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# MISTI STABILIZATION TRENDS AND IMPACT EVALUATION SURVEY

## ANALYTICAL REPORT

### WAVE I (BASELINE) SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER 2012

**JULY 18, 2013**

This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by John Roscoe and Andrew Boan, Management Systems International.

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600 Water Street, SW, Washington, DC 20024, USA  
Tel: +1.202.484.7170 | Fax: +1. 202.488.0754  
[www.msiworldwide.com](http://www.msiworldwide.com)

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Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI)

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## ACRONYMS

AAPOR	American Association of Public Opinion Researchers
ACSOR	Afghan Center for Socioeconomic and Opinion Research
Afs	Afghanis (local currency)
ALP	Afghan Local Police
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
ASF	Afghan Security Forces
AYC	Afghan Youth Consulting
CCI	Community Cohesion Initiatives
CDC	Community Development Council
CDP	Community Development Program
DDA	District Development Assembly
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MISTI	Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives
MSI	Management Systems International
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
RC	Regional Command
SIKA	Stability in Key Areas
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report covers the findings of the MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey, Wave 1. The survey acts as the baseline for subsequent evaluation of stabilization trends and the impacts of three United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/Afghanistan stabilization programs: 1) Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA), 2) the Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI), and 3) the Community Development program (CDP).

After a brief introduction and discussion of the survey methodology, the findings are presented.

The survey instrument consists of 184 substantive questions, 21 demographic questions, and 36 management and quality control questions. The substantive questions explore 10 components of stability:

- Security and crime
- Governance
- Service provision and development
- Rule of law
- Corruption
- Quality of life
- Economic activity
- Community cohesion and resilience
- Grievances
- Media

Overall, 34,972 household respondents were interviewed, with no more than one respondent per household. Data collection was conducted from September through December 2012 in 83 Afghan districts in 19 provinces selected by MISTI in consultation with USAID. This selection was based on the 76 districts where the stabilization programs listed above are operating. An additional seven relatively stable control districts were included so that results can be placed in a national context. A description of the survey methodology including a list of the districts surveyed appears in the first chapter following this summary.

Stabilization results were analyzed using an index that accords districts a score on a scale of 1–5, with 1 representing “most unstable” and 5 representing “most stable.” A district’s stability is said to be improving if we see an increase in its score over subsequent survey waves. The findings are presented in various formats:

1. **Program type.** CCI, CDP, SIKA–N, SIKA–E, SIKA–S, and SIKA–W.
2. **District level.** Cross-tabulations were run for each program broken out by district.
3. **Overall results.** These findings include all results for the stabilization districts and do not include the control districts.

The Stabilization Index is composed of several different sub-indices and indicators that explore different aspects of stabilization, including changes in local area security (in the last 12 months), the general direction in which the district is heading (right/wrong), confidence in local government, quality of life, local area resilience, local government provision of public services, corruption in local government, and the presence of armed opposition groups.

Seventy-five percent of the Stability Index is drawn from data derived from the MISTI Survey, while 10 percent is drawn from enumerators’ assessments (observations) of the level of control by different groups (most notably the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan or the Taliban) in a given district. Ten percent is derived from the Afghan Center for Socioeconomic and Opinion Research (ACSOR)

(MISTI survey partner) District Accessibility Tracker, and 5 percent is drawn from security incidents reported by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and the British Embassy.

The Stability Index results are presented in Table 6, in the Survey Findings chapter of the report. The average stability score across all districts is 3.41, while the variation in scores is between 2.40 and 4.33 (which is moderate). On a regional basis, the greatest stability is found in RC–N (3.67), and the least in RC–S (3.27). The report also provides a series of graphs that illustrate results for each of the sub-indices.

A summary of the survey’s key findings for each of the 10 components of stability is given below. It is noteworthy how broad these areas are, ranging from security and crime to economic activity and “quality of life.” *Consequently, the MISTI survey results are valuable not only for USAID’s Stabilization Unit but also for a variety of other Mission offices involved with sectors such as rule of law, governance, and the provision of social services.*

- **Security and Crime.** In general, respondents are positive about the security situation in their areas. Respondents in SIKA–E districts are least likely to perceive improvements in local area security over the past year. They are also the least optimistic that security will improve in the next year. Overall, the overwhelming majority of respondents (92 percent) feel secure in their homes during the day, but there is a high degree of variation across program districts regarding feeling secure in one’s home at night (from a low of 20 percent in Barmal to a high of 95 percent in Ab-e Kamari).<sup>\*</sup> Most respondents feel secure enough to travel to a neighboring village (55 percent) but not to the district or provincial center (47 percent). Across all program areas, more respondents report that crime levels have decreased, rather than increased, in the past year in the following categories: petty crimes and offenses (53 percent versus 15 percent), serious nonviolent crimes (49 percent versus 17 percent), and serious violent crimes (45 percent versus 19 percent). Notably, more respondents believe that petty crimes and offenses will increase, rather than decrease, in the next year (43 percent versus 29 percent). Meanwhile, more respondents expect nonviolent serious crimes and violent serious crimes (33 percent versus 34 percent for both non-violent and violent serious crimes) to decrease, rather than increase, in the next year. Most respondents have “some” or “a lot” of confidence in the Afghan National Army’s (ANA’s) and Afghan National Police’s (ANP’s) ability to make their areas safe (75 percent and 62 percent, respectively), and report improvements in the capabilities of both the ANA (64 percent) and ANP (56 percent). The presence of armed opposition groups varies widely across program areas, with the strongest perceived presence across SIKA–E districts (“a lot,” 42 percent; “some,” 39 percent). The weakest presence is recorded across SIKA–N districts (“a lot,” 16 percent; “some,” 34 percent).
- **Governance.** Respondents were asked whether the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. Overall, just over two thirds of respondents (68 percent) report that the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. SIKA–S has the highest level of support across its districts (74 percent), while SIKA–E has the lowest (54 percent). Several districts targeted by the CCI and CDP (in Kandahar and Helmand) report highly favorable response rates in the 80-plus percent range; however, support levels vary widely across a program’s districts. For example, across CCI districts, Zahri has an 85 percent support level, while Barmal has only 15 percent. Overall,

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<sup>\*</sup> It should be noted that the responses for many questions varied widely across districts. Readers of this report are advised to review the district-level findings provided herein. A full set of cross-tabulations by district is available through the MISTI portal: <http://usaidmisti.com/>

respondents seem to have the most confidence in their district governors (75 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (74 percent), district governments (67 percent), and provincial governors (58 percent). There are, however, wide variations across districts. When asked for specific details regarding their districts governments, a majority of respondents across SIKA–E districts state that their district government does not understand their problems (64 percent) or care about the people (53 percent). Majorities also state that their district government officials do not do their jobs honestly (57 percent) and that they abuse their authority 52 percent). In contrast, SIKA–S respondents generally believe that their district government understands their problems (59 percent) and cares about the people (69 percent). Notably, while a majority of SIKA–S respondents believe that district government officials do their jobs honestly (58 percent), half believe they abuse their authority (50 percent). While a majority of SIKA–N respondents believe that their district government understands their problems (62 percent), majorities also believe that government officials abuse their authority (61 percent) and do their jobs dishonestly (57 percent). Fewer than half of SIKA–N respondents believe their district government cares about people (47 percent), and most believe that they do not do a good job delivering basic services (58 percent). While the majority of SIKA–W respondents believe district officials abuse their authority (55 percent), a majority also believe they do their jobs honestly (56 percent). Across CCI districts, a slight minority believes district officials abuse their authority (46 percent), while half (50 percent) believe they do their jobs honestly.

- ***Service Provision and Development.*** While a plurality of respondents (47 percent) believe services from the government have improved over the past year, many are dissatisfied with the services provided to them by their district government. Most respondents are satisfied with their district government’s provision of clean drinking water (71 percent), but far fewer are satisfied with the government’s provision of agricultural assistance (40 percent), retaining flood walls (28 percent), and electricity (15 percent). Overall, half (50 percent) of surveyed participants have seen or heard about development projects, including those funded by USAID, in their area. Those living in RC–South districts are the most likely to have seen or heard about such projects (64 percent), while those living in RC–North districts are the least likely to have seen or heard about them (35 percent).
- ***Rule of Law.*** Respondents prefer to work with tribal elders rather than government courts in disputes over land, water, and theft. They are more likely to say that tribal elders have respect for Sharia law (84 percent) than government courts (74 Percent) or armed opposition groups (41 percent). A high proportion of respondents (91 percent) have “a lot” or “some” confidence in local/tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes, while 71 percent have the same confidence in government courts. Only 34 percent of respondents feel confident that armed oppositions groups are able to fairly resolve disputes.
- ***Corruption.*** A majority of respondents (79 percent) say corruption is a problem in their area, but a plurality claim they have not personally been asked to pay a bribe in the last year (43 percent). Study participants most often mention the courts (12 percent) and the police (12 percent) as the top sources of local government corruption. In terms of trends, a plurality (42 percent) state that corruption has increased within the past year.

