remain responsive to partner needs.

According to the original program design, an Advisory Committee was to be established to provide guidance on specific approaches and activities, and act as champions for the project within their spheres of influence. This Advisory Committee would also have provided informal evaluation on project impact throughout the life of the program. The Advisory Committee was to be comprised of representatives from parliament, civil society, local government, religious organizations, the media, and the private sector. However, for reasons that the evaluation team could not establish, the Advisory Committee was not established. The evaluation team believes such a committee could have played a valuable role by identifying and recommending corrective measures related to challenges experienced throughout the implementation period, including more effective monitoring and evaluation of the program. Further discussion on this topic can be found in Chapter III.

NDI/IRI provided quarterly and annual progress reports to USAID. To implement support to civil society, NDI appointed three national NGOs: 1) Action for Development (ACFODE), 2) the Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC), and 3) the Network of Ugandan Researchers and Research Users (NURRU) to act as mentors for district beneficiaries. National and district beneficiaries provided monthly progress reports directly to NDI.

The M&E system was not well developed and the indicators used were changed during the implementation period. The Uganda Monitoring and Evaluation Management Services Project (UMEMS), a management services project contracted to assist the Mission and its IPs with M&E reported difficulty in getting the SMD program and the Mission to adopt more meaningful outcome-level indicators that would have entailed more rigorous data collection and greater costs despite these being included as illustrative indicators in the RFA. Consequently, stronger focus was placed on quantitative results and output indicators (especially USAID standardized indicators) and less on qualitative nuances even though most of the changes in the governance sector can only be recorded using qualitative measures. Had the Advisory Committee been established and actively involved, it could have strengthened the M&E process by demanding reporting against outcome indicators. Weak indicators would have been identified at an early stage and could have been addressed.

Although NDI/IRI scored high in terms of the number of activities implemented and results achieved, they had limited capacity to make speedy decisions and overall the program was not flexible enough. This was confirmed by testimonies during fieldwork and by the team's own assessment. This hampered program responsiveness.

To some extent, NDI and IRI were treated with suspicion by many stakeholders and program beneficiaries, and increased usage of local contractors like UJCC, NURRU and ACFODE at the national level and other CSOs (PWD, women, and youth organizations) at the district level could have resolved this issue and helped build local capacity, thus contributing to skills transfer. Where local contractors were used, they believed they were not sufficiently involved in program design and planning of implementation schedules and were not delegated sufficient authority to implement based on their knowledge of local conditions. A mechanism to obtain input from potential stakeholders by using a participatory yearly work planning session may have been useful.

National NGOs did not participate in the processes used to identify and select district partners. This may have contributed to some partners being selected without having the necessary skills and capacity to meet the objectives of the SMD program. National NGOs were also not part of the design phase of the activities they were appointed to implement. This caused some misunderstanding and frustration during implementation. National NGOs interviewed indicated that the NDI program was not flexible and logistical arrangements made by NDI made it very difficult for the national NGOs to adapt to this approach to mentoring. They would prefer more flexibility in order to have provided mentoring support in a manner more commonly adopted in Uganda. This includes more follow-up sessions and spending more time with district partners. The SMD program would have benefited from the inclusion of the IPDs from the outset of the program and not just as a pre-election activity. Although the IPDs were mentioned in the original design, this did not translate effectively into the SMD program activities until the approval of the modification in early 2010.

Communication channels between NDI's national mentor NGOs and district partners were unclear and caused confusion as national NGOs communicated with the district partners they were responsible for, but NDI also at times communicated directly with the district NGOs without informing national mentors, resulting in mixed messages being sent to the district partners. Although IRI communicated with national political parties, some political parties raised concerns that IRI communicated directly with the district level regarding, for example, selection of representatives for training interventions without obtaining the input of the national leadership. Communication with other development partners occurred on an informal and irregular basis. USAID is not formally part of the Steering Committee of the Deepening Democracy Program (DDP) where all other development partners coordinate programs and activities in a formal manner. DDP was developed by members of the international community's Partners for Democracy and Governance (PDG), a group that includes major development partners in Uganda. DDP's goal is to contribute to improved democratic governance in Uganda. Its purpose is to increase informed, active, pluralistic participation in the political process by Uganda's citizens. DDP also aims to build the capacity of institutions critical to the promotion of public participation and holding the state accountable to citizens' needs and concerns.

Implementation of the SMD Program was in general not well communicated and various persons interviewed at the national and district levels confused the SMD Program with the LINKAGES Program. This is a very important observation and explains the perception of the evaluators that instead of SMD supporting multiple processes in parliament i.e., those related to building consensus, political completion, etc., SMD should have concentrated on support to oversight functions, such as budget oversight, anti-corruption, HIV/AIDS, and poverty reduction. The objectives of the SMD Program were also not well communicated to local district implementers

or aligned with district-level activities. It became clear that partner CSOs at the district level often had their own objectives and it was difficult to relate activities implemented to the achievement of SMD objectives.

District CSOs expressed concern that implementation occurred over short periods of time and reporting was expected immediately after implementation of activities before implementers could analyze the outcomes of the activities that conducted. The format of reporting was also different from what CSOs were used to and they needed more time to understand the reporting requirements. If new or different procedures from what the recipient are used to are required during implementation, it might be useful to provide sufficient orientation on implementation requirements and procedures before actual implementation of a new program. This led to some CSOs withdrawing from NDI support. Although the format for financial reporting was new and difficult to master, some district CSOs appreciated the financial reporting and management system of NDI and IRI. They did, however, request that IRI provide financial support to staff of NGOs/CSOs delegated to work on NDI and IRI-funded projects.

NDI was tardy making payments and some final payments were still outstanding at the time of this evaluation without clear communication in this regard to the beneficiaries. The unpredictability of funding placed those CSOs with limited resources under serious pressure as they tried to keep human resources on board for the sake of the Project. One of the CSO's in Arua summarized this perception shared by various CSO's interviewed as follows: *"Implementers at local level feel that they are not equal partners with NDI and IRI; they are 'underdogs'."*

District-level Community Development Officers (CDOs) were not always involved with project development and some projects were, therefore, not aligned with district-level development programs. IRI and NDI did not disclose the budgets spent in districts to the CDOs. It was, therefore, difficult for the CDOs to plan their requests for support from the government. CDOs interviewed suggested greater transparency to prevent double-funding and also to prepare better from their side where additional support should be provided.

4-CONCLUSIONS

4.1 CONCLUSIONS ON SMD's POLITICAL PARTY SUPPORT

4.1.1 Greater Engagement among Political Parties, CSOs and Government

The IPDs were responsible for strengthening the district-level relationships among parties, CSOs, and government, including police, local government officials and the EC. For the first time the IPDs brought together parties to debate issues of national importance and to showcase divergent party and ideological positions. In the target districts, there was a tangible change in perceptions as a result of the IPDs, not only inter and intra party but also among constituents. Relationships were built that did not previously exist and knowledge and awareness was raised vis-à-vis political tolerance and the multi-party dispensation. Radio programs provided a positive example of political tolerance over the airways. Through the radio talk shows the EC, parties and other stakeholders were able to share critical information with the general public, achieve consensus on contentious issues and in some cases reduce the perceptions of political bias on the part of the EC and police. IRI-supported activities were able to generate action plans from the

stakeholders including commitments from the EC, political parties and CSOs to increase and work collectively to increase dissemination of information on election processes.⁸⁴ District-level agreements were also generated through the dialogues on how to improve the security situation during elections.

Likewise, a strengthened relationship between parties and local government was apparent. Political parties now have relationships with local government officials, the police and EC district officials where none had existed before. Training of the EC officials and their participation in the dialogues was instrumental in improving the environment for more open discussions with the voters on problem areas. All parties perceived that relationships had improved with the key actors – opposition political parties, regulatory authorities and the police force. The intended result of increased collaboration between political parties and CSOs was one of the less successful elements of the SMD program. This could have been a design flaw in the SMD program in that it was not clearly articulated how this could be achieved. Overall, the conclusion of the evaluation team is that the key political actors in Uganda have a more nuanced appreciation of what it means to compete in the political arena.

4.1.2 Increased Organizational Capacity of Representative Political Parties

The capacity of political party officials to manage party offices increased. Party officials were able to more successfully mobilize resources as a result of IRI trainings as they could lobby members for resources needed for maintaining the offices and carrying out party activities. The exception was the NRM party, which remained frustrated by its inability to mobilize resources due to members' perception that the party had ample resources. There was an increased presence of parties at the sub-national level because some parties were able to increase their presence here by recruiting party representatives and in some cases opening party offices in districts for the first time. Intra-party communications also improved as IRI support through bulk SMS'ing and improved ICT capabilities including e-mail resulted in more regular communications within the parties. There was a strengthened ability of parties to articulate policies as a result of IRI's support to party-affiliated think tanks. IRI support in this area was indispensable to the formulation of party policies and manifestos used in the election campaigns. Parties across the board, both nationally and locally, indicated they had benefited significantly from IRI support and were able to set up e-mail systems, internal computer networking systems and electronic membership databases. In sum, political parties are now better organized and supported administratively and have a stronger resource base from which to operate.

4.1.3 Improved Constituent Relations and Representation by Political Parties

The ICT and internship activities significantly contributed to improved constituent relations and representation by political parties through increased capacity of the parties to communicate with constituents through SMS, web page reporting, on-line chats and blogs. Parties increased outreach to constituents through radio slots and radio dialogues and participation in the radio programs improved their image. The police, local government and EC indicated that it raised the awareness of their roles in addition to improving their image. In a win-win situation, the radio stations also benefited as the radio shows increased their listenership. Dialogues at the district, sub-county and parish levels also contributed to improved relations between the parties and their constituents as they enabled cash-strapped parties to reach out to grassroots constituents who

⁸⁴ Ibid., pg. 23

were often ill-informed about issues relating to multi-party democracy and how to participate in elections. As mentioned above, parties were able to mobilize increased membership and candidates for their parties as a result of the IRI-supported trainings and parties were better informed about the needs of constituents as a result of IRI's support to activities that brought them together. The increase in the number of women the opposition was able to field during the 2011 election compared with 2006, is due at least in part to SMD's work with the parties and the women.

4.1.4 Conclusions about the SMD Internship Program

The internships component of the SMD program was both unique and innovative. This was a 'win-win' scenario where young individuals benefited from on-the-job experience, often being given responsibilities far above their experience base due to the acute human resource gaps and the lack of resources to recruit permanent staff and benefit from IRI training programs. The internship program also responded to the desire in the SMD program design to target the youth as a beneficiary. The program exposed the individuals to the business of politics, enabling them to view the workings of multi-party democracy up close and appreciate the importance of being informed, and participating and engaging in order to create change. In sum, the internship program provided a unique opportunity for youth to engage in party work and so helped engage youth in the political process.

4.1.5 Conclusions about SMD's Support to the Electoral Process

The key strength of IRI's work concerning the electoral process was located in bridging the divide between the EC and the general public, thereby reducing the levels of mistrust in the system. In the districts, the ability of people to access EC officials, to put questions to them and have some of their fears addressed reduced the political tensions on polling day in 2011.

The SMD work with the EC was important to the electoral process, specifically in improving targeted aspects of the process. These included voter registration, vote tallying and announcement of results, electoral observers, and resolution of election disputes to counter what were seen as anomalies in the 2006 elections. Working with political parties, the police, and the EC, election observers; polling agents and polling station supervisors was a good way to bring cohesion to the electoral process. The agents and groups of individuals targeted in the training workshops were critical in restoring confidence in the EC and the electoral process in general. The training of polling agents at regional and national level contributed to supervision at polling stations, reorganization and updating of the voter registers and their display, all of which proved to be steps in the right direction and supported work done under the USAID/Uganda-funded International Foundation for Elections Support (IFES) program.

Another challenge to effective political engagement and the maturation of multi-party politics is limited political awareness and education among the population. The lack of knowledge of the electoral processes and what is expected of the political leaders and the electorate was a significant drawback, with calls by all respondents for continuous civic education/voter education activities from a human rights perspective, the need to improve engagement between CSOs and political parties, the continuation of dialogues with stakeholders at the national and sub-national level focused on more peaceful political processes, transparency of the electoral process, strengthening multi-party democracy and improved service delivery. An ongoing and major effort in voter education was seen as needed to support stakeholder dialogues on electoral law reform, including passage of a code of conduct for political parties. People's perceptions and

attitudes regarding the electoral process will take a long time to change completely. Therefore the challenge for any future interventions is to sustain them between election periods so that civic education is ongoing and targeted interventions and advocacy are conducted well ahead of elections.

In sum, therefore, future interventions must be based on longer-term objectives related to (a) civic education for greater political awareness; (b) sustained voter education targeting all those involved in the electoral process including poll agents, local party officials; (c) political dialogues that involve CSOs and political parties; (d) the translation of the rules of political engagement into the vernacular language and regular radio shows in different language to ensure that the rules and processes are understood and appropriated by all parties involved.

4.1.6 Conclusions on Electoral Violence

It is difficult to attribute to the SMD project alone the increase in the level of political awareness and tolerance and the decline in electoral violence in trouble spots in different parts of the country that were previously marred by violence. However, IRI interventions significantly contributed to building capacity of political parties at the district level. In addition, the interventions raised awareness about the rules of political engagement. It also contributed to build skill sets needed for political actors, such as polling agents, political candidates, local party officials in resource mobilization, mobilization, recruitment, retention of support and the key roles of police.

Formal statistics could not be obtained to compare the levels of election violence between districts (or sub-counties) participating in SMD and those not involved in the SMD program. The timeframe for this assessment only permitted visits and interviews to seven districts and comparative interviews could not be conducted in districts or sub-counties outside the scope of this program. It is therefore not possible for the team to make definitive evidence-based findings and conclusions on electoral violence as part of this evaluation. A baseline for such hypotheses incorporated into future programs should be collected well in advance of program implementation and evaluation.

4.2 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SMD'S SUPPORT TO CIVIL SOCIETY

Overall, the SMD support to CSOs has changed the way many CSOs in Uganda perceive themselves – from being predominantly service providers to engaging on governance issues and adopting a rights-based approach. Several groups discovered that tangible change in people's lives could be realized through good governance and accountability. Previously marginalized groups, especially PWD's and Youth, had received a voice. There was a significant increase in interactions among the CSOs and political actors and their joint actions have translated into new thinking and attitudes. Newly acquired community organizational and mobilization skills were acquired with several CSO leaders of the view that this was a *“lesson for life”*. *This is an important result attributed to SMD by most leaders in the program area.-.*

4.2.1 Increased Internal Accountability

The most important result that the SMD Program achieved regarding civil society was the **increased accountability within several of the CSOs** that occurred as a result of the training they received. Internal planning improved and the usurpation of organizational processes such as planning by dominant personalities in the organization's leadership was replaced with higher levels of participatory engagement.

4.2.2 Increased Engagement with Local Government

Many CSOs started to engage concretely with their respective local government entities in planning and development interventions where previously they had been complacent. Associated with this was an effort to sensitize communities about the benefits of participating in the local government planning process. The level of civic consciousness was raised as a result of sensitization by CSOs, and communities became more active and innovative about demanding their rights and having them met at the district and sub-county level

4.2.3 Proactive engagement between CSOs and the EC

This increased in some places such as Apac and Kumi that calmed tensions during the election process. These outcomes were noticed by the EC officials in Kumi and Bukedde. In some areas the police force and district administration also came on board as a result of the work of CSOs and this helped mitigate violence.

4.2.4 Value of Research Recognized

Most of the CSOs previously worked in an *ad-hoc* manner but with SMD training they were able to undertake **research that strengthened their policy or advocacy** stance that made them more effective and taken more seriously by other stakeholders. CSOs embraced an enhanced culture of empirical evidence based on actual data. Training of CSOs in data collection, data management, analysis and application is likely to improve efficiency in CSOs.

4.2.5 Networking

Finally, **networking** was an important outcome of SMD's interventions. CSOs have built relationships with other CSOs and umbrella/networking type-CSOs and leveraging resources.

NDI fell short in understanding some of the key characteristics of the CSO mentality in Uganda. A closer examination of CSO capacity, their activities and their *modus operandi* was needed upon start up since this would have influenced subsequent selection. Many of those selected had never done advocacy or governance work before. A more careful examination might for example have resulted in SMD working with the national PWD organization that was already engaged in advocacy and then downwards to PWD CSOs as they were advocating.

Building on this, some CSOs did not fully understand how the SMD funding was expected to work. It was sometimes seen as a top-up for activities that they were already doing rather than a SMD separate program. There was a lack of clarity regarding the criteria for receiving the next tranche of funds and this led to competition between CSOs.

Communication was ineffective and feedback given was not timely. This had the effect of turning some people off the SMD Project. Related to this was an absence of professional monitoring as young and inexperienced people were sent to the field and a higher field presence was needed for NDI to fully understand CSO activities rather than relying on the reports from national NGOs.

The training offered by the national NGOs was not detailed or deep enough and needed to be customized to address the real needs and level of capacity of the CSOs group.

5-RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 GENERAL PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

Summary of Findings

While the project was overall well designed and implemented, there were areas of deficiencies including the following: a lack of a project Advisory Committee and a non-well-developed M&E System. Another important deficiency was that National NGOs did not participate in the process of identifying select district partners, a situation made worse by the lack of clear communication channels between national mentor NGOs and district partners. There was also a lack of understanding amongst the public as well as relevant interviewees about SMD program implementation, especially surrounding issues of confusion with the Linkages Project. Communication could have also been improved with other DPS especially higher level authorities at the DDP. While more of a qualitative rather than a quantitative finding was the positive correlation between women, youth and good quality program implementation. Finally, there were some differences of expectations surrounding some district CSOs and the implementation process.

Recommendations

- Coordination should be improved with other DPs to ensure synergy and increased levels of outcomes and impact.
- USAID should consider incorporating an integrated media component in any follow-on activity to increase reach to a broader group of society.
- In future work consider establishing Advisory Committee and better inclusion of political parties and National NGOs in project design and implementation.
- Put more effort into a comprehensive monitoring plan, one that makes certain that local CSO efforts are in line with SMD Program objectives across all levels and one that concentrates on results and outcomes not activities.
- Expand activities to include reaching a better understanding with district CSOs about project monitoring and implementation expectations.
- Continue and possibly expand the role of women and youth in follow on activities.

