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WORKING PAPER

Evaluating the Impact of the Wula Nafaa Natural Resources Management Program in Senegal on the Distribution, Exercise, and Accountability of Power

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Executive Summary

Recognizing the need to improve governance in natural resource management (NRM) and development projects, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) developed the *Nature, Wealth and Power* (NWP) framework in 2002, which defined a set of guiding principles for project designers to “integrate nature (environmental management), wealth (economic concerns), and power (good governance)” (USAID, 2002). The NWP framework was put in practice in Senegal through the Wula Nafaa (Mandinka for *value of the forest*) project, a 5-year USAID NRM initiative launched to support sustainable rural development. The political context in Senegal at the time provided opportunities for a strong governance component of the project. As such, the “Power” component of Wula Nafaa’s NWP framework focused on supporting effective decentralization of NRM.

This retrospective report assesses how USAID interventions in Senegal implemented the NWP framework and examines the impacts of these interventions on environmental governance in Senegal. The Power component of the NWP framework defines environmental governance as “the distribution, exercise and accountability of power and authority over nature” (USAID, 2002:4). Using this definition, this report presents USAID efforts to improve environmental governance in the last 10 years. To assess impacts of these efforts in the absence of baseline data or performance indicators, this assessment focuses on case studies from the forestry sector, where USAID has long been involved and where project interventions were best documented. The main case study used for this work is the charcoal commodity chain.

Commodity chain analysis is used as a method to identify power changes, and quantify them through changes in value distribution among categories of players involved in the chain (*e.g.*, producers, merchants, retailers). The charcoal value chain was selected for a number of reasons, including data availability before the Wula Nafaa project started. This data was updated in February-April 2013, which allowed charting the changes in income distribution at different nodes in the commodity chain before and after the major USAID intervention in this sector, the Wula Nafaa project. This analysis is completed with qualitative data on the charcoal sector and on another forest commodity, the baobab fruit (also known as monkey bread), available in academic and project literature, including USAID project evaluations conducted in the last twenty years.

The survey for this assessment shows that almost all local producers perceive that Wula Nafaa enabled them to enter the charcoal market and break charcoal merchants’ domination. Producers felt that the project had either “freed them from charcoal merchants’ vile prices” or allowed a significant price increase, from 400-600 to 1,500-1,750 F CFA per sack on the roadside (Faye, 2013). **These changes represent radical income improvements for local producers.** This assessment also finds that, in spite of this progress, many problems still weaken environmental governance at the local level. Local elected councils, legally in charge of forest management, are still not able to exercise their official authority over charcoal production in their forests; or to respond to their constituents’ insistent request to increase production by local producers or access to the lucrative urban markets.

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List of Acronyms

ARD	Regional Development Agency (<i>Agence Régionale de Développement</i>)
CBNRM	Community-Based Natural Resource Management
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CFA	<i>Communauté Financière Africaine</i>
CSO	Civil-Society Organization
CR	Rural Council (<i>Conseil Rural</i>)
CT	Territorial Collectives (<i>Collectivité Territoriale</i>)
DGL-Felo	Democracy and Local Governance —Progress
DGP	Democracy and Governance Program
GAF	Accounting and Financial Management
GIE	Economic Interest Group (Groupement d'Intérêt Economique)
GOS	Government of Senegal
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NRM	Natural Resource Management
NWP	Nature, Wealth and Power
PAGERNA	Self-promotion and Natural Resource Management Project (<i>Projet d'Auto-Promotion et de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles</i>)
PERACOD	Rural Electrification and Household Energy Supply Program
PNDL	Participatory Local Development Project (<i>Programme National de Développement Local</i>)
PRECOL	Local Authorities Development Program
PROGEDE	Sustainable and Participatory Energy Management Program
PAF	Forest Management Plan (<i>Plan d'Aménagement Forestier</i>)
PCR	President of Rural Council
SAGIC	Support for Accelerated Growth and Increased Competitiveness
TWG	Technical Working Group
USAID	United States Aid Agency

Introduction

In the late 1990s, many scholars and project evaluators criticized how natural resources projects addressed governance needs: most projects acknowledged governance problems, but few articulated how they could be addressed, and even fewer provided sufficient budget to address them (Acedo, 1995; Lichte, 1999; Murombedzi, 1999; Hickey and Mohan, 2005; Béné and Neiland, 2006). Poor governance, generally qualified as insufficient technical abilities of public agents, limited organizational capacity, unresponsive governments and corruption, is still often taken as an exogenous factor in project design, and left for governance programs to address (Acedo, 1995; Lichte, 1999). Given this prevalent characterization of the problem, governance programs tend to provide general trainings and equipment to public institutions; organize workshops with civil society organizations to “disseminate knowledge” and “increase accountability.” Improvements in the institutional, procedural and regulatory environment, that is, in the arrangements that can enable resource-dependent populations to influence and engage in decisions over the management and use of resources they depend on, are rare. The need to address these governance challenges in natural resource management and development projects has been repeatedly highlighted in the last 20 years, including by USAID program evaluations (Acedo, 1995; Lichte, 1999), in order to increase programmatic impacts and achieve ecologically and socially sustainable results.

Recognizing the need to improve governance, the *Nature, Wealth and Power* (NWP) framework, developed in 2002-2004, defined a set of guiding principles for project designers to “integrate nature (environmental management), wealth (economic concerns), and power (good governance)” (USAID, 2002). The NWP framework was put in practice in Senegal through the Wula Nafaa (Mandinka for *value of the forest*) project, a 5-year USAID natural resource management (NRM) initiative launched to support sustainable rural development. The political context in Senegal provided opportunities for a strong governance component in this new program: Senegal had adopted in 1996 several decentralization laws transferring to elected local governments significant responsibilities and power over natural resource management. Implementation of these laws was slow, with central State agencies reluctant to give up power, arguing that local councils were inexperienced, and therefore not fit to manage natural resources sustainably (Ribot, 2006 and Ribot, 2009).

Following the NWP initiative, the ‘Power’, or governance, component of Wula Nafaa therefore focused on supporting effective decentralization of NRM, building on lessons from a previous governance project supporting decentralization called DGL-Felo (Democracy and Local Governance —Progress; Felo is a local language translation for progress). Wula Nafaa activities on the Power component aimed at informing citizens, elected officials and public servants on the decentralization laws; training local governments to perform their basic duties (*e.g.*, create and execute a budget, levy taxes, establish bookkeeping and reporting procedures); supporting them in the provision of services to citizens, by setting up NRM management tools such as local conventions; and helping villagers organize into user groups to manage and exploit natural resources.

This report assesses how USAID interventions, mainly DGL-Felo and Wula Nafaa, effectively implemented the NWP framework and, doing so, how these interventions managed to durably improve environmental governance in Senegal. The Power component of the NWP framework defines environmental governance as “the distribution, exercise and accountability of power and authority over nature” (USAID, 2002:4). Environmental governance sets the conditions for control over and access to resources (USAID, 2002). The framework differentiates ‘power’ and ‘authority’ over natural resources. In this document, we use the term ‘authority’ to designate official authority given by laws; the term ‘power’ is used to discuss more broadly the ability to act, or to influence others, with or without official authority to do so. We hereby recognize that power is not the monopoly of those with official authority. Hence, state-recognized authorities are one set of actors exercising power, but not the only one: knowledge, social status, economic resources are other vehicles that may transcend government hierarchies – and may, of course, also establish hierarchies of their own. These actors are considered to be involved in good governance when they are accountable to citizens.

Accountability is the ability to sanction. So, it is defined here as the relation between a constituency’s preferences expressed to actors who govern (or wield power), and the outcomes of decisions made by these actors. Constituencies sanction positively or negatively to influence those who govern. Accountability is an important element in the NWP framework, since it is a key means by which actors who hold powers (state authorities and others) can be made to respond to the needs and aspirations of affected populations. Accountability to the law and to higher levels of government is also important in the exercise of the powers that local actors hold. These latter, upward accountabilities define and also constrain the powers that local actors can exercise.

If shifts in the distribution of official authority and of official lines of accountability can easily be tracked through changes in laws and regulations, assessing shifts in the distribution of power demand more creative strategies. There are always large gaps between law and practice, making the analysis of practice as important as the analysis of laws and regulations. Measuring changes in the actual exercise and accountability of power or authority is a difficult task. This assessment relies largely on case studies to unpack evolving practices. But these studies have limited geographic scope and do not always provide sufficient cross-time comparisons. More significantly, it is difficult to separate the effects of USAID efforts from the many other forces operating on the configuration of authority in the local arena (*e.g.* other projects and changes in prices and availability of resources in the zone). These problems can make it difficult to produce a thorough assessment of USAID impacts on environmental governance. Nevertheless, Wula Nafaa’s intervention zone does have a number of high quality case studies that the assessment draws on.

This report focuses on case studies from the forestry sector, where Wula Nafaa has been involved from its launch and which is the best-documented aspect of the program’s interventions. The main case study used for this work is the charcoal commodity chain. We use commodity chain analysis as a method to identify power changes, and quantify them through changes in value distribution among categories of players involved in the chain (*e.g.*, producers, merchants, retailers). The charcoal value chain was selected for a number of reasons, including data availability before the Wula Nafaa project started; this data was updated in February-April 2013 to provide a comparison point. This analysis is completed with

qualitative data on the charcoal sector and on another forest commodity, the baobab fruit (also known as monkey bread), available in academic and project literature, including USAID project evaluations conducted in the last twenty years. The survey for the charcoal commodity shows that almost all local producers perceive that Wula Nafaa enabled them to enter the charcoal market and break charcoal merchants' domination. Producers felt that the project had either "freed them from charcoal merchants' vile prices" or allowed a significant price increase, from 400-600 to 1,500-1,750 F CFA per sack on the roadside (Faye, 2013). These changes represent radical income improvements for local producers.

This report starts with a discussion on the methods used for this assessment (section I) and a presentation of background information (section II). Section III is organized around the three components of environmental governance as defined in the NWP framework: it describes how USAID interventions tried to change the distribution, exercise and accountability of power and authority in natural resource management (NRM). This section will look at actors with authority or power—who they are responsive to, and how they are held accountable. Section IV assesses the actual impacts of USAID interventions in the charcoal commodity chain. Changes in the value captured by villagers in the charcoal value chain will be used as a proxy for the outcomes of USAID interventions to change the distribution, exercise and accountability of power and authority. Examples from the baobab fruit market will be used to balance conclusions from the charcoal sector. The last section provides a synthesis of USAID actions and results with respect to the six guiding principles enunciated in the NWP framework,¹ and concludes.

Section I – Methods

The purpose of this study is to assess changes in the distribution, exercise and accountability of power over natural resources that can be associated with USAID interventions implemented in the last 10 to 30 years. This study was not designed as a program evaluation, as defined in the USAID Evaluation Policy (USAID, 2011). Previous evaluations and impact assessment have been conducted in Senegal with regards to governance in the NRM sector, including for a USAID project called DGL-Felo (described further in this document). These evaluations were conducted several years after the concerned projects

¹ The six guiding principles are:

- a. Strengthen procedural rights for rural people
- b. Improve rural representation and amplify rural voices in public decisions that affect their lives and well being
- c. Distribute environmental authority and functions to institutions best positioned to exercise them
- d. Transfer environmental powers to authorities representative of and accountable to local populations
- e. Explore a minimum environmental standards approach
- f. Encourage checks and balances, pluralistic approaches, and conflict management

had closed to capture lasting impacts on the local governance systems. The present study will draw on these evaluations, while using the specific angle of the Nature, Wealth and Power framework. While we try to understand what changes USAID interventions may have influenced environmental governance observed in Senegal in the last 30 years, the scope of this assessment is not to establish scientifically causality—if it ever could be established in matters of governance.

This section presents the method used in this study to identify where and how changes occurred, as well as the limitations and shortcomings of this method.

1. Commodity chain analysis to identify and understand changes in environmental governance

USAID activities in Senegal, particularly Wula Nafaa, were documented through a large number of surveys, studies and project reports which provided useful context information for this study. Many of these reports included insights of external experts and project beneficiaries on project performance and design, thereby reflecting a variety of perceptions beyond USAID project staff's.

While relying on these reports for contextual information, this assessment needed additional information to get a sense of whether, and how, the legal or process changes brought by USAID projects in governance did materialize into systemic changes in the distribution and exercise of power; and whether governments did deliver to better meet the interests and preferences of rural populations identified by USAID as the ultimate project beneficiaries.

To respond to these questions, this study chose to focus on one natural resource—forest commodities—rather than spread resources over all resources addressed in USAID interventions over the last 30 years. The distribution of power varies with the type of natural resources: water, forest and fisheries are sectors organized quite differently. The findings of this assessment may therefore not reflect changes in water governance. This study will show that, even within one type of resource, governance systems can vary widely as well: factors such as resource availability, technical skills for harvest or extraction, transportation options, the way buyers are organized, also determine the distribution of power between producers, traders, buyers and public authorities.

The method used here to trace the distribution, exercise and accountability of power within the forest sector is the commodity chain analysis. Commodity chain analysis is “a method for analyzing how and for whom market conduits operate” (Ribot, 1998). This analysis identifies each actor involved in the commercialization of a natural resource from extraction to its final users; measures the distribution of income and expenses amongst them, as well as the “dynamics of control and maintenance of access” to the resource enabling each actor to derive commercial benefit from it (Ribot, 1998).

Because commodity chain analysis looks at the three components of the NWP framework, it is particularly well suited to the present assessment. Assessing governance changes at the commodity-chain level offers a better view of articulations between power, wealth (*e.g.*, changes in revenue distribution among parties within a commodity chain) and nature (*e.g.*, changes in management of the commodity). Additionally, the commodity chain analysis was a tool used in several USAID projects,

including Wula Nafa and SAGIC (Support for Accelerated Growth and Increased Competitiveness), for both project design and project evaluation purposes.

The choice of commodities to focus on was determined by two factors: availability of data before and after USAID interventions on these commodities; and characteristics of the commodity chains. The charcoal commodity chain is an obvious candidate for a number of reasons. First, Wula Nafaa heavily invested to support sustainable participatory forest management and villagers' access to the charcoal market. The charcoal business is quite lucrative given the high demand for this commodity in the country's major cities, in particular Dakar; since 1998, rural communities have the right to decide how much charcoal can be produced in their forests and by whom, but without project support, these communities have been unable to realize this right in practice.

The charcoal value chain also provides insights across the three components of the NWP framework: charcoal production is the most-profitable activity related to forest management in many Wula Nafaa project sites; the Government of Senegal sees woodcutting for wood-fuel as the primary source of forest degradation in Senegal; woodcutting for wood-based fuel production is also a central concern of the decentralization laws of 1996, which mention forest resources more than other natural resources. Finally, the structure of the charcoal business in Senegal makes it a particularly interesting case study to analyze power distribution: an oligopolistic market, on which central state authorities had extensive influence (Ribot, 1999); and a profitable business, thereby attracting interest from the wealthy and powerful.

Finally, detailed data on the charcoal commodity chain is available on the period of time that immediately preceded USAID engagement in this sector, which is not the case of other forest commodities in Senegal. More recent data was therefore gathered to obtain a cross-time comparison in project and non-project sites. The method used to gather new data is presented later in this section.

2. Charcoal commodity chain survey method

A mix of qualitative and quantitative data was used to create an understanding of both measured impact and process. Questionnaires were given to various actors in the sector, and interviews were sought with those who have influence over the policies and management regulating the sector. The work was divided into two parts: a survey of the actors in the main production region, Tambacounda, and another of the urban actors involved in the charcoal commodity chain. The questionnaires were tested from February 26 to 28, then adjusted between March 1 and 2. The actual survey took place during the remainder of March 2013, in both Dakar and Tambacounda.

The objective of the quantitative portion of the survey was to collect data to estimate the actors' net income and expenses at every level of the chain. The survey also aimed to identify and evaluate the factors influencing the vertical and horizontal distribution of net income among the different actors. The survey was conducted in Wula Nafaa project areas, and in areas where PROGEDE, another major project (further described hereafter), was working with similar objectives as Wula Nafaa with regards to the charcoal sector. For local producers, we sought to survey at least 12 individuals in Wula Nafaa and 12

individuals in PROGEDE areas. For other actors involved in the charcoal commodity chain, at least 12 actors were surveyed.²

Qualitative data was collected through interviews with representatives of the main institutions involved in the Wula Nafaa project or with charcoal sector regulation (*e.g.*, Forest Service). In addition to providing reports and possible interview contacts, project staff from USAID-Wula Nafaa, PROGEDE and a third project called PERACOD (another project involved in charcoal production, further described hereafter) also provided input on the effectiveness of policies implemented with the goal of achieving a better integration of local populations in the charcoal sector.

The overall objective of this study was to chart the changes in income at different nodes in the charcoal commodity chain since before the decentralization laws were enacted in forestry in order to see if decentralization laws and the programs that were supported by USAID and the World Bank resulted in greater income for rural producers and whether it presented them with a greater share of the market profits in charcoal. This was achieved by comparison with earlier commodity chain studies conducted in 1987, 1994 and 2002-3.

The Forest Service (*Eaux et Forêts*), provided statistics on logging and charcoal production. While the representatives with whom we were in contact agreed to answer questions and provide additional background, they were not available for follow-up questions: the reasons varied from business travel and meetings, to new employees replacing those we had originally contacted.

3. Limitations and shortcomings

In spite of its many advantages, the method used in this assessment presents a number of practical and conceptual shortcomings. Practical limitations stemmed from the contrast between the wide scope of this study—assessing 30 years of USAID interventions in multiple NRM-related sectors—and the necessarily more limited means available to carry out this assessment. Initially designed as a desk-review only, this assessment was later expanded to include a field survey to address the scarcity of cross-time data on governance issues on one commodity. Ideally, similar work on other commodity chains would have been necessary to grasp sectorial differences.

The sample size for charcoal commodity chain survey is limited, with only 12 to 15 questionnaire responses for each type of actor involved in the chain (this will be further explained in Section IV). The survey could only be conducted in one of the three main charcoal production regions in Senegal. Because all major charcoal production regions did receive some form of project support (by USAID, another organization or multiple organizations), comparing the USAID project area to an area without

² In addition, this survey found a new type of actors in the chain: local residents, called *depositaires légaux*, authorized by the Forest Service to produce charcoal from woods lopped for fire-prevention purposes (they enter the charcoal business occasionally, and are therefore not reflected as an actor of the value chain in this document).

project support was impossible. In the absence of a true control group, we opted to compare the USAID project area to the World Bank project area.

Conceptual limitations pertain to using the charcoal value chain as the main basis to assess changes in environmental governance: the charcoal value chain, because it is highly political and politicized, may not be representative of other forest commodities. Rural Councils' (CRs') legal authority may not be disputed as much; constraints on villagers' access to other markets, such as *fonio*, gum Arabic, baobab fruit, are likely different from the factors limiting their access to the charcoal market—distance from roads and markets, lack of information on potential buyers, scarce credit availability, inadequate organization of the value chain may be more or less of a constraint for different forest products. To account for these differences, information on these other forest products will be used whenever possible throughout this report to illustrate changes in environmental governance. The lack of detailed, quantified data on these commodities is, however, a major limitation to their use in this assessment. Moreover, just as these commodities may present a very different picture of power dynamics from charcoal, some may not provide much insight on power dynamics precisely because they are less attractive to those with power. The Power component of the NWP framework is most relevant where there are struggles over control and access to resources.

Section II – Background

This section presents the context in which USAID interventions took place over the last 30 years, with an emphasis on the last 10 years. Despite steady progress toward freedom and political competition, confirmed by a peaceful regime change in March 2012, “gaps in the rule of law and the lack of good governance practices constitute the weakest parts of Senegalese democracy” (Gellar *et al.*, 2004: 6). Acknowledging this reality, donors have heavily invested to increase capacity within state administration and civil society alike, hoping to create new incentives for more responsive and efficient government. Decentralization was considered a major part of this process, while also responding to the need for the Government of Senegal (GOS), facing serious financial difficulties since the 1980s, to significantly reduce operating costs.

Although the USAID mission in Senegal did not play a major role to encourage the adoption of decentralization laws before 1996, it has consistently supported their implementation through AID-funded governance, agriculture and NRM programs. During the 1995-2005 decade, the World Bank and the German and French cooperation agencies also supported the implementation of decentralization laws. A total of 19 projects were financed by international aid agencies, including 11 directly benefiting CRs—not including additional support provided through sectorial projects like Wula Nafaa.

Some of these programs are further described in this section. The last two parts of this section provide more specific information regarding the two commodity chains that will be used as case studies: the charcoal and baobab fruit commodity chains.

4. Political context over the last 30 years

Senegal has a long history of de-concentration reforms, dating back to colonial times. These reforms are often coined as decentralization reforms, while they merely delegated power from central authorities to centrally appointed local administrators (see Box 1 for a definition of decentralization and de-concentration). Those administrators were *ordonnateurs* in the 1964 law, and *préfets* in the 1975 law establishing rural communes (Piveteau, 2005). Over the last 30 years, Senegal however took important steps to formally transfer decision-making authority over daily administration tasks to elected local governments: a law adopted in 1990 allowed, for the first time, mayors and rural councils to manage their communes; their decisions, however, were still submitted to oversight and approval (called ‘prior control’) by the *préfet*, thereby maintaining central state control over local decisions and politics. The 1996 decentralization law lifted the prior control rule: since, a control of the legality of local government decisions is performed *a posteriori*.³ The law 96-07 of 7 March 1996 also extended the area of competence of local government to nine domains, including NRM and land-use planning.⁴ Any responsibility transferred from the central state to local government was to be supported with the transfer of corresponding resources and means (see Box 2 for a history of decentralization in Senegal).⁵

Box 1: Decentralization and de-concentration

Decentralization is any act by which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political administrative and territorial hierarchy.

Democratic Decentralization or **Political Decentralization** (sometimes called Devolution) occurs when powers and resources are transferred to authorities representative of and accountable to local populations. These are typically elected local governments. Democratic decentralization aims to increase public participation in local decision-making. Democratic decentralization is an institutionalized form of the participatory approach. Of the two primary forms of decentralization, democratic decentralization is considered the stronger and the one from which theory indicates the greatest benefits can be derived.