- **Quality of Life and Basic Needs.** A majority of respondents are “very” or “somewhat” satisfied with their financial situation (57 percent) and overall quality of life (71 percent). While a majority of study participants (74 percent) are still “very” or “a little” worried about being able to meet their basic needs, nearly half (47 percent) say their ability to meet basic needs is better now than a year ago. SIKA–E respondents are the most likely to express concern about meeting basic needs in the coming year (77 percent), and are less likely to report satisfaction with their quality of life and financial outlook. With regard to planning for the future in general, just over half of all respondents (54 percent) believe things in Afghanistan are too uncertain to make future plans. SIKA–E respondents are the most likely to agree that things are too uncertain to make future plans (67 percent).
- **Economic Activity.** For the most part, study participants say not much has changed over the past year with regard to the availability of basic necessities such as food, water, and health care. Just over half (55 percent) report, however, that their ability to get to local markets is better now than a year ago. Prices for basics have increased or stayed the same for most respondents. A plurality of respondents (40 percent) say there are more paid jobs than there were a year ago. However, many also say the number of paid jobs has not changed (30 percent) or that there are fewer jobs available compared with a year ago (29 percent).
- **Community Cohesion and Resilience.** A majority of respondents (70 percent) believe local leaders “often” or “sometimes” consider the interests of ordinary people when making decisions about their neighborhoods, so they tend not to participate in local decision-making activities. Respondents feel they are able to “somewhat” or “very” freely express personal views about the government and security groups; however, three fourths (75 percent) say they can express their opinions about armed opposition groups only carefully, if at all.
  - The majority of respondents report that things from inside (63 percent) or outside (59 percent) of their village/neighborhood “rarely” or “never” create problems that disrupt their normal lives. In SIKA–S, however, 43 percent report that things from outside their district “often” or “sometimes” disrupt normal life in their area. Over 58 percent of respondents in four SIKA–E districts (Andar, Baraki Barak, Waz Drazadran, and Zurmat) report that things from outside their district “often” or “sometimes” disrupt normal life in their area. A majority of all respondents (66 percent) say that villages/neighborhoods in their area “often” or “sometimes” work together to resolve problems.
  - Of those who say their daily lives are affected by things from *outside* their village/neighborhood: the Taliban, ethnic disputes, land disputes, insecurity, roadside bombs/suicide attacks, roads being destroyed (in general), and small crimes/theft are mentioned most often as the types of interferences that disrupt their normal lives. Fifty-seven percent of respondents report that they are “often” or “sometimes” able to deal with and solve these types of problems, while 38 percent feel they are “rarely” or “never” able to do so.
  - Of the respondents who report that their normal lives are disrupted by things that happen *inside* their village/neighborhood: ethnic disputes, land disputes, water disputes, small crimes/theft, and family problems are mentioned most often as the types of things that

disrupt their normal lives. Sixty percent of respondents report that these types of problems are “often” or “sometimes” resolvable by residents. In contrast, 36 percent feel these problems are “never” or “rarely” resolvable by residents.

- A large majority of respondents (81 percent) say that they do not belong to any groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or partake in certain activities together (e.g., CDCs); this finding could indicate low levels of social capital. The situation is most acute in SIKA–E districts, where only 8 percent of respondents report they belong to these types of groups.
- ***Grievances: Problems that Create Stress or Tension in an Area.*** Respondents most often mention insecurity (27 percent), unemployment (25 percent), lack of electricity (16 percent), lack of paved roads (10 percent), and corruption (9 percent) as issues that create stress or tensions in their areas. The concern about insecurity is most acute in RC–East districts (37 percent), while the concern about lack of electricity is most pronounced in RC–North districts (33 percent). A majority of Afghan respondents report that the district governor (63 percent), local shuras and community leaders (57 percent), and the Afghan National Security Forces (55 percent) are “very” or “somewhat” interested in addressing their concerns when they have problems that create tension or stress.
- ***Media.*** Majorities of respondents turn to the radio (90 percent), friends/family (90 percent), elders (77 percent), and the mosque/mullah (66 percent) for news and information. Seventy-two percent of respondents rely on the radio as one of their top two sources to get information about government services. Respondents in districts targeted by SIKA–S are most likely to report turning to the radio for information about government services (75 percent), while the highest proportion of information uptake from a mosque/mullah is reported in SIKA–W districts (78 percent).

The final pages of the report detail conclusions drawn from the findings for each of the areas and topics included in the survey, along with corresponding recommendations for USAID.

Appendices include the survey questionnaire; a table illustrating Stability Index components, variables, weights, and scales; and overall Stability Index results by International Security Assistance Force Regional Command and by district.

## INTRODUCTION

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) administers several development and capacity-building programs in Afghanistan. Management Systems International (MSI), the implementer of the USAID-funded Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) project in Afghanistan, contracted the Afghan Center for Socioeconomic and Opinion Research (ACSOR) to conduct a baseline survey to measure stability trends and lay the groundwork for future impact evaluations in districts where the following USAID stabilization programs were taking place:

1. ***Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA)***. This program focuses on community development programs that support USAID's goal to increase the Afghan people's confidence in their district governments.\* This program is administered in four separate regions covering the north, east, south, and west of Afghanistan. For the purposes of this report, the individual programs are referred to as SIKA-N, SIKA-E, SIKA-S and SIKA-W, respectively.
2. ***Community Cohesion Initiative (CCI)***. This program aims to foster stability in areas of Afghanistan that are susceptible to insurgent activity with the goal of creating a more stable environment in which to implement peace and development programs. The program also intends to strengthen relationships between locals and the government and enable community organizations to diminish key sources of instability.†
3. ***Community Development Program (CDP)***. This program encourages stability in Afghanistan by offering temporary employment in targeted districts with the hope of deterring unemployed Afghans from seeking employment (or financial support) by joining the insurgency.‡

Between September 13 and December 23, 2012, ACSOR conducted interviews with 34,972 Afghans in 83 districts across Afghanistan. This report provides summary and detailed findings of the survey, along with specific program recommendations where appropriate. Specifically, the report provides analysis of the respondents' opinions and behaviors regarding the following issues chosen in consultation with USAID:

- Security and crime
- Governance
- Service provision and development
- Rule of law
- Corruption
- Quality of life
- Economic activity
- Community cohesion and resilience
- Grievances
- Media

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\*Source: USAID Afghanistan. *Stabilization in Key Areas (SIKA)*. Retrieved from [http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/259/Stabilization\\_in\\_Key\\_Areas\\_SIKA](http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/259/Stabilization_in_Key_Areas_SIKA) on January 25, 2013.

†Source: USAID Afghanistan. *Transition Initiatives: Afghanistan*. Retrieved from [http://transition.usaid.gov/our\\_work/cross-cutting\\_programs/transition\\_initiatives/country/afghanistan2/index.html](http://transition.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/afghanistan2/index.html) on January 25, 2013.

‡Source: USAID Afghanistan. *Community Development Program—South, East and West (CDP-SEW)*. Retrieved from [http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/147/Community\\_Development\\_Program\\_South\\_East\\_West\\_CDPSEW\\_on\\_January\\_25](http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/USAID/Activity/147/Community_Development_Program_South_East_West_CDPSEW_on_January_25), 2013.

# METHODOLOGY

MISTI Survey Wave 1 is a survey of the general public throughout the country of Afghanistan with a total sample size of 34,972 individuals, ages 18 and over.

The vast majority of the interviews were conducted face-to-face by ACSOR Surveys (n=33,445). A subset of interviews were conducted face-to-face by Afghan Youth Consulting (AYC) (n=1,527).

The questionnaire consisted of 184 substantive questions, 21 demographic questions, and 36 management and quality control questions.

The fieldwork was conducted between September 13 and December 23, 2012, by trained interviewers and supervisors of the ACSOR Surveys team and AYC team.

The average length of a successful interview was 37 minutes and ranged from 20 minutes to 90 minutes (this includes all interviews). The average length of an ACSOR interview was 37 minutes, and the average for an AYC interview was 49 minutes.

## General Overview and Summary of Sampling

The target population for this survey is Afghans 18 and older living in 83 districts, selected for inclusion by MISTI, throughout Afghanistan. The basic overview of the sampling process is as follows:\*

### Step 1. Disproportionate Stratification by District

The sample was disproportionately stratified across 83 selected districts, as specified by MISTI. The following provinces contain districts that were included in MISTI Wave 1: Badghis, Baghlan, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Kunduz, Logar, Paktika, Paktiya, Parwan, Samangan, Uruzgan, Wardak, and Zabul.

### Step 2. Selection of Primary Sampling Units (Settlements)

Primary sampling units were specified by MISTI at the settlement level. In each district, settlements were grouped into three strata based on the population density from the district center. Seventy percent of settlements were selected in the first strata, which included 50 percent of the population closest to the district center. The next 20 percent of settlements were selected from the next 30 percent of the population closest to the district center, and the remaining 10 percent of settlements were selected from the 20 percent of the population most remote from the district center. A simple random sample selection of settlements was performed inside each stratum. This was done because programs generally felt that programming would likely start near the district center and then work its way out to more remote areas over time.