5.2 POLITICAL PROCESS

Summary of Findings

Increased peaceful political competition and a strengthened relationship between parties, local government and constituents is apparent in geographic areas where this evaluation took place. Identified contributing factor include the use of ICT, establishment of a sub-national presence (especially the use of IPDs) and the corresponding use of interns. At national level there were indications of a general lack of knowledge by new MPs of their roles and responsibilities and that many large parliamentary structures were fraught with partisan influences. Finally at both the national and local levels there continues to be major deficiencies in basic political tasks such as lobbying, fund raising, operating in a transparent manner, media relations and inclusiveness

(especially the views of the youth, women and those with disabilities).

Recommendations

- Support a regional presence of IRI and use districts IRI has worked with for the past several years on the SMD program as mentor districts in order to share lessons learned with newly identified districts.
- Expand IPD efforts both geographically and topically.
- IRI should consider helping constitute local consultative committees, which would encourage groups and organizations at the regional level to organize and synthesize the views, interest and needs of people at that level. Said consultative committee results could form the basis for some IPDs.
- Continue ICT and consult political parties on messaging and engage party officials to manage the website; use other languages in the communications of political messaging to ensure broader reach; and incorporate ICT in all training and interventions.
- Consider providing support to multi-party local government structures that are still learning how to work together.
- The internship program should continue; there are suggestions that it should be extended to six-month duration and that an intern is placed in each of the district offices that receive SMD support.
- Re-engage with Parliament to train the new MPs in their roles and responsibilities. Relatedly, parliamentarians should be trained to focus on particular issues and use issues such as budget oversight, anti-corruption, HIV/AIDS, and poverty reduction as vehicles to improve parliamentary performance, rather than focusing solely on parliamentary procedures.
- Keep the pressure on the caucuses by conducting an annual induction-like event at the start of every session to assess whether the MPs are on course in performing their job.
- Provide support (interns and research staff) to legislative sub-structures that can act as neutral, bipartisan, non-conflict forums in which competing actors can develop relationships and build compromises that address national issues, and where minority or opposition parties can participate in compromise-building processes.
- The training of candidates and party officials in lobbying and advocacy, resource mobilization and management should continue at all levels.
- IRI should continue to provide leadership training to youth, women and PWDS to encourage their participation in the political process.
- Establish mechanisms to engage the media to improve public perceptions of the legislature and legislators.
- To ensure that parties are fully prepared to make the best use of IRI training opportunities, IRI should provide a timetable of events and training ahead of time to enable parties to plan and raise funds if necessary to sponsor more people to participate in the training. In addition, IRI should consult political parties on participants to avoid deepening conflicts within some of the parties such as DP; consult political parties on the

content of training workshops; and adhere to party constitutions.

5.4 CIVIL SOCIETY SUPPORT

Summary of Findings

There was increased accountability within several CSOs that occurred as a result of the project training they received. In addition, there was an increase in engagement between CSOs and local government (especially the EC) after project training. In addition, networking and research or analysis capabilities increased with CSOs associated with the Project. Nonetheless, there were identified deficiencies including a substantial variation in CSOs by their ability to start up project funded activities. This was further hampered by a lack of understanding among some CSOs as to the potential uses and timeliness of project funding.

Recommendations

- Project should continue to engage CSOs at both the national and sub-national levels but with strict selection criteria to ensure that only those CSOs with the necessary skills and capacity to work in the democracy field are included.
- There is also a need for more comprehensive and longer-term interventions.
- Roles and responsibilities between implementing partners and beneficiaries should be clarified upfront and communication between implementing partners and beneficiaries should be improved.
- There should be better integration of the program with the development activities of local governments to allow people to participate freely and projects to be more sustainable.
- Use service delivery issues and priorities together with the newly acquired analysis skills as vehicles to strengthen principles of democracy.
- If the ‘mentor’ model is replicated in a future program to engage with CSOs, the mentor NGOs should be part of the design of the mentoring program and be engaged in selection of sub-national partners. Provision should be made in the program for engaging at the local level for a longer period and with a more sustained approach.
- Initiatives should be supported that are based on CSO /political party collaborations.

5.5 SUPPORT TO THE UGANDAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

Summary of Findings

There is still a general lack of knowledge in the electoral process, especially local knowledge of the “rules of elections”. There is suspected but not proven link in the reduction in electoral violence in project areas. The training of polling agents and polling supervisors is suspected to be a critical part in reducing election violence with concurrent increases in public confidence in elections.

Recommendations

- Consider a baseline survey prior to any electoral process project to compare the incidence of electoral violence between project and non-project areas.
- Continue training work of polling agents and polling supervisors.
- Dialogues should be continued with stakeholders at the national and sub-national level that are focused on more peaceful political processes, transparency of electoral law reform and processes, strengthening multi-party democracy, improving service delivery and passage of a code of conduct for political parties.
- Activities should be considered for monitoring the political finances and system to track funding for elections.

6-LESSONS LEARNED AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

6.1 LESSONS LEARNED

6.1.1 General

The SMD program was too small and thinly spread in districts to have a real impact. In most cases only one or two sub-counties per district were targeted and activities implemented are just starting to make a difference but will need future support to ensure sustainability. Representatives from local government and CSOs interviewed agreed that more needs to be done at the sub-county and parish level to ensure real change and impact.

A comprehensive monitoring system was needed to ensure all role players were contributing to achievement of the same objectives and targets from national to sub-county level. It was clear among district CSOs that they do not strive towards achievement of the objectives of the SMD program, but rather focus on their own objectives. Establishment of an Advisory Committee as foreseen in the RFA could play a valuable role in this regard by measuring progress on a regular basis against program objectives.

Involvement of key stakeholders in the project design/ implementation would contribute to meaningful conceptualization/ participation/ mainstreaming of the program. Alignment with government, CSOs and political parties development/strategic plans would contribute to a greater degree of sustainability. Overall, there was a failure to breed ownership and sustainability due to insufficient participation by key stakeholders during planning, selection of participants, design of activities and monitoring implementation. Related to this is **communication** including communication with DPs, political parties, CSOs and government institutions that requires improvement.

The majority of Ugandans are poor people and therefore money figures prominently in their motivations. In order to ensure attendance at district level activities Ugandans expect to receive minimum reimbursement for their transportation costs. There was a general feeling throughout the course of the evaluation that the reimbursements for transportation provided was insufficient and this ultimately impacted attendance.

The DEMGroup needs to be reconsidered due to internal organizational issues. Its internal capacity, status as a legal entity and lack of a clear vision and strategic direction pose a serious

risk. Most of the capacity developed during implementation of the SMD program will be lost because key individuals already left the DEMGroup for other career options.

6.1.2 Political Parties Support

Timing of activities is critical. Representatives of political parties and CSOs interviewed believed the dialogues were too close to election time and if started earlier could have a greater impact. They also expressed a need for an ongoing, comprehensive program between elections and not only a focus on the period around elections.

Training interventions can be planned to include larger group of representatives from candidates and councilors. It was also suggested that during the selection of representatives to attend training interventions, provision should be made to reach more people and not training the same people over and over.

USAID should look critically at criteria used for selection of partner parties under the SMD program to assess whether this criteria is the most appropriate going forward. The criterion used by SMD to select the political parties with which to work was based on those represented in the 8th Parliament, although CP and JEEMA each only held one seat respectively. Moreover, although CP has representation in the 8th Parliament it may not have other attributes of a political party with respect to structures and operations. Consideration should also be given to other parties such as PPP that do not currently have representation in Parliament but do have more grassroots party structures and nationwide support and representation.

Party respondents regularly indicated that the scope of the SMD's program was too small to have any real impact on strengthening multi-party democracy in Uganda. Despite the district level activities yielding impressive results, the resources and logistical efforts expended travelling to 12 districts spread over Uganda's four regions might not be the most cost-efficient method of providing support. Additionally, parties complained that a visit from IRI once per quarter was insufficient to provide sustained support. Future programming might consider district or regional presence, as in the case of the Linkages program, to ensure more cost-efficient and sustained interventions.

In order for USAID support to political parties to have any legitimacy the ruling party must participate. The participation of the ruling party, as evidenced by the experience of the SMD program, cannot be assumed. During the course of the evaluation NRM party officials said the party leadership did not support receiving assistance from 'foreign influences'. Reluctance at the highest levels of the NRM has a significant impact on what can be achieved, particularly at the national level. It was made clear during evaluation interviews that reluctance by the NRM party leadership led to the stalling of the parliamentary caucus support. During the design phase of any follow-on party support activity it is therefore imperative that USAID consult widely with the political leadership of ALL parties, including NRM, to ensure there is a mutual understanding and desire for the support provided by USAID and commitment from all stakeholders.

Cultivating and maintaining positive relationships with stakeholders is crucial to the success of any intervention. Respondents interviewed indicated that at times during the implementation of the SMD program IRI had challenging relationships with some of the parties, including CP and DP, and at other times with FDC and NRM. Many of the difficulties seem to stem from the lack of an institutional relationship between IRI and the parties. No Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) formalized the partnership outlining the mutual understanding of

support provided by USAID through the SMD program.⁸⁵ Parties expressed frustration at what they perceived as a lack of transparency on the part of IRI in particular vis-à-vis the full scope and extent of support from IRI. A variety of party headquarters officials protested that IRI engaged district offices without first going through the secretariats and they felt that this was not only inappropriate but on some occasions a waste of resources as IRI provided training to the ‘wrong people’. Other party officials said they felt IRI was inflexible and designed activities which were ‘one size fits all’⁸⁶ or employed a ‘take-it-or-leave it’ style⁸⁷ and did not focus on the specific needs of individual parties.⁸⁸ Others felt that IRI was trying to “drive the parties” rather than support them. For any similar follow-on program, USAID should therefore insist that a MoU be signed with all political parties to formalize the partnership and clearly outline roles, responsibilities and expectations from both sides. Connected to this is the need for improved transparency and communication between the implementing partner and the beneficiaries.

6.1.3 Information Communication Technology

Although the ICT activities were extremely beneficial to the stakeholders the activities did not progress without incident. Many of the respondents were extremely disappointed – in particular FDC – regarding the failure of the SMS vote tallying system, which was not effective on Election Day due to the mobile service being severed. Many of the parties had relied on this initiative to confirm (or reject) the election results and were extremely irritated at the system’s failure. In view of this, in the future it might be useful to build capacity to undertake a mobile vote tallying process, to manage expectations and prepare the stakeholders for the worst-case scenario.

Sustainability of increased outreach to constituents via multi-media approaches including radio, SMS, internet and grassroots dialogues is questionable after the SMD program. SMD provided resources for the radio slots and the SMS messaging and the management of the Internet web pages. During interviews and in responses to questionnaires political parties predicted they would be unable to continue to access these mediums in the absence of USG or other DP resources. Similarly, political parties indicated that some of the mediums were only accessible to opposition parties through IRI and a direct approach by the parties to solicit the same radio slots and/or SMS bulk messaging might yield different results – particularly during pre-elections periods when many media outlets are not accessible to opposition parties.

6.1.4 Internship

Interns who participated in the SMD program were generally very satisfied with the experience, but those interviewed during focus group discussions were unanimously dissatisfied with the level of stipends provided. The interns said they were insufficient, particularly given the high inflation rates and indicated that the initial three month experience was too short.

There was concern from both parties and interns regarding confidentiality issues. Particularly as the election period drew near, parties’ suspicions were heightened not only regarding the real motives of new interns but also what information they were sharing with IRI and what IRI was doing with the information. This at times created a conflict of interest for the

⁸⁵ FDC national headquarters did eventually sign an MoU with IRI after their insistence.

⁸⁶ FDC headquarters.

⁸⁷ Focus group discussion with DP headquarter officials, including DP party President, Norbert Mao.

⁸⁸ CP, FDC and DP party officials.

interns as they were required to maintain confidentiality for the party while at the same time provide a monthly report to IRI outlining their work. Respondent interns said it would often take some time to earn the trust of the party they were working for and thereafter gain exposure to more substantive party work. Similarly, some parties expressed concern regarding the interns' management of the party web pages as in some cases the website management took place from the IRI offices. This created anxiety on the part of some parties that they were not in control of their information. All parties also expressed confusion about how the interns were selected and distributed among the parties and expressed concern that IRI was sending 'spies' into their camps.

Interns were often used to bridge the human resources gap suffered by both parties, resulting in heavy workloads and, based on the fallacious assumption that they were well-trained because they had been recruited through IRI and the USG, required to do work that was far above their skill level. A majority of interns reported being subjected to intimidation and harassment (in at least one case sexual harassment) as a result of working in politically sensitive environments.

To signify the successful completion of each internship, IRI should present every intern with a certificate. Interns interviewed suggested that being presented with a certificate of completion would provide further motivation and demonstrate appreciation for their work.

6.1.5 Caucuses

Caucuses have in various national contexts proven to be useful mechanisms for building consensus across party lines, on a variety of issues. In Uganda the culture of crossing party lines to exchange ideas, to form collective platforms on particular policies is highly underdeveloped. In a recent paper presented to the 9th Parliament, retired Chief Justice Kanyeihamba pointed to the stifling nature of party structures that inhibit free thought among members.

This observation is underscored by the opposition, which believes that the support provided to parliamentary caucuses did not meet expectations for a number of reasons. First, according to the FDC, the parliamentary caucuses start off at a disadvantage, with the NRM causes well facilitated and funded and therefore able to produce well researched policy. The opposition parties are not in a position to do the same. In addition to operating in a hostile environment, officers lack the knowledge to raise issues on the floor of the house. An opposition research secretariat is needed to help the caucuses effectively inform their respective members. The workshop approach to building capacity is insufficient and limited in building the capacity of party caucuses, which need to retreat to focus on specific issues and then armed with knowledge beyond what is provided by the general research staff can counter government policies

Furthermore the lack of internal democracy within parties makes it difficult to build a viable caucusing culture in parliament. Retired Supreme Court Judge George Kanyeihamba recently advised the ruling party to refrain from the anti-democracy practice of stifling free debate using its parliamentary caucus. However, he appreciated the change in parliamentary trends that recognizes the leader of opposition and the shadow cabinet.

6.1.6 Electoral Process

An important lesson learned regarding the work of IRI and SMD on the electoral process is **the number of missed opportunities** to make a real difference in the electoral process. These

include the capacity and ability to identify gaps in the electoral process around election financing⁸⁹, and the political code of conduct that dilute some of the positive gains made through greater awareness raising.

The **existence of a multi-party environment was viewed as a given**. In reality, however, there are several elements to a multi-party electoral process that need to be elaborated, and awareness must be raised about to embrace the different aspects of multi-party political engagement. The existence of political parties does not connote multi party democracy, including respect for political differences and the acceptance of multi-party competition.

6.1.7 Civil Society

Many CSOs, particularly at the local level, are reluctant to engage in what they perceive as political activities. Interviews with CSO representatives at the local level indicated a reluctance to become too involved with political parties for fear of losing their political neutrality and/or being seen as political activists. CSOs stated that they only saw the benefit of engagement with political parties during the pre-election period to ensure their constituents' needs are represented. Outside this time period respondents often felt it could be detrimental to their cause if they were too closely associated with the political parties – particularly the opposition parties.

SMD assumed institutional capacity and resources from beneficiaries (mainly at the district and local levels). The program therefore did not make sufficient provision for skills development, institutional capacity development, and all administrative and logistical support costs related to implementation of activities.

The selection criteria used to identify district and local CSOs as participants did not result in those with the highest capacity for implementing activities in the field of democracy promotion being selected. The inclusion of national NGOs during the selection process could address this problem as they have a solid knowledge of the capacity, skills and previous experience of local and district CSOs and could provide valuable input if they were included in the selection process. They would also have been able to identify cases where CSOs misrepresented themselves and claimed to have specific skills and experience they do not have.

Training material available in local languages will increase its distribution. Local CSOs can use training material if it is available in local languages to train others at the district, sub-county and parish levels. CSOs interviewed agree that the content of the material was of high quality and relevant, but expressed the need to make the material available in local languages so they can distribute it among other CSOs and ordinary citizens.

Integrating SMD program activities with the development program of local governments will strengthen results and sustainability. Local government representatives interviewed believe they could budget the provision of support to SMD activities if it becomes part of their development plans.

Duration of training interventions was too short to be institutionalized. Most training interventions were only one or two days and covered various topics per day without sufficient follow-ups. The selection of trainers needs to be reconsidered as most of the CSOs interviewed

89 Taking the example of the 2006 Presidential Elections, the incumbent was able to use the Presidential Press Unit and Helicopter to cover the whole country in the designated campaign time of two months which the rest of the candidates were unable to do.

contended that trainers are too young, don't have enough experience and speak a difficult language (what they refer to as dot com language) that is difficult for them to follow or understand.

6.1.7 Coordination with other Development Partners

Although informal and ad-hoc communication between SMD, IRI and USAID with other DPs took place, they are not formally part of the Steering Committee of the DDP program. A structured and formal process to do joint planning, harmonization and coordination will improve synergies that could produce improved sustainable results.

6.1.8 Coordination with Related USAID Programs

There are clearly areas of potential synergy between the SMD, LINKAGES and IFES programs, but activities were not well coordinated at the implementation level. Even within the SMD program where NDI and IRI operated sometimes within the same districts, activities were not coordinated. Such coordination could have improved results and linking the work of CSOs and political parties in areas of mutual interest.

6.2 MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

Closer harmonization with other development partners and managing synergies could enhance results and potential impact. The workload and funding required to address issues related to the MPD is too great for one development partner. One of the weaknesses of the SMD program was that it was too small and thinly spread to have a real impact. Some good work was done and some foundation was laid, but it will require future support to keep the momentum going and effectively strengthen democratic principles in Uganda. Without support from other DPs some of the work done in the SMD program may be lost as USAID will not have the required resources to continue on a larger scale with all activities of the current program.

In addition, delayed payments and activities, specifically with regard to the CSO component, set back the timely achievement of results.

Improved coordination between SMD and the Linkages program could have contributed to increased quality and quantity of results. There are various areas of overlap and potential for synergy between the two programs, but they were not followed through. Recommendations of the IFES program should be considered when a follow-up SMD program is considered, since there are many aspects of the IFES program that can be built upon in an SMD program.

Improved use of radio stations could have maximized the reach of voter education and promotion of MPD, particularly because they are the most popular and effective mode of communication in the districts. One of the complaints of CSOs at the district level was that training sessions did not reach enough people, and it will be too costly to engage larger groups of people in workshops.

An improved M&E system and baseline data collection would have strengthened overall program management as well as the evaluation process.