Deconcentration or **Administrative Decentralization** concerns transfers of power to local branches of the central state, such as prefects, administrators, or local technical line ministry agents. These upwardly accountable bodies are appointed local administrative extensions of the central state. They may have some downward accountability built into their functions, but their primary responsibility is to central government. Deconcentration is considered the weaker form of decentralization because downward accountability is not as well established as in the democratic or political form of decentralization.

Source: Ribot (2002)

In 1998, the Forest Code was reformed to incorporate changes brought by the 1996 decentralization laws: it confirmed the right for local government (*collectivités locales*) to administer non-gazetted public

³ Except for a few important matters, including land use decisions over national lands.

⁴ The nine domains are: state land registry (*domaines*), environment and natural resource management, health and social welfare, youth sports, culture, education, planification, land use planning, urban planning and habitat.

⁵ RDS, Law 96-07 of 7 March 1996, article 5.

domain forests (called *domaine forestier de l'Etat*), and enabled them to enter agreements with the Forest Service and co-manage areas within Government gazetted forests (*forêts classées*).⁶

These changes significantly altered the distribution of power and authority between central government technical and administrative services, and local government. The local representatives of central government, *Préfets* and *Sous-Préfets* alike, were stripped of the roles that had made them the most powerful local actors. The Forest Service, which monopolized decisions relating to every forest in the country, was to become a technical advisor to Rural Council Presidents (PCRs). State representatives, whose authority had been uncontested since colonial times, and whose power had been extended and deepened by decades of de-concentration reforms, have resisted these decentralization reforms. They used a whole “repertoire of resistance” strategies (Poteete and Ribot, 2011) to prevent CRs from exercising the authority legally given to them. This was particularly clear with forest management and charcoal production.

In practice, implementation of decentralization has been slow. Responsibilities have been transferred to CRs without the legally mandated “transfer from the State of the resources and means necessary for the normal exercise of these powers.”⁷ A recent World Bank study found that for most Regions, Communes and Rural Councils “only four out of the nine assigned functions receive grants (education, health, youth and sport, and culture). The other functions are not compensated by a grant as is statutorily required” (Guilbert G. and Taugourdeau E., 2013).

Local government is authorized by law to raise local taxes but they lack financial management skills and collection capacity. Tax recovery rates are low, except for high-yield taxes such as taxes on companies. A sign that decentralization exists more on paper than in reality: “The levels of local spending are the same as they were before decentralization.” (Guilbert G. and Taugourdeau E., 2013: 234). In the forestry sector, the Forest Service has been reluctant to let CRs fulfill their new mandate over forests, arguing that they do not have the capacity to enforce the law and manage their forests sustainably.

⁶ Changes brought in the 1998 Forest Code are described in more details in Section III on the distribution of power and authority.

⁷ Law 96-06, Art. 6.

Box 2: History of Decentralization in Senegal

“Senegal inherited an embryonic system of territorial collectivities (*collectivités territoriales* hereafter CTs) at the end of the 19th century, molded on the national system of the former colonial power, France. In 1873, the country had four fully functioning communes (municipalities): Dakar, Gorée, Rufisque, and Saint- Louis. The year 1903 saw the creation of 20 “mixed communes” where the office of mayor was held by a centrally appointed municipal administrator.

Upon independence in 1960, decentralization gained more of a foothold: the number of communes gradually increased to 37 and then 48, while the special-status communes (“mixed communes”) were dissolved. A 1972 law established “rural communities” ... with a view to creating real centers for development. Their management was nonetheless entrusted to a subprefect. Finally, Dakar was given the status of urban community, which was later dissolved in 2001. Since then, Dakar has been a commune. Its territory comprises 19 arrondissement communes. In addition, since 2004, Dakar is a member of two intermunicipal structures created in lieu of the previous urban community.

Decentralization continued with successive reforms until the watershed year 1996, when 12 new communes were created and, more important, some key legislation was passed, including (a) Law 96-06 of February 5, 1996, on the Code of Local Government (*Code des collectivités locales*) and (b) Law 96-07 on the transfer of powers to these entities.

The 2001 Constitution enshrined the advances made in 1996 by strengthening their constitutional basis. In particular, it stipulated that the CTs “constitute the institutional framework for citizens’ participation in the management of public affairs”; “that they are freely administered by elected assemblies”; and that “their organisation, their composition and their functioning are determined by law.” Alongside the creation of these CTs, the central government has set up deconcentrated administrative entities: regions, départements, and arrondissements.”

For more information, see the decentralization 1972-2008 timeline in Annex 1.

Source: Gilbert G. and Taugourdeau E. (2013)

Donors stepped in after the laws were enacted to support implementation. Major governance programs included:

- The Participatory Local Development Project (*Programme National de Développement Local PNDL*): the World Bank was the first funding institution (US\$ 50 million) contributing to this 5-year program, which ended in 2012. The project provided institutional support to regional development agencies (ARDs), Communes and CRs, financed local infrastructure, health and education projects, and trained state agents, local government officials, community and private organization on decentralization and public management. PNDL extended to all 321 CRs and 52 of the poorest Communes.
- Support to the Local Authorities Development Program (PRECOL) by the World Bank (US\$ 80 million) with additional funds from the French cooperation agency (*Agence Française de Développement*), focused on urban areas. As with PNDL, it financed local infrastructure, health and education projects, and trained state agents, local government officials on infrastructure management. This project started in 2006 and was extended for its World Bank component until September 2013.

- The Decentralization and Local Governance Support program financed by USAID, which is further described below.

Support to decentralization was also integrated in sector-specific projects like World Bank's PROGEDE Wula Nafaa and the German projects PAGERNA and PERACOD in the forest sector. These projects are described in the next two subsections.

Despite these efforts, progress has remained disappointing. Many point to the lack of commitment by central authorities to release decision-making authority, especially in lucrative charcoal-producing areas (Poteete & Ribot, 2011; Ribot, 2006; Piveteau, 2005; Gellar *et al.*, 2004). This problem will be further explored in the present study.

5. USAID interventions to support environmental governance: from DGL-Felo to Wula Nafaa

USAID Senegal considers good governance as “foundational to achieve all other development objectives” (USAID CDCS, 2012-2016: 5). In the last thirty years, USAID Senegal has used two strategies to support governance improvements: before the early 2000s, governance was addressed as a separate program, not necessarily connected in objectives and activities to sectorial programs such as economic growth, health or education. Support to electoral processes, conflict resolution mechanisms and civil-society organizations, considered the ‘core’ of governance activities, constituted the bulk of governance activities.

In 1999, an evaluation of USAID's NRM programs called for cross-sectorial actions to address all factors constraining growth in the agricultural sector of Senegal: “Narrowly defined programs are not sufficient to increase agricultural production and rural incomes unless those programs work in an environment in which the basic enabling conditions for a productive and profitable agriculture already exist” (Acedo, 1995). Just as sectorial programs highlighted the need to address governance problems, a major USAID project in the Democracy and Governance Program, called DGL-Felo, showed that governance could be best improved through concrete improvements in key sectors such as NRM. This project, described in more detail below, incorporated activities aimed at “resolving real-life service delivery or resource management problems”: beside generic training and technical assistance, the program addressed governance issues that sector-specific USAID programs were facing, especially the natural resources management (NRM) program.

Building on this experience, and following the release of the Nature, Wealth and Power framework released at the same period (2002), the next large project within the USAID NRM program in Senegal, called Wula Nafaa, included an ambitious governance component. Since then, USAID support to good governance in Senegal is divided between a pure governance program, called the Democracy and Governance Program (DGP), and governance components embedded in sectorial programs (mainly Feed the Future and Economic Growth).

Democracy and Governance Program: Compared to USAID Senegal sectorial programs, the DGP has remained a program of modest size. Many interventions of the program aimed to support free and fair elections and are outside the scope of this study.

In 2000-2004, the main USAID project under this program was DGL-Felo (US\$14 million). This project laid the ground for most governance activities later implemented through Wula Nafaa. It covered 50 Local Communities in 9 of the 10 Regions of Senegal. It had five main objectives:

- Building local institutions' capacity;
- Increasing their access to financial resources;
- Increasing local populations' participation in the management and supervision of local affairs;
- Enhancing the effectiveness of the implementation of decentralization policies and regulations.

The strategy was to set up Technical Work Groups (TWG) representative of various sections of the community (*e.g.*, adult males but also women and youth), which identified development priorities, developed action plans and grant proposals. TWGs also helped mobilize community members for the implementation of these action plans (*e.g.*, organize forest fire control, solid waste management...). NRM activities were therefore only one aspect of the project.

At the end of DGL-Felo, a Senegal Democratic Governance Assessment (Gellar, Charlick & Thioub, 2004) conducted for USAID recommended that the DGP focus on non-governmental actors at all levels (national, local) to promote sound and transparent public financial management. The one area in which the Assessment recommended to work directly with the GOS was through election preparation activities (*e.g.*, public debates and inter-party communication). This recommendation was followed, as reflected in projects of the ongoing DGP (2012-2016):

- The three-year Decentralization, Governance and Transparency project (2009-2011) focused on fighting corruption, strengthening representation and local governance through greater citizen control. This project worked exclusively with civil society groups.
- The Governance and Peace program (2010-2014) supporting transparency, accountability of public institutions, and decentralization. Support to decentralization was mainly channeled through other existing programs in health, education, environment and water.
- The Peace in Casamance project focused on conflict resolution;

Governance as a component within sectorial programs: Governance components within sectorial programs cover a wide range of activities, from support to policy reform at the national level, to strengthening technical skills of local state services with responsibilities for implementing program-related actions. The degree to which governance activities are integrated with other components of a given program seems to vary. Since 2003, USAID interventions on NRM in Senegal have been channeled through the Wula Nafaa program. This program explicitly moved away from the technical, mono-sectorial approach used in previous NRM programs, and adopted the NWP framework to guide the project strategy. The five-year program started in January 2003 with a budget of US\$11.75 million. A second phase (Wula Nafaa II) extended the program until 2013, with a budget of US\$12.6 million.

In Wula Nafaa, governance activities focused on “creating, foresting and strengthening the capacities of new economic organizations such as producer groups, processing groups and producer networks” (Weidemann Associates, 2006). The program supported CRs to develop forest management plans and local conventions, and successfully pushed for a legal recognition of the latter (as further discussed in Section III of this study).

Toward the end of Wula Nafaa I, project staff recognized the need for broader institutional strengthening of CRs. New governance activities were added in Wula Nafaa II to enhance local capacity for planning, budgeting and financial management. The program sought to increase fiscal revenue for CRs and to develop accountability mechanisms through public scrutiny of CRs’ financial management.

6. Non-USAID projects supporting environmental governance improvements

A number of other NRM projects were implemented over the last 20 years that contributed to shape the context of USAID/Senegal interventions:

PROGEDE (World Bank)

The most important project in size and impact in the NRM sector is arguably PROGEDE I (1997-2004), followed by a transitory phase until 2008, and PROGEDE II (2011-2016). Financed by the World Bank (together with other bilateral funding⁸), PROGEDE aims to “contribute to increase the availability of diversified household fuels in a sustainable and gender equitable way, and to contribute to increase the income of participating communities while preserving the forest ecosystems.” (PROGEDE II PID, 2010). The project is under the *tutelle* of the Ministries of Energy and the Ministry of Forests, which means that project activities are implemented by these ministries with support from the World Bank.

PROGEDE I helped set up 378,000 ha of community-managed forests in the Tambacounda and Kolda regions (some areas overlapped with USAID’s Wula Nafaa project). It helped these communities form producer groups, trained them in charcoal production. These groups have sold the equivalent of 67,400 tons of charcoal per year (World Bank, 2006). The project also developed other forest-related income-generating activities such as apiculture cooperatives. According to the World Bank, PROGEDE I generated the equivalent of US\$ 40,000 per year for each of the 317 participating villages (World Bank, 2006).

PROGEDE II extended community-managed forest areas with new villages within Tambacounda and Kolda regions, and in two additional regions: Kedougou and Sedhiou.

The two phases of PROGEDE had strong governance components, mainly focusing on three objectives:

- *Ensuring that “a minimum policy platform” is in place to allow for sustainable forest management and fair distribution of revenue within the charcoal value chain: a key result of this*

⁸ PROGEDE I funders were: IDA, US\$ 5.2 million; DGIS (Dutch Co-operation), \$8.8 million; GEF, \$4.7 million. PROGEDE II funders are: IDA, US\$15 million; Nordic Development Fund, US\$ 4.37 million.

component has been the GOS order in March 2009 to eliminate the charcoal quota system, a practice that persisted in spite of the 1998 Forest Code that had already transferred the decision on charcoal production from the Forest Service to PCRs. The GOS order was put as a condition for the disbursement of the 2009 IDA Development Policy Operations

- *Reorganizing the charcoal trade to let communities enter the value chain by producing and selling charcoal directly to urban traders:* Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE also aligned here, while using different approaches. PROGEDE primarily worked with the Forest Service, which was the main project partner and beneficiary. PROGEDE also tried to address the regulatory barriers undermining local populations' access to charcoal trade. Wula Nafaa engaged more extensively with CRs and community-based organizations (e.g., user groups).
- *Supporting attitude changes within the Forest Service from a "para-military law enforcer agency" to a "technical assistance and capacity development agency with a participatory vocation" (World Bank, 2006).* This was also an objective of Wula Nafaa. In spite of PROGEDE claims that this objective was achieved (World Bank, 2006), results on this objective are mitigated at best: The Forest Service became a military organization in 2005.⁹ This reform was officially motivated by two main objectives: enable Forest Service agents to face increased life-threatening risks involved in their duty; improve efficacy of the Forest Service by revalorizing staff and strengthening discipline.¹⁰ In spite of the militarization, PROGEDE and Wula Nafaa evaluation reports argue that major changes were achieved in Forest Service staff attitude and perceptions of their own role. Perceptions gathered from CRs and villagers tend to differ, as indicated in Section IV of this document.

Given the institutional grounding of PROGEDE within the Ministry of Environment, the project mostly engaged the national Forest Service and its local branches in its first phase. Support to other institutions, such as CRs or regional development agencies, was minimal. This is an important difference with Wula Nafaa and was identified as a gap to be addressed in PROGEDE II.

PAGERNA and PERACOD (German Cooperation):

These two projects financed by the German cooperation agency (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, hereafter GIZ) included governance components that concurred with USAID investments: the *Projet d'Auto-promotion et de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles* (PAGERNA), a community-based natural resource management project in the Kaolack and Fatick Regions; and the Rural Electrification and Household Energy Supply Program (PERACOD), still ongoing, active in the Peanut Basin (including the Kaolack Region) and Casamance Regions.

⁹ Forest Services became a military organization per the Law 2005-10 of 3 August 2005. Forest agents had uniforms and guns before this law, but previous Forest Service efforts to be more friendly and closer to the rural populations seem to have ended after the law was passed, and all foresters came back to wearing uniforms (Ribot, comm. Pers., 2013).

¹⁰ Law 2005-10 of 3 August 2005, *Exposé des Motifs*.

PAGERNA was active from 1994-2003, running a total budget of 5.7 million euros. It was the first project in Senegal involving local villagers in forest management beyond merely seeking their participation in labor duties. In 1994, the Forest Service was still the only authority regulating forest management. Initially focused on training villagers on the need to protect forests and setting up community-managed protected woodlots, PAGERNA entirely revised its approach after the 1996 decentralization laws were enacted. Located in a region where forests were already scarce and heavily degraded (charcoal production had been suspended at the time), it helped CRs work with villagers to elaborate local conventions (*conventions locales*)¹¹ regulating the use of natural resources; after the 1998 Forest Code was enacted, the project also helped put together simple forest management plans allowing production in community forests (*forêts communautaires*). This approach, which involved intense participation by villagers and encouraged PCRs to play their role as defined in the law, generated hostility from the Forest Service. Project leaders compromised on several points to ease their resistance. A 2011 assessment (Robinson, 2011) of project results in the Kaolack Region showed that the project managed to change villagers' perception of the importance of managing forests sustainably, and the Forest Service's perception of its own role. Local conventions set up by the project are still being used to date (Robinson, 2011). Many features of this project were later found in Wula Nafaa.

PERACOD operates in the Peanut Basin and the Casamance Region of Senegal. The project started in 2004 and is planned to end in 2016. It is active in several sites of the PAGERNA project and explicitly builds on experiences there, although with a different focus: placed under the *tutelle* of the Ministry of Energy and Mines, with collaboration from the Ministry in charge of forests (*Ministère de l'Environnement et de la Protection de la Nature*), PERACOD aims to spread access to and use of sustainable energy sources in rural areas (solar energy and non-fossil fuels). One of the four project components called "Sustainable supply in domestic fuel" includes support to sustainable and participatory forest management. Several areas overlap with Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE project areas (Fatick, Kaolack, Ziguinchor and Kolda), although the number of communities involved is more limited than Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE. PERACOD expected to reach a total of 40 000 ha of forest under management at the end of 2012, against 487,000 ha for PROGEDE.¹² Wula Nafaa had helped set up community forests covering 77,000ha by 2008.¹³

¹¹ Local conventions are documents formalizing local rules of access and use of natural resources within a community, including sometimes a local land use plan. Usually drafted with external support from NGOs or aid agencies, local conventions aim to either modify or strengthen enforcement of oral or customary rules to encourage sustainable NRM practices. This approach to community-based NRM became popular with NGOs and donors involved in Sahel toward the end of the 1990s. PAGERNA was a precursor with this approach in Senegal.

¹² [PROGEDE II Implementation Status and Results Report](#), December 2012.

¹³ [Wula Nafaa I final report](#), May 2008, p.10.

Section III – USAID efforts to influence the Distribution, Exercise and Accountability of Power and Authority

This section presents USAID interventions to improve governance of natural resources through the lens of the NWP definition of environmental governance: the distribution, exercise and accountability of power and authority. Given the vast number of activities carried out by USAID within the last 30 years in the NRM sector, this section will focus mostly on the forestry sector, where USAID has had a consistent and major impact over the last 30 years, and which features prominently in Senegalese decentralization.

1. USAID efforts to influence the distribution of power and authority

Since 2000, USAID investments have consistently aimed to augment the official authority and effective power held by decentralized government (mainly CRs) and align it with the authority they formally hold. As mentioned earlier, this document uses the term ‘authority’ designate official authority given by laws, while the term ‘power’ refers more broadly to the ability to act, or to influence others, with or without official authority to do so. The distribution of authority stems from laws and regulations, which are also important vehicles for power. In practice, however, power does not necessarily come with authority. Other factors influencing the distribution of power include technical knowledge, financial and organizational capacity (Ribot, 2006), and social capital (Oyono, 2003; Larson, 2005). Changes in the macro-economic context can also contribute to the re-distribution of power among organizations and institutions or among players along affected commodity chains (Ribot, 1999).

USAID focused on promoting local engagement with decentralization. Although USAID may have been less visible than other bilateral agencies in Senegal in providing direct institutional support to design and implementation of Senegal’s decentralization from the national level, the agency has been active in national policy debates, in a specific niche. To bring local voices into the process, USAID organized, especially under Wula Nafaa, numerous forums, workshops and discussion groups at the community, regional and national levels to gather stakeholders’ ideas on how to reform the legal and regulatory framework to support sustainable NRM and wealth generation. In the same spirit, USAID pushed for specific measures that would help institutionalize project tools or build on project lessons: in the Senegal Reforestation project (1987-1995), USAID contributed to discussions preparing the Forest Code revision of 1998 regarding tree ownership. Since 2008, Wula Nafaa has actively engaged in the revision of the 1998 Forest code (discussed later in this document).

Finally, at the policy level, USAID also funded and supported CONSERE, the inter-ministerial committee on natural resources (*Conseil Supérieur des Ressources Naturelles et de l’Environnement*), to prepare the National Environmental Action Plan adopted in 1997. The support ended after the document was successfully adopted. USAID’s efforts to influence lawmakers and regulators on technical issues effectively extended participation to actors usually not included in these decisions—without any guarantee that their wishes would be met, as in most participatory processes. Beyond support to participation, USAID did attempt, in more recent years, to directly change the distribution of authority as written in the laws. Limitations to an institution’s authority are produced in different forms. Reducing

the formal scope of this institution's powers, as defined by the law, is just one form. Other, less visible forms include limiting its ability to levy taxes and generate revenue autonomously, preventing its representatives from exercising their duty by granting them a lower-level employment status (e.g., no authority to arrest, to issue fines, etc.), or by creating jurisdictional overlaps with other, more powerful institutions.

Under Wula Nafaa, USAID tried to address these limitations to local government's power. A September 2008 report tackled specifically the problem of fiscal decentralization in forest management. This report (Djigo, 2008) tackled dispositions in existing fiscal arrangements that weakened the effective power of CRs by reducing their sources of revenue, such as: the absence of fiscal transfers from the state for environmental responsibilities; the non-inclusion of Local Councils in the national commission establishing taxes and fees, in contradiction with the 1996 Decentralization laws; and the existence of a regime of exception regarding the sale of confiscated wood. In addition, the report called for the suppression of quotas and the official recognition of local conventions as a tool for land-use planning and local access to resources. Wula Nafaa, and earlier, the PAGERNA project, had supported CRs in establishing these local conventions in a participatory manner. They would also define fees and sanctions, and distribute responsibilities within the RC to enforce them. The report publication was followed by a workshop gathering Forest Service officials, representatives of the Ministries of Decentralization and of local collectives, NGOs and researchers.

In 2009, as the Government of Senegal was preparing a new Forest Code, USAID had the draft bill analyzed (Ribot, 2009:2,8,10-11). The resulting report indicated several articles in the draft Code that would re-centralize decision-making on forest management. The code would have recentralized by reducing forest areas under CR authority; by imposing on rural communities objectives for their forest use; by maintaining the Forest Service's prerogative to deliver permits and professional cards without prior approval from CRs. These changes in the draft Forest Code have gone unchallenged by USAID and other donors. If the bill does pass (and it is still sitting in the national assembly), rural communities and their elected leaders will lose most of the ground won under Wula Nafaa's long fight to engage elected CRs in forest management. CRs will be engaged, but very little – in much less than the 1996 decentralization and 1998 forestry code had promised. The 2009 revision of the Forest Code has not yet materialized into a new Forest Code, but local conventions, which USAID fought for, are now widely recognized by the Forest Service. In 2012, Wula Nafaa issued a third report (Peltier, 2012), evaluating experiences with forest management plans, and issuing recommendations on how to improve the regulation for forest exploitation campaigns.