### Step 3. Household Selection

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\*There is a separate methodology report available that provides more detail about each of these four sampling steps.

For ACSOR: Maps and available information about the settlements were used to select starting points for random walks. Interview teams used a random route procedure to select households.

For AYC: Because of the insecure nature of the areas they were assigned, interviewers were instructed by supervisors on where the safest locations were in the selected sample points. The interviewers followed the supervisors' advice to select households.

#### Step 4. Respondent Selection

For ACSOR: Interviewers used a Kish grid to select individual respondents from households.

For AYC: Interviewers were allowed to select any member of the household who was willing to participate to speed up the fieldwork and to more easily abide by cultural norms in Afghanistan. The head of households were most commonly interviewed as this created the least amount of tension when interviewers visit households in less secure areas.

Table 1 provides a summary of the provinces, districts, and respective sample sizes for the MISTI Wave 1 baseline survey.

**TABLE I. PROVINCES, DISTRICTS, AND SAMPLE SIZES**

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	Target N	N Delivered
12. Kunar	Marawara	320	280
12. Kunar	Sarkani	320	334
12. Kunar	Khas Kunar	640	654
12. Kunar	Sawkai	640	654
16. Baghlan	Doshi	320	322
16. Baghlan	Puli Khumri	640	630
16. Baghlan	Baghlan i Jadid	640	651
17. Kunduz	Imam Sahib	640	603
17. Kunduz	Char Darah*	640	633
17. Kunduz	Ali Abad**	640	637
17. Kunduz	Khanabad	640	639
17. Kunduz	Kunduz	640	646
19. Samangan	Aybak	320	320
22. Faryab	Almar	640	565
22. Faryab	Qaisar	640	594
23. Badghis	Ab-e Kamari	320	303
23. Badghis	Qadis	640	577
23. Badghis	Moqur	640	622
24. Herat	Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	640	590
24. Herat	Shindand	640	612
25. Farah	Farah	320	332
25. Farah	Pusht Rod	640	634
25. Farah	Bala Boluk	640	650
27. Helmand	Kajaki	160	173
27. Helmand	Lashkar Gah	160	175
27. Helmand	Naw Zad	160	176
27. Helmand	Marjah	320	335

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	Target N	N Delivered
27. Helmand	Garmser	640	643
27. Helmand	Nad 'Ali	640	652
27. Helmand	Nahr-e Saraj	640	654
27. Helmand	Musa Qala	640	655
27. Helmand	Sangin	640	656
28. Kandahar	Maiwand	160	175
28. Kandahar	Arghandab	640	638
28. Kandahar	Panjwai	640	640
28. Kandahar	Daman	640	642
28. Kandahar	Dand	640	643
28. Kandahar	Zhari	640	651
28. Kandahar	Shah Wali Kot	640	652
28. Kandahar	Spin Boldak	640	655
29. Zabul	Tarnak Wa Jaldak	160	137
29. Zabul	Shah Joy	160	157
29. Zabul	Qalat	640	623
3. Parwan	Charikar	320	309
3. Parwan	Salang	320	328
30. Uruzgan	Khas Uruzgan	640	647
30. Uruzgan	Shahidi Hassas	640	653
4. Wardak	Sayed Abad	320	333
4. Wardak	Chak	640	654
4. Wardak	Nerkh	640	655
5. Logar	Baraki Barak	320	332
5. Logar	Muhammad Aghah	640	650
6. Ghazni	Andar	160	72
6. Ghazni	Ghazni	160	173
6. Ghazni	Deh Yak	160	176
6. Ghazni	Waghaz	160	176
6. Ghazni	Khawjah Omari	320	336
6. Ghazni	Muqur	640	589
6. Ghazni	Qarabagh	640	644
6. Ghazni	Gelan	640	655
7. Paktiya	Dand wa Pattan	160	153
7. Paktiya	Lajah–Mangal	160	172
7. Paktiya	Shwak	160	173
7. Paktiya	Sayed Karam	160	174
7. Paktiya	Chamkani	160	176
7. Paktiya	Jaji	160	176
7. Paktiya	Lajah–Ahmad Khel	160	176
7. Paktiya	Waz Drazadran	320	244
7. Paktiya	Zurmat	320	293
8. Paktika	Barmal	320	147
8. Paktika	Sharana	160	175
8. Paktika	Khairkut (Zarghoon Shahr)	160	176

PROVINCE	DISTRICT	Target N	N Delivered
8. Paktika	Mata Khan	160	176
8. Paktika	Yousuf Khil	160	176
8. Paktika	Sar Hawza	320	336
8. Paktika	Urgun	640	650
9. Khost	Tani	160	168
9. Khost	Khost (Matun)	160	170
9. Khost	Gorbuz	160	172
9. Khost	Nadir Shah Kot	160	173
9. Khost	Shamal (Dwamunda)	160	176
9. Khost	Bak	320	328
9. Khost	Terezayi	640	616
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>35,200</b>	<b>34,972</b>

Note: Districts shaded in light blue were done entirely by AYC.

\* 8 sampling points in Char Darah done by AYC (43 interviews in the final data set)

\*\* 16 sampling points in Ali Abad done by AYC (116 interviews in the final data set)

## Interviewers

**TABLE 2. INTERVIEWERS BY GENDER AND COMPANY**

	Female	Male	Total
Number of ACSOR female/male interviewers	403	752	1,155
Number of ACSOR interviewers previously used in D3 project	<b>403</b>	752	1,155
Number of ACSOR interviewers new to a D3 project	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
Number of AYC male interviewers (no female interviewers were used)	0	30	30

## Rate Calculations

The American Association of Public Opinion Researchers (AAPOR) publishes four different types of rate calculations used in its reporting (response rates, contact rates, cooperation rates, and refusal rates). D3 and ACSOR Surveys use AAPOR's Response Rate 3, Cooperation Rate 3, Refusal Rate 2, and Contact Rate 2 as their standards.

Abbreviations used in the formulas:

I	=	Complete Interview
P	=	Partial Interview
R	=	Refusal and breakoff
NC	=	Noncontact
O	=	Other

UH = Unknown if household/occupied household unit  
 UO = Unknown, other  
 e = Estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible

$$\text{Response Rate 3} = \frac{I}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$$

$$\text{Cooperation Rate 3} = \frac{I}{(I + P) + R}$$

$$\text{Refusal Rate 2} = \frac{R}{(I + P) + (R + NC + O) + e(UH + UO)}$$

$$\text{Contact Rate 2} = \frac{(I + P) + R + O}{(I + P) + R + O + NC + e(UH + UO)}$$

These rates are provided in Tables 3 and 4.

### **Design Effect and Margin of Sampling Error**

Using Q1 as the key question, variance estimates were calculated for each response category’s proportion under the complex sample design. These were in turn used to estimate the design effect for each statistic within the question. The design effects across these statistics yielded an average design effect estimate of 1.856 for the sample.

When using this averaged design effect to calibrate the margin of error to account for the complex sample, at a 95 percent confidence interval level with  $p=0.5$  and  $n=34,972$ , we obtained a margin of error of  $\pm 0.71$ .

### **Estimates of Standard Errors and Intra-Cluster Correlation Coefficients**

Estimates of standard errors and intra-cluster correlation coefficients were also calculated using Q1 for the total sample and by regional command, program, and district. These statistics and related methodology notes are presented in a separate Excel document entitled “MISTI W1—Precision Estimates v3.xls.”