7-ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: SMD EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

1) PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The Strengthening Multi-Party Democracy (SMD) activity is a 4-year, \$7 million USAID/Uganda-funded program created to encourage and enable more broad-based, representative and peaceful political competition in Uganda. The project began in December 2007 and is scheduled to end December 2011. In 2009, an additional \$2 million was added to include work with new electoral activities.

Now that the activity is ending, the purpose of this evaluation is to better understand the overall lessons learned and impact from the activity to date, including but not limited to, what USAID and partners are obtaining from this activity, what is going well and what is not and how can lessons be applied in future programming.

More specifically, USAID/Uganda requires the Evaluation Contractor (the “Contractor”) to design and implement an evaluation of SMD. The evaluation will serve the following purposes: (1) provide lessons learned for USAID, and, the Government of Uganda (GOU), and other development partners supporting multiparty competition; (2) assess the existing and/or potential ability of key successes to be replicated, (3) uphold an institutional commitment of measuring program results; and (4) provide practical lessons for current and future multiparty competition support partners in developing and implementing multiparty competition activities.

Furthermore, the evaluation shall discuss and analyze program performance and success but should also address opportunities missed or accomplishments that fell short of potential or expectations, as this information can be a useful tool in informing future USAID/Uganda programming after SMD closes, particularly in the context of the Mission’s implementation of the Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS). Part of the CDCS, Collaborating, Learning and Adapting (CLA), specifically requires the use of a methodology to improve development efforts through increased coordination and collaboration, testing of promising new approaches, and adaptation of approaches when appropriate to improve effectiveness. The evaluation should take this effort into account when analyzing the evolution of SMD’s strategy and approach and should include these findings in its recommendations for the Mission, as this information is critical to decide if political party work will continue.

Based on the key findings and recommendations, the evaluation will inform USG and key stakeholders on future programming and collaboration and assist the upcoming Democracy and Governance (DG) assessment activity in May 2011 with future DG programming decisions.

2) BACKGROUND

Uganda’s return to multiparty politics following a 2005 referendum created new opportunities for political participation and competition. However, 19 years of *de facto*, one-party rule formed significant obstacles to peaceful political competition and the establishment of effective, representative political institutions. Political parties are grappling with the challenge of creating institutional identities while balancing individual ambitions, constituency representation and responsiveness and the need for party cohesion. Citizens’ desire to engage the civic, political and governmental institutions that claim to represent them is declining. Political intimidation and memories of a violent political past have left many citizens and civil society organizations

(CSOs) wary of advocacy and watchdog actions, as well as interaction with political parties. Equally important, government-sponsored grants given to CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) to provide community services limit the desire of these organizations to fulfill their advocacy and oversight roles.

The SMD program as a component of the U.S. Government's (USG) strategy for Governing Justly and Democratically, supports the Government of Uganda (GOU) priorities as outlined in the Governance Pillar of the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (2005-2008) (PEAP). SMD contributes to this goal by supporting peaceful political competition, consensus building and capacity building of major political parties. The program also directly addresses the development goals of the USG's Transformational Diplomacy Strategy, which seeks to help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. SMD works in the Arua, Kumi, Apac, Iganga, Masaka, Bushenyi and Kasese districts and an additional five districts of Rukungiri, Gulu, Tororo, Lira and Kamuli as the program was expanded to include new electoral activities. The primary results of the program include:

- strengthening the environment for peaceful political competition;
- increasing the organizational capacity for representative parties and CSOs;
- creating greater engagement between political parties, CSOs and government;
- improving constituent relations/representation by parties and CSOs; and
- increasing confidence in the electoral system.

The SMD program is managed by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) (2008-2011), in cooperation with the International Republican Institute (IRI), to assist Ugandan political parties and CSOs to work together to support the people of Uganda to establish a functioning, multiparty democracy. Together, NDI and IRI are utilizing a range of capacity building techniques to improve the skills of political parties and CSOs. This partnership supports actors to apply skills by developing and advancing credible policy alternatives that address key issues confronting Uganda, including economic development, HIV and AIDS and increased consideration of marginalized groups – specifically women, youth and persons with disabilities – in legislation and budget allocations. Finally, NDI and IRI work together with Ugandan and international actors to contribute to legal frameworks that govern political parties, civil society and elections to ensure that there is ample opportunity for these institutions to realize their full potential.

Additionally, as part of its program to assist Uganda's national CSOs in preparing for the 2011 elections, SMD has provided extensive technical assistance to a consortium of Ugandan Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in conducting a long-term election observation mission which included general capacity building of the organizations, observing the voter registration process and campaign period, an audit of the voter registry and supporting an website for information gathering on election-related reports.

To reduce tension and promote legitimate elections, SMD has also organized dialogs among political parties, CSOs, the Electoral Commission (EC) and Ugandan Police to discuss contentious issues and to enhance trust in the electoral process. Dialogue topics include: security in elections, voter registration process and campaign periods. Another SMD activity to increase communication amongst political parties has been organized debates for Parliamentary races.

Lastly, SMD has worked extensively with political parties in building their organizational capacity in the run up to the elections, which included improving communication and outreach to constituents, developing issue- based platforms and policy papers, and incorporating information technologies in their campaigns.

NDI and IRI work with all six political parties represented in parliament to assist them in their efforts to establish cohesive, effective, representative institutions; the NRM; the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC); the Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC); the Democratic Party (DP); the Conservative Party (CP); and the Justice Forum (JEEMA). While CSOs are highly capable and skilled entities as compared to party and government counterparts, NDI and IRI have observed that CSOs, particularly at the district level, have no incentive to engage in policy advocacy and oversight activities.

Overall, NDI and IRI have strived to strengthened civil society's ability to support electoral reforms and increase the public's participation in the lead-up to the general elections of February 2011. To ensure maximum impact of the SMD activity post election and in the final year before ending, it is essential to conduct this first evaluation of the SMD program to identify what is working well and what is not, in order to incorporate any modifications to the SMD agreement and future USAID programming.

3) PROGRAM INFORMATION

The following information documents and sources are available and relevant to the review:

GOU:

- National frameworks (PEAP and the National Development Plan), policies and implementation guidelines from the Electoral Commission

USAID:

- Original Request for Proposal
- USAID program and financial reporting requirements
- CLA presentations and Draft implementation plan

SMD:

- Agreement and other amendments/modifications
- Annual and quarterly reports
- Annual work plans and Performance Management Plans
- Data Quality Assessments
- Tools, training materials, guidelines, etc.
- Internal assessments and reviews
- Individual contracts and agreements between USAID and sub-grantees
- Other background materials such as relevant policy documents, sector strategies, etc.

4) EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The Automated Directive System (ADS) 203.3.6.1 requires that an evaluation is conducted when

there is a distinct and clear management need to address an issue. This review is to critically examine the overall SMD project progress/impact to date. The evaluation methodology and process shall address the questions outlined below:

1. To what extent have the intended results of the SMD program been achieved? Were there any positive or negative unintended results, including the factors that led to them? Reviewing specific SMD interventions at the national and local level, the evaluation should establish the effectiveness in supporting (as appropriate) political parties, party caucuses, party foundations, independent public interest groups, policy issues-oriented CSOs, civil society, Parliament, local government, youth and women with:

- Developing structures, processes, policies and platforms that effectively engage Ugandans in a range of political, economic and social issues Electoral System;
- Providing technical assistance to engage in political processes;
- Modified elections and political process activities;
- Fighting corruption;
- Engaging in meaningful dialogue to create consensus building and maturity around multiparty politics in Uganda;
- Providing leadership skills to engage program beneficiaries in the political process;
- Providing assistance with organizational capacity building, policy development support and engagement in political processes
- Involvement in political party processes/structures
- SMD activities between districts? What were the distinguishing factors between districts or between the approaches SMD took toward different districts? Based on these findings the evaluators should highlight the meaningful successes achieved and or failures registered, underlying factors and recommendations for future multi-party democracy work.

2. Analyze the nature and effectiveness of partnerships, collaborations and synergies with other government/development partners and USG initiatives in achieving the program objectives?

- What was SMD's comparative advantage and leveraging against other donors and their resources?
- To what extent has SMD brought together various stakeholders to monitor the electoral process, well ahead of election-day and worked with the parties, CSOs and the EC to advocate for and ensure that necessary pre-election milestones were in place?
- To what extent has SMD collaborated with other USAID programs where appropriate in pursuing cross-sectoral activities and objectives?

3. Is the original program design appropriate to address the objectives of the activity? Was the design flexible to meet the needs of all parties involved? What implemented activities led to outcomes (or meaningful changes in knowledge, attitudes and practices)?

- Were specific program implementation methodologies more or less effective in the attainment of program objectives? How did NDI, IRI and partners adjust their implementation methodologies throughout the program? Were these adjustments appropriate and effective?
- What activities undertaken by the program were most/least valued by the local partners (communities, government, non-government organizations)? Why? Are there activities that local partners' recommend that should be considered in the Mission's future work in Uganda?
- How appropriate was the SMD approach to support peaceful political competition, ensure a level playing field and assist with adequate planning and preparation necessary for transparent, free and fair elections in February 2011?
- To what extent has SMD supported the domestic monitoring of campaigns, political space and voter registration using new, innovative technology for the electoral process in preparation for the 2011 Presidential and Parliamentary elections?
- Did the management and evaluation conducted on the program effectively gauge impact? Did it function as an effective feedback loop to help the program learn and improve strategy and activities?
- How well was the activity managed by USAID? How could oversight be improved?
- What is the projected sustainability of the SMD program interventions or results – because the program has a definite end time? What was projected in the design to be sustainable, the activities or the results .e.g. engagement of CSOs in watch dog functions and their participation in political and electoral processes and capacity of political parties according to international standards? How sustainable are the CSO organizations? How sustainable is the knowledge use by individuals within the CSO organizations? How sustainable are activities carried out under the SMD program? How can USAID in build better sustainability mechanisms in its multi-party democracy interventions?

5) EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

The evaluation team will be required to propose a clear methodology to answer all the evaluation questions, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative methodologies such as focus groups, structured interviews and/or questionnaires, as appropriate. In addition to identifying how information will be collected, it is essential for the evaluation team specify where the data will be collected (which of the 7/12 districts the program is currently operating, parliament, political parties, CSOs, etc.) in order to better understand the impact of programming interventions. As a participatory evaluation, feedback from USAID, implementing partners, sub grantees, program beneficiaries and other development partners are critical throughout the process. The Consultant should review relevant documentation and propose use of other tools to ensure that the findings are backed up with evidence and facts as much as possible.

With regard to data quality, the evaluation team is expected to be familiar with USAID data quality standards for objectivity, validity, reliability, precision, utility and integrity and be able to apply them in the final report, by identifying such data limitations as may exist with respect to these standards (ADS 78.3.4.2 - <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads//500/578.pdf>) and ADS 203.3.5.1- <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/203.pdf>).

6) EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team will be comprised of **four** regional/national experts. The team will have prior organizational capacity building experience that focuses on the two program components of the SMD project: strengthening multiparty systems and strengthening electoral processes. **One** staff member from USAID/Uganda will also participate. The team should possess the skills and experiences below:

Team Leader

- Demonstrated 5-10 years experience with political parties and/or political process program evaluation experience in Uganda. Extensive experience in Africa will also be considered.
- Solid experience in organizational capacity building in developing countries covering the following components: strengthening multiparty systems and strengthening electoral processes.
- Solid understanding of the political environment in Uganda and/or Africa.
- USAID programming experience is desirable.

Regional/National Experts

- Solid experience in evaluating programming aimed at strengthening multiparty democracy institutions including parliament, political parties, electoral processes and civil society participation.
- Solid understanding of the political environment in Uganda and/or Africa.
- Experience in program/project cost-effectiveness analysis.

7) DELIVERABLES

The evaluation team is expected to deliver the following outputs to USAID/Uganda:

Deliverable	Level of Effort	Total
1. In-brief meeting for an introduction of the evaluation team, discussion of the SOW and initial presentation of the proposed evaluation work plan.	1 day x 1 person	1
2. An inception report to be reviewed by USAID. The report will include: A detailed work plan showing a timeline for each evaluation activity to be undertaken, including field work. Methodology detailing sub-grantees and field sites to be visited, data collection, instruments and plan.	2 days x 2 persons	4
3. Field work/Data collection	7 days x 2 persons	14
4. Oral debriefing to USAID, SMD and selected partners to present key findings prior to submission of draft report.	1 day x 1 person	1
5. Draft evaluation report in both hard copies (2) and one electronic copy for review by USAID. <i>*Please see the Illustrative Report Outline at the end.</i>	1 day x 1 person	1
6. Final evaluation report in both hard copies (5) and one electronic copy incorporating feedback from USAID.	1 day x 1 person	1

8) SCHEDULE

The evaluation will begin on or before March 31, 2011 and will require approximately 30

working days of effort. In addition to time in the NDI & IRI offices in Kampala, it is proposed that team members will spend time with each sub-grantee at their headquarters, and where appropriate, at selected field sites throughout the country. A draft report will be submitted to USAID prior to the departure of the evaluation team leader and a final report provided to USAID no later than May 20, 2011.

9) ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

UMEMS:

- Provide quality assurance of the process and products before delivered to USAID
- Select and contract the evaluators
- Manage the evaluation process
- Provide briefings to team; organize consultant participation
- Provide logistical support for the evaluation team including office space and transport
- Submit evaluation report to USAID

USAID:

- Have a full time USAID staff member to participate in the evaluation
- Appoint a point of contact for the assignment to coordinate USAID inputs
- Approve the evaluation team , methodologies and work plan
- Participate in briefings
- Review inception and draft evaluation reports and provide feedback
- Sign off on final report

NDI/IRI:

- Participate in final review of the inception, draft and final reports
- Provide relevant documents as needed
- Provide assistance with setting up meetings and interviews

PARTNERS/SUB GRANTEES:

- Provide relevant documents as needed
- Participate in meetings and interviews as needed
- Other roles and responsibilities reviewed in line with the level of participation deemed as necessary.

ILLUSTRATIVE REPORT OUTLINE

- **Cover page** (Title of the study, the date of the study, recipient's name, name(s) of the evaluation team.
- **Preface or Acknowledgements** (Optional)
 - **Table of Contents**
 - **List of Acronyms**
 - **Lists of Charts, Tables or Figures** [Only required in long reports that use these extensively]
 - **Executive Summary** [Stand-Alone, 1-3 pages, summary of report. This section may not contain any material not found in the main part of the report]

Main Part of the Report

1. *Introduction/Background and Purpose:* [Overview of the final evaluation. Covers the purpose and intended audiences for the final evaluation and the key questions as identified in the SOW)
2. *Study Approach and Methods:* [Brief summary. Additional information, including instruments should be presented in an Annex].
3. *Findings:* [This section, organized in whatever way the team wishes, must present the basic answers to the key evaluation questions, i.e., the empirical facts and other types of evidence the study team collected including the assumptions]
4. *Conclusions:* [This section should present the team's interpretations or judgments about its findings]
5. *Recommendations:* [This section should make it clear what actions should be taken as a result of the study]
6. *Lessons Learned:* [In this section, the team should present any information that would be useful to people who are designing/manning similar or related new or on-going programs in Uganda or elsewhere. Other lessons the team derives from the study should also be presented here.]

ANNEX 3: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POLITICIANS

SMD EVALUATION QUESTIONS: POLITICAL PARTIES

Date of analysis.....13/06/2011... by.....

A	Basic Data on Respondent			
	Name (optional)			
	Organization			
	Job Title (optional)			
	Gender			
	Contact (telephone/email) (optional)			
B Please Complete all questions which are relevant to you/your Political Party				
1	How long has your party been in existence?	1-5 Yrs	6-20 yrs	>20 yrs
2	How many seats did your party win in the last elections?	In Parliament	at local level	
	Is this an increase or decrease in previous seats your party held? (tick one applicable)	Increase	decrease	
3	How many women representatives does your party have?	in parliament	at the local level	
	Was this an increase or decrease in the previous seats your party held? (tick one applicable)	Increase	Decrease	

4	How long has your party been working with the USAID funded SMD project?	<2Yrs			>2yrs		
5	What kind of activities/support does the SMD project provide to your party?						
6	Do you think there has been a benefit to your party from working with the SMD project?	Yes				No	
7							
8	Did your party receive an intern through cooperation with the SMD project?	Yes				No	
9	Do you feel that your party has increased capacity as a result of the contributions of the SMD project?	Yes				No	
10	How would you describe, your interactions with civil society?	Frequent		Moderate		Low	

	Has this interaction, increased, decreased or remained the same as a result of support/activities of the SMD project?	Increased	Decreased	Remained the same
11	Do you engage more with civil society at local level or national level?	Local level	National	
12	Have you/your party experienced any challenges in your work with the SMD project?	Yes	No	
13	Do you think the SMD Project properly responded to the needs of your party?	Yes	No	
14	In your opinion is there a need for USAID to continue to fund this type of activity to strengthen multi-party democracy in Uganda?	Yes	No	
15	Is your party receiving support from other development partners/groups?	Yes	No	

ANNEX 4: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DISTRICT CSOs

SMD EVALUATION QUESTIONS: CSOs

Date of Analysis.....

Coding/ Correlating/ Analysis of other CSOs (women esp) District interviewed

A	Basic Data on Respondent									
	Name (optional)									
	Organization									
	Job Title (optional)									
	Gender									
	Contact (telephone/email) (optional)									
B	Please Complete all questions which are relevant to you/your organization									
1	What kind of work is your organization engaged in? (<i>list them</i>)									
2	Does your organization engage in any kind of advocacy?	Yes				No				
	If yes what kind of advocacy and how frequently?	Kind		Frequency						
				1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year				
	If no why not?									

4	How long has your organization been working with the SMD Project?	< 1 yr	2-4yrs	>4 yrs
5	What kind of SMD activities have you been involved in?			
6	Do you think you or your organization has benefited from the SMD project?	Yes	No	
7	Do you think your capacity has increased as a result of SMD capacity building support?	Yes	No	
8	Does your organization engage with political parties?	Yes	No	
	If yes how frequently? (<i>tick where appropriate</i>)	1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year
9	Has your organization's engagement with political parties increased as a result of the SMD project?	Yes	No	
10	Who are your organization's constituents?			
11	How often do you engage with your	1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year

	constituents?			
	How often do you engage with your constituents at the local level?			
	How often do you engage with your constituents at the national level?			
12	Has your engagement increased, decreased or remained the same as a result of SMD?	Increased	Decreased	Remained the same
13	How often does your organization engage with GOU? (engages with local government instead)	1-3 times per year	4-7 times per year	7+ times per year
14	Has your engagement with the GOU changed as a result of the SMD project support?	Yes	No	
	If yes, how?			
15	Have you received a small grant from the SMD Project?	Yes	No	
16	If yes, what was the grant used for?			
	Did your organization achieve the	Yes	No	

	intended results identified in your sub-grant proposal?		
	if yes, what key results were achieved and (if yes skip c below) if no what prevented your organization from achieving the results		
17	Did staff from your organization receive proposal writing training from the SMD project?	Yes	NO
	If yes, has this training enabled your organization to leverage additional resources?	Yes	NO
18	Has your organization received strategic planning training from SMD?	YES	NO
	If yes, how did this help your organization?		
19	Do you think it is necessary for USAID to continue to provide capacity building support similar to that provided by the SMD project?	Yes	No
	If yes, why?		