The three reports do not systematically align on all recommendations. As an example, Ribot (2009) noted that the resource inventories included in forest management plans (*Plans d'Aménagement Forestier* PAFs) are costly; that they help to recentralize forest management decisions into the Forest Service; and that they are not necessary to assess production potential of forests (Wurster, 2010, Ribot 1999 on natural regeneration). Indeed, Wurster (2010) shows through transect and satellite analysis that these management plans have no discernible ecological effect – hence they are not of any ecological consequence or relevance. Indeed, the NWP Framework suggests that management plans impose unnecessary constraints while the same, if not better, environmental outcomes can be achieved

through a minimum standard approach—a recommendation formulated by Ribot in his 2009 analysis.¹⁴ Peltier (2012) argued, on the contrary, that PAFs needed to be better enforced, considering inventories as necessary and even suggesting that they be renewed at the end of each parcel rotation period to ensure that FMPs set sustainable production rules.

These differences indicate that Wula Nafaa’s approach to influencing the forest code reform was based on providing expert input, accepting the variety of views these experts might have. An external expert¹⁵ perceived that USAID was more influential on a few key issues, like the recognition of local conventions.

2. USAID efforts to influence the exercise of power and authority

Before 2000, USAID projects used a technical approach to support natural resource management, and favored engagement with community-based organizations. A lesson from the Senegal Reforestation Project (1987-1995) was that local successes and failures of this program largely depended on external factors such as village organizations or local authorities’ ability to deliver services (Lichte *et al.*, 1999: 66). In 1995-1997, the “Test Program” tried to address these problems by supporting the creation and operations of community-based organizations. Again, local politics were perceived as a problem that should be addressed: PCRs dominated the NRM committees set up by USAID, and CRs were unable to implement sound accounting and financial management. The conclusion was that the next NRM project would have to “support decentralization as much as support NRM” (Lichte *et al.*, 1999: 66).

The Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) project that followed still focused on providing CRs with technical NRM skills, such as drafting land-use management plans. The project failed to address more general capacity needs of CRs, and was mistaken in assuming that any acquired technical capacity would trickle down to residents and result in more sustainable NRM. In contrast, the Kaolack Agricultural Enterprise Development Program led by Africare (1992-1997) seemed more successful in achieving visible results by adjoining activities on transparent management techniques to its traditional technical activities.

The DGL-Felo program was the first USAID initiative in Senegal directly addressing local governance failure. This program, and later Wula Nafaa II,¹⁶ supported other local authorities in the exercise of their mandates: CRs, Environmental Commissions within CRs, local Forest Service representatives, Regional Councils and other regional agencies.

Capacity building of Rural Councils and CBOs on financial and project management

¹⁴ Setting minimum environmental standards is one of the six guiding principle spelled out in the NWP Framework. A minimum environmental standard approach is an alternative, more effective approach to management plans. They “specify goals, set targets, and establish restrictions and guidelines for environmental use and management. Any government agency, private institution, or individual operating within those restrictions and meeting goals/targets needs no approval from a government or management plan to use or manage resources.” (NWP Framework, p. 30)

¹⁵ Papa Faye, pers. comm., 2013.

¹⁶ Under Wula Nafaa I, the project mostly engaged Presidents of Rural Councils. Toward the end of this phase, and in Wula Nafaa II, project activities were extended to other Council members and to Environment Commissions (Benjamin, 2008: 7).

The preeminent form of support to these institutions was capacity building on the legal framework for decentralization and financial and project management. These information sessions were a preliminary requirement acknowledged and addressed by most NRM projects working to implement decentralization—DGL-Felo, Wula Nafaa, but also PAGERNA and PERACOD. With limited information on decentralization available, these sessions were for many Rural Councilors the only way to learn about active laws and regulations, their official role and what was expected from them. The assumption for both DGL-Felo and Wula Nafaa was that “there is an obvious correlation between local actors better understanding their respective roles and responsibilities in decentralization and increased observance of the norms and procedures prescribed by legislation” (DGL-Felo Final Report, 2004: 26).

These training sessions, which reached several thousand people each year,¹⁷ targeted “behavior change of elected officials, local leaders and the general public, not only transfer of knowledge” (Wula Nafaa Annual Report, 2010-2011: 42). A 2008 impact assessment of DGL-Felo found inconsistent results. This assessment used random interviews of villagers to gather their perception on improvement of competence, service delivery and overall legitimacy of CRs since the program closed down. Evaluators also checked if tools and techniques provided to CRs were being used four years after. Project impacts seemed quite positive with regard to financial management techniques used in CRs. Relationships with local Treasury agents have improved, budgets are better prepared, presented and are more reliable (Senagrosol-Consult, 2008). Wula Nafaa support in this area was also positively evaluated, with CRs levying more local taxes after project intervention (Wula Nafaa annual reports of 2011 and 2012).

Concrete improvements in service delivery to citizens were noted in the use and management of civil registry, health and education (Senagrosol-Consult, 2008). The project encouraged CRs to partner with community-based organizations (CBOs) to deliver these services, which were then trained by USAID. Many of these CBOs were still functioning in 2008, and were led by women. These CBOs were flagged as the principal channel for women’s participation and empowerment (Senagrosol-Consult, 2008).

Women were found to be more critical than men with regards to DGL-Felo impact. In their view, rural councils “do not play their role properly even if the program has put the necessary resources in their training” (Senagrosol-Consult, 2008: 35). Even CBOs were considered to fail in properly carrying out their mandate as defined in the project. Mixed results were also found in land management and natural resource management, the latter being mainly linked to a lack of financial means for CRs to perform their mandate. Differences of perceptions between men and women on participatory forest management ‘successes’ are a recurring finding of case studies (Bandiaky, 2007; Cornwall, 2003; Agarwal, 2001). Women often fail to see lasting changes in their ability to influence forest management decisions, or to see the benefits of their men’s or peers’ increased participation (Bandiaky, 2011; Cornwall, 2003; Agarwal, 2001; Mosse, 2001).

Annual reports of Wula Nafaa II also highlight improvements in public financial management as an important success for the program. The program tailored its support to the context and priorities of

¹⁷ As an example, Wula Nafaa trained 7,250 persons between October 2009 and September 2010 on the legal framework, good governance and financial management.

each CR, and therefore covered a wide range of activities: develop participatory budgets, find new financial resources, increase revenue from the local taxes, improve the management of revenues from taxes and fees, improve coordination between actors who intervene in CR finances (accountants, heads of taxes and lands services, government representatives, local administrative heads)...

Technical support to Rural Councils, CBOs, the Forest Service and user/producer groups

Technical skills are an important component in the exercise of authority: institutions and individuals that legally have the authority to manage natural resources, without the skills to do, may not be able to perform their duty. This argument is often used by state central and de-concentrated services to resist the transfer of authority to decentralized government.

Before 2000, USAID projects tended to provide technical support directly to natural resources users, constituted in CBOs or producer/user groups, rather than local government institutions. Wula Nafaa departed from this USAID tradition by extensively engaging local government.

The program's interventions in this area included the development of NRM tools, such as local conventions; support to the use of legally required documents, such as forest management plans; and training of villagers and user groups in management techniques.

Support to the writing up of local conventions and forest management plans was described in Wula Nafaa annual reports as highly participatory (see Box 3), although this has not been verified through an external evaluation. Local conventions would cover the use of a variety of natural resources, such as gum Arabic, *fonio*, baobab fruit and charcoal. The role of CRs in these conventions varies with the type of resources: some require less involvement from the CR, such as *fonio* or baobab fruit than charcoal production, which mobilize the PCR's intervention at critical phases (*e.g.*, the PCR participates in the annual meeting where production targets are decided and decides who can produce in the Council's forests).

Yet participation was flagged in the Wula Nafaa I final report as a major constraint: the report mentions that lack of participation by rural councilors, Forest agents and other Government officials was a serious problem to implementation of local conventions, PAFs, and Accounting and Financial Management plans (*Gestion Administrative et Financière* GAFs¹⁸); local populations and their elected officials were not able to support the local conventions and PAFs due to insufficient knowledge of legal texts on decentralization, low levels of literacy, and lack of motivation in the absence of economic benefit. The role of Village Chiefs was also a problem and needed to be better defined (Wula Nafaa I Final Report, 2008: 20). Participation was no more mentioned as a major program constraint in later annual reports, although progress was not assessed either. Participation is, however, an issue in most projects, which struggle to include socially marginalized groups (*e.g.*, the poor, women, youth) and to avoid perpetuating inequality within communities (Bandiaky, 2007; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Ribot, 1999).

¹⁸ GAFs are administrative and financial management processes that are written down and formally adopted by an institution (Rural Councils, management committees...). Formalizing these rules is designed to increase transparency and accountability of the concerned institution's financial and administrative management decisions.

Box 3: Wula Nafaa's work with Local Conventions

Local conventions (LCs) are documents formalizing local rules of access and use of natural resources within a community. In their simplest form they aim to reflect existing local arrangements, enforced by traditional or customary figures, and support their enforcement through transcription from oral to written rules. In most cases, they are drafted with external support from NGOs or aid agencies. The PAGERNA project used local conventions in the late 1990s in Senegal in conjunction with trainings on sustainable NRM and to promote inclusive decision-making within communities by supporting the participation of community's youth and women in the LC crafting process.

Wula Nafaa's approach to LCs, as formalized in the updated guidebook to LCs (USAID Senegal, 2008) encompassed an elaborated 19-step process taking a minimum of 13 months work. Starting with consultations with Regional and Local Councils and the signature of memoranda of understanding between them and Wula Nafaa, these steps provide detailed guidelines on the management structure to set up (steering committees, consultations, indicator-based monitoring...), the methods to achieve each step (how to do a participatory zoning exercise, where to obtain maps and how to give LCs a legal standing, whom to involve at each step) and the deliverables to produce (land zoning plan, management plans, annual action plans...).

This guidebook explicitly relies on the assumption that these LCs need to be crafted with intensive external support—although the institutional set-up promoted in the guidebook supports the use of existing local authorities (Rural Councils and environmental committees within these Councils), which should ensure sustainability of the process after project withdrawal.

Difficulties identified with LCs during a Wula Nafaa-sponsored workshop in January 2009 (USAID Senegal, 2009) include: lack of support to LC enforcement from local Forest Service and other partners, lack of financial means and equipment of institutions in charge of managing LCs, insufficient commitment by Rural Council Presidents who refuse to fine offenders for political reasons.

Support to the drafting of PAFs was necessary to CRs given the technical skills required for producing this document, but also to balance the power of the Forest Service in making decisions embedded in PAFs. Wula Nafaa annual reports mention difficulties in getting the Forest Service to collaborate with CRs in the drafting of these documents, and to sign completed PAFs—a condition for CRs to actually get authority over forest management. As mentioned earlier, however, research finds that PAFs may not actually empower CRs, but instead re-centralize power within the Forest Service (Poteete & Ribot, 2011).

A 2012 assessment of PAF implementation, which did not address this issue directly, found that the Forest Service still has extensive authority over management of forests legally under CR responsibility. For instance, the Forest Service was demarcating exploitation blocs; delaying the start of the production season later in the year, thus favoring charcoal merchants over villagers who must work in the fields during the rainy season. The Forest Service's prerogative to deliver woodcutting permits enables them to bypass CRs (legally sole decision-makers on who can produce in the Councils' forests) and favor charcoal merchants over villagers. These elements indicate that, with or without project support, the Forest Service is able to overstep the limits of its legal authority, and prevent CRs from exercising the authority they should have.

3. USAID efforts to influence the accountability of power and authority

The USAID vision of strengthening accountability historically emphasized NGOs and civil-society organizations (CSOs) as key players to balance government powers. This vision was central in the design of policy components in many USAID projects in Senegal: CBNRM, DGL-Felo and the current DGP, and Wula Nafaa all engaged with existing NGOs and CSOs, or directly with citizens. These projects helped set up new community-based organizations (CBOs) like GIEs (*Groupements d'Intérêt Economique*), a form of cooperative for-profit association with a specific economic purpose (e.g., association of *fonio* producers); and forest user groups ('blocs'). These groups are primarily organized for an economic or management objective, but they also aim to empower their members, just as unions empower workers to weigh in on management decisions. The objective, as stated in Gellar, Charlick and Thioub (2004), is also to initiate a change in beliefs and behaviors among Senegalese rural citizens, from "neo-patrimonial and clientelist norms and behaviors [reflecting] non-egalitarian social structures and modes of governance" to norms more compatible with democracy, accountability and good governance. The authors encouraged USAID to build on existing civil society institutions like *tontines*, women's rotating credit associations, which already operate according to the latter norms. In short, the idea is that these groups will have strong interest in holding local government accountable for decisions affecting their members.

The NWP framework suggests, however, that strengthening accountability of public authorities should comprise a wider range of interventions. Indeed, in its second phase, Wula Nafaa started engaging with local government members to support internal or inter-governmental accountability mechanisms, such as PCRs' accountability to CR members or Commissions, or the Forest Service's accountability to CRs.

Accountability of Rural Councils to villagers

Several USAID projects in the NRM sector, starting with the Kaolack Agricultural Enterprise Development Program (1992-1997), involved activities to raise the adoption of transparent accounting and financial management (AFM) techniques, first within enterprise groups set up by the projects, then within local public institutions. Later projects, such as DGL-Felo and Wula Nafaa, placed transparent accounting and financial management at the heart of their strategy. These projects created training modules in Decentralization and Good Governance, trained trainers in villages to ensure newly hired or elected officials could be trained after the project ended. This type of training was also provided to management committees of GIE, user groups and networks established locally for these groups to coordinate, as well as to their members. These modules included information on the legal and regulatory framework for decentralization, and technical trainings on AFM techniques.

To reach out to villagers outside these groups, Wula Nafaa organized radio programs and 'citizenship workshops' in several project sites, where villagers could learn about their rights and duties in the rural community (e.g., the taxes they are expected to pay, what these taxes are used for), about the responsibilities of CRs and how they can influence their decisions and monitor their actions. These

workshops were considered helpful by villagers interviewed.¹⁹ Their long-term efficacy to increase accountability of CR, GIE and other CBO leaders has, however, not been evaluated to date.

Wula Nafaa went a step further to help populations and CBOs/NGOs participate in local government decisions, by using tools like the GAFs. These systems were developed to support participatory decision-making in resource management such as Forest Management Plans, local fishery or water management groups. “The development of the PAF management system proceeded from the willingness to have all stakeholders participate in the supervision and control of financial management related to the PAF. The system put in place (GAF) benefited from lessons learned from (...) previously-implemented [systems]. The populations and locally elected officials of the two CRs approved it, and it also benefited from a full adoption and ownership by the population at the grassroots level.”²⁰ The Wula Nafaa project also organized forums on the budget in 14 CRs in 2009-2010 to clarify the budget process with every all actors involved (CRs, accountants, local tax services, government representatives, and others) and to let ordinary citizens express their needs and priorities.

There is no assessment of the impact of these activities in terms of strengthening accountability of CRs to villagers. The charcoal commodity chain survey presented in the next section tries to draw conclusions on this matter, both through direct questions asked to respondents, and by tracking changes in CRs’ responsiveness.

USAID did not attempt to tackle other factors undermining CRs’ accountability to community residents. Ribot (1999) showed that accountability of CRs is essentially limited by other factors, including electoral rules: CR members must be registered in national political parties, which propose candidates before each election. Villagers are unable to create political parties, or to influence the national ones. Independent candidates cannot run for election, and elected CR members lose their seat if they defect from their party of affiliation. Many CR members are notables who do not necessarily live in the village where they were elected (Peltier, 2012), As a result, CR members will likely favor their party’s interests (meaning, the interests of fellow party members) over their constituencies’. In practice, this upward accountability toward political parties may contribute PCR’s proclivity to collude with charcoal merchants or Forest Service officials (Ribot, 1999, 2008, 2010). Forest user groups (*comités villageois de blocs*) and CR members have diverging interests in matters of taxes and fees, and user groups have complained about PCR’s favoring their powerful friends over villagers in the allocation of charcoal woodcutting permits (Peltier, 2012: p.18).

Accountability of Rural Council Presidents to other Council Members

The 1996 decentralization laws give broad powers to the PCR, but also require CR deliberations for any decision within its areas of competence, including the definition of rules to access and use land, water, forest products and wildlife (Law 96-06 of 22 March 1996, art. 195). The Forest Code does not necessarily echo the requirement for CR deliberations, and the Forest Service does not, in practice,

¹⁹ Wula Nafaa annual report of 2010-2011.

²⁰ Wula Nafaa annual report of 2009-2010, p.66.

support its implementation. For instance, the Forest code gives the right of prior signature/authorization for charcoal production to the President of the CR without mentioning a CR deliberation, in spite of the decentralization law requirement.

In its first phase, Wula Nafaa tended to reinforce the dominant position of PCRs by not systematically involving other Council members or Environmental Committees.²¹ A 2008 governance evaluation report of Wula Nafaa I recommended that, “while Rural Councils are envisioned as the primary Wula Nafaa partner at the local level, the technical commissions should be considered as primary interlocutor for the project” (Benjamin, 2008).

USAID supported several types of committees: environmental committees (*commissions environnementales*) are usually an emanation of the CR with delegated power over environmental resource management. These Environmental Commissions are composed of Rural Councilors. In addition, Wula Nafaa and other projects often supported the creation or strengthening of villagers’ committees like well management committees, valley or lowland committees, and fishery committees. These committees would be encouraged to work together with CRs.

When Wula Nafaa started working with them, these committees were rarely functional: responsibilities were not clearly distributed with the CR; their members lacked technical, sometime basic literacy skills. Along the line DGL-Felo project design, Wula Nafaa focused on building their capacity as a first necessary step for these committees to start playing their role, and really “own” local conventions and other management tools set up with project support. Support to these committees is therefore a better technical option, but also as a way to encourage power sharing within CRs.

An impact assessment would be necessary to know if these committees are indeed able to hold CRs and their Presidents accountable. Wula Nafaa annual reports did not directly address this question, focusing instead on progress made by these committees to perform their duties (manage the resources in collaboration with multiple actors, and in a transparent, participatory manner). Indeed, bloc managers showed increasing interest in sustainable forest management and expressed gratitude for the project to have trained and equipped them (Peltier, 2012: 12). The issue of their sustainability after the project ended was another central concern, and Wula Nafaa pushed hard, in its last years, to enhance committees’ ability to raise local funds through taxes and fees.

Interviews conducted with forest bloc managers indicate that they feel unable to contest PCR decisions: “They are the boss, what can we do?” (Peltier, 2012: 13) Respect for existing social and ethnic hierarchies may motivate this perception of powerlessness, which projects like Wula Nafaa or PROGEDE may involuntarily reinforce by channeling more support to CR members than bloc managers. Wula Nafaa’s initiative to create and strengthen forest bloc management is clearly a positive move to re-distribute power more equitably within CRs, and to strengthen downward accountability; but it might have come too late in the project to have sustainable impact.

²¹ Abdu Sene, pers. comm., January 2013

Section IV – Impacts of USAID programs on the charcoal commodity chain

This section presents the results of a charcoal commodity chain survey conducted between February and April 2013 in Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE project sites. These results are compared with data gathered in 1987, 1994 in the same areas, before these projects were launched; and data gathered in 2002-2003 just before Wula Nafaa started. The objective of this cross-time comparison is to understand how Wula Nafaa influenced the “dynamics of control and maintenance of commercial forest access” in Senegal (Ribot, 1998): a cross-time comparison of net income distribution within a commodity chain allows the quantification of changes in the market leverage of each actor involved in a value chain, as indicated by their ability to reap a higher (or lower) net income.

As suggested earlier in this document, the charcoal commodity chain was selected to illustrate changes in the distribution, exercise and accountability of power for three main reasons:

- Importance of Wula Nafaa investments to support sustainable participatory forest management and villagers’ access to the charcoal market; meanwhile, the Government of Senegal sees woodcutting for wood-fuel as the primary source of forest degradation in Senegal;
- Characteristics of the charcoal market, making it a particularly interesting case study to analyze power dynamics: an oligopolistic market, on which central state authorities had extensive influence (Ribot, 1999); and a profitable business, thereby attracting interest from the wealthy and powerful. Since 1998, however, rural communities have the right to decide how much charcoal can be produced in their forests and by whom, but without project support, these communities have been unable to realize this right in practice.
- Data availability before and after USAID interventions

This section will first describe the main changes observed in Senegal’s charcoal commodity chain between 1987 and today. The rest of the section looks more closely at changes that affected the distribution, exercise and accountability of power, following the same structure as in the previous section.

Information on the baobab fruit value chain is also presented at the end of this section, illustrating different power dynamics. The lack of detailed, quantified data on this commodity is, however, a major limitation to its use in this assessment.

1. Charcoal commodity chain: elements of context

Senegal cities depend primarily on charcoal for cooking fuel. Charcoal demand has steadily increased, with more households switching from firewood to charcoal and a growing urban population (Ribot, 1993). As a result, charcoal supply to cities, especially Dakar, is considered a highly political issue by the GOS. The Forest Service has historically been in charge of ensuring both that the production capacity is maintained through sustainable forest management, and that charcoal supply meets urban demand. To strike this balance, the Forest Service would identify charcoal production zones and assign production plots at the village level. They defined a national production quota that would, theoretically, not exceed the production capacity of forests.

The Forest Service would then allocate woodcutting permits to licensed charcoal merchants, who send their woodcutters, called *surgas*²², in forests to produce the charcoal. Merchants, who are generally urban-based notables, are organized into co-operatives and grouped in the National Union of Forestry Co-operatives. *Surgas* receive advances from their *patron* (merchant) for their work, and inform him when the charcoal is ready. The merchant obtains a transport permit and organizes transportation to the cities, either with his own truck or by hiring transporters. In the city, merchants sell their charcoal to urban wholesalers called *coxeurs*²³, who distribute the charcoal to retail vendors called *Diallo keriiñ* (Ribot, 1998).