**TABLE 3. REFUSALS/NONCONTACTS/COMPLETED INTERVIEWS—ACSOR**

SURVEY MANAGEMENT SECTION			
ACSOR Code	AAPOR Code	Description	
	1.0/1.10	Completed Interviews	33,445
		Average Survey Length (minutes)	36.8
UNKNOWN HOUSEHOLD ELIGIBILITY			
		Unable to Reach/Unsafe Area <i>(This comes from the list of replaced sampling points)</i>	
	3.170		4456
2	3.130	No one at home after three visits	1554
3	4.100	No adults (18+) after three visits	842
4	4.500	Non-Residential or empty house	477
<b>Total Unknown Household</b>			<b>7329</b>
NON-CONTACTS			
1	2.230	Door or gate locked and no one came to open it	114
6	2.200	Respondent long -term absence /for the field work period	616
13		Selected respondent not available for interview	371
<b>Total Non-Contacts</b>			<b>1101</b>
REFUSALS			
7	2.111	Outright refusal at the door	1171
8	2.112	Not feeling informed to answer the questions Respondent got angry because of a question	407
9	2.112	and aborted interview	164
10	2.112	Prefers head of the house to be interviewed	471
11	2.112	In a hurry/ No time	628
		Selected respondent initial refusal Cumulative	
	2.112	(sums all '2.112' codes)	1670
<b>Total Refusals</b>			<b>2841</b>
OTHER			
12	2.32	Physically or mentally unable Respondent unable to complete interview in languages	81
5	2.332	available	37
<b>Total Other</b>			<b>118</b>
DISPOSITION RATES			
RATE	FORMULA/CALCULATION		PERCENT
Value for e	estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible		0.965
Response Rate 3	$I / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$		0.750
Cooperation Rate 3	$I / (I+R)$		0.922
Refusal Rate 2	$R / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$		0.064

**TABLE 4. REFUSALS/NONCONTACTS/COMPLETED INTERVIEWS—AYC**

SURVEY MANAGEMENT SECTION			
ACSOR Code	AAPOR Code	Description	
	1.0/1.10	Completed Interviews	1,527
		Average Survey Length (minutes)	49.4
UNKNOWN HOUSEHOLD ELIGIBILITY			
		Unable to Reach/Unsafe Area <i>(This comes from the replaced sampling points and inaccessible district list)</i>	0
2	3.170	No one at home after three visits	218
3	4.100	No adults (18+) after three visits	105
4	4.500	Nonresidential or empty house	6
<b>Total Unknown Household</b>			<b>329</b>
NON-CONTACTS			
1	2.230	Door or gate locked and no one came to open it	60
6	2.200	Respondent long-term absence /for the field work period	25
13		Selected respondent not available for interview	137
<b>Total Noncontacts</b>			<b>222</b>
REFUSALS			
7	2.111	Outright refusal at the door	130
8	2.112	Not feeling informed to answer the questions Respondent got angry because of a question	7
9	2.112	and aborted interview	0
10	2.112	Prefers head of the house to be interviewed	47
11	2.112	In a hurry/ No time Selected respondent initial refusal Cumulative	109
	2.112	(sums all '2.112' codes)	163
<b>Total Refusals</b>			<b>293</b>
OTHER			
12	2.32	Physically or mentally unable Respondent unable to complete interview in languages	4
5	2.332	available	2
<b>Total Other</b>			<b>6</b>
DISPOSITION RATES			
RATE	FORMULA/CALCULATION		PERCENT
Value for e	estimated proportion of cases of unknown eligibility that are eligible		0.948
Response Rate 3	$I / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$		0.647
Cooperation Rate 3	$I / (I+R)$		0.839
Refusal Rate 2	$R / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$		0.124
Contact Rate 2	$(I+R+O) / (I)+(R+NC+O)+e(UH+UO)$		0.774

## Quality-Control Methods

The quality of the data is assured by the following control procedures applied in various stages.

1. After the delivery of questionnaires from the field, most of the completed questionnaires were checked for proper administration and proper household and respondent selection.
2. Twenty-seven supervisors and their assistants observed interviewers' work in the field.
3. When there was no opportunity for direct supervision, a supervisor and assistant supervisor revisited selected houses after the completion of interviews or called back if there was a working telephone at the household. The issues verified during in person back-checks were proper household and respondent selection, and the correct recording of answers to three randomly selected questions from the main body of the questionnaire.

At the end of the three procedures, 22.4 percent of the completed questionnaires were controlled (n=7,846) using the following methods:

- Direct supervision during interview (1.1 percent)
- Back-checked in person by supervisor (21.1 percent)
- Back-check in person or by telephone by supervisory team (0.2 percent)

ACSOR back-checked 22.5 percent of their interviews and AYC back-checked 21.7 percent of their interviews.

After the completion of field work, three tests are performed that looked for patterns that may indicate an improperly conducted survey by an interviewer. The tests are run using proprietary software developed in-house that we refer to as the “Hunter Program.” The tests are part of the data cleaning process and include the following:

1. **Equality** compares cases grouped by interviewer for similarity within a sampling point or any other variable. Flag and manually review any interviewer with an average of 90 percent or more.
2. **Don’t know/Nonresponse** determines the percentage of “Don’t Knows” and Refused for each interviewer’s cases. Flag and manually review any case with an average of 35 percent or more.
3. **Duplicates** compares cases across all interviewers and respondents for similarity rates. This test will flag any pair of interviews that are similar to each other. Flag and manually review any case with 95 percent or more.

**TABLE 5. RESULTS OF QUALITY CONTROLS**

	# Interviews Rejected	# Interviewers Terminated	# Supervisors Terminated
Before Completion of Interviews	0	0	0
After Completion of Interviews	1,169	7	0

A total of 1,169 interviews were deleted from the data file. The reasons for deletion are summarized below. No cases were deleted because they failed the Equality test.

Time overlaps: 1 case  
 Nonresponse: 33 cases  
 Duplicates: 1,135 cases

Seven interviewers from the ACSOR field team were fired following fieldwork for poor performance.

## Differences in Field Providers and Implications for Analysis

Differences in fieldwork procedures and data collection methods employed by ACSOR and AYC have been described in detail in a separate methodology report. While the findings of AYC provide valuable insight into dangerous areas, they should not be considered accurate to a scientific certainty, and caution is warranted when interpreting those results.\*

ACSOR processed the questionnaires and the data received from AYC. There were significant issues with

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\*The findings in this report include data from AYC.

some of the packs received including blank pages, nonsensical responses to open-ended questions, lack of back-checks, and a significant number of overlapping, which called into question data quality. There were also problems with the quality of the contact sheets received, and concerns about the quality of supervision in the field. ACSOR recommended sampling points that should be refiled by AYC; data quality improved after some sampling points were redone.

For further information on the survey's Stability Index, please refer to Appendix B of this report which covers the Index components, variables, weights and scaling. If additional information is desired, please contact MISTI Chief-of-Party, John Roscoe at [jroscoe@msi-afghan.com](mailto:jroscoe@msi-afghan.com).

# SURVEY FINDINGS

## Introduction

This section provides the baseline results of MISTI’s stabilization trends analysis and outlines the detailed survey findings of respondents’ opinions and behaviors regarding the following issues:

- Security and crime
- Governance
- Service provision and development
- Rule of law
- Corruption
- Quality of life
- Economic activity
- Community cohesion and resilience
- Grievances
- Media

Stabilization results are analyzed using an index that accords districts a relative score on a 1–5 scale, with 1 representing “most unstable” and 5 representing “most stable.” A district’s stability can be said to improve if we see an increase in its score over time. Also, we can rank order districts by their stability scores to see where districts stand relative to one another. Changes in ranking over time will allow us to identify districts that are improving or deteriorating, and those that are doing so most rapidly. This information is useful in deciding the appropriate program/s to assign to a district. Moreover, because the Stability Index consists of many sub-indices and indicators measuring different aspects of stabilization—for example, local area security, confidence in local government, quality of life, official corruption, services provision—the results can be used to identify sources of instability within a district, enabling implementers to direct resources to where they can have the best effect.

The findings are presented in various formats, as described below:

1. **Program type.** CCI, CDP, SIKA–N, SIKA–E, SIKA–S, and SIKA–W.
  - a. For example, any district that was part of the CCI program was coded as such, even if it was also included in another program’s list of districts, such as CDP. Therefore, it is important to note that there is some district overlap across programs. There was no significance testing (i.e., statistical analysis) performed across programs; they simply reference each other in charts and in text.
2. **District level.** Cross-tabulations were run for each program broken out by district. Given the amount of districts and programs, results are presented only for the most interesting findings. If the reader is interested in specific programs and their respective districts, those tables are available separately.
3. **Control districts.** These are relatively stable districts within Afghanistan that have not received any of the six programs described above. They were included in the study as a way to place the analysis in a national context.
4. **Overall results.** These findings include all of the results for the stabilization districts and do not include the control districts.

## Stabilization Index Baseline

This subsection outlines the results of MISTI’s baseline stabilization trends analysis. To provide a baseline stability score, the MISTI team created a Stability Index composed of several different sub-indices and indicators exploring different aspects of stabilization. Areas explored include changes in local area security (in the last 12 months), the general direction the district is heading in (right/wrong), confidence in local government, quality of life, local area resilience, local government provision of public services, corruption in local government, and the presence of armed opposition groups.

Seventy-five percent of the Stability Index is drawn from data derived from the MISTI Survey, while 10 percent is drawn from enumerators’ assessments (observations) of the level of control by different groups (most notably the GIRoA and the Taliban) in a given district. Ten percent was derived from the ACSOR District Accessibility Tracker, and 5 percent was drawn from the level of security incidents reported by the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and the British Embassy (see Table 6 below for a breakdown of district-level scores using these four data sources).

The Stability Index scores districts on a 1–5 scale, with 1 being “most unstable” and 5 “most stable.” The index does not present absolute or fixed measures of district stability because stability is perceived differently from area to area and person to person. Stability is not like distance or weight that can be measured using commonly accepted units of measure such as meters or kilograms. The Stability Index’s scores are relative, meaning that district scores should be compared relative with one another—for example, a district scoring 2.83 on the index is perceived as less stable than one scoring 4.05. Table 6 provides the overall results. To simplify where districts rank we have split the results into quartiles represented by different colors: red represents the lowest quartile, orange represents the second lowest, yellow the second highest, and green the highest quartile.