20	In your view, what are the main priorities and challenges USAID should target in any future support?	
	Priorities	Challenges

ANNEX 5: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MENTOR CSOs IN UGANDA

SMD EVALUATION QUESTIONS: MENTOR CSOs

Date of Analysis.....

Coding/ Correlating/ Analysis of PWD CSOs interviewed

A Basic Data on Respondent									
	Name (optional)								
	Organization								
	Job Title (optional)								
	Gender								
	Contact (telephone/email) (optional)								
B Please Complete all questions which are relevant to you/your organization									
1	What kind of work is your organization engaged in? (<i>list them</i>)								
2	Does your organization engage in any kind of advocacy?	Yes				No			
	If yes what kind of advocacy and how frequently?	Kind			Frequency				
					1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year		

	If no why not?				
4	How long has your organization been working with the SMD Project?	< 1 yr	2-4yrs	>4 yrs	
5	What kind of SMD activities have you been involved in?				
6	Do you think you or your organization has benefited from the SMD project?	Yes	No		
7	Do you think your capacity has increased as a result of SMD capacity building support?	Yes	No		
8	Does your organization engage with political parties?	Yes	No		
	If yes how frequently? (<i>tick where appropriate</i>)	1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year	
9	Has your organization's engagement with political parties increased as a result of the SMD project?	Yes	No		

10	Who are your organization's constituents?			
11	How often do you engage with your constituents?	1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year
	How often do you engage with your constituents at the local level?			
	How often do you engage with your constituents at the national level?			
12	Has your engagement increased, decreased or remained the same as a result of SMD?	Increased	Decreased	Remained the same
13	How often does your organization engage with GOU? (engages with local government instead)	1-3 times per year	4-7 times per year	7+ times per year
14	Has your engagement with the GOU changed as a result of the SMD project support?	Yes	No	
	If yes, how?			
15	Have you received a small grant from the SMD Project?	Yes	No	
16	If yes, what was the grant used for?			
	Did your			

	organization achieve the intended results identified in your sub-grant proposal?		
	if yes, what key results were achieved and (if yes skip c below) if no what prevented your organization from achieving the results		
17	Did staff from your organization receive proposal writing training from the SMD project?	Yes	NO
	If yes, has this training enabled your organization to leverage additional resources?	Yes	NO
			ADUP
18	Has your organization received strategic planning training from SMD?	YES	NO
	If yes, how did this help your organization?		
19	Do you think it is necessary for USAID to continue to provide capacity building support similar to that provided by the SMD project?	Yes	No

20	In your view, what are the main priorities and challenges USAID should target in any future support?	
	Priorities	Challenges

ANNEX 6: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR YOUTH CSOs IN UGANDA

SMD EVALUATION QUESTIONS: YOUTH CSOs

Date of Analysis.....

Coding/ Correlating/ Analysis of Youth CSOs interviewed

A	Basic Data on Respondent								
	Name (optional)								
	Organization								
	Job Title (optional)								
	Gender								
	Contact (telephone/email) (optional)								
B	Please Complete all questions which are relevant to you/your organization								
1	What kind of work is your organization engaged in? (<i>list them</i>)								
2	Does your organization engage in any kind of advocacy?	Yes				No			
	If yes what kind of advocacy and how frequently?	Kind	Frequency						
			1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year				
	If no why not?								

4	How long has your organization been working with the SMD Project?	< 1 yr	2-4yrs	>4 yrs
5	What kind of SMD activities have you been involved in?			
6	Do you think you or your organization has benefited from the SMD project?	Yes	No	
7	Do you think your capacity has increased as a result of SMD capacity building support?	Yes	No	
8	Does your organization engage with political parties?	Yes	No	
	If yes how frequently? (<i>tick where appropriate</i>)	1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year
9	Has your organization's engagement with political parties increased as a result of the SMD project?	Yes	No	
10	Who are your organization's constituents?			
11	How often do you engage with your constituents?	1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year

	How often do you engage with your constituents at the local level?			
	How often do you engage with your constituents at the national level?			
12	Has your engagement increased, decreased or remained the same as a result of SMD?	Increased	Decreased	Remained the same
13	How often does your organization engage with GOU? (engages with local government instead)	1-3 times per year	4-7 times per year	7+ times per year
14	Has your engagement with the GOU changed as a result of the SMD project support?	Yes	No	
	If yes, how?			
15	Have you received a small grant from the SMD Project?	Yes	No	
16	If yes, what was the grant used for?			
	Did your organization achieve the intended results identified in your sub-grant proposal?	Yes	No	

	if yes, what key results were achieved and (if yes skip c below) if no what prevented your organization from achieving the results	
17	Did staff from your organization receive proposal writing training from the SMD project?	Yes NO
	If yes, has this training enabled your organization to leverage additional resources?	Yes NO
18	Has your organization received strategic planning training from SMD?	YES NO
	If yes, how did this help your organization?	
19	Do you think it is necessary for USAID to continue to provide capacity building support similar to that provided by the SMD project?	Yes No
20	In your view, what are the main priorities and challenges USAID should target in any future support?	
	Priorities	Challenges

ANNEX 7: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PWDs CSOs IN UGANDA

SMD EVALUATION QUESTIONS: PWDs CSOs

Date of Analysis.....

Coding/ Correlating/ Analysis of PWD CSOs interviewed

A Basic Data on Respondent													
A	Name (optional)												
	Organization												
	Job Title (optional)												
	Gender												
	Contact (telephone/email) (optional)												
B Please Complete all questions which are relevant to you/your organization													
1	What kind of work is your organization engaged in? <i>(list them)</i>												
2	Does your organization engage in any kind of advocacy?	Yes						No					
	If yes what kind of advocacy and how frequently?	Kind						Frequency					
								1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year			

	If no why not?			
4	How long has your organization been working with the SMD Project?	< 1 yr	2-4yrs	>4 yrs
5	What kind of SMD activities have you been involved in?			
6	Do you think you or your organization has benefited from the SMD project?	Yes	No	
7	Do you think your capacity has increased as a result of SMD capacity building support?	Yes	No	
8	Does your organization engage with political parties?	Yes	No	
	If yes how frequently? (<i>tick where appropriate</i>)	1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year
9	Has your organization's engagement with political parties increased as a result of the SMD project?	Yes	No	
10	Who are your organization's constituents?			
11	How often do you engage with your constituents?	1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year

	How often do you engage with your constituents at the local level?			
	How often do you engage with your constituents at the national level?			
12	Has your engagement increased, decreased or remained the same as a result of SMD?	Increased	Decreased	Remained the same
				UJCC
13	How often does your organization engage with GOU? (engages with local government instead)	1-3 times per year	4-7 times per year	7+ times per year
				UJCC
14	Has your engagement with the GOU changed as a result of the SMD project support?	Yes	No	
				UJCC
	If yes, how?			
15	Have you received a small grant from the SMD Project?	Yes	No	
		UJCC		
16	If yes, what was the grant used for?			
	Did your organization achieve the intended results identified in your sub-grant proposal?	Yes	No	
				UJCC
	if yes, what key results were achieved and (if yes skip c below) if no what prevented your organization			

	from achieving the results		
17	Did staff from your organization receive proposal writing training from the SMD project?	Yes	NO
			UJCC
	If yes, has this training enabled your organization to leverage additional resources?	Yes	NO
18	Has your organization received strategic planning training from SMD?	YES	N0
			UJCC
	If yes, how did this help your organization?		
19	Do you think it is necessary for USAID to continue to provide capacity building support similar to that provided by the SMD project?	Yes	No
		UJCC	
20	In your view, what are the main priorities and challenges USAID should target in any future support?		
	Priorities		Challenges

ANNEX 8: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PARTY INTERNS

SMD EVALUATION QUESTIONS: PARTY INTERNS

A	Basic Data on Respondent							
	Name (optional)							
	Organization							
Various jobs did- Title (optional)								
B	Please Complete all questions which are relevant to you/your Party Internship							
1	How long have you worked as an intern through the SMD project?					< 1 yr	1-2	>2 yr
2								
3								
4	Do you believe you managed to provide a benefit to the party/group you worked with?					Yes	No	
5								
6	Did your capacity increase, decrease or remain the same as a result of the internship?			increased	decreased	remained the same		
7								
8	Did you experience any challenges during your internships either with the party/group or SMD?					Yes	No	
9	Do you believe that USAID should continue to support a similar internship program after the expiry of the SMD project?					Yes	No	

ANNEX 9: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DISTRICT CSO FORUMS IN UGANDA
SMD EVALUATION QUESTIONS: DISTRICT CSOs FORUM

Date of Analysis.....

Coding/ Correlating/ Analysis of District NGO Forums as part of the CSOs interviewed

A	Basic Data on Respondent								
	Name (optional)								
	. Organization								
	. Job Title (optional)								
	. Gender								
. Contact (telephone/email) (optional)									
B	Please Complete all questions which are relevant to you/your organization								
1	What kind of work is your organization engaged in? (<i>list them</i>)								
2	Does your organization engage in any kind of advocacy?	Yes				No			
	If yes what kind of advocacy and how frequently?	Kind	Frequency						
			1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year		7+ times per year			
If no why not?									

4	How long has your organization been working with the SMD Project?	< 1 yr	2-4yrs	>4 yrs
5	What kind of SMD activities have you been involved in?			
6	Do you think you or your organization has benefited from the SMD project?	Yes	No	
7	Do you think your capacity has increased as a result of SMD capacity building support?	Yes	No	
8	Does your organization engage with political parties?	Yes	No	
	If yes how frequently? <i>(tick where appropriate)</i>	1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year
9	Has your organization's engagement with political parties increased as a result of the SMD project?	Yes	No	
10	Who are your organization's constituents?			
11	How often do you engage with your	1-3 times per year	3-7 times per year	7+ times per year

	constituents?			
	How often do you engage with your constituents at the local level?			
	How often do you engage with your constituents at the national level?			
12	Has your engagement increased, decreased or remained the same as a result of SMD?	Increased	Decreased	Remained the same
13	How often does your organization engage with GOU? (engages with local government instead)	1-3 times per year	4-7 times per year	7+ times per year
14	Has your engagement with the GOU changed as a result of the SMD project support?	Yes	No	
	If yes, how?			
15	Have you received a small grant from the SMD Project?	Yes	No	
16	If yes, what was the grant used for?			
	Did your organization achieve the intended results identified in your	Yes	No	

	sub-grant proposal?		
	if yes, what key results were achieved and (if yes skip c below) if no what prevented your organization from achieving the results		
17	Did staff from your organization receive proposal writing training from the SMD project?	Yes	NO
	If yes, has this training enabled your organization to leverage additional resources?	Yes	NO
18	Has your organization received strategic planning training from SMD?	YES	NO
	If yes, how did this help your organization?		
19	Do you think it is necessary for USAID to continue to provide capacity building support similar to that provided by the SMD project?	Yes	No
	If yes, why?		
20	In your view, what are the main priorities and challenges USAID should target in any future support?		
	Priorities		Challenges

ANNEX 10: UGANDA POLITICAL CONTEXT

Political succession in Uganda has always been controversial and to date Uganda has never experienced a peaceful transfer of power from one regime - elected or unelected - to another. Coups, counter-coups, and armed rebellion have been the norm.

As most African countries opted for multiparty politics in the 1990's, President Yoweri Museveni remained committed to preserving the Movement system⁹⁰ of governance in Uganda. The Movement system emphasized the desirability of political participation based on individual merit as the basis for “no party” democracy. Although parties were not banned, the NRM prohibited most political party activities, including recruitment, political rallies, delegate conferences, and the establishment of country-wide party branches. The suspension of political party activities in the name of national unity, reconciliation, stability, and reconstruction was justified by the NRM on the basis of a critique of political parties which suggested that parties generally organize around divisive issues such as religion and ethnicity rather than on the basis of national issues and policies. The NRM remained the sole political organization free to organize on a national level until the referendum in 2005 where a majority of Ugandans voted for the return to multi-party politics.⁹¹

For USAID to appropriately respond to the changing political environment and the reopening of political space as a result of the constitutional referendum – USAID/Uganda commissioned a DG Assessment in 2005.⁹² The 2005 DG Assessment recommended that future democracy and governance support should focus on demand-side programming with only a very limited and selective engagement on the supply-side. The report emphasized the desirability of demand-side support to civil society, the media, and political parties while the supply-side should focus on selective engagement with state institutions that have significant formal authority that can be used to resist the predations of executive interference.⁹³

Uganda's post-colonial political history has no great record of democratic governance. Elections have been rare, and whenever held, they have been manipulated by incumbents. At a quick glance, an audit of Uganda's political trajectory may be divided in four parts – the immediate post colonial era (1962 – 66) when there was vibrant multi-party politics. Thereafter (1966-70) there were moves toward a single party system. This was followed by the dictatorial reign of Idi Amin, whose regime was sustained by the military, political persecution and suppression of all human freedoms. The ending of this dictatorship by a force of Ugandan exiles together with Tanzanian Peoples Defense Forces (TDF) in 1979 helped the country to organize the 1980 multi-party elections in eighteen years since independence. The controversial elections of 1980 were generally rigged by the ruling Military Commission in favor of Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC). This led to a renewed civil conflict between the government and the rebel group of the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/RM) led by Yoweri Museveni until 1986 when they

⁹⁰ Article 70 (1) of the 1995 Constitution of Uganda defined the Movement System as a broad-based, inclusive and non-partisan system of governance that conformed to the principles of participatory democracy, accountability, and transparency. As a system of governance, the Movement System was ostensibly based on the principle of popular participation, with leaders to be chosen on “individual merit” to occupy positions of authority in the state

⁹¹ In July 2005, 92.5% of voters in a constitutional referendum voted to restore multi-party politics to Uganda.

⁹² USAID/Uganda has also recently commissioned another DG Assessment which was taking place during May/June 2011.

⁹³ Ard., Inc. Democracy and Governance Assessment: Republic of Uganda 2005, November 2005

succeeded to capture power. The past twenty five years have been dominated by the NRM. For the period 1986 – 2005 the NRM ruled through the “no-party” or Movement system which was claimed to be all-inclusive, non-partisan and with a mode of elections based on individual merit. This claim was used by the NRM government to suspend activities of political parties with an assumption that the Movement was an alternative to the multi-party system (Article 69, 70 and 71 of the Constitution of Uganda). Article 74 of Constitution specifies that change of the political system is through a referendum. These were held in 2000 and in 2005. The one of 2000 re-affirmed the Movement system while that of 2005 opened the country’s politics to a multi-party system. These referenda saw the NRM officials’ campaign for particular result that they desired at a time.

The Return to Multi-party Politics

The return to multi-party democracy in 2005 was a strategic calculation by the NRM to entrench their rule. It was realized that the Movement was getting unpopular. Also within the Movement space for democratic debate was narrowing. Instead, loyalty to the NRM leader, Yoweri Museveni was becoming more important. To this extent, tolerance of diverse views – the original character of the NRM was fading. Many critics within the NRM argued that the Movement had become a *de facto* one-party system. To stave off the critics, the NRM decided in 2003 that the system be changed to allow multi-party politics. The strategic underpinning of this decision was that the critics within the Movement be pushed out. Besides a proposal was floating to amend the Constitution to remove the two-five year term on the President, which gave the incumbent president an indefinite eligibility to stand for as many terms as he wishes. This has since increased the power of the executive vis-à-vis other branches of government. The President has overwhelming influence over the Parliament, and to some extent the Judiciary.

Return of Constitutional Order

This process of reviewing the Constitution began with wide consultations in the late 1980s up to early 1990s when a Constituent Assembly was elected to debate a new draft constitution, leading to its promulgation in 1995. The main foundation of the new constitution is chapter four on the protection and promotion of fundamental human rights and freedoms. The second key aspect is the separation of powers in government. These provisions were entrenched to prevent absolutism that is associated with unchecked power. While these provisions are entrenched in the constitution, recent political manipulations including the removal of term limits on the presidency have eroded the original concept of separation of power. The executive has had overwhelming powers over all other institutions. Bill No.9 introduced in the 6th Parliament to separate Cabinet (executive) from the legislature was defeated in Parliament. The President is the Chairperson of the ruling party (NRM), Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Chair of Cabinet, and Chair of the NRM Caucus. Patronage politics which has been encouraged by the desire by President Museveni to keep power has seen the Cabinet posts increased from 42 in 1996 to the current 75. This keeps Members of Parliament on their toes seeking to catch the President’s eye for a cabinet position. Thus, in Uganda it is very rare that a proposal from the executive can be defeated in Parliament. Other forms of patronage include the expansion of districts (local administrative units) from 39 in 1992 to 112 in 2011. These have chairpersons and executive committee members who are paid, the Resident District Commissioners appointed by the President, Internal Security officers and several departments which are financed directly by the government. Patronage politics has expanded the cost of public administration at the expense

of service delivery to the ordinary people.

Decentralization Process

In 1992, the Uganda government launched a decentralization process that devolved powers from the centre to local governments. Many observers noted that this was a step in the right direction in terms of service delivery, encouraging local people's participation in design and implementation of projects, popular accountability and transparency. Increasingly however, the government has been taking away some of the powers from local governments back to the centre, for instance instead of enhancing collection of local taxes, the local governments depend mostly on central government for grants and other subventions. This has reduced accountability in local governments. Most recently, the government brought the administration of Kampala city to its direct control.