In 1986, the charcoal commodity chain was estimated to include approximately 11,000 migrant woodcutters, 2,900 merchants, 300 wholesalers (*coxeurs*) and 2,000 retail vendors (Ribot, 1998). The national Forest Service was omnipresent in the commodity chain: they delivered merchant licenses, required them to be organized in co-operatives or associations, determined annual production quotas and allocated them among co-operatives, delivered permits for woodcutting (place and quantity), determined the dates for the production season, regulated transportation and storage, levied taxes and fixed retail price (Ribot, 1998).

Villagers had no say in the allocation of woodcutting permits in nearby forests, nor could they enter the commodity chain, given the financial and social capital required to get a producer license. Villagers could derive indirect income from the presence of woodcutters in the village by renting out huts and providing meals to them. But they would also bear the costs of woodcutting operations, since women would have to go farther to gather firewood. Charcoal production was perceived as a lower-status activity, left to Guinean migrants, or to poor farmers during a hunger gap.

This organization of the charcoal market largely followed colonial practices and was based on the perception that local populations left uncontrolled would cut all the forests (Ribot, 1993). Regulations designed to organize production however failed to stem the depletion of forests close to Dakar: areas of

²² *Surgas* are mostly Fulbe migrant workers from Guinea. Their role in charcoal production will be further discussed in this document.

²³ The word 'coxeur' was introduced to Wolof from Gambian English. It was originally used to refer to a person in a car park whose job it was to coax people to ride in their taxi. Hence it is a broad term used to refer to many different kinds of intermediaries.

charcoal production moved from a 70-200 km radius to a 300-450 km radius around the capital city, whereas quotas consistently remained below the city's needs, pushing prices up (Ribot, 1993). The quota system shaped the charcoal market, giving the Forest Service immense power over producers, prices and buyers.

The 1996 decentralization laws and the 1998 Forest Code radically changed the role of the Forest Service in the charcoal market—at least on paper. Per Law 96-07 of 22 March 1996, Chapter II, CRs manage forests located within their territorial boundaries following a management plan approved by the competent State authority (the Forest Service). Woodcutting in Council forests requires prior approval by the PCR. Rural Councils have the discretion to create protected woods and areas.²⁴

The 1998 Forest Code incorporated these changes, confirming that local governments have now full discretion to decide on management of forests located within their territorial boundaries, except for gazetted State forests, with three important restrictions: (1) The Forest Service approves forest management plans, which condition the actual transfer of forest management responsibilities to CRs (art. L-7); (2) the Forest Service remains the authority actually delivering woodcutting permits: they ensure that the PCR has approved the permit request and that it abides by the forest management plan (art. L-4); (3) the Forest Service delivers transport permits, without which forest products cannot legally circulate (art. R-22).

From primary decision-maker, the Forest Service became a technical advisor to the CRs. Rural councils now legally determine production quantities and who can produce in un-reserved forests (*forêts non classées*) located within the territorial boundaries of their community. Formally, the Forest Service can no longer impose quotas, or influence who will produce charcoal in CRs' forests.

Several years after the decentralization law and the new Forest code were enacted, however, the Forest Service has been able to retain significant power in forest management decisions through these dispositions. Forest management plans require technical expertise to prepare, which the Forest Service is best positioned to provide to CRs. Forest agents use their role as facilitators to remain involved in any forest-related decision. Arguing that CRs did not have the technical knowledge necessary to manage forests, they were able to impose the continuation of charcoal production quotas to CRs for another 10 years²⁵ after the 1998 Forest Code suppressed them (Dialigue-Ba, 2006b).

In 2009, the new draft of the Forest Code (yet to be voted on in Parliament) sought to establish a new allocation system: a commission, presided by the Regional Council President, would allocate rights to produce, following a procedure to be fixed by decree of the Forest Service Director (Ribot, 2009). This new system would have effectively maintained a central feature of the quota system (charcoal production levels are decided outside CRs). Today, production targets are decided on in an annual 'coordination meeting' gathering of PCRs, the Forest Service and charcoal merchants. Forest agents are still able to impose production targets to CRs through these meetings, as further described below.

²⁴ Law 96-07 of 22 March 1996, article 30.

²⁵ The Forest Service continued imposing production quotas in annual arrêtés organizing charcoal production every year. This is further described below.

Charcoal merchants continued to request woodcutting permits from the Forest Service, who can obtain PCRs' approval through a mix of coercion and collusion (Dialigue-Ba, 2006a). As a result, the Forest Service has been able to maintain control over the commodity chain (Ribot, 2006; Dialigué Bâ, 2006a; Faye, 2006).

2. Main changes in the charcoal commodity chain between 1987 and 2013

Data on the period that preceded USAID interventions in the charcoal commodity chain was gathered first in 1987 (Ribot, 1993), and partially updated in 1994 just before the decentralization laws were adopted. This initial work provided a detailed picture of how the charcoal trade was organized in rural and urban Senegal, who was involved, how decisions were made and how these decisions affected access to commercial forestry. Additional data gathered in 2002-2003²⁶ will also be used in this document to trace 1987-2002 trends in the commodity chain before Wula Nafaa started.

The time and resources available to update this initial data were limited to three weeks of surveys in March 2013. The surveys gathered historical data back through the year and also drew on observations and data gathered by the researcher while studying Senegal's forestry sector over the past year. Resources were focused on obtaining qualitative and quantitative data on production, prices and margins for the seven main actors involved along the charcoal chain from production to retail (Ribot, 1993 and 1998. See Figures 1 and 2 for a graphic representation of the chain):

- 1) **Local producers**
 - **Villagers** producing charcoal during winter season, and
 - **Surgas**, who are immigrant (mostly Guinean) charcoal producers brought and paid by a charcoal merchant;
- 2) **Charcoal merchants or patrons**, usually urban traders with political and business connections, members of the National Union of Forestry Cooperatives (UNCF);
- 3) **Unlicensed local traders**, called *bana banas*, who purchase charcoal from local producers and *surgas*, get woodcutting permits illegally and sell charcoal mostly in secondary towns;
- 4) **Transporters** using trucks to get charcoal sacks from area of production to urban markets (they also transport other products than charcoal, and are therefore not represented as actors of the value chain in the figure below);
- 5) **Urban wholesalers**, known as *coxeurs*, buying large quantities of charcoals usually from merchants; and

²⁶ Unpublished data shared by Jesse Ribot, based on research conducted by E.H.S Ndiaye.

6) **Urban retailers**, called *Diallo keriñ* (see Figure 1 for a graphic representation of the charcoal commodity chain)

For each of these categories of actors, a survey questionnaire was designed and applied to 12 to 15 persons. In addition, this survey found a new type of actors in the chain: local residents, called *depositaires légaux*, authorized by the Forest Service to produce charcoal from woods lopped for fire-prevention purposes. Since they enter the charcoal business occasionally, and are therefore not reflected as an actor of the value chain in the figures below.

A major Wula Nafaa achievement is that forest villagers, who were previously excluded²⁷ from the charcoal commodity chain, are now able to produce charcoal and to profit from its sale. As indicated in Table 1, local producers in the Wula Nafaa project area received a net income²⁸ from charcoal sales of 332,785 Francs CFA per producer per year (approximately US\$ 665²⁹). This finding is consistent with the net income calculated by Wula Nafaa staff for the 2009 campaign, which was estimated at 322,498 Francs CFA (US\$ 644) on average per producer (Wula Nafaa Annual Report of 2009-2010: 88).³⁰ This represents about 15 to 20% of annual expenditures for an average rural household.³¹

Average net income for Wula Nafaa local producers were slightly higher than for PROGEDE local producers (285,690 Francs CFA, US\$ 570), due to what appears to be higher yield in the Wula Nafaa kiln firings.³² Local producers in PROGEDE areas generated higher net incomes, however, by obtaining better prices in town. This difference may be due to the fact that PROGEDE areas used for the survey had at least three more years of experience in the charcoal business than Wula Nafaa areas.

²⁷ It is important to note that forest villagers did not want to be part of the charcoal trade and did not want charcoal produced in their areas prior to the arrival of these projects. Charcoal production was seen as a lowly (caste) profession. Forest villagers were against charcoal production because it was dirty, it was destroying their forests and they were gaining nothing from it. Their exclusion is partly due to the fact that the merchants who dominated the market worked with migrant workers (who held permits from the Forest Service), hence villagers did not have the opportunity to enter into the trade due to merchants and the Forest Service. The projects and Forest Service persuaded forest villagers to engage in an activity that they felt was not desirable. Now that they are engaging, they are convinced it is worthwhile since it is lucrative (Ribot, 2008; Ribot, personal communication, 2013).

²⁸ Net income is defined throughout this document as sale price minus production costs. A detailed breakdown of production costs is provided in Faye, 2013.

²⁹ 2012 average exchange rate used here and throughout this document, unless specified that constant US dollar value was used.

³⁰ Subsequent Wula Nafaa reports did not provide average net income per producer. The 2010-2011 Wula Nafaa Annual Report only mentions that sales increased by 463% in value from 2010, and that 328 local producers increased their revenue in 2011, mainly due to the canceling of quotas in managed forests.

³¹ Based on ANSD, 2006; annual expenditure leveled using the 2012 consumer price index of the World Development Indicators: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx>)

³² Kilns used in Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE areas are the same (Casamance kilns, as required in forest management plans). This difference may not be statistically significant in a larger sample, and was not reflected in figures gathered from GIE leaders, as mentioned later in the document.

Figure 1: Historical charcoal commodity chain until 2009.




Figure 2: New charcoal commodity chain since 2009, sale prices and margins per charcoal sack in 2012.




Table 1 also shows that income distribution amongst categories of actor in the charcoal value chain remains considerably unequal. On average, this survey found that a charcoal merchant earned 28 times more than a local producer in the 2012 campaign, with a total net income of 8,688,000 Francs CFA (US\$ 17,365) per merchant.

Comparing prices and net income of 2002-2003 and 2012 (Table 2), we see that woodcutters and local producers have increased their net income (by 36% for *surgas*), reversing a negative trend on the net income of *surgas* between 1987 and 2002-2003. Meanwhile, charcoal merchants were nevertheless able to increase their net income even more (by 90%). **This shows that inequality of income distribution has increased since the onset of Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE projects.**

Table 1: Average annual net income per category of actor in the charcoal campaign of 2012

Actors in the charcoal value chain	Average net income (Francs CFA)
WN Local producers	332,785
PROGEDE Local producers	285,690
WN Local committee leaders	1,440,750
PROGEDE Local producer group leaders	1,534,445
Charcoal merchants	8,688,000
<i>Bana banas</i> (unregistered traders)	2,777,600
Urban wholesalers (<i>coxeurs</i>)	3,717,525
Urban retailers*	N/A
Total of market shares	18,776,795

* N/A due to lack of sufficient data at this level of the market.

Source: Faye, 2013

This result is all the more striking given that quantities that charcoal merchants could legally produce, based on quotas until 2009, on woodcutting permits since then, has sharply declined over the same period. With the help of the Forest Service, surveyed merchants were nonetheless able to double their initial quota or permit allocation, using a variety of legal solutions, including buying the charcoal of local producers through ‘contracts’ that CRs are pressed to sign every year in the negotiation meetings that determine charcoal production targets;³³ and various illegal solutions discussed later in this section.

³³ These meetings and the system of *contractualisation*, which replaced the quota system after 2009, are further described below.

Table 2: Changes in prices and net income per category of actor since 1987 (in 2012 constant Franc CFA)

	1987	2002-2003	2012	1987-2002/3 variation <i>Pre-Wula Nafaa</i>	2002/3-2012 variation <i>Wula Nafaa project</i>	1987-2012 variation
AVERAGE PRICES PER CHARCOAL SACK						
WN Local producer price to merchant or bana bana	-	-	1,500 (rd)* 5,200 (D)**			
PROGEDE Local producer price to merchant or bana bana	-	-	1,500 (rd) 5,750 (D)			
<i>Surga</i> price to merchant	1,030	957	1,450	-7%	52%	41%
Merchant price to urban wholesaler	3,444	4,246	6,000	23%	41%	74%
Bana Bana price to urban wholesaler	N/A	N/A	6,000	N/A	N/A	N/A
Wholesaler price to retailer	3,720	4,636	6,600	25%	42%	77%
Retailer price to consumer	4,466	N/A	8,500	N/A	N/A	90%
NET INCOME PER CHARCOAL SACK						
WN Local producer margin	-	-	1,225 (rd) 2,510 (D)			
PROGEDE Local producer margin	-	-	1,220 (rd) 3,060 (D)			
<i>Surga</i> margin	901	894	1,220	-1%	36%	35%
Merchant/GIE margin	734	952	1,810	30%	90%	146%
Bana Bana margin	N/A	N/A	1,085	N/A	N/A	N/A
Urban Wholesaler Margin	276	390	485	41%	24%	76%
Retailer Margin	637	N/A	1,800	N/A	N/A	183%

* (rd) = roadside price or net income

** (D) = Dakar price or net income

In addition, several merchants have furthered their vertical integration within the commodity chain to maximize their net income: seven out of fifteen merchants interviewed said they used their own trucks to transport charcoal to town; an unknown number of *coxeurs* were also merchants.³⁴ Additional income captured by merchants through this integration could not be measured in this survey, but it can be estimated using Table 2. For example, by adding a merchant's net income per charcoal sack (1,810) with that of an urban wholesaler (485), we can assume that an integrated merchant-*coxeur* may be able to reap a net income of 2295. Nevertheless, an important achievement of both Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE

³⁴ When interviewed for this survey, *coxeurs* would not necessarily mention that they were also merchants—and merchants would not mention they were also *coxeurs*. This was only discovered toward the end of the survey, and could therefore not be measured here.

was that some local producers were able to sell their charcoal in the city of Dakar, where prices are much higher. Local producers who sold their charcoal directly in Dakar were able to double their net income compared to sales along the main road near production sites (average net income between 2,510 and 3,060 Francs CFA per charcoal bag in Dakar, compared to 1,220 Francs CFA per bag along the road). Local producers had, however, few opportunities to sell their charcoal in the capital city: 2 out of the 24 interviewed had sold their charcoal in Dakar during the last campaign.

Wula Nafaa annual reports since 2009 indeed enumerate each year new difficulties for local producers to access Dakar markets: forest management plans not approved in time; the decree opening the charcoal production campaign issued too late into the winter season, which is the main period during which villagers can be away from their fields; local producers not able to obtain woodcutting permits necessary to transport the charcoal to town.³⁵ Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE interventions also played the role of intermediaries by finding transporters and connecting local producers with urban wholesalers (*coxeurs*) who would buy their charcoal, as few local producers had market connections. Establishing partnerships with urban wholesalers or transporters can be challenging, as some transporters sought to get woodcutting permits to purchase charcoal from local producers, and reap the benefits resulting from higher sale prices in town. Transporters who have access to woodcutting permits are generally charcoal merchants and truck-owners (47% of interviewed merchants in this survey).

3. USAID impacts in re-distributing power within the charcoal commodity chain

USAID and the World Bank actively encouraged the Forest Service to move away from the 'quota system' that regulated the charcoal trade until 2009. This system, by which the Forest Service would determine production quotas and allocate them to charcoal merchants, was formally abandoned on February 21, 2001, as defined in the 1998 Forest Code.³⁶ The Forest Service, however, continued using this system until the campaign of 2009 with various justifications, which both Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE helped address: the two projects helped CRs draft forest management plans, shepherded them through the Forest Service for approval; they lobbied the Forest Service to de-concentrate quota-setting meetings from the national to the regional level, and to have PCRs and local producer group leaders³⁷ attend these meetings.

Survey findings indicate that these efforts have resulted in limited changes with regards to the distribution of power within the charcoal commodity chain. Charcoal merchants and urban wholesalers

³⁵ The objectives of decentralization should imply that local populations can cut wood without prior authorization from the Forest Service as long as they follow the forest management plan. Law n°98-164 of 20 February 1998 yet states that anyone wishing to engage in forest exploitation activities must first obtain a permit from the Forest Service, which is granted upon proof of payment of the local tax (*redevance locale*) to the Rural Council. Woodcutting permits are then required to obtain a transport authorization from the Forest Service. These permits are necessary to take charcoal to town markets and pass the numerous road checkpoints. In practice, however, local producers selling their charcoal along the road near the production site do not seek permits. Few obtain them when they seek them.

³⁶ Decree No. 98/164 of 20 February 1998, Article R-66.1.

³⁷ The local producers group leaders who were able to participate in these meetings are "*présidents de structure locale de gestion forestière*", a general expression used to overcome the different terminology used in Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE to designate these group leaders.

maintain their power within the commodity chain (2a); the Forest Service continues to adopt regulations and practices that limit local producers' profits and are inconsistent with decentralization laws (2b); and within rural communes, existing elites seem to control new positions created to manage local production (2c).

2a – Charcoal merchants and urban wholesalers have maintained, and even strengthened, their dominant position

Since 1987, charcoal merchants have faced important expense increases³⁸, while their production quotas diminished significantly after 2009, and competition from local producers intensified. All other things being equal, these adverse conditions should have reduced their net income. Still, they were able to multiply their net income by 3.4 between 1987 and 2012 (constant Franc CFA value), and to double the number of truckloads they were initially authorized to produce (Table 3). In fact, some merchants were able to increase their net income even *more* than threefold since additional income from vertical integration could not be estimated.

Table 3: Average number of charcoal truckloads sold by 15 surveyed merchants in 2012

	Permits initially allocated	Purchased 'quittances' (seized wood auctioned off)	(Illegally) Purchased permits	Proxies obtained from other producers/merchants	Total number of truckloads
# of truckloads	5	1	2	4	12

Survey findings were consistent with previous research (Dialigue Ba, 2006a; Dialigue Ba, 2006b; Faye, 2006; Poteete and Ribot, 2011) on techniques used by charcoal merchants to maintain their market share. They have been using the following legal solutions:

- The purchase of *quittances*: illegally-cut wood seized and auctioned off by the Forest Service—some merchants purposely have their *surgas* cut more wood than they legally can, tip the Forest Service on the depot location, and buy the wood back from the Forest Service, still achieving a net income from charcoal sales (Ribot, 1998);
- The purchase of production proxies: a registered producer unable to fulfill his quota can give a proxy to another producer; in practice, many merchants do not have production capacity and profit from the (illegal) sale of these proxies, for about 100,000 Francs CFA each. Four copies of proxies were shown to the surveyor in February 2013, giving rights for 800 quintals of charcoal each.
- Authorizations delivered by the Forest Service to produce charcoal from firebreaks to merchants or producers in the vicinity of their regular production zone: in the survey, we found that two

³⁸ Increases in merchant's expenses were mainly due to the payment of the local tax (*redevance locale*) and price increases from *surgas*.

merchants and three local producers had obtained an authorization to produce charcoal from firebreaks in 2012. The average charcoal production for each of these *dépositaires légaux* was approximately 703 quintals, with an average net income of 1,950 Francs CFA per sack sold in Tambacounda (which is the only legal destination for this charcoal, although some of it still reaches Dakar).

In addition to these legal solutions, merchants have long resorted to illegal strategies, such as the purchase of production quotas from each other.

In 2011, there were 248 federations and GIEs of charcoal merchants registered with the Forest Service. Based on previous research (Ribot, 1998), we can reasonably assume that the presidents and treasurers of these organizations take most of the charcoal woodcutting permits, with “fifteen to twenty of them controlling over 50 per cent of Senegal’s charcoal commerce” (Ribot, 1998 and Ribot, 2013).³⁹

2b – The Forest Service continues to adopt regulations and practices that limit local producers’ profits and are inconsistent with decentralization laws

While the 1996 decentralization laws have transferred rights to decide how forests will be used and who will have access to commercial forest opportunities from central government to CRs, the Forest Service continues to control in a large part access and use of CR forests. The annual *arrêtés* (administrative decrees) organizing the forestry campaign since 2010 include several dispositions re-centralizing important forest management decisions:

- While the *arrêtés* do not mention production quotas, they define a ‘production potential’ (*possibilités en bois énergie*) for each forest under management by CRs, and for each forest block within managed forests, and for each forest parcel within each block. There is no legal reason to have this information, already provided in the concerned forest management plans, repeated in a government-issued regulation. The Forest Service, however, conveniently twists the term “production potential” into an effective production quota, by establishing later in the *arrêtés* that the production potential not covered through local production will be allocated to registered charcoal producers (the merchants mentioned earlier) through a contract signed between the CR and the producer, and approved by the regional Forest Service agency.⁴⁰
- The *arrêtés* require the Forest Service to assess the ‘technical and organizational performance’ of production three months into the campaign. Based on this assessment, production quantities allocated to local producers and merchants can be increased, or decreased. Although imposed on all producers, this requirement effectively puts local producers, who are less experienced than merchants’ *surgas*, at a disadvantage. The timing of the *arrêtés* can also be a problem for local producers, who need to work in their fields starting May or June (whereas the migrant

³⁹ The distribution of market shares among urban wholesalers is also skewed: there were 100 wholesalers in Dakar identified in 1987 to 1994, while a third of them controlled 22% of the market (Ribot, 2013).

⁴⁰ See Article 15 in the 2011 *arrêté* (*arrêté ministériel* n° 1246 MEPN-DEFC du 3 février 2011). The same article is present in the 2010, 2012 and 2013 *arrêtés*.

surgas are no longer working in agriculture).⁴¹ In addition, this disposition contradicts (again) the principle by which CRs are legally entitled to decide who can produce and how much they can produce within the local forests.

- The *arrêtés* continue to require that producers apply for woodcutting permits, and gives the Forest Service the authority to deliver these permits. To ensure that producers will apply for woodcutting permits, they are required to obtain a transport permit, a condition to ship charcoal to town markets.