**TABLE 6. STABILITY INDEX RESULTS**

1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (Sep-Oct 12)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
<b>Ab-e Kamari*</b>	<b>4.14</b>	<b>3.78</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>4.23</b>
Ali Abad	3.55	4.00	3.00	5.00	3.61
Almar	3.04	2.66	2.00	3.00	2.90
Andar	2.78	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.49
Arghandab	3.59	2.67	4.00	4.00	3.56
<b>Aybak</b>	<b>4.03</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>4.28</b>
Baghlan i Jadid	3.71	3.88	2.00	2.00	3.47
Bak	3.45	2.13	3.00	4.00	3.30
Bala Boluk	3.05	3.01	2.00	2.00	2.89
Baraki Barak	3.12	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.79
Barmal	2.78	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.53
Chak	2.80	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.75
Chamkani	3.60	4.18	4.00	5.00	3.77
Char Darah	3.54	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.66
<b>Charikar</b>	<b>3.98</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>4.00</b>	<b>4.18</b>
Daman	3.57	2.94	4.00	5.00	3.62


1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (Sep-Oct 12)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Dand	3.65	2.16	4.00	1.00	3.40
Dand wa Pattan	4.02	3.69	4.00	5.00	4.03
Deh Yak	3.67	2.73	3.00	3.00	3.47
Doshi	3.71	3.85	3.00	5.00	3.72
Farah	4.06	4.30	5.00	3.00	4.18
Garmser	3.83	2.23	3.00	4.00	3.59
Gelan	3.14	2.56	2.00	4.00	3.01
Ghazni	3.74	4.36	5.00	1.00	3.79
Gorbuz	3.54	3.26	4.00	3.00	3.53
Imam Sahib	3.91	4.00	4.00	5.00	3.98
Jaji	3.52	3.68	2.00	5.00	3.46
Kajaki	3.91	1.46	2.00	3.00	3.43
Khairkut (Zarghoon Shahr)	3.45	4.64	4.00	5.00	3.70
Khanabad	3.95	3.48	3.00	4.00	3.81
Khas Kunar	3.69	2.85	3.00	4.00	3.55
Khas Uruzgan	2.58	1.74	2.00	3.00	2.46
Khost (Matun)	3.68	3.95	3.00	1.00	3.50
Khvajah Omari	3.55	2.10	5.00	5.00	3.62
Kunduz	3.64	4.00	5.00	2.00	3.73
Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	3.52	3.87	3.00	5.00	3.57
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	3.39	2.23	2.00	5.00	3.22
Lajah-Mangal	3.55	2.00	2.00	5.00	3.31
Lash Kar Gah	4.06	2.81	3.00	2.00	3.73
Maiwand	3.52	2.96	2.00	1.00	3.18
Marawara	3.23	1.84	2.00	3.00	2.96
Marjah	3.94	1.93	3.00	3.00	3.60
Mata Khan	3.67	1.55	3.00	4.00	3.41
Moqur	3.98	2.46	3.00	4.00	3.73
Muhammad Aghah	3.42	2.07	4.00	4.00	3.37
Muqur	3.49	2.37	2.00	3.00	3.21
Musa Qala	3.74	1.46	2.00	3.00	3.30
Nad 'Ali	3.87	2.61	3.00	2.00	3.56
Nadir Shah Kot	3.43	3.56	3.00	4.00	3.43
Nahr-i-Saraj	3.83	1.81	3.00	1.00	3.41
Naw Zad	3.56	1.41	2.00	4.00	3.21
Nerkh	2.91	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.93
Panjwai	3.39	1.94	3.00	1.00	3.09
Puli Khumri	3.62	4.35	5.00	3.00	3.80

1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (Sep-Oct 12)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Pusht Rod	3.76	3.27	2.00	4.00	3.54
Qadis	4.04	2.75	4.00	4.00	3.91
Qaisar	3.21	2.69	3.00	2.00	3.08
Qalat	2.75	2.14	4.00	4.00	2.87
Qarabagh	3.42	2.28	3.00	3.00	3.24
Salang	3.88	3.88	5.00	5.00	4.14
Sangin	3.74	1.95	2.00	3.00	3.35
Sar Hawza	3.58	3.83	3.00	4.00	3.57
Sarkani	3.59	3.26	2.00	2.00	3.32
Sawkai	3.60	3.52	3.00	3.00	3.50
Sayed Abad	3.04	4.00	3.00	1.00	3.03
Sayed Karam	3.50	2.69	3.00	5.00	3.44
Shah Joy	2.82	1.26	3.00	4.00	2.74
Shah Wali Kot	3.48	3.18	2.00	3.00	3.28
Shahidi Hassas	2.48	1.38	2.00	3.00	2.35
Shamal (Dwamunda)	3.38	1.95	3.00	5.00	3.28
Sharana	3.64	4.47	4.00	3.00	3.73
Shindand	3.33	3.07	3.00	3.00	3.26
Shwak	3.46	2.05	2.00	5.00	3.25
Spin Boldak	3.34	3.87	4.00	4.00	3.49
Tani	3.52	3.11	4.00	3.00	3.50
Tarnak Wa Jaldak	2.66	2.16	3.00	5.00	2.76
Terezayi	3.38	2.57	4.00	2.00	3.29
Urgun	3.47	4.43	5.00	4.00	3.75
Waghaz	2.31	1.73	3.00	4.00	2.40
Waz Drazadran	2.45	2.00	1.00	5.00	2.39
Yousuf Khil	3.67	3.68	4.00	4.00	3.72
Zhari	3.48	3.46	3.00	2.00	3.35
Zurmat	2.80	2.00	1.00	4.00	2.60
<b>Overall</b>	<b>3.47</b>	<b>2.94</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>3.47</b>	<b>3.38</b>

\* Light purple indicates the seven control districts


Stability can also be represented in the form of a curve or a map. The curve provides us with the average stability score across all districts as well as the quartile break scores. A move to the right (higher average stability score) will indicate an improvement in overall stability while a move to the left (lower average stability score) will indicate a deterioration in overall stability. In future waves of the survey, MISTI will be looking to see whether the curve moves to the right or to the left. In addition, the width of the curve's base indicates the variation of scores across districts. A broad base indicates a high variation in scores. A narrow base indicates a low variation. The chart and map below illustrate the baseline stability score and district level results.

## CHART I. STABILITY INDEX



The average stability score across all districts is 3.43 while the variation in scores is between 2.40 and 4.33, which is a moderate degree of variation.

Results can also be represented in a mapped format, as shown below.




The results of the MISTI Survey sub-indices and indicators that comprise 75 percent of the composite Stability Index are included as Appendix E to this report.


## Security and Crime

### Overall View of Current Security Situation

Respondents were asked to evaluate the overall security situation in their local areas. Seventy-four percent of respondents in control districts rate security in their local area as good\* while only 4 percent rate their situation as poor.† This compares with 54 percent of respondents in stabilization districts who evaluate their local security situation as good and 20 percent who rate their situation as poor. Respondents in SIKa-E areas are the least optimistic with nearly as many saying their local security is poor (36 percent) as those who say it is good (41 percent).



Low levels of optimism for respondents in SIKa-E are primarily a result of responses in four districts where a majority rate the security situation as either “poor” or “very poor”: Waz Drazadran (75 percent), Andar (68 percent), Baraki Barak (53 percent), and Zurmat (51 percent).




\*Combined responses for “very good” and “good”

†Combined responses for “poor” and “very poor”


## Perceptions of Past and Future Security

Respondents were asked to consider the current security situation in their local areas, compared with the security situation one year ago. Of the program areas to be served, SIKa–E respondents are least likely to perceive improvements over the past year. Forty percent say the situation is less secure (13 percent “much”; 27 percent “somewhat”) compared with 23 percent overall who say it is less secure (5 percent “much”; 17 percent “somewhat”). Respondents in control districts hold mostly favorable views of security level changes over the past year with only 8 percent who believe the situation has become less secure (1 percent “much”; 7 percent “somewhat”).




When asked to consider security expectations one year from now, respondents in SIKa–E districts are least optimistic that security will improve with 32 percent expecting their area to be less secure (9 percent “much”; 23 percent “somewhat”) while only 41 percent expect it to be more secure (16 percent “much”; 26 percent “somewhat”). Overall, 19 percent of respondents in all stabilization districts believe the situation will be “somewhat” (15 percent) or “much” (4 percent) less secure in the coming year compared with 52 percent who believe it will be “somewhat” (32 percent) or “much” (20 percent) more secure in the coming year.