Restoration of Traditional Leaders

In 1993 an Act of Parliament was passed to reinstate traditional leaders who had been abolished by Obote's government in 1966. This was seen as a right political act in terms of restoring cultural heritage and promoting local institutions of governance. Where the cultural leaders existed, they were restored. While the people welcomed them as part of their socio-cultural heritage, the contending political forces have tended to manipulate them for selfish political gains. The ruling party and its leadership perceive these institutions as their preserve for political recruitment while the opposition parties want to gain equal advantages from their popularity in the communities. The kingdom of Buganda, which commands a population of 7 million people, appears to be specifically targeted. Because the ruling party feels insecure with some of the traditional leaders allying with opposition, it introduced a Bill that was passed into an Act in 2011 prohibiting traditional leaders from participating in "partisan politics". This law stops the traditional leaders from commenting on matters under debate in Parliament. This particular legislation has strained relations between the Buganda Kingdom and the Central Government.

Strengthening the Judicial System

The 1995 Constitution of Uganda Chapter 8, Article 128 asserts the independence of the judiciary. The judiciary is also self-accounting. This constitutional independence has been under threat in recent years especially in court battles involving the leaders of the ruling party and the opposition. For example, during the trials involving the main opposition (FDC) leader, Kiiza Besigye in 2005, the court premises were invaded by a paramilitary force code – named *Black mambas* to deny Besigye from being released on bail. Despite such threats, the judicial system has upheld its doctrine of rule of law and judicial independence in adjudication of cases, including highly sensitive political cases.

Change of Government through Elections

Uganda has a nominal record of democratic elections. While the 1980 elections were rigged in favor of Uganda People's Congress (UPC), those held under the NRM since 1986 have had one particular weakness – they have little potential to remove President Museveni from power. However, they have been able to change leaders at the lower levels. There have only been two elections held under the multi-party dispensation that is in 2006 and 2011. These elections, unlike those held under the Movement system are contested by several parties and candidates, including direct presidential candidates. In 2006 there were five presidential candidates and in 2011 there were eight presidential candidates. While Museveni's rating had been moving down -

76 percent in 1996, 69 percent in 2001 and 59 percent in 2006 - it shot up again to 68 percent in 2011. Ugandan elections have been generally characterized by intimidation of voters by the security forces, vote-buying and ballot stuffing. These electoral malpractices are attributed to state officials, especially security officials who owe personal loyalty to Museveni and the ruling party. The opposition is neither united nor strong enough to effectively challenge the NRM. The fragmentation of the opposition is their main weakness. They lack strong structures in the rural areas, where the ruling party has the local councils (LCs) that buttress its support. The ruling party has large financial resources to fuel their large patronage networks through which they mobilize votes. In the 2011 elections, there were serious concerns that the ruling party had “invaded” the Treasury taking unexplained supplementary funding, particularly to the state House (President’s official house) which could have ended into campaign activities of the ruling party. Many observers believe the NRM bought its victory with public money. Moreover, intolerance of opposition has gone on unabated in the post -2011 elections with the harassment by police of the opposition leaders, including beating of Kiiza Besigye during the ‘Walk – to – Work’ campaign against high fuel and food prices. Other key factors that have influenced the process of democratization in Uganda include the role of the army and management of conflicts.

The Role of the Military in Politics

Given the bad history of the military in Uganda’s history since 1966, that is characterized by killing of innocent people, rape and robbery in 1970s and early 1980s; the army in the past was viewed with suspicion by most Ugandans. There has been remarkable improvement in the discipline of the armed forces under the NRM. The points of contention in public debate today revolve around army representation in Parliament, (10 army MPs), involvement in politics and meddling with elections, whereby the opposition parties see the army as playing a partisan role in siding with the ruling party. To this extent, it is argued by the opposition that the army is not a neutral arbiter but is pro – NRM. It became evident when all security chiefs attended Museveni’s launching of his election manifesto in 2010

Persistent Conflicts

The country suffered persistent conflicts since the early 1980s when the NRA was fighting the UPC government. When the NRM came to power in 1986, a series of armed rebellions emerged. The longest among these has been the Lords Resistance Army Movement (LRA/M) from 1988 to 2009. This conflict caused untold suffering to the people of Northern Uganda where it was concentrated. It reduced the people in the whole region to abject poverty, loss of lives, living in squalid camps, depending on food hand-outs, and children losing opportunities for education and adults remaining unemployed. The main political implication was that for most of the elections held since 1986 the NRM lost to opposition candidates in that region. The end of that conflict has seen the NRM gain votes in the 2011 election in that area. However, rehabilitation and reconstruction will take a long time.

Role of Civil Society Organization (CSOs)

Since the colonial days civil society organizations have played a significant role in service delivery as gap-fillers where the state failed to deliver. In Uganda CSOs, traditionally did not actively engage the state for democratization of society. This is now a new form of engagement both at the centre and the local level. Since the 1980s the CSOs have engaged the Uganda state on issues of corruption, service delivery, accountability and transparency. With the help of

multilateral donors such as the World Bank, the government has attempted the supply side of service delivery that is determining how to meet the needs of the people. However, there has been a deficit on the demand side of service delivery and accountability, that is, the people do not realize that it is their right to be heard, get services and to be accounted to. CSOs have taken keen interest in advancing the advocacy role, enlightening people about their roles and rights in society. At the local level, this has been enabled by the devolution of powers to local councils, which are partnering with CSOs, to advance the issues of service delivery. CSOs are also engaging state institutions on accountability of public resources.

Freedom of Expression and the Media

Since the 1990s there has been extensive liberalization of the media, both electronic and print. The state owns the largest newspaper *The New Vision* and its several subsidiaries as well as Vision TV and radio. The private sector newspapers are led by the *Daily Monitor* which rivals with the *New Vision*. There are more than 100 FM radio stations. There are 14 TV stations. Clearly, there are avenues for public expression. In recent years, the government has been arresting and detaining journalists and closing radio stations. The state also uses subtle means of controlling radios through “directives from above”, which instruct radio owners and program managers not to allow opposition politicians to air out their views. In the 2011 elections campaigns, the opposition FDC party paid UGX 19 million to the state broadcaster, Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC) but still the opposition leaders were not allowed to use the UBC for their campaign. This apart from the fact the state media, by law is supposed to apportion air-time in equal quantities to all contending candidates. In the 2011 election campaigns, the State media was decidedly pro-ruling party candidates (and was particularly keen on promoting Museveni’s candidature) in terms of coverage and content. Because of the covert threats by the state on the media, including threats to withdraw operating license, most media operators have resorted to self-censorship or keeping away from controversial political views. In 2010 the government introduced the Press and Journalism Act Amendment Bill which intends to curtail further the freedom of reporting on matters considered by the executive as of national security concerns. Already, in several instances, the police are entirely barring the press from many of its operations. These are in addition to other laws interfering with human freedoms such as the Anti-terrorism Act, Interception of Communication Act and the Presidential proposal for removal of Bail from suspected demonstrators. If these actions continue, the excessive corruption and abuse of power that are already prevailing the country will not only get worse, because so far, the media has been at the fore front of exposing such ills in the Ugandan public realm.

Creation of Oversight Institutions

Uganda government has created several institutions intended to ensure good governance and accountability. These include: the office of the Inspector General of Government, strengthening of office of the Auditor General, creation of the Anti-Corruption Court, the Ministry of Ethics and Integrity and the Ministry for Economic Monitoring. Despite existence of these institutions, corruption has persisted in the country. The African Peer Review Mechanism Report (2007) reported that Uganda loses USD 258 million annually in corruption. The Auditor General’s reports indicate that 70 percent of public spending is done through public procurement of which 20 percent is lost to corruption.

Summary

In Uganda, procedural democracy has been taking shape with regular elections, though not fair. The return to multi-party democracy in 2005 was a good starting point for open political competition. However, the political space allowed for opposition groups has been narrowing due to politics of intimidation, patronage and dispersal of public rallies organized by the opposition. Besides, there is growing loss of trust in public institutions because they tend to favor the ruling party and its political elite. The cost of public administration due to a large government structure has eaten up into resources meant for service delivery. Moreover, institutions that are supposed to act as watch-dogs of public accountability remain weak in the face of pervasive misuse of resources and power. This is not helped by a timid civil society that is shy of politics.

ANNEX 11: KEY ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED BY CSOs

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
ANDINGO Trainings Dialogs/fora Radio Talk shows	ADUP <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobilization and Sensitization • Dialogue / fora • Workshops • Advocacy 	Masaka Youth Development Forum <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participated in Political Dialogue • Participated in Election process by sensitizing youth 	CIFOVUP Baseline survey Dialogue meetings Budget Harmonization Monitoring and evaluation Community group mobilization Communication and salaries	Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building especially through trainings and mentoring of district partners like CBOs in the areas of research, data analysis, advocacy and communication
Apac NGO Link Forum Held Political party dialogue Participated in observing campaigns Observed poling Organized and observed Candidates debate/meetings	ADIPU Mobilization Sensitization participating in election process monitoring the election	Mayodo <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organized seminars and workshops. • The fund supported in refreshment, transport and meals 	PIRD <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conducted Research • Conducted Trainings in proposal writing, advocacy, strategic planning • Mobilization and Sensitization • Facilitate advocacy programmes 	
Masaka NGO Forum Never received any grant from SMD project however implemented related activities as below without any clear funding source; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project Coordination 	KUDUP Baseline survey on participation of PWDs in LG was conducted <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Awareness and dissemination of findings Popularization of disability	Bushenyi Network of Children and Youth (BUNCY) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • contract terminated in 2010 without clear justification • Training conducted in proposal writing and strategic planning 		

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bringing Political Parties together through seminars Sensitization about human rights Training of beneficiaries in project proposal writing, strategic planning 	<p>policy</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advocacy on issues identified <p>Increasing participation of PWD with local government</p> <p>Training of leaders of PWDs on advocacy engagement meetings between trainees and sub counties</p>			
<p>KADDENET</p> <p>Did not directly benefit from the SMD project though on its own got involved and implemented some related SMD activities;</p> <p>Advocated for Youth employment issues, Domestic violence and Child protection</p> <p>Conducted Political party trainings</p> <p>Carried out Civic education</p> <p>Participated in Election monitoring process/activity.</p>	<p>KADUPED</p> <p>Promoting employment rights of PWDs</p> <p>Trained in strategic planning</p> <p>Supported dialogue meetings to engage leaders</p>	<p>YAPI</p> <p>With SMD project support the organization;</p> <p>Advocated for rights of people to vote,</p> <p>Advocated and lobbied for youth to access friendly health services</p> <p>Trained community volunteer</p> <p>Supported education program by providing scholastic materials to already identified school</p>	<p>ASDI</p> <p>Empowered farmer beneficiaries with advocacy skills</p> <p>Conducted engagement meetings with authority and community</p> <p>Promoted good governance</p> <p>Increased access in information and innovations</p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 	<p>Action on Disability and Development</p> <p>Political meetings</p> <p>Research and continuous Data collection on</p>	<p>African Youth Development Link</p> <p>Green light campaign – digital media advocacy</p> <p>Promotion of youth local</p>	<p>TAAC</p> <p>Was not a beneficiary and involved in SMD project</p>	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
	employment	advocacy program Youth election observation		
	<p>Uganda National Paralympics Committee (Kampala City Council)</p> <p>Has not been involved in SMD project</p> <p>Has its own purpose in advocating for the rights of PWDs to access information and the Rights of disabled athletics</p>	<p>Uganda Youth Network (UYONET)</p> <p>With SMD Project support the organization;</p> <p>Held local and national level advocacy to promote youth employment</p> <p>Participated in electoral process by conducting civic education and contributing to developing of a national youth manifesto</p>	<p>ACANE</p> <p>Advocacy for rights to education and none violent elections</p> <p>Built Capacity of Board/ staff</p> <p>Conducted Baseline survey on girl child education</p> <p>Paid Staff allowances</p> <p>Met Field work transport with SMD support</p>	
	<p>Uganda National Association of PWD (UNAPD)</p> <p>Capacity building</p> <p>Awareness raising</p> <p>Networking</p> <p>Activities on employment of PWDs</p> <p>Meeting with political parties</p>	<p>Youth Plus Policy Network (YPPN)</p> <p>The young advocacy project (eg in Kasese)</p> <p>Young women in leadership project</p>	<p>PAG</p> <p>Organized Women fora</p> <p>Conducted Community sensitization on human rights</p> <p>Held police dialogue with the community</p> <p>Held dialogs with politicians</p> <p>Salary contribution and support to community activities</p>	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
	•		<p>WESO</p> <p>Conducted baseline survey on issues for activities to be planned on</p> <p>Conducted training of local leaders</p> <p>Conducted Civic education for election</p>	
			<p>LIDI- Uganda</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empowering and strengthening communities to monitor policy implementation (education policy) especially strengthening/ empowering children to monitor UPE <p>Advocacy for children's participation in policy monitoring</p> <p>Building institutional capacity of staff and Board in advocacy, lobbying, financial management, monitoring, project planning, implementation, management,</p>	
			<p>NWASEA</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empowered community members in four sub counties in Participatory poverty resource monitoring and budget 	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
			<p>tracking (PPRM) by holding their leaders accountable.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provided Administrative support to staff and other budget lines <p>Conducted Budget Tracking</p> <p>Advocacy and Lobbying</p> <p>Held Round Table Meeting (RTM)</p> <p>Held Dialogue Meetings</p>	
2			<p>Tweyambe</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conducted research and basic data collection Monitoring and evaluation Community mapping Capacity building Data collection 	
			<p>Sumakwe</p> <p>Carried out research, Roundtable meeting where community members read their manifesto</p> <p>Training in Leadership/ governance and advocacy & lobbying skills</p> <p>Screening aspirants</p> <p>Electing committees and mobilizing committee</p>	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
			<p>members to elect the right people</p> <p>The SMD grant mainly supported activities for meetings, trainings and mobilization by facilitating; lunch, hall hire, stationery, per diem for facilitators at workshops for improved democracy and cooperation</p>	
			<p>Catholic Church Masaka Diocese</p> <p>Has not received any direct funding from SMD project but are able to get themselves involved in training of trainers in Masaka district especially on advocacy</p> <p>Benefited as secondary beneficiary</p>	
			<p>Kitenge Development Organization</p> <p>Never received any funding from SMD project but out of own initiatives Participated in Sensitization Workshops and Seminars on how to engage in activities related to; community mobilization, Political Parties, Civil Society involvement in advocacy</p>	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
			<p>Masaka Primary beneficiary of CSO'S (Mr Robert Kintu, a teacher)</p> <p>Sensitizing and educating people through media</p> <p>Disseminating education materials to the masses to learn from</p> <p>organizing short notice meetings</p> <p>Transporting facilitators</p> <p>Buying necessary requirement and topping up transport refund</p>	
			<p>Moslem S. Council</p> <p>Political Education</p> <p>Voter Education</p>	
			<p>Renewed Effort to Alleviate Poverty (REAP)</p> <p>With SMD support the organization is involved in advocating and engaging leaders on issues of public accountability by</p> <p>Empowering women and increasing their participation in local government planning processes through a number of workshops on proposal writing, report</p>	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
			writing, public accountability, advocacy Supporting farmers in developing home based activities and building their institutional capacity in good governance	
			Women Together for Development (WOTODEV) Trainings Sensitizing People about Elections	
			Yiga Okola Women's Group Organized Workshops on Groups forming, good governance and better home management activities	
			St Jude Kigo Association Has not directly received any funding/ support from SMD; on its own are involved in promotion of political pluralism through seminars and political education	
			Abamwe Group Has not received any grant from SMD Project. However the organization on its own got involved in related SMD	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
			activities as below; Conducting research on women access to justice Conducting community dialogue meetings at sub county level	
			Awake Ankole With SMD project support the organization did the following; Conducted research on women access to justice Conducted community dialogs Trained women human rights advocates Trained members in research methodology	
			Borebero Women Group With SMD project support the organization was able to do the following; Conducted research on women access to justice Conducted community dialogue meetings at sub county level Trained in human rights advocacy	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
			<p>Butoha Catholic Women Group</p> <p>With SMD Project support the organization;</p> <p>Trained staff and beneficiaries in advocacy, human rights, M&E and resource mobilization.</p> <p>Conducted research on women access to justice</p> <p>Conducted community dialogue meeting at sub county level</p>	
			<p>Rwemihungye Rushozi I Twetungure Association</p> <p>With SMD Project support the organization;</p> <p>Trained staff and beneficiaries in advocacy, human rights, M&E and resource mobilization.</p> <p>Conducted research on women access to justice</p> <p>Conducted community dialogue meeting at sub county level</p>	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
			<p>NSHENGA ABATEGANDA Group</p> <p>With SMD Project support the organization;</p> <p>Conducted research on women access to justice</p> <p>Conducted community dialogue meeting at sub county</p>	
			<p>Caritas</p> <p>With SMD Project support the organization;</p> <p>Conducted advocacy in women property rights</p> <p>Conducted civic education on multiparty democracy</p> <p>Conducted education on constitutional rights and good governance</p> <p>Carried out baseline survey</p> <p>Disseminated the research findings</p> <p>Conducted Training of community process facilities</p> <p>Conducted Community dialogue meetings with local leaders</p> <p>Built trainable Capacity of staff</p>	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
			<p>Munkunyu Mother Care</p> <p>The organization did not directly receive support from SMD project. however it implemented related activities successful</p> <p>Carried out a SWOT analysis with CSO, District and NDI and set up project goal</p> <p>Conducted Consultative meetings with the local leaders on some of the human rights issues</p> <p>Mobilized community and other key stakeholders in understanding the concept of human rights, gender and Women’s property rights</p> <p>Monitored and evaluated issues of women rights abuse in community</p>	
			<p>NACWOLA</p> <p>With SMD Project support the organization;</p> <p>Strengthened the capacity of staff through training on research methods and electoral laws/ civic rights</p> <p>Trained health workers and staff in participatory policy</p>	

Forum/Networks	PWDs	Youth CSOs	General CSOs (women)	Mentors
			advocacy and lobbying Trained on basic participatory approach to development Conducted Policy research and collected baseline data on available services Conducted advocacy on women rights Coordinated meetings with PHA, CSO and Health workers Carried out Support supervision and Monitored provision of services by government Conducted Civic education in Kasese during election	