2c – Within rural communes, existing elites seem to control new positions created to manage local production

Another important finding of the survey is a growing divide within the category “local producers”. To organize production within rural communities, the Forest Service requires in the annual *arrêté* that local producers form production groups (*comités* or for-profit local groups, called GIEs for *Groupement d’Intérêt Economique*).⁴² The leaders of these production groups were found to produce three times more charcoal than typical local producers in the last campaign and appeared to have a higher kiln performance. These group leaders have more connections than the average local producer with the Forest Service, enabling them to obtain woodcutting permits and transport authorizations. In a few cases, they were able to purchase a truck and transport their production to sell in Dakar. They had sufficient financial resources to pay advances to other villagers to produce charcoal, and buy their production back. Some group leaders also hire *surgas*, who are more experienced with kiln building than typical villagers, to improve kiln yields.⁴³ Other local producers mentioned that they would rather sell their charcoal to the GIE leaders of their village, than work with a foreign transporter and *coxeur* and take the risk of being paid late, or not be paid at all.⁴⁴

As a result, local group leaders surveyed were able to reap four to five times the average market share of local producers in both Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE areas, making them primary beneficiaries of project support. To understand who these local groups leaders are, and assess whether they accessed their function because of their personal motivation or thanks to existing privileges, four of them were asked about their other functions in the community. All four occupied leadership positions before taking on the role of GIE president: one was president of the Environment Committee within the CR; another one was a manager in a company selling cotton transportation services and became a village chief.

⁴¹ For example, the 2010 *arrêté* was issued in April, leaving less than 3 months for local producers to produce charcoal. This campaign was exceptionally prolonged into 2011 to compensate for the late delay, but *arrêtés* are generally issued at best in February.

⁴² This requirement does not appear in the Forest Code, but in the implementing regulation (*arrêté annuel*) issued each year by the Forest Service to organize the charcoal production campaign.

⁴³ In the annual *arrêtés* taken by the Forest Service organizing forest exploitation, licensed professional foresters (meaning they have registered with the Forest Service) are the only ones authorized to hire *surgas* for production. This effectively excludes local producers, who are less experienced than *surgas* with charcoal making and have lower yields per kiln.

⁴⁴ Local producers mentioned they had entered an agreement with a *coxeur*, shipped the charcoal to town, but the *coxeur* never paid them back.

There is no surprise that these new local producer groups are generally led by local elites and that the new lucrative opportunities are strengthening such elites. While the intention of the project was not to reinforce local elites, the positive outcome is that local elites are much more likely to reinvest their income locally than are the urban elites who certainly do not return their profits to the forest villages they have little relation with (see Bardhan 1997). While this concentration of wealth may be due to illegal activities such as hiring of migrant laborers (which is forbidden by the Forest Service), or due to buying charcoal from forest villagers, it should still be considered a success story that new capital is at least partly being retained at the village level, which is not the case with urban charcoal merchant. More research is needed to understand where these group leaders are reinvesting their income and more work is still to be done to help ensure that forest villagers engaged in production are able to sell in the city if they so desire – and it is clear that they would choose to if they were aware of the great profits involved.

4. USAID impacts strengthening local government's exercise of power and authority over forest management

Wula Nafaa (2003-2012) invested significant resources to support local populations in entering the charcoal market through technical trainings on kiln construction, sustainable woodcutting, and regulations organizing production. They helped structure local producers' groups in forest bloc committees, GIEs and federations of producers. They took villagers to town to meet with wholesalers and learn about charcoal prices; Wula Nafaa connected local producers with truckers to arrange transportation.

The survey conducted in 2013 for this assessment shows that local producers perceive that Wula Nafaa enabled them to enter the charcoal market and break charcoal merchants' domination. All but one Wula Nafaa producer mentioned that the project had either "freed them from charcoal merchants' vile prices" (dixit a surveyed local producer) or allowed a significant price increase, from 400-600 to 1,500-1,750 F CFA per sack on the roadside (Faye, 2013). **This finding shows radical improvement for local producers, which is new since previous studies had not revealed such a positive trend.**

Fewer PROGEDE producers mentioned benefits from the project (all those who did mention benefits were former block or village committee presidents).⁴⁵ A majority of respondents said that the two projects helped local producers obtain woodcutting permits. Of course, this answer would be expected since obtaining woodcutting permits for forest villagers was a central activity of both projects.

Three quarters of local producers in PROGEDE and Wula Nafaa areas mentioned that they received assistance from either project.⁴⁶ The most common forms of assistance cited was training in charcoal production, access to production equipment and access to woodcutting permits. No PROGEDE

⁴⁵ Given the limited sample size (12 respondents for PROGEDE plus 12 respondents for Wula Nafaa), differences between Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE areas may not be representative and should be taken with caution.

⁴⁶ All respondents but one received support in Wula Nafaa areas (the one who did not had recently arrived in the village), while five PROGEDE respondents said they had not received any project support.

respondent mentioned receiving support to arrange transport and sell charcoal in town, while five producers did mention some form of Wula Nafaa support in this matter. Lack of access to transport and woodcutting permits necessary to sell charcoal in town were mentioned as the main problem by 41% of respondents (66% could cite Dakar prices, and therefore knew they could get a higher net income by selling there).

Only two respondents said they had been able to sell their charcoal in Dakar at least once since January 2012. One of them was a former village committee president; the other was a forest block president and village chief (former manager in a company established nearby).

Local producers' difficulties to obtain woodcutting permits stem from a series of regulations adopted each year by the Forest Service:

- **The production quota system is still in place, under a different name:** officially, the Forest Service cannot determine production quotas in managed forests under CRs' authority. However, as described earlier, it continues to determine each year, in an *arrêté*, production targets based on forest bloc 'capacity'. These targets are shared during annual 'negotiation' meetings hosted by Regional Councils, which gather the regional Forest Service agency, PCRs and registered foresters (charcoal merchants). The Forest Service allocates production targets, just the same way it used to allocate production quotas: initial 'production targets' are defined by the Forest Service, and allocated among local producers and merchants. Many PCRs complained that there was no room for negotiation during these meetings. Regional Forest Service officials would threaten to blame PCRs for delaying the charcoal production campaign and thereby preventing local producers from participating if they refused to endorse the Forest Service allocation (Faye, pers. comm., April 2013; an old argument according to Ribot, 2008 and Ribot, 2010). In Saare Bidji, the PCR said at the 2013 negotiation meeting that local producers could produce 100% (or more) of the total charcoal production target for their forest blocks; the regional Forest Service official responded that he had to give charcoal merchants 30% of the production (which was the Forest Service initial 'proposal') or "there will be riots"⁴⁷. He also accused the PCR of trying to "divide the country"⁴⁸ by cutting urban merchants from access to their forests (Lindsay Dozoretz pers. comm., April 2013). The PCR ended up accepting the Forest Service 'proposal'. After completion of mid-campaign evaluations, the Forest Service allocates the remaining permits—just as reserve quotas were allocated to fast producers in the past. In practice, most permits are allocated to merchants, the Forest Service arguing that local producers broke production rules—infractions also common with *surgas* (Faye and Ribot, 2013).

⁴⁷ This should be understood as a reference to the fear of urban riots if the charcoal demand is not met. See Ribot, 1999 on the 'history of fear' cultivated by the Forest Service in Senegal.

⁴⁸ This is a (hardly) veiled threat that can have several meanings: the Forest Service official may have implied that local producers did not really have the skills to produce all the charcoal, and that failing to reach the target (effectively a quota) would set urban populations against rural populations and divide the country. The official may also have echoed urban merchants' argument about forests being a public good that every Senegalese should be able to access. It has been common for foresters and merchants to say that the 'merchants are citizens' and so that they too have rights to these forests – despite that decentralization has said otherwise.

- **Conducting production evaluations three months into the campaigns puts local producers at a systematic disadvantage:** obligated to work in their agricultural fields, less experienced than *surgas*, and forbidden from hiring them (which merchants are allowed to do), they cannot compete with merchants' production yields. In addition, feedback sessions organized by Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE with local producers tend to indicate that Forest Service agents punish infractions (e.g., production outside assigned block, or beyond quota limit) inconsistently between local producers and merchants (Faye, pers. comm., April 2013). Of course, in addition to this, fines *de facto* represent a much larger financial burden to local producers than merchants given the unequal distribution of net income.

These findings suggest that, in spite of USAID and PROGEDE efforts, Rural Councils are still not able to exercise their official authority over charcoal production in their forests; or to respond to their constituents' insistent request to increase local producer's share in production quotas or their access to the lucrative urban markets. The 'contract' system (*contractualisation*) which Wula Nafaa and PROGEDE pushed for as an alternative to the quota system, has become a new form of quota limiting local producers' ability to increase their share of production and their access to markets. There is some improvement since local producers are now allowed to produce and get higher forest-edge prices; but the huge disproportion between local producers' and merchants or *coxeurs*' net income show that there is still much room for improvement (Table 1).

5. USAID impacts on accountability of power within the charcoal commodity chain

According to the 1996 decentralization laws, CRs have the official authority to manage forests within their jurisdiction. The same laws established a number of levers for local populations to hold CRs accountable, such as the election of CR members every five years, or the requirement for CR deliberations to avoid centralizing power within the PCR. We mentioned earlier how deficient these levers can be used to hold CRs accountable.

Survey findings suggest, however, that the main problem undermining accountability is not these accountability levers, but the fact that CRs cannot effectively exercise their official authority over forest management decisions: the Forest Service is still making all major decisions, such as who can produce in CR forests, where they can produce, when they can produce, and how much can be produced. Rural Council Presidents are not able to change quota allocations (or 'potential' estimates) 'proposed' by the Forest Service, and cannot help local producers get a larger portion of the 'potential' production, or simply get all the permits reserved for them on paper. **In these conditions, since the Forest Service, rather than their elected leaders, make all decisions, local populations have no lever to hold accountable those with power over the most important decisions affecting net income distribution within the charcoal market.** In this respect, USAID did not significantly improve the accountability of power and authority.

USAID, however, did address important constraints on accountability, which may bear fruit in the future. By insisting that quota allocation decisions be discussed at the regional level, USAID did help create a forum for discussion between the Forest Service, PCRs and merchants that did not exist in the past. With

time and experience, PCRs may be able to gain more ground in the long term, having the 1996 decentralization laws work for them. USAID provided PCRs and Rural Councilors with essential negotiating tools and skills through numerous trainings and training material disseminated.

Meanwhile, CRs are already in a position to exercise their authority over some, less-important forest management decisions, such as the drafting or revision of local conventions affecting forest management, or the collection and use of rural fees (*redevance rurale*).

On this aspect, survey findings indicate that individuals associated with CR management, such as environmental committee presidents, are able to reap more benefit from charcoal production than the average local producer, who does not know the total number of permits allocated to their group and were less likely to access woodcutting permits. Although more information needs to be gathered on local producers' group leaders, this finding is consistent with the existing literature on the domination of local elites in local government throughout Africa (Ribot, 2002).

This raises a number of issues with regards to accountability: if a few individuals have multiple functions within CRs and local producers' groups, they are more likely to push CRs to effectively exercise their authority in the forestry sector; but this type of strategy is not incompatible with excluding fellow villagers from the benefits obtained, thus skewing accountability toward more-privileged groups. In fact, the survey suggests that local producers who received project support did not share their knowledge with other villagers, which partly explains significant productivity differences among local producers. Several producers surveyed mentioned that those within their group who had managed to sell in Dakar did not share sale price information.

In conclusion, USAID impacts on accountability are mixed: Wula Nafaa did manage to de-concentrate quota (contractualized 'potential') allocation decisions, and to prepare PCRs for their role in forest management—two important conditions to strengthen accountability. The Forest Service was able, nevertheless, to still retain most of the power. At the local level, it is not clear that local accountability was significantly improved, as social dynamics tend to favor concentration of power rather than downward accountability.

6. Evidence from the baobab fruit commodity chain

Context in other forest-related commodity chains: the case of baobab fruit⁴⁹

The baobab fruit, also called "monkey bread", is the fruit of *Adansonia digitata*. The bark, leaves and fruit pulp of this dry, not-easily perishable fruit are used in traditional medicines (fevers, dysentery) and as a cooking ingredient. Domestic and regional demand for baobab fruit has been steadily growing, and accounts for a significant share of household revenues in the Tambacounda region (second source of revenue among non-timber forest products according to IRG, 2003). International demand for the

⁴⁹ Public information on the baobab fruit value chain is very limited. This section is largely based on two studies produced for Wula Nafaa: a 2012 study written by Sanogo and Tamba, and a brief review of several value chains produced by IRG at the onset of Wula Nafaa (February 2003).

baobab fruit has historically been modest, with the fruit being used mainly in cosmetic and pharmacy products. New prospects were expected after the European Union authorized the use of baobab fruit in food products and beverages in 2008.

Baobab fruits are collected from the trees, with larger trees producing more fruits. Total collection of fruits tends to reduce the potential for tree regeneration. Tree productivity is affected by rainfall, aging baobab population, radical pruning and early harvest (before the fruits are ripe). Most harvesters are local people, mainly women and youth, who use a pole to get the fruits. Harvest campaigns are set by the Forest Service, usually between January and March, to ensure that fruits are ripe. However, Sanogo and Tamba (2012) found that large quantities are often harvested before the campaign legally starts.

Traditionally, the fruits are sold within the village to local or outside intermediaries, who either sell them on local markets to other intermediaries or to industrial clients; or bring them to urban retailers. All fruits end in town-based traditional or semi-industrial processing units, which sell the product to supermarkets or consumers (Sanogo and Tamba, 2012).

Intermediaries and retailers tend to control purchasing prices. In response to low prices, villagers try to increase the production every year. First-level intermediaries who purchase the fruits from villagers are usually men between the ages of 35 and 60 years. They can be local or come from other regions of Senegal. The latter tend to arrive ahead of the harvest campaign to secure the village's production with a down payment, encouraging villagers to start harvesting before the official opening and hide the production until they get the permit from the Forest Service (Sanogo and Tamba, 2012).

Second-level intermediaries who purchase the fruits from local markets are also called *bana-banas*. They get the fruit in bags and arrange truck transportation to the larger town or Dakar where they have their clients—retailers or *coxeurs*.⁵⁰ Like the *bana-banas* of the charcoal chain, they know the market well and are able to hold on to their products for several weeks in order to get better prices in high-demand seasons (religious celebrations and non-harvest season).

Industrial companies (e.g., the Baobab Fruit Company, Bioessence) buy the fruit either whole or already processed. They face a growing international demand that they cannot meet. They purchase baobab fruits in Senegal but also in other countries. They are tied to specific quality standards, which is another important factor determining where they source from.

USAID impacts on the baobab fruit value chain⁵¹

As mentioned above, local baobab fruit producers (mostly women and youth) traditionally sell the fruit mostly raw, whole or husked, with frequently two levels of intermediaries to get the fruits to urban

⁵⁰ The word 'coxeur' was introduced to Wolof from Gambian English. It was originally used to refer to a person in a car park whose job it was to coax people to ride in their taxi. Hence it is a broad term used to refer to many different kinds of intermediaries.

⁵¹ Public information on the baobab fruit value chain is very limited. This section is largely based on two studies produced for Wula Nafaa: a 2012 study written by Sanogo and Tamba, and a brief review of several value chains produced by IRG at the onset of Wula Nafaa (February 2003).

centers. In contrast with the charcoal market, this commodity chain has more intermediaries but is also less structured: some *bana-banas* are able to sell directly to retailers; wholesalers and *coxeurs* can be different persons, with *coxeurs* in this market being either independent or paid by wholesalers to find retailers. Some wholesalers do not use a *coxeur*, and some *coxeurs* work directly with *bana-banas*.⁵²

Wula Nafaa encouraged local producers to form groups; informed these groups on market chain actors and costs; helped install rural processing units; and tried to reduce the number of intermediaries to increase producers' net income. Wula Nafaa succeeded in connecting several producer groups with the international market through the Baobab Fruit Company (BFC), an Italian firm purchasing various forms of the fruit for export. Similar support was generally provided for other products beside the baobab fruit, such as *mbep* gum, madd and *fonio*.

As described in Figure 2, Wula Nafaa effectively helped reduce the number of intermediaries between local producers and final consumers, and increase producers' prices. Gathered in local groups to reach higher volumes, producers arguably gained some negotiating power and established direct contracts with industrial processors (one of Wula Nafaa's success stories), or with urban retailers (Wula Nafaa reports do not indicate this as a big success, however, partly due to difficulties in transporting the fruits to town). A total of 17 rural processing units were established through project support, and received training to diversify products and improve quality (Sanogo and Tamba, 2012). These units were able to get annual contracts with BFC and significantly increase sales.⁵³ Products were also directly sold on rural markets, in town-based boutiques and to urban retailers.


Wula Nafaa annual reports indicate that these activities had contributed to the creation of 183 baobab producer enterprises in Ziguinchor, Tambacounda and Kolda by 2006. In 2011, project-supported rural processing units recorded close to CFA Francs 275 million (approximately US\$ 550,000), resulting in a revenue increase for 1,172 persons (including 52% of women). Revenue generated through baobab fruit sales and transformed products (*e.g.*, powder, seeds) rapidly increased every year since the project started (39% increase between 2010 and 2011), except for 2012 (-23%) due to lower production rates associated with climate events (Wula Nafaa Reports of 2010-2011 and 2011-2012).

No information could be found on the respective volumes, prices and expenses associated with the three marketing channels. A 2012 study mentions price changes in 2009-2011, without specifying which marketing channel they apply to. This study suggests that producers' prices increased between 2009 and 2011 from 1,500-2,000 Francs CFA to 2,500-2,750 Francs CFA (prices for a 22 kg sack of fruit pulp), while retailers' prices decreased from 3,850 to 2,750 Francs CFA for early season fruits, and increased by 25% for late-season fruits (Sanogo and Tamba, 2012). Although these changes cannot be directly attributed to changes in the commodity chain, producers' share seems to have increased while intermediaries' shrunk.

⁵² This information may not be exhaustive. The only study we could find on the baobab fruit commodity chain (Sanogo and Tamba, 2012) was more focused on the production potential than the organization of the commodity chain.

⁵³ In 2013, however, the company decided to recentralize processing activities due to quality issues with baobab powder processed by local producers.

Figure 2: Wula Nafaa changes on the Baobab fruit marketing chains



In the absence of any market share data, it is impossible to assess the extent to which local producers gained power to determine prices. Wula Nafaa annual reports indicate a sharp and constant increase in direct sales from producers to industrial processors, who offer better prices than *bana-banas*. Industrial processors are few, however, and it is not clear that producers' groups are in a position to choose between potential clients—*e.g.*, an industrial processor and a *bana-bana*. As an example, BFC's decision to stop purchasing baobab powder from rural processing units in 2013 had the effect of pushing up prices for raw products. Although good for producers, this decision also resulted in rural processing units facing higher expenses together with a sharp sales drop. This illustrates the limited control local populations still have over the market chain.

In contrast with the charcoal market, Wula Nafaa did not encounter significant resistance from the Forest Service to address administrative or regulatory barriers, such as obtaining certification or legal authorizations to put products on the market following European norms. Of course, this is a relatively new market and so there is also no history of regulation. Local conventions, enforced by the CR, generally organize the production by defining who can produce (*e.g.*, any villager or members of local producers group) and when, depending on fruit maturity. The Forest Service seems to be playing its role of a technical advisor to the CR.

No information could be found on accountability of CRs, producers' group or the Forest Service to local populations.

The case of the baobab fruit market chain would deserve a more in-depth evaluation to reach definite conclusions. Based on available information, it seems to confirm that, while Wula Nafaa did contribute to raise producers' prices by connecting them with industrial companies, the program did not fundamentally change the distribution of power within the commodity chain: local producers have limited capacity, if any, to negotiate the price despite being better informed of market opportunities and prices, and despite the diversification of products (shelled and unshelled baobab fruit, powder and seeds). As with the charcoal business, access to town markets seems to remain the main barrier to durably empowering local producers—just as it is to lifting them out of poverty.

Section V – Conclusions and Recommendations

This study could not cover, nor assess the impact of all the ways in which USAID tried to improve environmental governance in Senegal over the last 10 years. An in-depth assessment, based on a more comprehensive survey, will be needed in a few years to get a better understanding of successes and shortcomings. This initial assessment, however, indicates a number of preliminary outcomes.

1. Concluding on the NWP framework and its implementation by USAID-Senegal

USAID projects in the last 10 years unequally implemented the six guiding principles proposed in the NWP Framework to strengthen environmental governance. However ambitious, no program can address all the points mentioned in these recommendations, and USAID had to select areas to focus on.

One key achievement specifically brought by the Wula Nafaa project was to articulate medium and long-term governance goals into project design, and to fully integrate activities aimed to achieve these goals into NRM and wealth generation activities. Before Wula Nafaa, DGL-Felo had used a similar, comprehensive approach, without referring to the NWP framework (which had not been written at the time).⁵⁴

⁵⁴ The main difference between the angles used in the two projects is that DGL-Felo was designed explicitly around governance goals and expanded into NRM and wealth generation activities to support project buy-in and support governance goals.

Figure 3: Principles and action recommendations on the Power component (NWP Framework, 2002).