Aside from SIKa–E, there is little variation in perceptions, between program districts, that there will be less security a year from now; all other program areas report that between 17 percent and 19 percent of respondents believe it will be less secure. However, there is greater variability among program districts in the view that their areas will become more secure in the coming year. Sixty-one percent of respondents in SIKa–S believe their area will be “much” (27 percent) or “somewhat” (34 percent) more secure in the coming year, which is slightly higher than the control districts where 60 percent believe they will be “much” (25 percent) or “somewhat” (35 percent) more secure a year from now.




### Freedom of Movement


Respondents were asked to specifically rate the security situation on the roads they use. Respondents in SIKA-E districts continued to be the least optimistic of the various program districts with 35 percent feeling that the road security is “somewhat bad” and another 25 percent who say road security is “very bad.” This compares with the overall average of stabilization districts where 27 percent believe road security is “somewhat bad” and 12 percent believe it is “very bad,” and the average for control districts where 12 percent believe it is “somewhat bad” and only 4 percent believe it is “very bad.”




Within SIKA-E districts, there is considerable variation in how road security is viewed. In Andar, a full 53 percent say the situation is “very bad.” In Waz Drazadran, 47 percent of respondents share that assessment. Notably, no respondents reported road security as being “very good” in each of these districts. Respondents in Deh Yak and Muhammad Aghah hold the most positive views of road security within SIKA-E districts; 59 percent in each of those districts say road security is at least “somewhat good.”




Not only do respondents in SIKA-E districts hold the least positive views of current road conditions, they are also most likely to believe that road security has deteriorated over the past year. Thirty-seven percent of SIKA-E respondents say road security has worsened “a little” (26 percent) or “a lot” (11 percent) in the past year. The overall average for stabilization districts is that 20 percent believe conditions have worsened “a little” (15 percent) or “a lot” (5 percent). In control districts, only 6 percent of respondents report seeing road security become “a little” (5 percent) or “a lot” (1 percent) worse in the past year.



Not surprisingly, the overall trend of SIKA-E districts reporting lower levels of security on the roads can also be seen in questions about feeling secure while traveling to a neighboring village or the provincial / district capital. A full 57 percent of respondents in SIKA-E districts report feeling at least somewhat insecure while traveling to a neighboring village, the only program area where a majority report feeling insecure in making such a journey.




SIKA-E respondents feel even less secure when traveling to the district or provincial capital with 66 percent of respondents stating they feel at least somewhat, if not very, insecure in making the trip. Generally, in all program areas respondents are slightly more likely to say they are comfortable making a trip to a neighboring village than to their district or provincial capitals.




## Sense of Security around the Home


Respondents were asked a series of questions about how secure or insecure they feel inside and outside of their homes, both during the day and at night. Respondents in all program areas feel most secure in their homes during the day. Even respondents in SIKA-E districts, who expressed the greatest level of insecurity, report only 7 percent feeling “somewhat insecure” and 4 percent feeling “very insecure” inside their homes during the day. The two districts within SIKA-E that are driving these slightly higher numbers are Deh Yak with 14 percent of respondents saying they feel “very insecure” and Zurmat, with 12 percent of respondents who report feeling “very insecure.”




However, respondents are considerably less likely to feel safe inside their homes at night. In all stabilization districts, 34 percent of respondents say they feel at least somewhat insecure in their homes at night compared with merely 8 percent of respondents in control districts. Nearly half (45 percent) of respondents in SIKA-S districts say they feel at least somewhat insecure in their homes at night, while in SIKA-N districts that number is only 21 percent.



When asked how secure they feel outside of their homes during the day—in contrast to how SIKA–S respondents felt in their homes at night—respondents in those districts are less likely than the average of all stabilization districts to report feeling at least somewhat insecure. Twenty-one percent of SIKA–S respondents and 26 percent of all stabilization district respondents reported feeling at least somewhat insecure. Respondents in SIKA–E districts, however, remain the least secure by this measure: 44 percent of respondents in those districts report feeling at least somewhat insecure. Respondents in control districts remain significantly more optimistic about security by this measure with a full 92 percent who report feeling at least somewhat secure outside of their homes during the day compared with 74 percent of those in all stabilization districts who feel likewise.




Being outside of one’s home at night was the least secure situation for all program areas and for the control districts. Only respondents in SIKA–N (53 percent) and the control group (70 percent) have a majority who feel at least somewhat secure outside of their homes at night. Respondents in SIKA–E districts again feel the least secure with nearly one-fourth (22 percent) saying they feel “very insecure.”




## Perceptions of Crime


Respondents perceive petty crime and offenses, defined in the question as “theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand Afs” fairly regularly throughout all of the districts sampled. Even in the control districts, 69 percent of respondents believe there is at least “a little” crime of this nature in their areas.




However, respondents in SIKA-S districts are most likely to rate this level of crime as “a lot” (36 percent) and least likely to say there is “none at all” (15 percent). Within SIKA-S districts, half of Panjwai respondents say there is “a lot” of this crime, while 42 percent of respondents in Arghandab believe there is “a lot” of petty crime and offenses in their area.




When respondents were asked to rate the level of serious, nonviolent crime in their area, defined as “theft of goods worth more than 5,000 Afs,” the stabilization districts start to separate further from the control districts than in the previous question. The average in stabilization districts indicates that 23 percent of respondents believe “a lot” of serious, nonviolent crime is happening in their areas while 28 percent believe “none at all” is occurring. This compares with the control districts where only 10 percent believe serious, nonviolent crime happens “a lot” and 40 percent believe there is “none at all” in their areas.




The disparity in perceptions of crime is greatest between the stabilization districts and the control districts when respondents were asked to rate the level of serious, violent crime in their area, defined as murder, assault, and kidnapping. When asked, 21 percent of respondents in stabilization districts believe there is “a lot” of crime while 32 percent believe there is “none at all.” This compares with 10 percent of respondents in control districts who believe there is “a lot” of serious, violent crime and 56 percent who believe there is “none at all” in their areas.




When asked to consider the level of crime in their area, a majority of respondents in all program areas believe crime rates have either improved or stayed the same over the past year with regard to the three types of crime discussed above, and relatively few respondents believe crime is increasing in their area. Most notably, respondents in SIKA-W districts are just as likely as respondents in control districts to say there is “a little more” (4 percent) or “a lot more” (1 percent) petty crime and offenses in their area. Respondents in SIKA-W districts are also as likely as respondents in control districts to say crime has decreased in their areas (although the percentage that say crime is “much less” is slightly higher in the control districts by a 30 percent to 24 percent margin).




A similar trend is seen with respondents when asked if they believe serious, nonviolent crime has increased or decreased in the past year. One notable exception can be found with respondents in SIKA-E districts where more than one-fourth of respondents say there is “much more” (8 percent) or “a little more” (19 percent) serious, nonviolent crime than there was last year. Even though respondents in SIKA-E are most likely to say crime has increased—at 39 percent there are still more respondents who believe this type of crime has decreased. Meanwhile, 10 percent say it is “much less” and 29 percent say it is “a little less” when compared with the last year.




Perhaps most troubling though is that, of the three types of crimes they were asked about, respondents in SIKA-E districts are most likely to say there is “much more” (10 percent) or “a little more” (22 percent) serious, violent crime in their areas this year as compared with last year. This means approximately one respondent in three in the SIKA-E districts believes violent crime is decreasing, one in three believes it is staying the same, and one in three believes it is increasing.




However, not all SIKA-E districts share the same view of increases in serious, violent crimes. The overall SIKA-E results are driven downward by respondents in two districts, Waz Drazadran and Zurmat, where half of respondents believe serious, violent crime has increased. In Waz Drazadran, 34 percent say there is “a little more” and 16 percent say there is “much more” serious, violent crime while in Zurmat, 27 percent say there is “a little more” and 22 percent say there is “much more” serious, violent crime in their area than last year. Respondents in Deh Yak are much less likely to believe the level of crime is the same (12 percent) than in other SIKA-E districts (33 percent on average). Deh Yak respondents are also considerably more likely to say there is much less serious violent crime (42 percent) than the average for all SIKA-E districts (11 percent). However, a relatively high percentage of respondents in Deh Yak also say there is much more (19 percent) serious crime in their area, second only to the 22 percent of Zurmat respondents who hold this assessment. This could be an indication that some areas of Deh Yak district have improved over the past year, while other areas within the same district may have become less safe.




Respondents were then asked to consider what they expect to happen with crime rates for these same three types of crime over the next year. Respondents are considerably less optimistic about future levels of crime when compared with their perceptions of current crime levels and perceived improvements over the past year. Across all stabilization districts, 42 percent of respondents say petty crimes and offenses will “increase a little” (13 percent) or “increase a lot” (29 percent). More than half (55 percent) of respondents in SIKAE districts believe petty crime will increase and about one-third of respondents in the control districts believe petty crime will increase over the coming year.



Respondents are a bit more optimistic about increases in serious but nonviolent crime rates. One-third of respondents in stabilization districts say that this type of crime will increase over the coming year while 26 percent of respondents in control districts share this view.