ANNEX 12: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
Kampala	1.	Salome Lukwiya	Programs Officer	Network of Ugandan Researchers and Research Users (NURRU)	0779287896 lukwiyangom@yahoo.com
	2.	Tunyazango Bowes	Finance Officer	Network of Ugandan Researchers and Research Users (NURRU)	0772691976 turyazs@yahoo.com
	3.	Geoffrey Amanyire	Deputy Executive Secretary	Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC)	0754868316
	4.	Joseph Oneka	Head Human Rights/ Good Governance	Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC)	0772603530
	5.	Maureen Mboizi	Programs Officer	Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC)	0782324398
	6.	Kisiimgha Elizabeth	Deputy Executive secretary	Uganda Joint Christian Council (UJCC)	0782414600 ujcc@utlonline.co.ug
	7.	John Mary Odoy	Executive Director	Dem Group	0782457990/0701457990 odoydemgroup@gmail.com
	8.	Odith John	Secretary General	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0772512856 jodit@parliament.go.ug
	9.	Anyakoit Cecilia	National Youth Leader	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0785222703 ceciliaanyakoit@yahoo.com
	10.	David Pulkol	Secretary for Policy and National Mobilization UPC	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	mzeedpb@yahoo.com
	11.	Chris Opoka Okumu	Special Presidential Envoy	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0782101527 opokaster@gmail.com
	12.	Ofwono Opondo	Spokesperson	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0772865590
	13.	Hon	Minister of	National Resistance	0772469517/

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
		Kabakumba Masiko	Information and former NRM chief Whip	Movement (NRM)	041222448
	14.	Hon Daudi Migereko	Chief of Whip	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0772506549/ 0414233331
	15.	Bakandonda Wycliffe	Executive Secretary	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0712736353
	16.	Okumu Ronald Reagan	Member of Parliament	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0772402851
	17.	Hon. Augustine Ruzindana	Member	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0752777221
	18.	Hon. Nandala Mafabi	Head of Opposition	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0772220157
	19.	John Ken Lukyamuzi	Member of Parliament/Leader Conservative Party	Member of Parliament/Leader Conservative Party (MP/CP)	0752694597
	20.	Norbert Mao	Chairperson Gulu	Democratic Party(DP)	0772 885688/ 0772 222246 mpmao@yahoo.com
	21.	Deo Hasubi	Secretary	Democratic Party(DP)	0772631777
	22.	David Opio	Secretary General	Peoples Progressive Party (PPP)	0788005356
	23.	Robert Mugabe	Member	Peoples Progressive Party (PPP)	0772343012
	24.	Hon William Nokrach	Member of Parliament	Representative of People with Disabilities for Northern Region	0772610204
	25.	Dr. Badru Kiggundu	Chairman	Electoral Commission	0414337561
	26.	Mulekhwah Lenard	Director of Programs	Electoral Commission	0772507153/03122622 15
	27.	Mpidi Bumali	President/Councilor	Uganda National Paralympics Committee (Kampala City Council)	0712811378
	28.	Peace Sserukuma	Program Officer	Uganda National Association of PWD	0775917656

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
				(UNAPD)	
	29.	Mukasa Apolo	Program Officer	Uganda National Association of PWD (UNAPD)	0752945132
	30.	George Katemba	Programs Manager	Action on Disability and Development	0772589180
	31.	Brien Robert Lukumbuka	Intern Democratic Party- Kasese	Democratic Party (DP)	0702559539
	32.	Nsubuga Willingtone	Intern Forum for Democratic Change	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0757693020
	33.	Smith Ongom	Intern Uganda People's Congress	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0774281413
	34.	Osoru Constance	Intern Uganda People's Congress	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0774609827
	35.	Margret Bakuba	Intern National Resistance Movement	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0782385257
	36.	Bilfred Kirunda	Intern Democratic Party	Democratic Party (DP)	0782642433
	37.	Kaviri Ann	Intern Peoples Progressive Party	Peoples Progressive Party (PPP)	0782883347
	38.	Paga Gloria Snoop	Intern Forum for Democratic Change	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0774321468
	39.	Florence Mkalazi	Intern National Resistance Movement	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0772980088
	40.	Ahmed Hadji	Team Leader	African Youth Development Link (AYDL)	0702799015
	41.	Miriam Talwisa	Coordinator	Youth Plus Policy Network (YPPN)	0712969199
	42.	Kitamirike Emmanuel	Executive Director	Uganda Youth Network (UYONET)	0715140029
	43.	Helena Okiring	Programs Officer	Uganda Youth Network	0773251861

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
				(UYONET)	
	44.	Michael Ronning	Team Leader Democracy, Governance and Conflict Programs	United States Agency International Development (USAID)- Uganda	0414306001 mronning@usaid.gov
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DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
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	75.	Timothy Kalyegira	Editor Monitor Publications	The Monitor	0700839639/ 0712730003
	76.	Ambrose Murangira	Chairman	Uganda National Association of the Deaf (UNAD)	0782366520
	77.	Deborah Lyute	Membership Officer	Uganda National Association of the Deaf (UNAD)	

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
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	85.	Andresiru Grace	Assistant Field Officer Pajulu	Community Initiative for the Empowerment of the Vulnerable People (CIFOVUP)	0711570497/ 0779570497
	86.	Candiru Jane	Chairperson Pajulu Sub county	Community Initiative for the Empowerment of the Vulnerable People (CIFOVUP)	0773990294
	87.	Azabo Horace	Director	Community Initiative for the Empowerment of the Vulnerable People (CIFOVUP)	0712233680

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
	88.	Andama B. Innocent	People with Disabilities Councilor	Arua District Union of People with Disabilities	0753995591
	89.	Ocokoru Ruth	People with Disabilities Councilor	Arua District Union of People with Disabilities	0777622836
	90.	Joshua Muki	Chairperson	Council for Disability	0772865564/ 0701223566
	91.	Abdu A. Moses	Programs/Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	Center for Governance and Economic development	0772198706
	92.	Aseru Dona Abinbe	Chairperson	Arua District NGO Network (ADNGON)	0772535719
	93.	Acadribo Henry	Coordinator	Arua District NGO Network (ADNGON)	0782310866
	94.	Joshua Muki	Member	Arua District NGO Network (ADNGON)	0701223566
	95.	Cakuru Christine	Community Development Officer/ Ag Sub County Chief Adumi	Adumi sub county	0772983566 cakuruc@yahoo.com
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	97.	Draku Joel	Sub County Chief	Pajulu Sub County	0772348152
	98.	Andama Martin	Community Development Volunteer	Adumi Sub County	0772863505
	99.	Ejua Simon (Hon)	District Chairperson National Resistance Movement	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0772592970 sejua2011@gmail.com
	100.	Peter Debelle	General Secretary National Resistance	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0752679850

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
			Movement		
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	102.	Avutia Ronald Kizito	Local Consultant National Resistance Movement District Office- Arua	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0772332229
	103.	Kezia L.	National Resistance Movement Member	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0772920004
	104.	Lemeriga Fadhil	Publicist	Democratic Party (DP)	07797444321
	105.	Adrole Ben	Organizing Secretary	Democratic Party (DP)	0772199087
	106.	Kaleb T. Kamure	National Deputy Secretary for Policy and Mobilization	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0782262546
	107.	Ezattia Susan	Deputy National Women Leader	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0754400139
	108.	Kaza A. Kelvis	National Council Member	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0777706387
	109.	Ben Olwa	Chairman	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0772654132
	110.	Candiga Vaty Bosco	General Secretary Arua	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0782288516
	111.	Alekua Ja' Afar	Member	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0752326749
	112.	Buga Mayor	Deputy Secretary for Defense and Security	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0782980094
	113.	Sam Ogenrwoth	Chief Administrative Officer	Arua District Local Government	0782674511

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
	114.	Martin Gwoktho	Deputy Chief Administrative Officer	Arua District Local Government	0772460408/0702460484
	115.	Rose Ayakaka	Arua District Registrar	Electoral Commission	0772511299
	116.	Nyakuni Isaac	Community Liaison Officer	Uganda Police Arua	0774973537/0718598252
Apac	117.	Obote Tommy	Chair	Women and Child Advocacy Network (WACANE)	0773009622
	118.	Otim Peter	Board General Secretary	Women and Child Advocacy Network (WACANE)	0772686189
	119.	Ebuu M.O	Programme Coordinator	Women and Child Advocacy Network (WACANE)	0772946225
	120.	Geoffrey Kumakech	Accountant	Women and Child Advocacy Network (WACANE)	0782724276
	121.	Edam Peter Agoa	Member	Women and Child Advocacy Network (WACANE)	0782790926
	122.	Evaline Ogwang	Farmer's Trainer of Trainers (ToT)	Cungi I Yesu	0774149710
	123.	Okwang Dick	Farmer's Trainer of Trainers (ToT)	Too- I rwot	0774448632
	124.	Sam Olili GGR	Programme Officer Finance and Administration	Agency for Promoting Sustainable Development (ASDI)	0773433511
	125.	Quirinus Oyugi Onono	Chairman Agency for Promoting Sustainable Development Board	Agency for Promoting Sustainable Development (ASDI)	0775364050
	126.	Otim DC	ATOPI Women at Work	Agency for Promoting Sustainable Development (ASDI)	0781472043

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
	127.	Edward Opiny	General Secretary	Agency for Promoting Sustainable Development (ASDI)	0772370511
	128.	Omara Geoffrey	Focal Person Life Skills (FP LPS)	Uganda Red Cross Society (URCS)	0772556270
	129.	Eron Gilbert	Programme Coordinator	Apac Disabled Persons Union (ADIPU)	0777141330
	130.	Odongo Alfred	Vice Chairperson	Apac Disabled Persons Union (ADIPU)	0774470994
	131.	Awanyo Isaac	Guide	Apac Disabled Persons Union (ADIPU)	
	132.	Opwonya Tom	Program Director	The Apac Anti Corruption Coalition (TAACC)	0772647107
	133.	Sam Jamara	Program Coordinator	Non Governmental Organization (NGO) Link	07825711396
	134.	Ongom Alfred	Member	Apac Theater Group	
	135.	Jack Otim	Programme Manager	Apac 92.9 FM Radio Station	0772835876 apacproducer@iwayafrica.com
	136.	Janet Odongo	Sub county Chief	Apac Sub- County	0785307490
	137.	Ojok Francis	Sub County Naads Coordinator Apac	Apac Sub- County	0772875199
	138.	Edam Peter	Parish chief	Apac Sub- County	0782790926
	139.	Egir Renison	Chairman LCIII	Apac Sub- County	0774415111
	140.	Okello Felix	General Secretary	Uganda Federation of Farmers Association(UFA)	0785916087
	141.	Alado George	Community Liaison Officer	Police	071427720
	142.	Dickens Olak	Apac District Speaker (out going)	Apac District Local Council	0712847834
	143.	Masango Edmon	Assistant Returning Officer/Assistant	Electoral Commission	0781565614

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
			Registrar		
	144.	Awati Jimmy	Chairperson	Apac Theater Group (Music, Dance and Drama)	0779075108
	145.	Owong Ronald	Secretary	Apac Theater Group (Music	
	146.	Omara Denish	Members	Apac Theater Group (Music	
	147.	Abaa Morish	Members	Apac Theater Group (Music	0783177585
	148.	Akello Lilian	Members	Apac Theater Group (Music	
	149.	Okello Tommy	Members	Apac Theater Group (Music	
	150.	Adongo Susan	Members	Apac Theater Group (Music	
	151.	Jenty Adonjo	Members	Apac Theater Group (Music	
	152.	Ajal Salaman	Vice Secretary	Apac Theater Group (Music	
	153.	Angena Allan	Members	Apac Theater Group (Music	
	154.	Engole Patrick	Members	Apac Theater Group (Music	
	155.	Okello James	Members	Apac Theater Group (Music	0779984564
	156.	Man Ojok	Members	Apac Theater Group (Music	0782588017
	157.	Ojaa Bonny	Deputy Registrar National Resistance Council	National Resistance Council (NRM)	0782472570
	158.	Rose akulo	Secretary General National Resistance Council	National Resistance Council (NRM)	0785443764
	159.	Lily Aguti	Secretary Finance National	National Resistance Council (NRM)	0777025736

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
			Resistance Council		
	160.	Dickens Olak	Member	National Resistance Council (NRM)	0754847834
	161.	Odyang A.	New Coucilor	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	
	162.	Felix Yine	Executive Member	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0787079577
	163.	Ojok David	Chairperson	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	
	164.	Alado George	Community Liaison Officer	Apac Police Station	0714277720
	165.	Tom Okello	Apac District Community Development Officer	Apac District Local Government	0772660023
Kumi	166.	Okiria Innocent	Sub county chief	Atatur Sub- County	0772199898
	167.	Okwii Patrick	Vice chairperson LCIII	Atatur Sub -County	0782339092
	168.	Alex Okiringi	Community Development Officer	Kumi District Local Government	alexokiringi@gmail.com
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	170.	Denis Budali	Kumi District Registrar	Kumi District	0782913296 dennistawodda@yahoo.com
	171.	Akeru Charles	Radio Presenter/ Moderator	Kumi FM Radio Station	0773773334
	172.	Opea Apedel	District chairperson Forum for Democratic Change	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0773908874
	173.	Odeke Patrick	Sub -County	Forum for Democratic	0775524060

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
			official	Change (FDC)	
	174.	Omutia Francis	Sub -County chairperson	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0712493447
	175.	Okidi Emmanuel	District Secretary	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0773350606
	176.	Omutia Wilson	Member Central Executive	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0782436945
	177.	Ogugu Margret	Chairperson	Kumi District Union of Persons with Disability (KUDUP)	0752535381
	178.	Emuria Stephen	Accounts Assistant	Kumi District Union of Persons with Disability (KUDUP)	00702035454
	179.	Adakun Hellen	Councilor Ongino	Kumi District Union of Persons with Disability (KUDUP)	
	180.	Amoding Mary Gorrey	Member	Kumi District Union of Persons with Disability (KUDUP)	
	181.	Ikulumet U.P	CD	Kumi District Union of Persons with Disability (KUDUP)	0702871745
	182.	Ikwalingat Annet	Guide	Kumi District Union of Persons with Disability (KUDUP)	0785430776
	183.	Ocepa Martin	Member	Kumi District Union of Persons with Disability (KUDUP)	
	184.	Akure Hellen	Member	Kumi District Union of Persons with Disability (KUDUP)	0785257438
	185.	Ekoot Justine Ivan	Uganda Women Effort to Save Orphans Kumi	Uganda Women Effort to Save Orphans (UWESO)	0774506819
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DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
	187.	Alemu Tinah	CBT Kumi	Uganda Women Effort to Save Orphans (UWESO)	0782660127
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	196.	Musoomenoa Muttalib	Executive Member	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0754197155
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	210.	Mirembe Clare	Volunteer	National Women Association for Social and Educational Advancement (NWASEA)	0782203049
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DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
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	216.	Basoga Waiswa	Reporter	Bukedde/ Eye FM	0772448333
	217.	Sooma Fred	Reporter	Bukedde Television	0782976273
	218.	Naigaga Nasimu	Reporter	NBS & SMART FM	0775567981/ 0712436122
	219.	Kityo Ssizi A.A	Reporter	CBS/ BAABA FM	0772406887/07028001 15
	220.	Hamala Solomon	Reporter	Red Pepper	0712570144
	221.	Willy Basoga Kadaama	Reporter	Radio Simba	0772639340
	222.	Waibi Said	Reporter	Vision Voice, Bukedde and Voice Busoga	071229338
	223.	Surgent Wandira Henry Moses	District Liaison Officer	Uganda Police Iganga	
	224.		District Police Commander	Uganda Police Iganga	
	225.	Jackson Pabire	District Registrar	Electoral Commission-Iganga	0752464410/ 0772464410
	226.	Idah Tusiime	Assistant Registrar	Electoral Commission-Iganga	0774330256
	227.	Kaingo Richard	Program Officer/ founder	Association for Integrated Community Development (AICODE)	
	228.	Samuel Batuuka	District Community Development	Iganga District Local Government	0772481749

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
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	229.	Waitubi	Local Council 1 (LC1) Chairman	Waibuga Health Centre Three (HCIII)	
	230.	Kamutono Peter	Enrolled Nurse	Waibuga Health Centre Three (HCIII)	0782252315
Masaka	231.	Joseph Kalungi	Chairman Local Council Five (LCV)	Masaka District Local Government	0772399318
	232.	Bamusede Bwambale Banabas	Resident District Director (RDC)	Masaka District Local Government	0772491504
	233.	Kayemba G. Afaayo	District Chairperson(Mayor Elect Masaka)	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0752611875
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	236.	Mugenyi Bernard	General Secretary	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	
	237.	Asiimwe George William	Member	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0751747541/0701747541
	238.	Bukenya Achilleo	Member	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0753743232/0702743232
	239.	Lukanga Denis Majwala	Publicity Secretary	Democratic Party (DP)	0752851186
	240.	Kasekende Francis	Secretary	Democratic Party (DP)	0772611116
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	245.	Namatovu Annet	Assistant Administrator	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0783046719
	246.	Julius Musiime	District Community Liaison Office/Assistant Inspector of Police	Uganda Police	
	247.	Mweruka Paschal	Chief News Editor	Radio Buddu Masaka	
	248.	Walugembe Moses	Programmes Director	Radio Buddu Masaka	
	249.	Dorothy Nakito	Vice Chairperson	Bumakwe Women Organization	075651746 evelnnkitto@yahoo.com
	250.	Apolonia	Member	Bumakwe Women Organization	0752303032
	251.	Nassimbwa Teddy	Member	Bumakwe Women Organization	0784498344
	252.	Namatovu Teo	Member	Bumakwe Women Organization	0778536740
	253.	Namatovu Margaret	Member	Bumakwe Women Organization	0774514955
	254.	Najjemba Fassy	Member	Bumakwe Women Organization	0782259733
	255.	Nantume Juliet	Member	Bumakwe Women Organization	0784079477

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
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	257.	Agnes Kalule	Beneficiary Kyamulibwa Sub- County	Bumakwe Women Organization	0787683017
	258.	Resty Nanyonjo	Secretary	Bumakwe Women Organization	0775967748
	259.	Sheik Kumira Swaibu	Religious Leader	Masaka	0701365791
	260.	Namuyanja Mariam	Kyabakuza TC	Masaka Youth Development Organization (MAYODO)	0783205848
	261.	Ndifuna Ahmad	Kyabakuza	Masaka Youth Development Organization (MAYODO)	0785879516
	262.	Kintu Robert S	Kyabakuza	Masaka Youth Development Organization (MAYODO)	
	263.	Sebayigga Tomothy	Masaka	Masaka Youth Development Organization (MAYODO)	
	264.	Nakatudde Victoria	Masaka T	Masaka District NGO Forum (MADINGOF)	0753747750
	265.	Buwembo Edward	Secretay Finance	Masaka District NGO Forum (MADINGOF)	0772493218
	266.	Ndifuna Ahmed	Member	Masaka District NGO Forum (MADINGOF)	0785879516
	267.	Rose Naggirinya	Women Representative	Masaka District NGO Forum (MADINGOF)	0782630001
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	269.	Musoke Margaret	Teacher	Kitenge Development Organization	0772524756 margaret_msk@yahoo.com