<p>1 Strengthen procedural rights for rural people</p> <p>Promote understanding of and access to procedural rights</p> <p>Assure that rights include information access, decision-making, and environmental recourse</p> <p>Assure rights of association, speech, movement, and access to government institutions</p> <p>Strengthen environmental legislation</p>	<p>Shift the role of central state authorities from command and control toward technical support and legal oversight</p>
<p>2 Improve rural representation and amplify rural voices in public decisions that affect their lives and well being</p> <p>Build and strengthen independent organizations that represent rural views</p> <p>Contribute to performance of government officials and institutions with rural representation</p>	<p>4 Transfer environmental powers to authorities representative of and accountable to local populations</p> <p>Transfer discretionary decisions before obligations</p> <p>Make transfers in the form of secure rights</p> <p>Transfer powers even before capacity is demonstrated</p>
<p>3 Distribute environmental authority and functions to institutions best positioned to exercise them</p> <p>Encourage inclusive national-level debate to guide restructuring of natural resource governance</p>	<p>5 Explore a minimum environmental standards approach</p> <p>6 Encourage checks and balances, pluralistic approaches, and conflict management</p> <p>Create or modify forums for NRM discussion</p> <p>Recognize that NRM conflicts can present learning opportunities and facilitate conflict management</p> <p>Promote social approaches that do not depend on consensus and help identify losers and problems</p>

This assessment indicated that USAID invested most resources into “improving rural representation and amplifying rural voices in public decisions” (#2); “distributing environmental authority and functions to institutions best positioned to exercise them” (#3); and, to a lesser extent, “strengthening procedural rights for rural people” (#1) and “encouraging conflict management” (#6):

- **Strengthen procedural rights for rural people:** USAID used participatory processes to establish local conventions – agreements between local government and the government on resource management and use.
- **Improve rural representation and amplify rural voices in public decisions that affect their lives and well being:** DGL-Felo, Wula Nafaa and smaller Democracy and Governance projects provided extensive support to strengthening rural organizations, such as producer groups, for-profit groups like GIE, producers’ federations and civil-society organizations. The DGL-Felo impact assessment of 2008 showed that governance training had had a lasting, positive impact on the performance of local government.
- **Distribute environmental authority and functions to institutions best positioned to exercise them:** USAID played a key role to facilitate national debates where rural views were expressed. Resulting clarification of the status of local conventions was helped institutionalize local participation in NRM decisions. USAID relentlessly pushed the Forest Service to relinquish their former command-and-control style of authority over forest management: the CBNRM project and Wula Nafaa offered trainings to generations of Forest Service officials on decentralization and changes brought by the 1998 Forest Code; USAID, PROGEDE and PAGERNA then PERACOD engaged the Forest Service in collaborative efforts to draft and approve forest management plans with CRs. Despite these efforts, progress was modest: the Forest Service constantly pushed back, using innovations (contracts and forest management plans) to block decentralization of forestry decisions. The extent of their resistance to decentralizing of the

lucrative charcoal trade reflects the financial and political stakes. Forest Service paid limited interest to regulating the less-remunerative baobab fruit trade.⁵⁵

- ***Transfer environmental powers to authorities representative of and accountable to local populations:*** USAID strengthened the capacity of elected Rural Councils (CRs) to better perform their roles – a significant milestone toward this objective. But few discretionary powers over forests have been transferred to the elected local authorities. In practice, USAID rather aimed to fill the capacity gap than advocate to transfer powers *before* capacity was demonstrated (see Faye 2003,2006,2013; Kante 2006; Dialigue-Ba 2006). Further, USAID promoted the use of forest management plans, which define more obligations than rights (Faye, 2013), resulting in transfer obligations rather than the discretionary decisions making powers that would constitute decentralization
- ***Explore a minimum environmental standards approach:*** no USAID project seemed to have explored this option. Wula Nafaa actually went the other direction by supporting forest management plans with costly and time-consuming forest resources inventories. The plans supported by Wula Nafaa were, however, not as expensive and time-consuming as the PROGEDE plans – and also not as simple as the PAGERNA local conventions – but followed a middle ground, in order to be simpler, faster, less costly than PROGEDE but still responsive to Forest Service requirements.⁵⁶
- ***Encourage checks and balances, pluralistic approaches, and conflict management:*** conflicts over NRM most often cited in USAID project literature concerned herders and farmers. USAID, like PAGERNA and PERACOD, promoted the use of local conventions for local communities to discuss their needs and agree on a set of rules. The evaluation of PAGERNA indicates that the positive impact of these tools is visible several years after the project ended, giving good hopes that USAID impact in this area will also be sustained.

USAID impacts on the distribution, exercise and accountability of power in Senegal are limited, but promising. The most important decisions regarding forest management are still made by the Forest Service; CRs are more knowledgeable of their rights and duties, and are more involved in daily NR management decisions, involved in local initiatives on water, sanitation, health and education; but they remain unable to fulfill important parts of their mandate regarding charcoal production, which is by far the most lucrative activity in many rural communities, with direct impacts on forest cover.

Rural Councils, however, are in a better position today to demand the powers associated with the authority attributed to them by law but still withheld from them in practice. They are better informed, better trained, better connected with de-concentrated administrations, better organized to provide

⁵⁵ This could change, however. Indeed, in 2002-2006, the Forest Service members of an advisory committee to a CODESRIA-WRI-CIRAD study of the charcoal sector asked repeatedly for the project to study the new baobab fruit market (among other markets). They said these chains needed to be studied since they had not yet ‘mastered’ these chains (Ribot, Personal communication, May 2013).

⁵⁶ Bob Winterbottom, pers. comm., July 2013.

their constituencies basic services. This may not be a sufficient condition for CR's empowerment, but it is a necessary one. USAID contributed to changing local expectations from elected local government, which is also one important condition to strengthen downward accountability in the long run. The next step is to help those elected local authorities to gain their legally specified powers so that they are able to respond to local expectations. If there are no responses to the expectations from local people, people's expectations and demands will evaporate.

2. Recommendations

Wula Nafaa saw great success in two areas: first, in convening and bringing rural voice into national dialogues; second, in enabling the rural councils and rural producers to exercise the rights given to them by law. By organizing national policy dialogues they were able to influence the establishment of local conventions. By insisting on giving rural councils their rightful role in forest management and allowing charcoal market access for local producers, Wula Nafaa has helped some rural producers to increase their forestry income. These fledgling governance innovations are at risk. They need firm backing in the local arena and they need to be expanded. The potential for influence through national dialogues is the greatest channel by which local democracy can be strengthened to fight for its own rights to serve and respond to local needs and aspirations. The potential to expand rural incomes is enormous – the charcoal commodity chain survey found that most producers who are not selling in the cities have increased their incomes significantly (Faye, 2013). The potential to increase these margins is still enormous and requires mere vigilance and a well-organized and conscious rural polity and population. These are the great successes of Wula Nafaa. They continue to have great potential to improve rural wellbeing. They are also at risk of being lost in the face of Forest Service retrenchment.

To build on this achievement, USAID should work to keep the innovations of the 1998 Forestry Code that support most of Wula Nafaa's achievements in the proposed forestry code:

- Continue informing producers of the changes
- Continue informing elected local councilors of the changes
- Continue organizing regional and national dialogues on the code and its implications for local democratic prerogatives and for rural income

In addition, USAID should further support local elected authorities to weigh in policy- and law-making processes to redefine forest management policies as a political, rather than a technical problem.

Annual regulations adopted by the Forest Service both contradict the Forest Code and are against the interests of local people. Local councils are supposed to manage forests, but Forest Service regulations, by specifying forest management as a technical problem to be managed by the Forest Service, contribute to maintain control over important decisions that the Decentralization laws have transferred to RCs. The laws at the national level cannot resolve this conflict without input from local authorities whose powers are curtailed by these ostensible technical concerns. What is needed is real substantive representation of rural populations – *via* their elected representatives in the CRs. USAID should help these representatives **federate** to lobby national lawmakers so as to create policies that do support their decision-making roles in forestry.

In addition to these two key points, findings of this assessment suggest the following recommendations:

<u>NWP Framework Objective</u>	<u>Recommendations</u>
Strengthen procedural rights for rural people	<p><u>Institutionalize rural participation in national policy engagement</u>: Work to institutionalize national processes that bring rural concerns into national law making and enforcement.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Help form federations of elected local authorities. • Enable public forums for the discussion of national policies that affect rural populations. • Improve rural access to grievance mechanisms such as courts.
Improve rural representation and amplify rural voices in public decisions that affect their lives and well being	<p><u>Replicate successful institution building programs</u>: Reinstate programs like DGL-Felo that train rural councils to know their rights as local representatives and the channels by which they can defend, exercise and expand those rights.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Diffusion of information on laws and regulations in local languages • Training in local languages of Rural Councilors on their roles, rights and responsibilities. • Training of rural populations on their rights and on the roles and powers of their elected representatives.
Distribute environmental authority and functions to institutions best positioned to exercise them	<p><u>Leverage Decentralization</u>: Project interventions must be contingent on Forest Service transfer of those powers to Rural Councils that are already specified in the law of decentralization and in Senegal’s forestry code.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that ‘contracts’ transfer more benefits than burdens. • Ensure that ‘conventions’ transfer more discretionary powers than obligations. • Ensure that ‘management plans’ follow ecological requirements to meet local needs rather than ecologically unnecessary inventory and management activities.
Transfer environmental powers to authorities representative of and accountable to local populations	<p><u>Transfer powers with all capacity building efforts</u>: Capacity building for elected local authorities is a good investment. It is limited by the failure to transfer powers to these authorities so they can exercise and develop their skills and play their legally attributed roles. The application of capacity building programs should be predicated in future on commitment from the Forest Service and Central Government to transfer significant discretionary powers mandated by decentralization laws.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transfer powers before starting capacity building programs.
Explore a minimum environmental standards approach	<p><u>Adopt a minimum environmental standards approach</u>: Apply an approach that specifies the ecological conditions that must be maintained if production is to be allowed. Production and use can then proceed if these standards are met.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Manage forests for the needs and aspirations of rural populations. If urban populations need forest products, make the conditions of supply worthy of rural aspirations. • Create management and use standards that are the minimum conditions needed for forest production. • Allow RCs to decide whether or not production is necessary or wise given the management requirements established.

Finally, in terms of project management, this assessment illustrates **the importance of defining performance measures and establishing a baseline before project inception through well-defined surveys, including on governance.** On this respect, Wula Nafaa failed to produce a baseline against which performance on the Power component of the NWP framework could have been assessed. The Wula Nafaa project did, however, remain flexible on project boundaries to address problems that may not have been initially within project limits, but were nonetheless perceived as important by stakeholders to achieve project goals. **This illustrates the need to strike a balance between making sure to measure progress on anticipated outcomes and impacts, while maintaining flexibility in the project to adapt to local contexts and demands.** Wula Nafaa annual project reports show every year new activities added to respond to local demands. Wula Nafaa's flexibility in this regard enabled the project to address barriers in different sectors (e.g., support to access credit, to access new markets through new partnerships in local towns and through new regulations, etc.).

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Appendix

Annex 1: Timeline of the Key Legislation on Decentralization in Senegal, 1972–2008

Source: based on Gilbert, G. and Taugourdeau, E. (2013) “The Local Government Financing System in Senegal” in Dafflon B. and Madies T. (eds) “The Political Economy of Decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Implementation Model in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal”. A co-publication of the Agence Française de Développement and the World Bank. Africa Development Forum Series, Washington D.C.

1972	Law 72–02 of February 1, on the organization of territorial administration Law 72–59 of June 12, introducing a rural tax
1973	Decree No. 3853/DCPT/PM of May 2, laying down the arrangements for collection of the rural tax, introduced by Law 72–59 of June 12, 1972
1988	Decree No. 12248 of October 15, laying down rules for the organization and functioning of the Fund for Local Government Infrastructures (<i>Fonds d'équipement des collectivités locales</i>), a special Treasury account 1992 Law 92–40 of July 9, on the General Tax Code (<i>Code général des impôts</i>)
1993	Interministerial decree 10830 MEFP/M.INT. of December 1, on the nomenclature for local government budgets
1996	Law 96–06 of March 22, on the Code of Local Government (Code des collectivités locales; CCL) Law 96–07 of March 22, transferring powers to the regions, communes, and rural communities Law 96–09 of March 22, laying down the administrative and financial organization of the arrondissement commune (commune d'arrondissement; CA) and its relationship to the urban area Law 96–11 of March 22, concerning the limitation on accumulating electoral mandates and certain functions Decree No. 96–458 of June 17, organizing public accounting Decree No. 96–510 of July 4, on the financial regime of local government Decree No. 96–1118 of December 27, setting up the National Council on Local Development (Conseil national de développement des collectivités locales; CNDCL) Decree No. 96–1121 of December 27, setting up the Interministerial Committee on Territorial Administration (Comité interministériel de l'administration territoriale) Decree No. 6–1124 of December 27, setting the amount over which local government procurement contracts must obtain prior approval from a government representative Decree No. 96–1135 of December 27, implementing the law transferring powers to the regions, communes, and rural communities in matters of health and social services
1997	Interministerial Decree No. 62 of January 30, on the budget nomenclature for local government

1998	New Forest Code incorporating changes brought by the 1996 decentralization laws
2002	Law 2002–02 of February 15, amending Law 72–02 of February 1, 1972, concerning the organization of territorial administration
2003	Decree No. 2003–101 of March 13, on government accounts Circular 01191/MINT/CAB of January 29, on the exercise of local government budget control
2004	Decree No. 2004–1093 of August 4, creating the Communauté des agglomérations de Dakar Decree No. 2004–1094 of August 4, creating the Communauté des agglomérations de Rufisque Law 2004–12 of February 6, reforming local taxation (systematic registration of taxpayers, limitations on property tax exemptions, introduction of the combined business tax ('Contribution Générale Unique'))
2008	Decree No. 2008–517 of May 20, laying down arrangements for the organization and functioning of the regional development agencies (Agences régionales de développement; ARDs) Law 2008–14 of March 18, amending Law 72–02 of February 1, 1972, organizing territorial administration (creation of three new regions)
<p>Notes: The Senegal legislation uses the term '<i>collectivités locales</i>' for all decentralized territorial collectivities. We translate this generic term as 'local government' and as specified local government units. The term also corresponds to territorial collectivities (CTs).</p> <p>Local government units or CTs in Senegal include both the regions (first tier) and the communes and rural communities (basic tier)—that is, two levels.</p>	

Annex 2: Interviews conducted for this assessment

A/ Individuals interviewed for this assessment:

Aaron Bronwell, USAID (interviewed on January 17, 2013)

Papa Faye, researcher (interviewed on January 8, 2013)

Poonam Jusrut, researcher (interviewed on January 15, 2013)

Abdou Sene, Wula Nafaa (interviewed on December 3, 2012 and January 2, 2013)

B/ Institutions contacted for the charcoal commodity chain survey:

Institutions	Department and number of interviews conducted
Direction des Eaux et forêts chasse et conservation des sols	Division aménagement et production forestière (DAPF) - 2 interviews
IREF Tamba,	Aménagement et production – 1 interview
Direction de l'énergie/Système d'information énergie,	Cellule planification– 1 interview

USAID-Wula Nafaa	Bureau de Dakar– 1 interview Bureau de Kaolack – 1 interview
Direction de l'énergie,	PROGEDE 2– 1 interview
PROGEDE 2, Tambacounda	1 interview
PERACOD	2 interviews
Fédération nationale des producteurs locaux du Sénégal, Tambacounda	1 interview
Gaye Charbonnage	1 interview

Annex 3: Questionnaires of the charcoal commodity chain survey

A/ Questionnaire — Producteurs/surgah

1. Date de l'interview :
2. Lieu de l'interview :
3. Interviewer:
4. Numéro de l'interview :

I/ Origine et affiliation du producteur/coupeurs

5. Etes-vous résident de la Communauté rurale ? Oui Non
6. Avez-vous une carte/autorisation de producteur de charbon ? Oui Non
7. Qui/quelle autorité vous l'a délivrée ? _____
8. Combien aviez-vous payé pour l'obtention: _____ FCFA
9. Combien payez-vous annuellement pour la renouveler : _____ FCFA
10. Etes-vous membre d'un GIE ? Oui Non
11. Travaillez-vous pour le GIE comme employé ? Oui Non
12. Travaillez-vous pour quelqu'un d'autre que le GIE ? Oui Non
 - a. Si oui, précisez pour qui : _____
 - b. Si non, travaillez-vous pour vous-même? Oui Non

II/ Aspects liés à meule, au changement des prix du charbon

13. Temps nécessaire de la coupe à la mise en sac, pour une meule :
 - a. Meule Casamance : _____ jours
 - b. Meule traditionnelle : _____ jours
14. Combien de meules aviez-vous fait lors de la dernière campagne ? _____

15. Avec combien de personnes travaillez-vous ? _____ personnes

16. Combien de temps cela vous prenait pour faire votre dernière meule (de la coupe à la mise en sac) ?
_____ jours

17. Prix et Montant produit par chacune des meules :

Variations des prix selon les meules	1. Date de vente de la meule	2. Nbre de sacs de la meule	3. Prix de vente/sac	4. Lieu de vente	5. Coûts de mise en sac/sac	6. Les frais de chargement	7. Meule casamance ?	8. Gain (Somme totale moins toutes les dépenses opérées)
a. Toute dernière meule							Oui <input type="checkbox"/> Non <input type="checkbox"/>	
b. Avant-dernière meule							Oui <input type="checkbox"/> Non <input type="checkbox"/>	
c. Avant-avant dernière meule							Oui <input type="checkbox"/> Non <input type="checkbox"/>	
d. Première meule de la campagne							Oui <input type="checkbox"/> Non <input type="checkbox"/>	

18. Les frais de mise en sac et de chargement du camion sont-ils déduits du prix de vente que vous avez indiqué (dans le tableau) ? Oui Non

III/ Dépenses liées à la plus récente meule

19. Payez-vous pour du travail rémunéré ? Oui Non

a. Origine des personnes qui travaillent pour vous ? _____

b. Nombre de travailleurs _____ personnes

c. Nombre de jours travaillés (tous les travailleurs réunis) _____ jours

d. Indemnité journalière par travailleur : _____ FCFA

20. Organisez-vous des Kille (travail collectif d'entraide) dans le cadre de la production du charbon de bois ? Oui Non

21. Si oui, remplir le tableau ci-dessous :

Caractéristiques et activités du kille	1. Nbre de participants	2. Durée du kille	3. Estimation somme dépensée (si biens et services en nature)
a. Kille pour la coupe			
b. Kille pour la construction de la meule			

c. Kille pour la mise en sac			
d. Kille pour le chargement du camion			

IV/ Dépenses liées aux matériels de fonctionnement/travail

22. Quels matériels/outils utilisez-vous dans le cadre de la carbonisation ?

Liste des matériaux	1. Utilité/fonction	2. Prix d'achat	3. Nombre par meule	4. Durée de vie
a. Matériel/outil 1				
b. Matériel/outil 2				
c. Matériel/outil 3				
d. Matériel/outil 4				
e. Matériel/outil 5				
NB : la liste doit être exhaustive				

V/ Avance et implications sur la vente du charbon

23. Avance reçue pour la dernière meule :

- a. Montant de l'avance si cash _____ FCFA
b. Biens et services reçus si avance en nature (listez) : -

- c. Estimer la somme correspondante à l'avance reçue en nature :
_____ FCFA

24. Celui qui vous a donné l'avance lors de la dernière meule, était :

- a. GIE Coopérative d'exploitant Patron Charbonnier Banabana ? Propriétaire de « dépôt légal »:
b. Lequel/laquelle/qui ? _____
c. D'où était-il ? _____

25. Aviez-vous vendu le charbon à celui qui vous a donné l'avance ?

Oui Non

26. Si vous avez vendu le charbon bord champ, savez combien il est revendu à Dakar par sac ? Oui
Non

a. Si oui, prix de revente du sac à Dakar ? _____ FCFA

27. Le montant reçu comme avance ou les biens de survie empruntés ont-ils été déduits de votre revenu ? Oui Non

28. Combien aviez-vous reçu en guise d'avance pendant toute la dernière campagne ?
_____ FCFA

29. Pourquoi aviez-vous besoin d'une avance pour produire du charbon ?

VI/ Permis de coupe, taxes et autres cadeaux ou dons

30. Combien payez-vous pour l'obtention du permis de coupe ? _____ FCFA

31. Combien de permis de coupe aviez-vous lors de la dernière campagne ? _____
permis

32. Connaissez-vous le nombre de permis attribué à votre village annuellement ?

Oui Non

33. Si oui, combien de permis votre village avait-il durant la :

Année de la campagne	1. Nombre de permis
a. Campagne 2012	
b. Campagne 2011	
c. Campagne 2010	

34. Pour la production de charbon de bois, payez-vous une taxe locale ? Oui Non

35. Si oui, à combien payez-vous ?

a. _____ FCFA par sac

b. _____ FCFA par chargement

36. Cette taxe est-elle incluse dans les prix de vente du sac enregistré dans le tableau ci-dessus ?

Oui Non

37. Si non, à votre connaissance, y a-t-il des acteurs de la filière qui paient une taxe locale ?

Oui Non

38. Qui est-ce qui (quel type d'acteurs) paie une taxe locale ? Oui Non

39. Si oui, combien paient-ils ?

a. _____ F CFA par sac ?

b. _____ F FCFA par chargement ?

40. Comment cette taxe est-elle répartie (remplir le tableau)?

Types de bénéficiaire	1. Montant alloué	2. Pourcentage (%)
a.		
b.		
c.		
d.		
e.		
f.		

41. Avez-vous payé ou offert quelque chose au chef de village durant cette campagne dans le cadre de la production ? Oui Non

a. Si oui, s'il s'agit de cadeau/don, dites quoi précisément :

b. Si oui, s'il s'agit de numéraire (argent), combien : _____ FCFA

c. Si non, le faisiez-vous (paiement ou cadeau au chef de village) avant les aménagements ?

Oui Non

42. Combien de fois lui avez-vous payé ou offert quelque chose ? _____

VII/ Aspects liés à la fraude

43. La meule que vous avez faite dernièrement était-elle en zones aménagées ?

Oui Non

a. Si oui, dans quel bloc _____ était-elle construite ?

b. Si oui, dans quelle parcelle _____ était-elle construite ?

44. Depuis 2008, avez-vous produit du charbon en zones non aménagées ?

Oui Non

a. Si oui, Combien de fois ? _____

b. Si oui, dans quelle zone ? _____

c. Si oui, quelles en étaient les raisons ?

d. Si non, pourquoi vous ne produisez pas en zones non aménagées ?