The belief that serious, violent crime will increase over the coming year is similar to the belief that serious, nonviolent crime will increase. Thirty-two percent of respondents in stabilization districts say this type of crime will “increase a little” (10 percent) or “increase a lot” (22 percent). Respondents in SIKAE districts remain the least optimistic about all three projections of future crime rates: 55 percent believe petty crime will increase, 43 percent believe serious, nonviolent crime will increase, and 42 percent believe serious, violent crime will increase over the next year.




### Security Forces and Insurgent Groups—Presence and Confidence

Perceptions of security can be impacted by perceptions of both security presence and the presence of potentially destabilizing insurgent groups. Respondents in the various program areas have very different perceptions of the presence of both security and insurgent personnel in their areas.


The Afghan National Army (ANA) was perceived to have the largest presence throughout all of the program area districts. Less than 10 percent of respondents in each of the program area districts believe that there are no ANA forces in their area with the exception of SIKAE-N in which 21 percent of respondents say there are no ANA forces. That is slightly more than respondents in control group districts, of which 20 percent believe there are no ANA troops in their area.




Respondents also expressed great confidence in the ability of the ANA to keep respondents' areas safe. In all program areas, a clear majority of respondents have "a lot" or at least "some" confidence that the ANA can make their area safe. Respondents in SIKA-E and SIKA-S districts were the most likely to express little or no confidence in the ANA with 15 percent saying "a little" and 9 percent saying "no confidence" in the ANA to make their area safe.




Perceptions of ISAF presence throughout the various program areas vary more than perceptions of any other group tested. Perceived presence is lowest in SIKA-N where 66 percent of respondents in those districts say there is no ISAF presence in their area. The low level of perceived presence is followed closely by the control districts where 57 percent of respondents say there is no ISAF presence in their area. ISAF presence is strongest among respondents in SIKA-S districts where 85 percent say there are "a lot" (25 percent) or "some" (60 percent) ISAF presence in their area.




With regard to levels of confidence in ISAF’s ability to keep their area safe, respondents were unlikely to express high levels of confidence in any of the stabilization program groups or in the control districts. Respondents in SIKA–N (66 percent), SIKA–W (39 percent), and the control group districts (57 percent) were most likely to not express an opinion because ISAF is not in their area.




The perceived presence of Arbaki is far more varied throughout the program areas. At least 61 percent of respondents in each of the program areas say there are at least “some” Arbakai in their area. That compares with 73 percent of respondents in control districts who say there are no Arbakai in their area.




The confidence in Arbaki to keep respondents' areas safe is not significantly higher than that of the ISAF, although respondents in program areas were much more likely to have an opinion on the Arbaki than respondents in control group districts as 73 percent of them say there are no Arbaki and cannot rate this measure.




In sharp contrast to measures of Arbaki's presence, measures of Afghan National Police (ANP) presence throughout the program areas are far stronger and more consistent. While relatively few respondents in the control districts believe Arbakai are present in their area, nearly all (95 percent) believe there is at least some ANP presence in control districts and 69 percent say there are "a lot" of ANP in their areas.




The overall confidence in the ANP to make respondents' areas safe is second only to confidence in the ANA to do the same. Confidence is highest in control group districts where 55 percent have "a lot of confidence" and another 31 percent have "some confidence" in the ANP. Confidence is also very high in SIKAN districts where 46 percent say they have "a lot of confidence" and 29 percent have "some confidence."




The perceived presence of Afghan Local Police (ALP) is considerably lower than that of the ANP. In all stabilization districts, 20 percent of respondents say there is no ALP and in control districts 48 percent of respondents say there is no ALP presence in their area. ALP presence is strongest in SIKAS where 88 percent of respondents in those districts say there is at least some ALP in their area.




While confidence levels for the ALP are lower than for other Afghan security forces, a plurality of respondents in all stabilization program areas have at least “some confidence” in their ability to keep areas safe.




The presence of armed opposition groups varies much more by program area. The strongest perceived presence is in SIKA-E districts where 81 percent of respondents say there are “a lot” (42 percent) or “some” (39 percent) armed opposition groups in their area. This compares with 70 percent of respondents in control districts who say there are no armed opposition groups in their area.




Taking a closer look at SIKAE, it is clear that strong perceptions of the presence of armed groups are not found in all districts. In Deh Yak, for example, 68 percent of respondents say there are no armed opposition groups in their area. However, in Baraki Barak, 98 percent of respondents say there is “a lot” (78 percent) or “some” (20 percent) armed opposition group presence in their area. In Waz Drazadran, 88 percent of respondents say there is “a lot” (79 percent) or “some” (9 percent) armed opposition group presence.




There is little confidence in the ability of armed opposition groups to keep areas safe in both the stabilization districts and the control districts. A plurality of respondents in each program area (at least among those who felt they could rate this measure) state they have “no confidence at all” in the ability of armed opposition groups to maintain safety.





Respondents are likely to express high levels of confidence that the overall ability of ANA and ANP to provide security has improved over the past year. Twenty-nine percent of respondents in stabilization districts believe the ANA has “improved a lot” and another 35 percent say they have improved “a little” over the past year. In control districts, less than 1 percent of respondents say they have worsened either “a little” or “a lot” in the past year.




Respondents in SIKA–E districts are least likely to perceive improvements in the ANP, but only 12 percent of those respondents say their ability has “worsened a little,” while 5 percent say it has “worsened a lot.” Confidence is highest in control districts where 79 percent of respondents say it has improved (42 percent “a lot”; 37 percent “a little”) and only 1 percent claim it has “worsened a little.”



Respondents are slightly more likely to expect the ANA to improve over the next year when compared with the ANP in every program area and in the control districts. However, the belief that both the ANA and ANP will improve their ability to secure areas, or at least maintain current levels, in the coming year is relatively high in most program areas. The one exception is in SIKA-E where less than half of respondents (19 percent “much better”; 25 percent “a little better”) believe the ANA will improve in the coming year and fewer (15 percent “much better”; 27 percent “a little better”) say the same of the ANP.



Respondents in control group districts are less likely than respondents in stabilization districts to believe that the number of armed opposition fighters who have stopped fighting and joined the government has increased in the past year. Respondents in control group districts are also more likely to say the numbers of those doing so have decreased. Although respondents in control group districts report fewer armed opposition groups in their area compared with stabilization district respondents, it is still notable that the perception in the control districts is that reconciliation with former opposition group members and the government is on the decline. Respondents are actually more likely to say this form of reconciliation has “decreased a little” (18 percent) or “a lot” (17 percent) than they are to say it has “increased a little” (19 percent) or “a lot” (11 percent). It is also notable that respondents in SIKA–E districts are the most likely to say former fighters have joined the government than in any other program area with 22 percent who say it has “increased a lot” and another 26 percent who say it has “increased a little” over the past year.



Respondents were asked to choose one of two statements which they agree with more:

Q10a.

1. Armed Opposition Groups like the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami will reconcile with the Afghan government when foreign soldiers leave.
2. Armed Opposition Groups like the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami will *not* reconcile with the Afghan government when foreign soldiers leave.


Q10b.

1. The Afghan government effectively supports the reintegration of former armed opposition group fighters back into normal life.
2. The Afghan government *does not* effectively support the reintegration of former armed opposition group fighters back into normal life.

Q10c.


1. Ethnic disputes in Afghanistan are so strong that lasting peace is impossible.
2. Ethnic disputes in Afghanistan are *not* strong enough to stand in the way of lasting peace.

In terms of perceived likelihood to reconcile with the government, respondents in SIKAs-S districts are the most optimistic that such a reconciliation will happen—69 percent say they will reconcile. Respondents in SIKAs-E districts are the least optimistic with only half agreeing. Respondents in control group districts are the most likely to believe that the Afghan government effectively supports the reintegration of former armed opposition group fighters with 67 percent who say they agree. On this measure, respondents in SIKAs-E districts are again the least likely to agree with only 42 percent who say that the Afghan government effectively supports reintegration efforts. On the third measure, however, SIKAs-E (along with SIKAs-W) respondents are the most optimistic. Forty-eight percent of respondents in those two program areas believe ethnic disputes are **not** strong enough to stand in the way of lasting peace.



### Area Control

Interviewers were asked to assess the presence of the ISAF, ASF, Arbaki, and Taliban in each village they visited during the field period. This is not a question that was asked of respondents, but rather a subjective assessment made by each interviewer after they conducted all of their interviews in a village/sample point. Each program area averaged significantly more observations of Taliban presence than the control districts where 46 percent of interviewers report there is ISAF/ASF based in the village and no Taliban presence. Interviewers who conducted work in SIKAs-E were most likely to report a strong Taliban presence with 43 percent who say that the Taliban were based in the village they visited, and of those 38 percent, respondents say ISAF/ASF only visit and another 5 percent say that there are no ISAF/ASF present at all. Another 36 percent of interviewers report that the village they visited has ISAF/ASF based in the village, but the Taliban still regularly come to the village.