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
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	272.	Kintu Molly	Program Administrator	Renewed Efforts for Alleviation of Poverty (REAP)	0702089258
	273.	Paul Luberaga	Program Coordinator	Renewed Efforts for Alleviation of Poverty (REAP)	0772448583
	274.	Magezi Sula	Staff	Renewed Efforts for Alleviation of Poverty (REAP)	0752638154/07894042 11
	275.	Kaweesa Christopher	Farmer	Renewed Efforts for Alleviation of Poverty (REAP)	
	276.	Mary Nalwaga	Member	Yiga Okola	
	277.	Margaret Nakamannya	Chairperson	Yiga Okola	0714657874
	278.	Mwesigwa Stephen	Councilor	Kalungu Sub-County	0773789439
	279.	Nansamba Maxy	Villa Maria	Kalungu Sub -County	0758459249
	280.	Kaweesa Christopher		Bulegeya Sub- County	
	281.	Fr Gerald Mukwaya	Priest Pastoral	Catholic Church Masaka Diocese	0772402966
	282.	Robert Kintu	Teacher	Masaka Primary Beneficiary of Civil Society Organizations	0788958478
	283.	Timothy Ssebayigga	General Secretary	Masaka Youth Development Forum	0752484616/07014848 16

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
					timssebayiga@yahoo.com
	284.	Kirumira Swaibu	Organisation Secretary District Officer	Moslem S. Council	0701951116/0789742042
Kasese	285.	Rev. Canon Julius Kitaghenda	Chairman Local Council Five (LCV)	Kasese Local Government	0772875070
	286.	Capt. James Mwesigye	Resident District Council	Kasese Local Government	0772456598
	287.	Kamala Johnson Kalyase	Secretary Publicity	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0779593538/0704265084
	288.	Kasoke Ernest	Chairperson	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0774626603/0751626603
	289.	Bagheni Stellah	Member	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0784694804
	290.	Matebere K. Edward	Political Assistant	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0777309184
	291.	Musiime Edson	Publicity-Youth League,	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0772552685
	292.	Muhindo Alivan Craven	Secretary Mainstream Parish	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0777012581
	293.	Mutabali Deus	Chairperson	Democratic Party (DP)	0772462766
	294.	Kamuza	Secretary	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0771471883
	295.	Ahmed Naduli Musisi	Electoral Commissioner Registrar	District Registrar	0772503443
	296.	Kalim Sunday	Inspector of Police	Uganda Police	0772653739
	297.	Kahungu Misairi	Radio Presenter	Kasese FM	0772660589
	298.	Thembo Kahungu Misiari	Program Officer	Kasese Guide Radio	
299.	Kusemererwa	Chairperson	National Community of	0752257512	

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
		Yusta		Women Living with HIV/AIDS(NACWOLA)	
	300.	Kwebaze Faith	Program Coordinator	National Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS(NACWOLA)	0772671144/kwebaze2003@yahoo.com
	301.	Aryema Rehema	Treasurer	National Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS(NACWOLA)	0782184665
	302.	Bwambale Paul	Community Based Trainer	National Community of Women Living with HIV/AIDS(NACWOLA)	0782220062
	303.	Bwambale Tom	Coordinator	Kasese District Development Network (KADINET)	0772937211 bwambalet@yahoo.com
	304.	Masika Rhone	Member	Kasese District Development Network (KADINET)	0782082810 masikaronah@yahoo.com
	305.	Baseme Annet	Field Officer	Caritas	0774707974
	306.	Masereka Sylvest	Assistant Coordinator	Caritas	0774098385 caritaskasese@yahoo.co.uk
	307.	Bambale Patrick	Coordinator	Mukunyu Mother Care	0772829168 bwa.patrick@yahoo.com
	308.	Anna Bwambale	Member	Mukunyu Mother Care	0774268310
	309.	Muhindo Yunus	District Councillor	Munkunyu Subcounty	0791962972/0777743975
	310.	Mwesigye Charles	Program Coordinator	Youth and Powerful Initiative (YAPI)	0773989850
	311.	Kambasu Robert	Programme Officer	Youth and Powerful Initiative (YAPI)	0775277342
Bushenyi	312.	Medius Rubanda	Resident District Council (RDC)	Bushenyi District Local Government	0772696328/0704696328
	313.	Barbra	District Registrar	Bushenyi District	0701613675

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
		Murinira		Electoral Commissioner	
	314.	Ndyakira	Vice Chairman	National Resistance Movement (NRM)	0776882000
	315.	Mwebaze Kyabijejye	Chairperson	Democratic Party (DP)	0782738620
	316.	Muhereza Leonidas	Deputy Chairperson	Democratic Party (DP)	0772350579
	317.	William Mukaira	Chairperson	Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)	0772363702
	318.	Mbabazi Janiffer Rurangaranga	Chairperson	Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	0772424966/0702634099
	319.	Wabwiire Joab	District Police Commander (DPC)	Uganda Police	0702954423
	320.	Muhangi Kenan	Radio Presenter Editor	BFM Radio	0782583479
	321.	John Tumusiime	Executive Director	Awake Ankole	0703315966/0772631221
	322.	Birungi Faith	Human Rights Officer	Awake Ankole	0772680421/0702176222
	323.	Naijuka Jennifer	Sub-County Coordinator	Awake Ankole	0782090796/0703002290
	324.	Mutabazi Benon	Member	Awake Ankole	0703130036/0701026986
	325.	Natukwasa Milton	Sub county Advocate	Awake Ankole	0782164381
	326.	Alice Karegyeya	Sub county Advocate	Awake Ankole	0775589559
	327.	Banturaki Molly	Sub county Advocate	Awake Ankole	0782730626
	328.	Nasiima Benon	Program Coordinator	Bushenyi Network of Children in Difficult Circumstances	0771884100
	329.	Gumisiriza	Coordinator	Bushenyi Network of	

DISTRICT	NO	NAME	DESIGNATION	ORGANIZATION/ INSTITUTION	CONTACT
		Robert		Children in Difficult Circumstances	

ANNEX 13: RESULTS ACHIEVED BY SMD PROJECT

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
<p>The goal of the Mission’s strategic objective for <i>Governing Justly and Democratically</i> is to increase democratic participation, transparency and accountability in Uganda. SMD will contribute to this goal by supporting peaceful political competition, consensus building and capacity building of major political parties</p>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •
<p><u>Result 1: Strengthened Environment for Peaceful Political Competition</u></p> <p>Requirements:</p> <p>Consensus and coalitions built among political parties and CSOs on issues of common interest</p> <p>Enhanced citizen knowledge of multi-party democracy</p> <p>Illustrative Targets:</p> <p>70% of constituents in identified districts have increased awareness of multi-party democracy</p> <p>At least 10 joint campaigns on raising awareness of the multiparty political system are supported</p>	<p>Objective 1: Strengthened environment for peaceful political competition</p> <p><u>IR 1: Greater engagement between political parties, CSOs and government</u></p> <p><i>Indicator 1.1: Number of action points in the consensus building process agreements implemented (GJD- Annual Indicator)</i></p>	<p>For the whole of last year 2009/2010, district CSO advocacy campaigns, involving more than 900 community participants, resulted in 80 commitments to improve government services in a broad range of areas, including gender equity, HIV/AIDS, people with disabilities and agricultural programs. The figure was compiled through an extensive year-end review of district partner reports and in-person and telephone communication with CSOs, government officials, and community leaders</p> <p>In last quarter of 2009 the following were realised;</p> <p>Youth Inter-party Coalition dialogs to promote political tolerance and peaceful elections;</p> <p>National and district CSO networking sessions to strengthen relationships within civil society;</p> <p>Dialogs between CSO’s and political parties and parliamentarians to address pressing constituent issues at the political level;</p> <p>CSO and political party dialogs at the district level to address district level issues;</p> <p>Networking sessions between youth, people with disabilities, political parties and CSO leaders to plan and implement advocacy projects; and</p> <p>Budget briefing sessions between MP’s and CSO’s to illuminate the budget path from the national to local level.</p> <p>Dialogs between parties and the Electoral Commission on the electoral process;</p> <p>Dialogs between opposition parties and between the opposition and the ruling party on issues of interest, including party finance and electoral reform;</p> <p>Technical assistance to the IPC to develop a common electoral platform;</p>

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
		<p>Technical assistance to district partners to advocate for policy improvements and budget allocations to government and political party representatives with findings from the research they've conducted in the current quarter;</p> <p>Technical assistance to DEM-Group to engage with the Electoral Commission on its plans for election monitoring; and</p> <p>Technical assistance to Citizen Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU), to engage political parties and government on electoral reform.</p> <p>In the first quarter of 2010 the following were achieved; As the dialogs during this quarter between parties, the EC and CSOs focused on the voter registration process, parties have endeavored to disseminate information on the voter registration process (which was one of their action points) but have not completed many of their action points due to delays in commencement of the registration process and continued uncertainty on the electoral roadmap.</p> <p>Drawing on youth dialogs held last quarter of 2009 in Arua, the Arua District NGO Forum (ADINGON) and youth leaders conducted community sensitization meetings on democratic participation and political pluralism for youth groups. Youth also held meetings in the five sub-counties of Ajira, Aroyi, Dadam, Ogokorand Okolo in which they encouraged youth to engage in the planning process. This makes two action points implemented based on action plans developed from previous quarters.</p> <p>In second quarter of 2010 NACWOLA confirmed that commitments by two local governments to allocate funds for HIV/AIDS services were being implemented. The funds have served to increase transportation for PHAs to local health facilities.</p> <p>In second quarter of 2010 as the dialogs among parties, the EC and CSOs on security issues took place near the end of the quarter, none have yet implemented their action plans on security in elections by then. However, all districts implemented their action plans on voter registration, for a total of 50 percent of action points in the consensus building process agreements implemented. Many of the different groups of dialogue participants were able to implement their commitments to disseminate information on the voter registration process. Muslim leaders in Kamuli were effective in bridging party differences to encourage voters to register. The EC also intensified its information campaign in Arua to provide better information on where and when registration was taking place. NRM and FDC used their structures and meetings to disseminate information on voter registration to members and encourage them to register.</p> <p>In the third quarter 2010, KUDUP confirmed that Kumi government officials followed through with a commitment to allocate funds to construct a wheelchair accessible ramp and set aside funds for disabled groups to access for income generating activities.</p> <p>By third quarter 2010 through a follow up meeting led by WACANE, local officials demonstrated that they had implemented six agreements made last quarter. Officials took steps to: clear roads to schools to ensure safe commuting for girls; provide for additional school inspections; and create a larger, better trained school</p>

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
		<p>committee to prevent school drop outs. The government also trained members of the police and community leaders to address female drop outs and created a school management committee to increase community involvement in schools. Local parents also made good on a pledge to reenrol drop outs by getting 30 children back in school.</p> <p>At the end of third quarter 2010 of the thirty-one dialogs conducted by IRI resulting in agreement held since January 2010, partners and participants in the dialogs have implemented action points developed in those agreements in 21 of the 31 cases. As the recent dialogs held on the complaints process are relatively new, there has not yet been time to implement the resolutions reached at those dialogs.</p>
	<p><i>Indicator 1.2: Number of consensus-building processes resulting in agreement (GJD- Annual Indicator)</i></p>	<p>This reporting year 2009/2010, 51 percent of commitments made by government officials to district partners were fulfilled (41 fulfilled commitments out of 80 made). The fulfilled commitments helped to improve government services related to gender equity, HIV/AIDS, people with disabilities and agricultural programs. The figure was compiled through an extensive year- end review of district partner reports and in-person and telephone communication with CSOs, government officials, and community leaders (detailed results for indicators 1.1 and 1.2 are attached as Annex #2).</p> <p>By second quarter of 2010 three district CSOs held nine dialogs that led to nine agreements by local officials to make changes as a result of participatory CSO advocacy efforts, including commitments to: decrease the drop out rates among female students; improve and simplify local education policies; form a women’s farmer advocacy group to lobby for additional NAADS funding; provide a free meeting space for PHAs; and to create spots reserved for PHAs on local decision-making councils.</p> <p>In first quarter 2010 Dialogs held between parties, the EC and CSOs at the district level (and in one sub-county and parish in each district) on the voter registration and display processes, organized by IRI and its partner District NGO Forums in Apac, Kamuli, Kasese, Kumi, Lira, Gulu, Tororo, and Rukungiri resulted in eight district-level agreements on how to improve the voter registration and display processes</p> <p>In 2nd quarter 2010 Dialogs among parties, the EC and CSOs at the district level (and in one sub-county and parish in each district) on the voter registration and display processes (Arua and Masaka only), and on security during elections, organized by IRI and its partner District NGO Forums in Apac, Lira, Gulu, Tororo, Rukungiri, Kasese, Kamuli, Arua, Masaka, and Kumi, resulted in twelve district-level agreements on how to improve the security situation during elections and how to improve the voter registration and display processes.</p> <p>At the end of third quarter 2010 In two meetings led by KUDUP, local government officials made commitments to: improve services to disabled persons by sharpening data collection processes; to reform government grant making processes to allow more access for disabled groups; and to construct disabled-friendly public restrooms in public buildings.</p> <p>At the end of quarter three 2010, meetings led by WACANE resulted in: an agreement by female teachers to become more actively involved in girl-child education; a commitment by education officials to offer a refresher course to guidance counselors on working with female students; an agreement by parents and teachers to redouble their efforts to maintain and increase female student enrollment; and plans to draft</p>

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
		<p>local by-laws and collect additional data to address the scope of gender equality.</p> <p>In the third quarter 2010, a meeting led by AICODE resulted in several commitments from local leaders to form farmers groups to increase access to NAADS services; commitments by religious leaders to reach out to farmers in their congregations; and a commitment from the local NAADS administrator to increase communication with farmers during budgeting processes.</p> <p>At the end of third quarter 2010 as a result of a dialogue meeting conducted by PIRD in September, health department officials committed to: organizing a refresher training in sign language interpretation for its health staff; purchasing disability-friendly beds and other devices for district for health centers; and allocating funds to provide loans to two disabled groups to carry out income- generating projects.</p> <p>In the third quarter 2010, dialogs among parties, the EC and CSOs at the district level (and in one sub-county and parish in each district) on the complaints and display processes, organized by IRI and its partner District NGO Forums in Apac, Lira, Gulu, Tororo, Rukungiri, Kasese, Kamuli, Arua, Masaka, and Kumi, resulted in ten district-level agreements on how to improve the complaints process during elections and how to improve the voter register display and natural justice processes.</p>
	<p><i>Indicator 1.3: Number of consensus-building processes assisted by USG (GJD Indicator)</i></p>	<p>Dialogs among parties, the EC and CSOs at the district level (and in one sub-county and parish in each district), organized by IRI and its partner District NGO Forums in Apac, Arua, Gulu, Kasese, Kamuli, Kumi, Lira, Masaka, Rukungiri, and Tororo built consensus on a more effective electoral complaints process and discussed the ongoing exercise of displaying the voters' register. The dialogs represent a total of 10 processes.</p> <p>In the first quarter 2010 dialogs between parties, the EC and CSOs at the district level (and in one sub-county and parish in each district) on the voter registration and display processes, organized by IRI and its partner District NGO Forums in Apac, Gulu, Kamuli, Kasese, Kumi, Lira, Tororo, and Rukungiri and advocated for more engagement in electoral processes and better coordination between parties, the EC and CSOs (a total of eight processes).</p> <p>By end of second quarter 2010 NDI provided financial and technical support for 15 consensus-building processes with assistance from USG. These processes included efforts by district CSOs to collaborate with government officials to improve services to PHAs, female students, local farmers, female property owners, and PWDs.</p> <p>By the end of second quarters 2010 dialogs among parties, the EC and CSOs at the district level (and in one sub-county and parish in each district) on the voter registration and display processes, organized by IRI and its partner District NGO Forums in Arua and Masaka, advocated for more engagement in electoral processes and better coordination between parties, the EC and CSOs (a total of two processes).</p> <p>Dialogs between parties, the EC and CSOs at the district level (and in one sub-county and parish in each district) on the role of security forces in elections, organized by IRI and its partner District NGO Forums in Apac, Arua, Gulu, Kasese, Kamuli, Kumi, Lira, Masaka, Rukungiri, and Tororo advocated for conflict resolution and agreement on security issues during elections between parties, the EC and CSOs (a total of ten processes).</p> <p>By the end of third quarter NDI provided financial and technical support for 12 consensus-building processes with assistance from USG. These processes included efforts by district CSOs to collaborate with government</p>

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
		<p>officials to improve services to people living with HIV/AIDS, female students, local farmers, female property owners, and people with disabilities.</p> <p>By the end of the third quarter dialogs among parties, the EC and CSOs at the district level (and in one sub-county and parish in each district), organized by IRI and its partner District NGO Forums in Apac, Arua, Gulu, Kasese, Kamuli, Kumi, Lira, Masaka, Rukungiri, and Tororo built consensus on a more effective electoral complaints process and discussed the ongoing exercise of displaying the voters' register. The dialogs represent a total of 10 processes.</p>
<p>Result 2: Increased organizational capacity for representative parties and CSOs</p> <p>Requirements:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased transparency in party membership and financing • Strengthened ability of political forces to articulate, organize and compete clear political alternatives • Strengthened internal democracy of major political parties <p>Illustrative Targets:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> At least 60% of those surveyed are aware of party platforms At least 60% of major parties have increased amount of funds raised 	<p>IR 2: Increase the organizational capacity for representative parties and CSOs</p> <p><i>Indicator 2.1: Number of performance metrics on which USG-assisted political parties improve based on IRI's political party index</i></p>	<p>During the last quarter of 2009 the following 10 activities were achieved; Advocacy and political process monitoring consulting and coaching for district and national CSOs held;</p> <p>District CSO workshops conducted by national partners to implement monthly training plans; and</p> <p>National CSO workshops conducted by NDI to provide direct assistance on specific advocacy or training efforts.</p> <p>Customized workshops and technical assistance to district party structures to meet needs identified in the recent review of progress on their action plans;</p> <p>Continued tailored consultations and advising for district partners based upon existing or anticipated small grant projects and organizational development needs. Subjects could include: organizational management; fundraising; advocacy; research; and civic organizing;</p> <p>ICT support to increase communication between party headquarters and their leaders and members;</p> <p>Technical assistance to develop research desks for political parties;</p> <p>Continued support to the political party internship program.</p> <p>Development of a research tool kit for national and district partners to aid in the skills building of district partners and the implementation of research for advocacy at the local level;</p> <p>Publication of a manual of best practices on local party management; and</p> <p>Follow up technical assistance to IRI small grants recipients to implement their activities.</p> <p>During first quarter of 2010, both UPC and DP held successful delegates' conferences at which new leaders were elected. IRI's party communications project and its party interns provided each party with support in coordinating, staffing and communicating about the delegates' conference. Both UPC and DP gained a point on their party indices as they fulfilled the criteria of holding regular elections to choose leadership. The NRM also increased its score on the party index by one point through a more coordinated approach to monitoring by-election. The party displayed its progress in the Rukiga County by-elections, where NRM, with the technical assistance of IRI, tested a system for collecting and verifying results.</p> <p>During second quarter of 2010, parties including DP, NRM, FDC and UPC held internal party elections and</p>