45. Combien de sac chargez-vous généralement dans un camion ? _____ sacs

46. Pour quelle(s) raison(s) chargez-vous toujours ce nombre de sacs ?

47. Avez-vous une fois surchargé un camion (cad plus de 400 sacs) ? Oui Non

48. Pour quelle(s) raison(s) aviez-vous surchargé ou pourquoi surchargez-vous souvent ?

49. Avez-vous une fois été puni pour un quelconque motif de fraude ? Oui Non

50. Si oui, de quoi vous avait-on accusé ?

51. comment avez-vous été puni ? (remplir le tableau) **question ajouté au codage**

Mode punition selon le type d'autorité ayant sévi	1. Verbalisation	2. Arrangement	3. Montant de la transaction
a. Agent forestier			
b. Police			
c. Structure/autorité locale (précisez) :			
d. Autres (précisez) :			

52. Avez-vous une fois vu des acteurs de la filière frauder ? Oui Non

53. De quel type d'acteurs s'agissait-il ?

54. Que faisaient-ils ?

55. Ces acteurs fraudent-ils fréquemment ? Oui Non

56. Pourquoi pensez-vous qu'ils fraudent ?

VIII/ Perceptions sur WN and PROGEDE

57. Vous produisez en zone :

a. Wula Nafaa

b. PROGEDE

c. Ailleurs (précisez où) : _____

58. Les projets suivants vous ont-ils apporté une quelconque assistance dans l'intégration du marché de charbon de bois ?

a. Wula Nafaa Oui Non

b. PROGEDE Oui Non

59. Que vous a apporté le projet dans le domaine de la production de charbon ?

60. Que vous a apporté le projet dans le domaine du transport du charbon ?

61. Que vous a apporté le projet dans le domaine de la vente en ville ?

62. Que vous a apporté le projet dans le domaine de la négociation du prix du charbon ?

63. Que vous a apporté le projet dans le domaine de l'accès aux permis ?

64. Que vous a apporté le projet dans le domaine de la répartition du quota —contractualisation ?

65. Que vous a apporté le projet dans le domaine des relations entre producteurs locaux et patrons charbonniers ?

66. Quels sont les succès de votre activité que vous lieriez au projet ?

67. Quels sont les insuccès de votre activité que vous lierez-vous au projet ?

IX/ Autres informations importantes au courant de l'interview

68. Statut de l'interviewé : _____

69. Ethnie de l'interviewé : _____

70. Lieu d'origine de l'interviewé: _____

71. Sexe : Masculin Féminin

72. Age : _____

73. Avez-vous confiance aux réponses données ? Oui Non

74. Autres observations :

_____ Nous vous remercions de votre disponibilité et vous prions de bien vouloir accepter de vous entretenir avec nous une seconde pour des éclaircissements si besoin est.

B/ Questionnaire — GIE/Coopérative/Exploitant charbonnier

1. Date de l'interview : _____
2. Lieu de l'interview : _____
3. Interviewer: _____
4. Numéro de l'interview : _____

I. Aspects liés à affiliation des exploitants et à la carte professionnelle

5. Vous êtes un exploitant forestier:
 - a. Membre de GIE d'exploitants/producteurs
 - b. Membre de coopérative d'exploitants
 - c. Exploitant individuel
 - d. Si autre, (précisez) : _____
6. Si vous êtes membre d'une organisation, quelle fonction y occupez-vous ?
7. Avez-vous une carte professionnelle d'exploitant forestier ? Oui Non
8. Frais d'acquisition : _____ FCFA
9. Frais de renouvellement annuel de la carte d'exploitation : _____ FCFA

II. Modes d'approvisionnement et prix selon les zones

10. Date du dernier chargement/camion de charbon de bois acquis : _____
11. Lors de votre dernier chargement, vous vous êtes approvisionné auprès de :
 - a. Un GIE de producteurs
 - b. Un villageois producteur individuel
 - c. Par quittance (charbon saisi):
 - i. Adjudication
 - ii. Enchères
 - iii. Sur recommandation (recommandé par qui ?) _____
 - d. Un Fraudeur
12. Combien de fois avez-vous acheté d'un fraudeur à la dernière campagne ?

13. Pourquoi achetez-vous d'un fraudeur ?

- e. Autre (précisez) :

III. Prix selon les zones de production/d'approvisionnement

14. Avez-vous une fois acheté du charbon en zones non aménagées depuis 2008 ? Oui
- Non
- a. Si oui, pourquoi achetez-vous en zones non aménagées ?

- b. Si oui, quel est le prix d'achat du sac en zones non aménagées ? _____ FCFA
- c. Si oui, quel est le nombre de chargements que vous avez achetés en zones non aménagées pendant la dernière campagne ? _____
15. Si non, pensez-vous qu'il y a des exploitants qui achètent du charbon en zones non aménagées ? Oui Non
16. A votre avis, qu'est-ce qui les motivent à aller acheter du charbon en zones non aménagées ?

17. Lors de votre dernier chargement en zones aménagées, quel était le prix d'achat du sac de charbon ? _____ FCFA
18. Lors de votre dernier chargement durant la dernière campagne, quel était le prix de vente du sac de charbon ? _____ FCFA
19. Lors de votre premier chargement durant la dernière campagne et en zones aménagées, quel était le prix d'achat du sac de charbon ? _____ FCFA
20. Lors de votre premier chargement durant la dernière campagne et en zones aménagées, quel était le prix de vente du sac de charbon ? _____ FCFA

IV. Coûts du permis et frais par chargement

21. Nombre de surgah fichés lors de la dernière campagne ? _____
22. Frais de fichage par surgah ? _____ FCFA
23. Nombre de surgah par chargement _____
24. Nombre de chargements accomplis durant la dernière campagne d'exploitation ?
_____ chargements
25. Nombre de permis coupé à la dernière campagne ? _____
26. Coût d'un permis de coupe ? _____ FCFA
27. Pouvez-vous détailler les frais de chargement (de mise en sac au rangement dans le camion ?
- a. Prix du sac vide : _____ FCFA
- b. frais unitaire pour la mise en sac : _____ FCFA
- c. frais de rangement des sacs dans le camion (*mbapp*) : _____ FCFA
- d. frais de restauration et thé : _____
CFA
- e. autres frais (précisez les coûts en FCFA et la fonction) :

28. Est-ce que les frais de mise en sac sont inclus dans les prix indiqués ci-haut ? Oui
Non

29. S'il y a d'autres frais que vous supportez, listez-les et précisez leur fonction :

V. Taxes par sac de charbon lors du dernier chargement acquis ?

30. Payez-vous une taxe locale (au niveau des sites de production) ? Oui Non
a. Si oui, précisez le montant de la taxe locale par chargement _____ FCFA
b. Si oui, déterminez la fonction/sens de cette taxe locale :

c. Si non, quels acteurs de la filière paient cette taxe locale ?

31. Précisez comment la taxe locale est répartie entre les bénéficiaires :

32. Cette taxe locale est-elle incluse dans le prix auquel vous achetez le sac de charbon ? Oui
Non

33. Payez-vous d'autres taxes ailleurs ? Oui Non

34. Si oui, déterminez la fonction/sens de chacune de ces taxes :

VI. Frais de dépôt et de circulation du charbon de bois

35. Stockez-vous du charbon aux dépôts de charbon ? Oui Non

36. Si oui, citez les lieux de dépôts où vous déposez votre charbon habituellement ?

37. Pourquoi avez-vous besoin de déposer du charbon dans les dépôts que vous avez cités ?

38. Combien payez-vous pour le stockage du charbon dans un dépôt ? _____ FCFA

39. Pendant combien de temps max. êtes-vous autorisé à déposer du charbon dans un dépôt ? _____ jours

40. Frais de location de moyens de stockage au dépôt :

a. camion : _____ FCFA par chargement ;

b. frais de manutention du charbon à mettre en dépôt : _____ FCFA par sac

c. Frais de location de charrette _____ FCFA par sac

41. Quelle fonction joue le dépôt du charbon selon vous ?

42. Quels sont les avantages du dépôt du charbon de bois pour les GIE/exploitants ?

43. Quels sont les inconvénients du dépôt du charbon de bois pour les GIE/exploitants ?

44. A qui payez-vous les frais de dépôt ?

45. Combien de fois avez-vous payé des frais de dépôt durant la dernière campagne d'exploitation de charbon ? _____

46. Combien payez-vous pour le recours à un dépôt de charbon par opération ? _____ FCFA

47. Combien votre dernier stockage de charbon dans un dépôt vous a coûté au total ? _____ FCFA

48. Citez, s'il vous plaît, citez les paiements faits aux postes de contrôle forestiers tout au long de la route vers la ville (nom de la ville _____) :

Paiements officiels sur la route	1. Montant payé par poste	2. Raison du paiement

a. 1 ^{er} paiement		
b. 2 nd paiement		
c. 3 ^{ème} paiement		
d. 4 ^{ème} paiement		
e. 5 ^{ème} paiement		
f. 6 ^{ème} paiement		
g. Autres (listez-les)		

49. Combien aviez-vous dépensé au total aux postes de contrôle forestier installés tout au long de la route de votre région d’approvisionnement jusqu’en ville? _____ FCFA

50. Quels rôles jouent les différents postes forestiers suivants dans la filière charbon ?

a. IREF :

b. Chef Secteur :

c. Chef de brigade forestière :

d. Chef de poste de contrôle forestier sur la route vers Dakar :

51. Leurs rôles contribuent-ils à une exploitation plus durable et efficiente du charbon ?

Oui Non

52. Si oui, comment ?

53. Si non, pourquoi ?

54. Lors de votre dernier chargement, combien avez-vous dépensé comme frais auprès de la Police et la Gendarmerie avant d’arriver en ville ? _____ FCFA

- a. Région de départ _____
b. Région de destination (pour écoulement du charbon).

55. Quelles étaient les raisons de ces paiements auprès de la Police et/ou de la Gendarmerie ?

56. Quel rôle joue la Police/Gendarmerie dans la filière charbon de bois ?

57. Leur rôle contribue-t-il à une exploitation plus durable et efficiente du charbon ? Oui
Non

58. Si oui, comment ?

59. Si non, pourquoi ?

60. Combien aviez-vous payé au chef de village lors de la dernière campagne pour l'installation de vos surgah (bûcherons) ? _____ FCFA

VII. Transport et autres frais et aspects liés au transport du charbon

61. Etes-vous propriétaires de camions qui transportent du charbon de bois ? Oui Non

62. Si oui, combien de camions avez-vous ? _____

63. Si oui, avez-vous une licence de transport de charbon de bois délivré par l'UNCEFS ?

Oui Non

64. Si oui, à combien l'avez-vous payé ? _____ FCFA

65. Si oui, depuis quand l'avez-vous ? _____

66. Si oui, à combien louez-vous vos camions pour le transport d'un chargement de charbon des zones de production à Dakar ?

a. Tamba—Dakar : _____ FCFA par chargement

b. Kolda—Dakar : _____ FCFA par chargement

c. Sédhiou—Dakar : _____ FCFA par chargement

67. Quels sont les facteurs qui influencent les prix du transport ?

68. Dans quels cas augmentez-vous les prix du transport ?

Dans quels cas diminuez-vous les prix du transport ?

Quels sont les frais que supporte un transporteur pour convoier un chargement :

Frais de convoi d'un camion par région de départ	1. Frais de carburant aller-retour	2. Frais auprès des Policiers/Gendar-mes	3. Frais aux postes forestiers	4. Frais de survie du chauffeur
a. Tamba				
b. Kolda				
c. Sédhiou				
d. Autres (précisez)				

69. Combien de sac aviez-vous transporté lors de votre dernier chargement ? _____ sacs

70. Le charbon vous appartenait-il ? Oui Non

71. Si vous n'êtes pas propriétaire de camion, combien aviez-vous payé pour le transport :
_____ FCFA pour le chargement

VIII. Quota, fraude et mécanismes de légalisation du charbon de bois

72. Quota obtenu durant la dernière campagne : _____ quintaux

73. Quota obtenu durant la campagne précédente: _____ quintaux

74. Quota obtenu durant la campagne d'avant: _____ quintaux

75. Dernier quota obtenu avant la domiciliation de la production du charbon en zones aménagées en 2008: _____ sacs

76. Si votre quota est achevé et que vous avez du charbon ou bois en forêt, perdez-vous systématiquement le produit ? Oui Non

77. Si non, comment procédez-vous pour ne pas perdre le produit ?

78. Payez-vous une quittance pour circuler ce charbon dans ce cas? Oui Non

79. Combien de chargements avez-vous payé par quittance durant la dernière campagne?
_____ chargements

80. Avez-vous une fois acheté un permis de coupe dans le marché noir pour circuler du charbon? Oui Non

81. Combien de fois avez-vous acheté un permis dans le marché noir durant la dernière campagne?

82. Parmi ceux qui vous ont vendu de permis dans le marché noir, il y a des :

a. Agents forestiers

b. Exploitants forestiers

c. Bana bana

d. Comité de gestion

e. Autres, (précisez leur fonction) :

83. Dans quels cas achetez-vous un permis dans le marché noir pour circuler du charbon ?

84. Quel était le prix du dernier permis acquis dans le marché noir : _____ FCFA

85. Quel est le prix minimal d'un permis dans le marché noir ? _____ FCFA

86. Avez-vous une fois fait recours à la production par procuration d'un autre commerçant?

Oui Non

87. Combien de procurations vous a-t-on faites durant la dernière campagne? _____

88. Combien payez-vous pour obtenir une procuration d'un autre commerçant ?

_____ FCFA

89. Partagez-vous votre quota avec les autres membres de votre GIE/coopérative ? Oui

Non

90. Combien de sacs aviez-vous effectivement chargé lors de votre dernier chargement ?

_____ sacs

91. Quel a été le nombre de sacs officiellement noté sur le permis de circulation ? _____ sacs

92. Combien de sacs aviez-vous en surcharge lors de la campagne dernière ? _____ sacs

93. Pourquoi aviez-vous surchargé ?

94. Si vous n'avez jamais surchargé, quelles en sont les raisons ?

95. Aviez-vous une fois été puni pour un quelconque motif de fraude ? Oui Non

96. Si oui, de quoi vous avait-on accusé ?

Mode punition selon le type d'autorité ayant sévi	1. Verbalisation	2. Arrangement	3. Montant de la transaction
a. Agent forestier			
b. Police/Gendarmerie			
c. Structure/autorité locale (précisez) :			
d. Autres (précisez) :			

97. Avez-vous une fois vu des acteurs de la filière frauder ? Oui Non

98. De quel type d'acteurs s'agissait-il ?

99. Que faisaient-ils ?

100. Ces acteurs fraudent-ils fréquemment ? Oui Non

101. Pourquoi pensez-vous qu'ils fraudent ?

IX. Autres informations importantes au courant de l'interview

102. Statut de l'interviewé : _____

103. Ethnie de l'interviewé : _____

104. Lieu d'origine de l'interviewé: _____

105. Sexe : _____
106. Age : _____
107. Avez-vous confiance aux réponses données ? Oui Non
108. Autres observations :

Nous vous remercions de votre disponibilité et vous prions de bien vouloir accepter de vous entretenir avec nous une seconde pour des éclaircissements si besoin est.

C/ Questionnaire — Transporteurs/Chauffeurs de camion

1. Date de l'interview : _____
2. Lieu de l'interview : _____
3. Interviewer : _____
4. Numéro de l'interview : _____

I/ Statut du transporteur (transporteur, exploitant transporteur, chauffeur de camion de transport de charbon)

Questions 5 à 18 spécifiques aux transporteurs en même temps exploitants et à leurs chauffeurs

5. Combien de camions avez-vous (votre patron a-t-il) ? _____
6. Avez-vous (votre patron a-t-il) une licence de transport de charbon de bois délivré par l'UNCEFS ?
Oui Non
7. A combien l'avez-vous payé ? _____ FCFA
8. Depuis quand l'avez-vous ? _____
9. A combien louez-vous vos camions pour le transport d'un chargement de charbon des zones de production à Dakar ?
 - a. Tamba—Dakar : _____ FCFA par chargement
 - b. Kolda—Dakar : _____ FCFA par chargement
 - c. Sédhiou—Dakar : _____ FCFA par chargement
10. Le charbon que votre (vous) chauffeur(s) a transporté la dernière fois :
 - a. Vous appartient-il
 - b. Appartient à un patron
 - c. Appartient à un GIE de producteurs locaux
 - d. Bana Bana
 - e. Autres (précisez):

II/ Modes d'approvisionnement et prix

11. Date de votre dernier chargement convoyé en ville (nom de la ville _____) :

12. Le charbon vous appartenait-il ? Oui Non

13. Si le charbon vous appartient, à quel prix aviez-vous acheté le sac ? _____ FCFA
par sac

14. Si le charbon vous appartient, à quel prix aviez-vous vendu le sac ?
_____ FCFA par sac

15. Si le charbon vous appartient, combien de sac comptait le chargement ?
_____ sacs

16. Combien de sac avait été officiellement déclaré sur le permis de circulation ?
_____ sacs

17. Si surcharge, combien de sacs y-avait-il en surplus ? _____ sacs

18. Pourquoi aviez-vous surchargé ?

(Tout le reste des questions ci-dessous sont communes aux cibles)

19. Au dernier voyage, quel était le prix du transport du chargement : _____ FCFA

20. Quels sont les facteurs qui influencent les prix du transport ?

21. Dans quels cas augmentez-vous les prix du transport ?

22. Dans quels cas diminuez-vous les prix du transport ?

III/ Frais de transport pour convoier un chargement en ville

23. Quels sont les frais que supporte un transporteur pour convoier un chargement :

Frais de convoi d'un camion selon la région de départ	1. Frais de carburant aller-retour	2. Frais de survie du chauffeur	3. Villes de destination
a. Tambacounda			Supprimer dans le max
b. Kolda			
c. Sédhiou			
d. Autres (précisez)			

24. Autres frais, (listez et dites pourquoi) :

IV/ Paiements officiels et paiements non officiels sur la route

25. Citez, s'il vous plaît, les paiements faits aux postes de contrôle forestiers tout au long de la route vers la ville (nom de la ville _____) :

Paiements officiels le long de la route	1. Montant payé par poste	2. Raison du paiement
a. 1 ^{er} paiement		
b. 2 nd paiement		
c. 3 ^{ème} paiement		
d. 4 ^{ème} paiement		
e. 5 ^{ème} paiement		
f. 6 ^{ème} paiement		
g. Autres (listez-les)		

26. Combien avez-vous dépensé au total aux postes de contrôle forestier installés tout au long de la route de votre région d'approvisionnement jusqu'en ville? _____ FCFA

27. Les rôles des différents postes forestiers suivants dans la filière sont :

e. IREF : _____

f. Chef Secteur : _____

g. Chef de brigade forestière : _____

h. Chef de poste de contrôle forestier sur la route vers Dakar : _____

28. Leurs rôles contribuent-ils à une exploitation plus durable et efficiente du charbon ?

Oui Non

29. Si oui, comment ?

30. Si non, pourquoi ?

31. Lors de votre dernier chargement, combien avez-vous dépensé auprès de la Police et la Gendarmerie avant d'arriver en ville ? _____ FCFA

a. Région de départ _____

b. Région de destination (pour écoulement du charbon) _____

32. Quelles étaient les raisons de ces paiements auprès de la Police et/ou de la Gendarmerie ?

33. Quel rôle joue la Police/Gendarmerie dans la filière charbon de bois ?

34. Leur rôle contribue-t-il à une exploitation plus durable et efficiente du charbon ? Oui

Non

35. Si ou, comment ?

36. Si non, pourquoi ?

V/ Autres informations importantes au courant de l'interview

37. Statut de l'interviewé : _____

38. Ethnie de l'interviewé : _____

39. Lieu d'origine de l'interviewé: _____

40. Sexe : _____

41. Age : _____

42. Avez-vous confiance aux réponses données ? Oui Non

43. Autres observations :

Nous vous remercions de votre disponibilité et vous prions de bien vouloir accepter de vous entretenir avec nous une seconde pour des éclaircissements si besoin est

D/ Questionnaire — Coxeurs

1. Date de l'interview : _____

2. Lieu de l'interview : _____

3. Interviewer : _____

4. Numéro de l'interview : _____

I/ Approvisionnement, prix et quantité

5. A quelle date remonte votre dernier approvisionnement ? _____

6. Combien de sacs contenait-il ? _____ sacs

7. Où vous étiez-vous approvisionné ? _____

8. A quel prix aviez-vous acheté le sac ? _____ FCFA

9. Où vous approvisionnez-vous le plus souvent ? _____

10. Après de quel groupe d'acteurs vous étiez-vous approvisionné la dernière fois ?

a. Exploitants forestiers/patrons charbonniers

b. Baba bana

c. Autres (précisez) : _____

11. Etait-ce le cas pour les approvisionnements précédents ? Oui Non

12. A quel prix vous approvisionnez-vous ? _____ FCFA

13. Au détail, à quel prix revendez-vous le sac ? _____ FCFA

14. Combien de sacs aviez-vous acheté la dernière fois ? _____ sacs

15. Quels sont les facteurs qui influencent les prix d'achat du charbon ?

16. Pouvez-vous expliquer davantage comment chacun de ces facteurs influence les prix d'achat du charbon ?

17. Quels sont les facteurs qui influencent les prix de vente du charbon ?

18. Pouvez-vous expliquer davantage comment chacun de ces facteurs influence les prix de vente du charbon ?

19. Dépenses que vous faites

a. _____ FCFA par sac

b. _____ FCFA par chargement/camion

20. Frais de transport depuis le lieu d'approvisionnement au dépôt des client/détaillants (Jallo Këriñ)

21. Quel était le prix du sac de charbon lors de vos approvisionnements en janvier-février ?

_____ FCFA

22. Quel était le prix du sac de charbon lors de vos approvisionnements en novembre-décembre ?

_____ FCFA

23. Quel était le prix du sac de charbon lors de vos approvisionnements en juillet-août ?

_____ FCFA

24. Pouvez-vous lister exhaustivement vos dépenses en général

25. Dépenses que vous payez au total par camion de charbon/chargement de l'acquisition à la vente auprès des détaillants (jallo Këriñ) ?

26. Avez-vous votre propre lieu de stockage dans le parc-dépôt (ou parc central) où vous opérez ? Oui

Non

27. Quels sont les parcs-dépôts (parcs centraux) qui existent à Dakar ?

28. A qui payez-vous les frais de stockage dans le parc-dépôt de charbon ?

29. Combien de fois avez-vous payé des frais de dépôt durant la dernière campagne d'exploitation de charbon ? _____

30. Combien au total avez-vous dépensé pour le stockage de votre charbon dans le parc-dépôt ?

_____ FCFA

31. Quelle fonction jouent les parcs-dépôts de charbon dans la filière ?

32. Quelle fonction jouent les parcs-dépôts de charbon pour l'activité de coxeur ?

33. Quels sont les avantages du parc-dépôt de charbon pour la filière charbon ?

34. Quels sont les avantages du parc-dépôt de charbon pour l'activité de coxueur ?

35. Quels les inconvénients du parc-dépôt de charbon pour la filière charbon ?

36. Quels les inconvénients du parc-dépôt de charbon pour l'activité de coxueur ?

37. Listez les autres coûts induits par le stockage de votre charbon dans un parc-dépôt de charbon ?

38. Quelles sont les taxes officielles que paie un coxueur ?

39. Pour chacune des taxes, précisez à quelle autorité vous la payez ?

40. Durant l'année, la quantité de charbon qui arrive en ville est-elle constante ? Oui Non

41. Justifiez-votre réponse :

42. Quand est-ce que les pénuries de charbon surviennent-elles en ville ?

43. Quand est-ce que les sur-approvisionnements surviennent-ils en ville ?

44. En cas de sur-approvisionnement, comment vous approvisionnez-vous en charbon ?

45. Quels impacts le sur-approvisionnement a-t-il sur la filière charbon de bois ?

46. Quels impacts le sur-approvisionnement a-t-il sur l'activité de coxeur ?

Autres informations importantes au courant de l'interview

47. Statut de l'interviewé : _____

48. Ethnie de l'interviewé : _____

49. Lieu d'origine de l'interviewé: _____

50. Sexe : _____

51. Age : _____

52. Avez-vous confiance aux réponses données ? Oui Non

53. Autres observations :

Nous vous remercions de votre disponibilité et vous prions de bien vouloir accepter de vous entretenir avec nous une seconde pour des éclaircissements si besoin est.