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
		<p>primaries. On the index, however, IRI is only awarding one point to the FDC for holding primary elections, due to the high incidence of violence and malpractice in the NRM elections and the weak process of the DP and UPC elections.</p> <p>By the end of second quarter 2010, both FDC and JEEMA held delegates' conferences where elections for party leadership took place — JEEMA's resulted in new leadership while FDC's did not. Through its party communications project and political party intern program, IRI was able to provide human resource and in-kind support to the implementation of the delegates' conferences. For these reasons, both FDC and JEEMA gained a point on their party indices as they fulfilled the criteria of holding regular elections to choose leadership. The NRM continued to improve its performance through more organized use of IRI's text message election tally system, collecting results from a third of polling stations in the Mukono North by-election. FDC also dramatically improved its staffing structure through the recruitment of new personnel at the secretariat, including former IRI interns who have now become permanent staff. For these reasons, JEEMA, and NRM gained a point on their political party index, while FDC gained two points.</p> <p>During the third quarter of 2010, parties including DP, NRM, FDC and UPC held internal party elections and primaries. On the index, however, IRI is only awarding one point to the FDC for holding primary elections, due to the high incidence of violence and malpractice in the NRM elections and the weak process of the DP and UPC elections.</p>
	<p><i>Indicator 2.3: Percentage of USG-assisted CSOs able to develop, implement, monitor, and evaluate annual strategic plans</i></p>	<p>At the end of first quarter 2010, it was reported that with technical assistance from NDI, one CSO, NWASEA, is able to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate its strategic plan. Three CSOs, AICODE, Awake Ankole, and Bumakwe is able to develop, implement, and monitor their plans. Five CSOs, PIRD, ADIPU, ASDI, YAPI, and Tweyambe are able to develop and implement strategic plans.</p> <p>At the end of second quarter 2010, with technical assistance from NDI, all 19 CSO partners were able to develop an annual strategic plan, 17 were capable of implementing their plans, 12 could monitor their plans, and four were able to evaluate their plans.</p> <p>By the end of second quarter 2010, with technical assistance from NDI, all 19 CSO partners are able to develop an annual strategic plan, 18 are capable of implementing their plans, nine can monitor their plans, and two are able to evaluate their plans.</p> <p>At the end of third quarter 2010, with technical assistance from NDI, all 19 CSO partners are able to develop an annual strategic plan, 17 are capable of implementing their plans, 12 can monitor their plans, and four are able to evaluate their plans.</p>
	<p><i>Indicator 2.4: Number of individuals who receive USG-assisted political party</i></p>	<p>At the end of first quarter 2010 A total of 213 people received political party training during the quarter (162 men and 51 women).</p> <p>Second quarter 2010 a total of 546 individuals received USG-assisted political party training during the</p>

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
	<p><i>training (GJD Indicator)</i></p> <p><i>Indicator 2.5: Number of instances USG-assisted political parties and political groupings articulate platform and policy agendas</i></p>	<p>quarter, including 405 men and 141 women. This includes training in message development, campaign planning for women and youth and party poll agents in advance of the Mukono North by-election.</p> <p>At the end of third quarter 2010 a total of 452 individuals received USG-assisted political party training during the quarter, including 301 men and 151 women. This includes training for IPC members who participated in sessions on building the IPC at the district level.</p> <p>At the end of first quarter 2010 the DP-affiliated FAD produced a draft research report on improving smallholder agricultural productivity. Other parties did not conduct significant activities in this indicator during this quarter due to the need to focus on delegates' conferences, inter-party dialogue, and a busy legislative agenda.</p> <p>At the end of second quarters 2010 the UPC produced a revised short policy paper on employment, with the support of IRI in drafting and revision. It also began its process of producing an agricultural policy paper to support its agricultural policy position. Other parties did not conduct significant activities in this indicator during this quarter due to organizing delegates' conferences, inter-party dialogue, and a busy legislative agenda.</p> <p>At the end of third quarter 2010 the UPC policy consultant produced a draft policy paper on agriculture, which discussed strategic approaches to reforming agricultural extension and boosting agricultural productivity. Consultants for other parties worked within their policy expertise and policy recommendations and drafts will be forthcoming early in the next quarter.</p>
<p><u>Result 3: Improved constituent relations/representation by parties and CSOs</u></p> <p>Requirements:</p> <p>Major political parties have strengthened constituency relations</p> <p>Increased voice of the people in effective advocacy for reform</p> <p>Illustrative Target:</p> <p>At least 70% of constituents surveyed have strong links with parties</p>	<p><i>Indicator 3.1: Number of activities conducted by USG-assisted CSOs that strengthen political participation and civic education</i></p>	<p>In the last quarter 2009 the following were achieved;</p> <p>Women's Democracy Group meetings with local CSO's on women's issues to advance gender issues and political participation;</p> <p>Small grants to district CSOs to implement activities delineated in proposals;</p> <p>Youth radio programs and public dialogs to support youth engagement in the political process;</p> <p>Convening of democracy promotion meetings every quarter to coordinate efforts of NGOs, CSOs, and political leaders;</p> <p>Support to CSO district partners in analyzing their opinion research and developing presentations that form the basis for advocacy campaigns to government and political leaders;</p> <p>Support to caucuses to consider and move electoral law reform agendas brought forward by the IPC and CCEDU;</p> <p>Debates and mentoring sessions with young women at universities to identify, mentor, and groom future women leaders in politics; and</p>

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
<p>At least four Government actions per year are influenced by advocacy</p>		<p>Support for partner advocacy initiatives at the district and national level on disability issues.</p> <p>In the first quarter 2010 the eight district dialogs between parties, CSOs and the EC engaged party leaders, civic organizations, religious leaders, and other groups in working towards free and fair elections. It also supported the creation of peaceful participation through dialogue between political rivals.</p> <p>Two NDI district partners, NACWOLA and PAG, completed data analysis reports based on the results of data collection activities. The reports will educate citizens on pressing issues in their communities. Communities and CSOs will also use the reports to advocate local government officials to address the issues.</p> <p>Same in the first quarter 2010 five CSOs created advocacy plans: YAPI; AICODE; UWESO; WACANE; and REAP. Each organization, to varying extents, took into account the results of previously collected survey data in these plans. The advocacy plans will link local issues with local government and opinion leaders for action to be taken.</p> <p>By the end of second quarters 2010 Caritas, KUDUP, NACWOLA, REAP, Tweyambe and WACANE conducted 31 civic education activities, reaching over 200 local government officials, community leaders and citizens interested in public services in four target districts.</p> <p>By second quarter 2010 With IRI support, Y+PN conducted six activities this quarter that sought to strengthen the political participation and civic education of women. The five mentoring sessions provided young women with skills and confidence to assume leadership roles in their universities and elsewhere. The Facebook group allowed young women to build a community of peers devoted to increasing women's participation in political leadership and connected them with role models as they seek to increase their political and civic participation.</p> <p>By second quarters 2010 IRI's district partner NGO forums hosted twelve district dialogs between parties, CSOs and the EC engaged party leaders, civic organizations, religious leaders, and other groups in working towards free and fair elections. It also supported the creation of peaceful participation through dialogue between political rivals.</p> <p>At the end of second quarters 2010 the four advocacy campaigns carried out by IRI small grants recipients during the quarter strengthened political participation and civic engagement. Examples include the advocacy for the by-law for deaf persons in Kumi, the petition by parents of disabled children in Masaka, youth advocacy on resource allocation with district governments in Bushenyi and advocacy on service delivery in Arua.</p> <p>In the third quarter 2010 NWASEA held a meeting with the sub-county chairperson, the sub-county speaker, opinion leaders, and technical sub-county staff that yielded pledges of increased coordination among local officials and improved services in local health and educational facilities. NWASEA also held a meeting on January 14 to follow up on commitments made in the January 8 meeting. To connect commitments made at the sub-county level to the district level, NWASEA met with the district speaker, social service (education</p>

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
	<p data-bbox="531 1008 842 1122"><i>Indicator 3.2: Percentage of target party district branches with improved party grassroots activity</i></p>	<p data-bbox="852 280 1957 337">and health) secretary, and representatives from district health services, a representative of district education officer, the chief administrative officer, and the community development officer.</p> <p data-bbox="852 354 1957 443">In the third quarter 2010, KUDUP, WACANE, AICODE, NWASEA, ADIPU, and PIRD conducted 14 civic education activities, reaching over 200 local government officials, community leaders and citizens interested in public services in target districts.</p> <p data-bbox="852 459 1957 662">With IRI support third quarter 2010, Y+PN conducted five activities this quarter that sought to strengthen political participation and civic education among women. Three mentoring sessions provided young women with the skills and confidence to assume leadership roles in their universities and elsewhere. A Face book group allowed young women to build a community of peers devoted to increasing women’s participation in political leadership and connected them with role models that will be helpful as they seek to increase their political and civic participation. The printed materials provided women with helpful references that will be useful as they seek to expand their leadership careers.</p> <p data-bbox="852 678 1957 800">In 3rd quarter 2010 IRI’s district partner NGO forums hosted ten district dialogs between parties, CSOs and the EC, which engaged party leaders, civic organizations, religious leaders, and other groups working towards free and fair elections. These dialogs also supported the conduct of peaceful participation through communication between political rivals.</p> <p data-bbox="852 816 1957 995">In 3rd quarter 2010 IRI’s youth partners Y+PN and UYONET held three public dialogs on youth employment and other youth issues. These dialogs supported youth to become more engaged in governance and policymaking processes in Apac, Arua, and Kasese Districts. The youth, under UYONET, also held a national youth conference to develop the National Youth Manifesto. Finally, the youth released their youth manifesto and held a press conference to generate publicity on their initiative. In the youth arena, IRI supported a total of six activities that strengthened political participation.</p> <p data-bbox="852 1011 1957 1214">In the first quarter 2010 Party branches in the target districts demonstrated a high level of activity during the quarter, with 24 of 28 districts (86 percent) carrying out party activities, a slight increase from 79 percent in the previous quarter, and a significant increase from the baseline of 18 percent (5 of 28). DP Arua, Apac, and Iganga and UPC Iganga were the only party branches that held no activities. DP’s limited activities are partly explainable by the debilitating internal conflicts at the national level that have seeped down to the grassroots. IRI substituted UPC Nebbi for UPC Masaka due to the failure of the Masaka branch to conduct any activities.</p> <p data-bbox="852 1230 1957 1320">In first quarter 2010 NRM and FDC continued to be the most active parties, and have functional offices in most districts. Party structures in all parties still mostly stop at the sub-county level to the extent that they are present.</p> <p data-bbox="852 1336 1957 1417">In second quarters 2010 , 21 of 28 target party district branches, or 75 percent of all target party district branches, demonstrated improved levels of party grassroots activity. The limited activity of UPC in Iganga, Masaka and Bushenyi and DP in Iganga, Kumi, Apac and Bushenyi accounted for the slight decline in party</p>

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
		<p>grassroots activity.</p> <p>By second quarters 2010 DP Arua demonstrated considerable initiative in getting young people in urban areas to register to vote. NRM completed an impressive nationwide registration drive in advance of party primaries. FDC launched a nationwide drive to enhance local structures, improving the institutionalization of FDC countrywide. Although UPC and DP continue to face difficulties in opening and maintaining district offices, NRM and FDC have demonstrated initiative to keep most of their offices open in target districts.</p> <p>In the third quarter 2010, 25 of 28 target party district branches, or 89 percent of all target party district branches, demonstrated improved levels of party grassroots activity. The limited activity of UPC in Iganga and DP in Apac and Iganga accounted for the only blank spots in a flurry of busy party activity during which parties held internal elections and primaries (Note: IRI has substituted UPC-Nebbi for UPC-Masaka due to the weakness of UPC in Masaka).</p> <p>FDC was able to use the membership registers developed with support from IRI to hold more effective and less problematic primaries. Lack of consensus on valid membership registers helped to undermine NRM primary processes in some areas. UPC, FDC, and NRM have all strengthened their local party structures through the holding of primary elections.</p>
<p><u>Result 4: Increased Confidence in Electoral System</u></p> <p>Requirements:</p> <p><i>Increased confidence in the electoral process</i></p> <p><i>Effective electoral reform legislation is developed and implemented</i></p> <p><i>Increased awareness of electoral systems and processes</i></p> <p>Illustrative Targets:</p>	<p><i>Indicator 3.3: Number of local mechanisms supported with USG assistance for citizens to engage their sub-national government (GJD).</i></p> <p><i>Indicator 4.1: Number of proposals drafted by CSOs, parties, and members of parliament addressing electoral law reform.</i></p>	<p>By the end of second quarters 2010, 15 local dialogue meetings engaged sub-national government officials on a variety of issues including education, agriculture, gender and disability rights.</p> <p>By the end of third quarter 2010 ten dialogs on the electoral process and three dialogs on youth employment, supported by IRI, constituted the 13 local mechanisms for citizens to engage their sub-national government.</p> <p>In the last quarter of 2009 the following were achieved under result4;</p> <p>Facilitation of CSO and political party dialogue on comparative analysis of electoral reform options ahead of the 2011 polls;</p> <p>Creation and publicizing of a public hotline to report electoral irregularities;</p> <p>Technical support to the secretariat of DEMGROUP on identifying and documenting irregularities;</p> <p>Workshops for long-term observers on their roles and responsibilities;</p> <p>Technical support to DEMGROUP on audits of voter rolls;</p> <p>Support for the creation of all election monitoring materials; and</p> <p>Dialogs between parties and the Electoral Commission on the electoral process.</p> <p>By the end of first quarter 2010, IRI's activities resulted in two presentations to parliament this quarter to</p>

SMD Program Goal and Objectives	Objectives as per NDI and IRI Program Plans	Results Achieved (According to Progress Reports)
<p>Critical legislation passed in good time prior to the elections</p> <p>70% of constituents in identified districts have increased awareness of multi-party democracy</p> <p>Code of Conduct and Inter-party forum established and operational</p>	<p><i>Indicator 4.2: Number of domestic election observers trained with USG assistance (Output- GJD)</i></p>	<p>address electoral law reform. UJCC made a submission to the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee based on its pastoral letter entitled, “Towards Free and Fair Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Government Elections in 2011,” which it had developed with technical support from IRI. Also, the IPOD’s proposal on electoral reform contained issues that the IPC had developed under its research on electoral reform supported by IRI.</p> <p>No proposals were drafted by third quarter of 2010 since the electoral law process was complete. However, CSOs, parties and members of the EC responded to issues raised during the process of displaying the voters register. Through their response they were able to make changes in the display process that addressed concerns raised by political parties and CSOs, thus effecting administrative and procedural reform.</p> <p>At the end of first quarter 2010, IRI deployed four domestic observers, through its partner the Kamuli District NGO Council, for the Budiope by-elections. IRI also trained 113 party polling agents on the use of the text message reporting system for election results in the Rukiga by-election (50 NRM agents and 63 FDC agents).</p> <p>By the end of second quarter 2010 188 people were trained on using and marketing the Uganda Watch 2011 system to report issues with the voter registration process.</p> <p>IRI provided training in use of its electronic tally system for the parliamentary by-elections in Mukono North to 146 members of the DP, including 120 men and 26 women.</p> <p>By the end of third quarter 2010, twenty-two regional coordinators and 215 constituency coordinators were trained on observation methods during the pre-campaign period.</p> <p>IRI trained no domestic election observers during the period.</p>

ANNEX 14: LIST OF DEMGROUP ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED BY SMD PROJECT

Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMGGroup)

NDI provide support to the DEMGroup, which is a domestic elections monitoring organization. NDI assisted DEMGroup with the following:

- The hiring process and orientation for its Executive Director and establishment of a Secretariat, recruiting candidates for regional supervisors and draft policies to guide organizational operations.
- Sent a DEMGroup board member, staff person, and consultant to a conference in Kenya to discuss the use of technology such as SMS, geographic information system (GIS) mapping, social networking, and the internet in improving the outcomes of election observation.
- Support to strengthen its proposal and budget for elections monitoring work which was submitted to various donors, including the Deepening Democracy Program (DDP)
- To roll out a strategy for conducting a voter registration audit (VRA)
- Established infrastructure for the citizen hotline that allow citizens to call and text concerns about electoral irregularities to DEMGroup
- Provided a Technology and Elections expert to assist with the vetting of IT candidates for DEMGroup, review of potential technology contractors for specific software development and maintenance, to identify software companies capable of merging the election observation data processing tools with crowd sourcing data tools to provide for easier data management and analysis and development of a management strategy for its technology needs
- Initiatives aimed at contributing to a free, open, and fair electoral environment, including efforts to audit Uganda's voter registry, train long-term observers to monitor the electoral stages, and develop a database to collect information from observers on the electoral environment in each region of the country.
- Assistance to develop training manuals, guidelines, and checklists to be used for observation during the voter display and natural justice periods in which the EC displays voter registry lists at each polling station and then holds hearings to receive complaints or feedback from the public. The checklists are used to guide observers through the monitoring process to highlight salient problem areas.
- Provided technical support to organize and conduct training of trainers (ToT) for long term observation (LTO) to 22 regional coordinators. Regional coordinators then trained constituency coordinators in their respective regions to observe the pre-campaign period.
- Provided support and expert advice to DEMGroup on reviewing their working paper on Uganda's electoral legal framework. The paper highlights the absence of regulations on campaign finance, election observation, and the recruitment of the electoral commission structure.

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