E/ Questionnaire — Bana Bana

1. Date de l'interview : _____
2. Lieu de l'interview : _____
3. Interviewer : _____
4. Numéro de l'interview : _____

I/ Modes d'approvisionnement et prix selon les zones

5. Date d'acquisition du dernier chargement : _____
6. Pour votre dernier chargement, vous avez acheté auprès de :
 - a. Un GIE
 - b. Un villageois producteur individuel
 - c. Un fraudeur
 - i. Fraudeur local
 - ii. Fraudeur Peul Fuuta
 - d. combien de fois avez-vous acheté d'un fraudeur cette campagne ? _____
7. Autres sources d'approvisionnement (précisez) :

8. Vous êtes-vous une fois approvisionné en charbon en zones non aménagées depuis 2008 ? Oui
Non
9. Si oui, pourquoi vous êtes-vous approvisionné en zones non aménagées ?

10. Si oui, quel est le prix d'achat du sac de charbon en zones non aménagées?
_____ FCFA
11. Si oui, pouvez dire combien de chargements vous avez acheté en zones non aménagées ?
_____ chargements
12. Si non, pourquoi vous ne vous approvisionnez pas en zones non aménagées ?

13. Si non, connaissez-vous des Bana bana qui s'approvisionnent en zones non aménagées ? Oui
Non
14. Qu'est-ce qui, à votre avis, les pousse à s'approvisionner en zones non aménagées ?

- _____
- _____
- _____
15. A votre dernier chargement, à quel prix avez-vous acheté le sac en zones aménagées ?
_____ FCFA
16. A votre dernier chargement, quel était le prix à la vente du sac en ville (nom de la ville _____) ? _____ FCFA
17. A votre premier chargement durant la dernière campagne, quel était le prix d'achat du sac en brousse (nom du site _____) ? _____ FCFA par sac
18. A votre premier chargement durant la dernière campagne, quel était le prix de vente du sac en ville (nom de la ville _____) ? _____ FCFA

II/ Prix et mécanismes d'obtention du permis

19. Combien de permis avez-vous payé durant la dernière campagne ? _____
20. Déterminez, sans les nommer, la fonction des personnes qui vous ont vendu les trois derniers permis que vous avez acquis ?

Prix du permis selon le type de vendeur	1. Agents forestiers	2. Patrons charbonniers	3. Bana bana	4. Comité de gestion forestière	5. Autres (précisez la fonction)
a. Prix permis 1					
b. Prix permis 2					
c. Prix permis 3					
d. Nbre de permis acquis durant dernière campagne					

21. Avez-vous une fois payé à d'autres bana baba pour qu'ils circulent en leur nom du charbon vous appartenant ? Oui Non
22. Si oui, comment s'est-il passé ?
- _____
- _____
- _____

23. A combien payez-vous un permis de circulation ? _____ FCFA
24. Avez-vous une fois réutilisé un permis de circulation pour transporter un deuxième ou troisième chargement ? Oui Non
- a. Si oui, qu'est-ce qui vous a poussé à procéder ainsi ?

b. Si oui, comment cela s'était-il passé ?

c. Si oui, depuis combien de temps faites-vous cela ? _____ années

d. Combien de fois l'avez-vous fait durant la dernière campagne ? _____

III/ Coûts de chargement et de déchargement

25. Prix du sac vide ? _____ FCFA

26. Prix unitaire de la mise en sac _____ FCFA

27. Prix de la manutention du charbon par sac _____ FCFA

28. Prix du rangement (mise en ordre) des sacs dans le camion _____ FCFA

29. Payez-vous pour le déchargement une fois en ville ? Oui Non

30. Si oui, combien payez-vous par sac au déchargement ? _____ FCFA

31. Est-ce que ces frais de chargement et de déchargement sont-ils inclus dans le prix d'achat du sac que vous avez indiqué plus haut ? Oui Non

32. Listez les autres frais que vous supportez en brousse :

IV/ Taxes payées dans les sites de production

33. Avez-vous payé une taxe locale lors du dernier chargement ? Oui Non

34. Si oui, à qui (ou quelle structure) l'avez-vous payée ? _____

35. combien avez-vous payé ?

_____ FCFA par sac ; _____ FCFA par chargement ?

36. Cette taxe est-elle incluse dans le prix d'achat du sac que vous avez indiqué plus haut ? Oui

Non

37. Si non, y a-t-il des acteurs qui paient une taxe locale ? Oui Non

38. Y a-t-il d'autres taxes que vous payez au niveau local et ailleurs ?

39. Si oui, spécifiez le montant _____

40. Si oui, donnez les raisons de cette taxe

V/ Frais de dépôt et de circulation du charbon de bois

41. Stockez-vous du charbon dans des dépôts ? Oui Non

42. Si oui, pourquoi ?

43. précisez le lieu et les frais de stockage à ces dépôts :

Frais de dépôt de charbon	1. Frais de dépôt du charbon	2. Durée maximale
a. Lieu de dépôt 1		
b. Lieu de dépôt 2		
c. Lieu de dépôt 3		

44. Frais de location de moyens de stockage au dépôt :

d. Si camion, montant : _____ FCFA par sac

e. Si charrette, montant : _____ FCFA par sac

45. Quelle fonction joue le dépôt de charbon dans la filière selon vous ?

46. Quels sont les avantages du dépôt de charbon pour la filière ?

47. Quels sont les avantages du dépôt de charbon pour l'activité de Bana bana ?

48. Quels sont les inconvénients du dépôt de charbon pour la filière ?

49. Quels sont les inconvénients du dépôt de charbon pour l'activité de Bana bana ?

50. A qui payez-vous les frais de dépôt ? _____

51. Combien payez-vous à chaque fois que stockez du charbon dans un dépôt ?

a. Montant _____ FCFA par sac

b. Montant _____ FCFA par chargement

52. Combien de fois avez-vous payé des frais de dépôt durant la dernière campagne d'exploitation de charbon ? _____

53. Listez les autres coûts induits par le dépôt de charbon sur les GIE/exploitants, s'il y en a :

54. Autres frais opérés de l'achat à la vente en ville (nom de la ville : _____) ?

VI/ Paiements officiels et paiements non officiels le long de la route vers la ville

55. Nombre de paiements aux postes de contrôle forestier sur la route du site d'approvisionnement (préciser : _____) à la ville de destination (préciser ville: _____) :

56. Citez, s'il vous plaît, les paiements faits aux postes de contrôle forestiers tout au long de la route vers la ville (nom de la ville _____) :

Paiements officiels le long de la route	1. Montant payé par poste	2. Raison du paiement
a. 1 ^{er} paiement		

b. 2nd paiement		
c. 3^{ème} paiement		
d. 4^{ème} paiement		
e. 5^{ème} paiement		
f. 6^{ème} paiement		
g. Autres (listez-les)		

57. Combien avez-vous dépensé au total aux postes de contrôle forestier installés tout au long de la route de votre région d’approvisionnement jusqu’en ville? _____ FCFA

58. Quels rôles jouent les différents postes forestiers suivants dans la filière charbon ?

i. IREF :

j. Chef Secteur :

k. Chef de brigade forestière :

l. Chef de poste de contrôle forestier sur la route vers Dakar :

59. Leurs rôles contribuent-ils à une exploitation plus durable et efficiente du charbon ?

Oui Non

c. Si oui, comment ?

d. Si non, pourquoi ?

60. Lors de votre dernier chargement, combien avez-vous dépensé comme frais auprès de la Police et la Gendarmerie avant d’arriver en ville ? _____ FCFA

a. Région de départ _____

b. Région de destination (pour écoulement du charbon).

61. Quelles étaient les raisons de ces paiements auprès de la Police et/ou de la Gendarmerie ?

62. Quel rôle joue la Police/Gendarmerie dans la filière charbon de bois ?

63. Leur rôle contribue-t-il à une exploitation plus durable et efficiente du charbon ? Oui Non

a. Si oui, comment ?

b. Si non, pourquoi ?

VII/ Transport et autres aspects liés au transport du charbon

64. Combien de sacs aviez-vous transporté lors de votre dernier chargement ?

_____ sacs

65. Combien aviez-vous payé :

a. Montant : _____ FCFA par sac

b. Montant : _____ FCFA par chargement

66. Combien de sacs aviez-vous effectivement transporté lors de votre dernier chargement ?

_____ sacs

67. Quel a été le nombre de sacs noté officiellement sur votre permis de circulation ?

_____ sacs

68. Combien de sacs aviez-vous en surplus (surchargé) ? _____ sacs

69. Pourquoi aviez-vous surchargé ?

70. Aviez-vous été puni pour surcharge ? Oui Non

71. Si oui, quelle autorité vous a puni et comment (remplir tableau)?

Mode punition selon le type d'autorité ayant sévi	1. Verbalisation	2. Arrangement	3. Montant de la transaction
a. Agent forestier			
b. Police/Gendarmerie			
c. Structure/autorité locale (précisez) :			
d. Autres (précisez) :			

72. De quoi vous avait-on accusé ?

73. Avez-vous une fois vu des acteurs de la filière frauder ? Oui Non

74. De quel type d'acteurs s'agissait-il ?

75. Que faisaient-ils ?

76. Ces acteurs fraudent-ils fréquemment ? Oui Non

77. Pourquoi pensez-vous qu'ils fraudent ?

VIII/ Autres informations importantes au courant de l'interview

78. Statut de l'interviewé : _____

79. Ethnie de l'interviewé : _____

80. Lieu d'origine de l'interviewé: _____

81. Sexe : _____

82. Age : _____

83. Avez-vous confiance aux réponses données ? Oui Non

84. Autres observations :

Nous vous remercions de votre disponibilité et vous prions de bien vouloir accepter de vous entretenir avec nous une seconde pour des éclaircissements si besoin est.

F/ Questionnaire — Détaillants (Jallo këriñ)

1. Date de l'interview : _____
2. Lieu de l'interview : _____
3. Interviewer: _____
4. Numéro de l'interview : _____

I/ A propos des prix (à l'achat et à la vente)

5. Quel est le prix d'achat du sac de charbon actuellement ? _____ FCFA
6. Quel est le prix de vente du sac de charbon aujourd'hui ? _____ FCFA
7. Quel est le prix de vente du kilogramme de charbon aujourd'hui ? _____ FCFA
8. Lorsque les prix augmentent en gros, répercutiez-vous la hausse dans la vente au détail ? Oui
Non
9. Si oui, comment répercutiez-vous la hausse dans la vente au détail ?

II/ Approvisionnement en charbon :

10. Auprès de quel acteur de la filière vous approvisionnez-vous ?
 - a. Exploitant forestiers
 - b. Coxeurs
 - c. Bana banas
 - d. Autres, précisez: _____
11. Le prix d'achat du sac varie t-il selon qu'on achète auprès de l'un ou l'autre de ces trois acteurs ? Oui Non
 - a. Si oui, prix d'achat du sac auprès d'un exploitant forestier _____ FCFA
 - b. Si oui, prix d'achat du sac auprès d'un coxeur _____ FCFA
 - c. Si oui, prix d'achat du sac auprès d'un Bana bana _____ FCFA
 - d. Si oui, prix d'achat du sac auprès des autres (si autres) _____ FCFA
12. Si oui, comment expliquez-vous ces différences de prix ?

III/ Dépôt de vente de charbon de bois en ville

13. Supportez-vous des frais pour votre dépôt de vente ? Oui Non
14. Quels types de frais payez-vous :
 - a. Location du dépôt de vente _____ FCFA par mois

b. Taxe municipale : _____ FCFA par mois

c. Autres taxes, précisez : _____

15. Listez toutes autres frais que vous supportez dans l'exercice de votre activité que nous n'avons pas cités :

IV/ Coûts d'équipement

16. Quels matériels/outils utilisez- vous dans l'activité relative à votre dépôt ?

Frais d'acquisition de matériaux /outils	1. Utilité/ fonction	2. Prix d'achat	3. Nombre (combien ?)	4. Durée de vie (années)
a. Matériel/outil 1				
b. Matériel/outil 2				
c. Matériel/outil 3				
d. Matériel/outil 4				
e. Matériel/outil 5				
NB : la liste doit être exhaustive				

17. Autres dépenses (listez-les et donnez leur fonction) :

V/ Autres informations importantes au courant de l'interview

18. Statut de l'interviewé : _____

19. Ethnie de l'interviewé : _____

20. Lieu d'origine de l'interviewé: _____

21. Sexe : _____

22. Age : _____

23. Avez-vous confiance aux réponses données ? Oui Non

24. Autres observations :

Nous vous remercions de votre disponibilité et vous prions de bien vouloir accepter de vous entretenir avec nous une seconde pour des éclaircissements si besoin est.

G/ Questionnaire — Dépositaires légaux à Tambacounda

1. Date de l'interview: _____
2. Lieu de l'interview: _____
3. Interviewer : _____
4. Numéro de l'interview : _____

I/ Création des « dépôts légaux » et affiliation des dépositaires

5. En quelle année a-t-on créé les « dépôts légaux » ? : _____
6. Qu'est-ce qui a initié la création des dépôts légaux à Tambacounda ? : _____
7. Pourquoi a-t-on créé les « dépôts légaux » ?

8. Quels avantages avez-vous relevé de la création des « dépôts légaux » ?

9. Quels inconvénients avez-vous relevé de la création des « dépôts légaux » ?

10. Avez-vous une des cartes suivantes :

- a. Exploitant forestier
- b. Producteur local affilié à un CVGD (PROGEDE)
- c. Membre de GIE de producteurs (Wula Nafaa)

11. Montant payé pour la carte à votre disposition ? _____ FCFA
12. Quelle autorité/structure vous a délivré la carte à votre disposition ? _____
13. Combien payez-vous par an pour le renouvellement de votre carte ? _____ FCFA

II/ Mode d'approvisionnement et d'écoulement du charbon de pare-feu

14. Charbon produit dans le pare-feu :

Caractéristiques des pare-feu selon l'année	1. Nbre de km de pare-feu coupés	2. Nbre de chargements obtenus du pare-feu	3. Nbre de coupeurs recrutés	4. Origines des coupeurs recrutés	
				4a. Villageois	4b. Etrangers
a. 2011					
b. 2012					

15. Combien de temps la coupe du dernier pare-feu a-t-elle duré ? _____ mois

III/ Modes de paiement des coupeurs/producteurs

16. Comment payez-vous vos coupeurs/producteurs ?

- Payé cash
- Si cash, combien ? _____ FCFA
- Si avance, combien par coupeur ? _____ FCFA
- Si avance par coupeur différent, à combien estimez-vous le montant total déboursé en guise d'avance lors du dernier pare-feu ? _____ FCFA
- Si couverture en nature, citez les produits donnés et les services rendus ?

17. Évaluez en numéraire les produits et services déboursés pour le dernier pare-feu coupé ?

_____ FCFA

18. Ce montant a-t-il été soustrait aux coupeurs à l'achat du charbon à la fin de la coupe/production du pare-feu ? Oui Non

19. À quel prix avez-vous acheté le charbon produit dans le pare-feu dont vous êtes responsable ?

- En 2012, _____ FCFA
- En 2011, _____ FCFA

20. Où avez-vous vendu le charbon de bois produit dans votre pare-feu ?

Quantité de charbon écoulée selon le lieu de vente et le prix	1. Bord-champ		2. Tamba	3. Dakar	4. Autres villes (précisez)
	1a. Exploitant charbonnier	1b. Bana bana			
a. Nbre de chargements (précisez nbre de sacs)					
b. Prix de vente par sac de la dernière opération					

IV/ Mécanismes d'obtention de permis pour le charbon en pare-feu

21. Combien de permis avez-vous obtenu lors du dernier pare-feu ? _____
22. Combien avez-vous payé par permis ? _____ FCFA
23. Où avez-vous obtenu les permis ? _____
24. Avez-vous payé des taxes à la communauté rurale ?
- a. Combien par sac : _____ FCFA
- b. Combien par chargement : _____ FCFA
25. Citez toutes autres taxes que vous payez depuis la coupe à la vente du charbon (donnez les raisons pour chacune des taxes) :

V/ Mécanismes de fraude et de légalisation de charbon frauduleux

26. Combien de sacs chargez-vous le plus souvent pour vendre à Dakar ? _____ sacs
27. Avez-vous une fois surchargé ? Oui Non
28. Combien de sacs y avait-il de plus ? _____ sacs
29. Surchargez-vous souvent ? Oui Non

30. Pourquoi surchargez-vous ?

Si vous n'avez jamais surchargé, quelles en sont les raisons ?

Avez-vous une fois été puni pour un quelconque motif de fraude ? Oui Non

31. Si oui, de quoi vous avait-on accusé ?

mode de punition

Mode punition selon le type d'autorité ayant sévi	1. Verbalisation	2. Arrangement	3. Montant de la transaction
a. Agent forestier			
b. Police			

c. Structure/autorité locale (précisez) :			
d. Autres (précisez) :			

32. Avez-vous une fois vu des acteurs de la filière frauder ? Oui Non

33. De quel type d'acteurs s'agissait-il ?

34. Que faisaient-ils ?

35. Ces acteurs fraudent-ils fréquemment ? Oui Non

36. Pourquoi pensez-vous qu'ils fraudent ?

37. Si votre quota est achevé et que vous avez du charbon ou bois en forêt, perdez-vous systématiquement le produit ? Oui Non

38. Si non, comment procédez-vous pour ne pas perdre le produit ?

39. Payez-vous une quittance pour circuler ce charbon dans ce cas ? Oui Non

40. Combien de chargements avez-vous payé par quittance durant la dernière campagne?

_____ chargements

41. Avez-vous une fois acheté un permis de coupe dans le marché noir pour circuler du charbon ? Oui
Non

42. Combien de fois avez-vous acheté un permis dans le marché noir durant la dernière campagne?

43. Parmi ceux qui vous ont vendu de permis dans le marché noir, il y a des :

e. Agents forestiers

f. Exploitants forestiers

g. Bana bana

h. Comité de gestion

i. Autres, (précisez leur fonction) :

44. Dans quels cas achetez-vous un permis dans le marché noir pour circuler du charbon ?

45. Quel était le prix du dernier permis acquis dans le marché noir : _____ FCFA

46. Quel est le prix minimal d'un permis dans le marché noir ? _____ FCFA

47. Déterminez, sans les nommer, la fonction des personnes qui vous ont vendu les permis :

Type de vendeur de permis	1. Agents forestiers	2. Patrons charbonniers	3. Bana bana	4. Comité de gestion	5. Autres (précisez)
a. Prix permis					
b. Prix habituel par type de vendeur					
c. Nbre de permis à la dernière campagne					

VI/ Utilisation de la cheminée/meule Casamance

48. Utilisez-vous systématiquement de cheminée pour la carbonisation dans votre pare-feu ? Oui
Non

49. Qui est-ce qui paie les cheminés utilisés pour la carbonisation dans votre pare-feu ?

f. Vous-même

g. Chaque coupeur

h. Autre (précisez) :

50. A votre connaissance, combien de fois une cheminée peut-elle être utilisée avant de s'user ?

51. A combien d'années estimeriez-vous la durée de vie d'une cheminée? _____

52. Votez-vous aux élections locales au niveau d'une Communauté rurale ? Oui Non

53. Si non, pourquoi?

VII/ Frais de transport et taxes de dépôt en ville

54. Pour le transport du charbon du site de production à Tambacounda combien dépensez-vous par sac ? _____ FCFA

55. Pour le transport du charbon du site de production à Dakar combien dépensez-vous par sac ? _____ FCFA

56. Pour votre dépôt légal à Tambacounda, payez-vous des taxes ? Oui Non

57. Montant taxe municipale et temporalité :

a. Mensuelle : _____ FCFA

b. annuelle : _____ FCFA

c. Autres taxes listez-les et déterminez les montants) :

58. Quelles autres dépenses faites-vous ? (listez-les et déterminez les montants) :

VIII/ Paiement aux postes de contrôle forestiers

59. Payez-vous à la brigade forestière de votre lieu d'approvisionnement pour l'acheminement du charbon à Tambacounda ? Oui Non

60. Combien payez-vous ? _____ FCFA

61. Citez les autres paiements que vous faites pour l'acheminement du charbon à Tambacounda et expliquez pourquoi:

62. Combien payez-vous aux forestiers pour l'acheminement du charbon du site à Tambacounda ? _____ FCFA

63. Quel rôle les forestiers jouent-ils dans le fonctionnement dans la filière ?

a. IREF :

b. Chef Secteur :

c. Brigade forestière :

d. Poste de triage :

e. Autre, précisez :

64. Les rôles des forestiers contribuent-ils à une exploitation plus durable et efficace du charbon ?
Oui Non

65. Si oui, comment ?

_____ Si non, pourquoi

_____ Vous arrive t-il de payer à la Police en acheminant du charbon du site à Tamba ?

Oui Non

66. Si oui, combien payez-vous à la Police/Gendarmerie ? _____ FCFA

IX/ Autres informations importantes de l'interview

67. Statut de l'interviewé : _____

68. Ethnie de l'interviewé : _____

69. Lieu d'origine de l'interviewé: _____

70. Sexe : Masculin Féminin

71. Age : _____

72. Avez-vous confiance aux réponses données ? Oui Non

73. Autres observations :

Nous vous remercions de votre disponibilité et vous prions de bien vouloir accepter de vous entretenir avec nous une seconde pour des éclaircissements si besoin est.