\* The sample size for these data are a reflection of the total number of sample points (n=4,502) that were assessed throughout the field period. Some villages had multiple sample points assigned within the same village and were conducted by different interviewers. As a result, the above chart does not indicate that 4,502 *separate villages* were assessed; rather, 4,502 village assessments were made by interviewers while conducting field work.

## Governance

### Opinions of the Afghan Government


Respondents were asked about whether or not the Afghan government is well regarded in their area. A majority of respondents (68 percent) report that the Afghan government is well regarded in their area while 31 percent report that it is not.

Similar to the overall results, a majority of respondents in SIKAS program areas report a favorable attitude toward the Afghan government (74 percent), while 24 percent were unfavorable. All SIKAS districts except for Qalat (54 percent unfavorable) regard the Afghan government well in their areas.


Similar to SIKAS, a majority of respondents in SIKAN districts report a favorable attitude toward the Afghan government (68 percent), while 32 percent were unfavorable. Respondents in Baghlan-I-Jadid (85 percent) and Puli Khumri (84 percent) report that the Afghan government is well regarded in their areas. Respondents in Almar are split in their opinions with 49.7 percent having positive attitudes toward the Afghan government and 50.3 percent having negative attitudes.

Participants in SIKAW program areas have a positive opinion of the Afghan government (63 percent), while 36 percent do not. Respondents in Moqur (72 percent) and Qadis (70 percent) report the highest levels of favorability towards the Afghan government.

Opinions of respondents in SIKA–E areas are more split with 54 percent of respondents regarding the Afghan government well in their areas and 45 percent of respondents who did not regard the Afghan government well. Respondents in Muhammad Aghah (73 percent) report the most positive attitude toward the Afghan Government while Andar (68 percent) and Waz Drazadran (64 percent) report the most negative attitudes.




Similar to respondents in SIKA districts, those in CCI program districts report a favorable attitude toward the Afghan government (68 percent) while 31 percent have an unfavorable attitude. Respondents in Zhari (85 percent), Sawkai (82 percent), and Panjwai (82 percent) report that the Afghan government is well regarded in their area while respondents in Barmal (85 percent) report that the Afghan government is not well regarded in their area.



Respondents in CDP districts also report a favorable attitude toward the Afghan government (73 percent), while 26 percent have unfavorable attitudes. Respondents in Lash Kar Gah (91 percent), Kajaki (88 percent), and Zhari (85 percent) report that the Afghan government is well regarded in their area while respondents in Andar (68 percent) and Arnak wa Jalda (67 percent) report that the Afghan government is not well regarded in their area.

### Confidence in Afghan Government Positions/Organizations


The majority of Afghan respondents report that they have confidence\* in their district governor (75 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (74 percent), the district government (67 percent), and their provincial governor (58 percent). When broken down by program area, similar results are evidenced across programs with the exception of SIKA-E, where respondents' confidence in government positions and institutions, while still above 50 percent (with the exception of provincial governor, 43 percent), is consistently lower than in other program areas.




Respondents in SIKA-E districts report high levels of confidence with their district governor (62 percent), district government (58 percent), and local village/neighborhood leaders (57 percent). Conversely, a majority of respondents in SIKA-E districts report no confidence in their provincial governor (56 percent). Respondents in Baraki Barak (89 percent) have high confidence in their district governor while 56 percent of respondents in Nerkh have little to no confidence. Similarly, when asked about their confidence in local village/neighborhood leaders, respondents in Zurmat (81 percent) hold the highest levels of confidence while respondents in Baraki Barak and Nerkh are more split between high confidence (47 percent, each) and little to no confidence (52 percent and 53 percent, respectively).

Respondents in SIKA-E districts, overall, were confident with their district government and respondents in Chak were split evenly at 50 percent confidence and 50 percent no confidence, respectively. When asked to report their confidence in their provincial governor, a majority of respondents (56 percent) report having little to no confidence. Respondents in Zurmat (73 percent) have the highest rates of no confidence while respondents in Deh Yak (56 percent) report the highest levels of confidence.


\*Combines "a lot of" or "some" confidence




Participants in SIKA-W districts report confidence in their district governor (79 percent), district government (70 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (70 percent), and their provincial governor (64 percent). Respondents, overall, have high levels of confidence in their district governor with respondents in Moqur (94 percent) and Qadis (92 percent) reporting high confidence. Similarly, a majority of respondents report high levels of confidence with their district government, except for respondents in Bala Boluk (55 percent) who report little to no confidence at all. When asked if they had confidence in local village/neighborhood leaders, respondents report high levels of confidence while participants in Bala Boluk are more split with 50 percent having high levels of confidence and 49 percent having no confidence at all. Fifty-five percent of respondents in Bala Boluk have no confidence in their provincial governor.



SIKA-S participants report, overall, high levels of confidence in their district governor (77 percent), the district government (63 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (81 percent), and their provincial governor (58 percent). All respondents report favorable opinions of their local village/neighborhood leaders with respondents in Qalat (98 percent) having the most favorable views. Similarly, the majority of respondents have high levels of confidence in their district governor and district government; however, respondents in Qalat (61 percent confidence in their district governor and 60 percent confidence in their district government) report having little to no confidence. When asked about their provincial governor, respondents report relatively high levels of confidence except for, again, respondents in Qalat (60 percent) who have no confidence.




Respondents in SIKA-N districts report confidence in their district governor (81 percent), the district government (75 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (79 percent), and their provincial governor (64 percent). At the district level, the majority of respondents report high levels of confidence in their district governor (Khanabad, 87 percent), district government (Khanabad, 80 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (Khanabad, 82 percent), and their provincial governor (Baghlan-I-Jadid, 76 percent).



Respondents in CCI districts report confidence in their district governor (72 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (72 percent), and the district government (62 percent). With regard to their percent having no confidence at all,\* respondents in Spin Boldak (88 percent) and Sawkai (87 percent) confidence in their provincial governor, respondents are split with 52 percent having confidence and 47 report the highest levels of confidence in their district governor while respondents in Barmal (95 percent) report no confidence. When asked about their confidence in their district government, respondents in Marawara (87 percent) report high levels of confidence while respondents in Barmal (97 percent) report no confidence.

Respondents in CCI districts also report similar findings about their local village/neighborhood leaders with respondents in Qalat (98 percent), Sangin (96 percent), and Nahr-I-Saraj (90 percent) reporting the highest levels of confidence. Respondents from Barmal, Khas Uruzgan, and Shahidi Hassas are more split between no confidence at all (51 percent, 55 percent, and 56 percent, respectively) and high confidence (48 percent, 45 percent, and 44 percent, respectively). Respondents are the most divided when asked about their confidence in their provincial governor. Respondents in Musa Qala (70 percent), Nahr-I-Saraj (70 percent), and Marawara (69 percent) report the highest levels of confidence while respondents in Barmal (95 percent) report no confidence.



Respondents in CDP districts report confidence in their district governor (76 percent), district government (64 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (74 percent), and their provincial governor (57 percent). Respondents from Lash Kar Gah (91 percent), Spin Boldak (88 percent), and Dand wa Pattan (86 percent) report high levels of confidence while respondents from Waghaz (80 percent) report no confidence at all. Similarly, respondents in Dand wa Pattan (90 percent) and Lash Kar Gah (85 percent) report higher levels of confidence in their district government while respondents in Waghaz (81 percent) report little or no confidence.


When asked about their confidence in local village/neighborhood leaders, respondents in Lash Kar Gah (98 percent), Dand wa Pattan (90 percent), and Nahr-I-Saraj (90 percent) report high levels of confidence

\*Combination of "not much" or "no confidence at all"

while respondents in Waghaz (81 percent) report little or no confidence. Respondents in CDP districts also report high levels of confidence in their provincial governor in Lash Kar Gah (93 percent) and Dand wa Pattan (90 percent), while respondents in Andar (71 percent) report low levels of confidence.

### Responsiveness of Afghan Government Positions/Organizations

The majority of Afghan respondents report the following Afghan government positions and organizations as responsive\* to the needs of the local people with regards to their district governor (68 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (73 percent), the district government (66 percent), and their provincial governor (59 percent). When broken down by program area, similar results are evidenced across programs with the exception of SIKa-E, where respondents report consistently lower scores than in other program areas.




Respondents in SIKa-E districts report that Afghan government positions and organizations are responsive to the needs of the people with regard to their district government (52 percent) and local village/neighborhood leaders (55 percent). Conversely, a majority of respondents report the lowest levels of responsiveness from their district governor (52 percent) and from their provincial governor (55 percent). Respondents in Baraki Barak (78 percent) report high levels of responsiveness in their district government while respondents in Nerkh (85 percent) report poor responsiveness. Similarly, when asked about the responsiveness of their local village/neighborhood leaders, respondents in Zurmat (77 percent) report the highest levels of responsiveness while respondents in Baraki Barak (56 percent) and Nerkh (54 percent) report low responsiveness.

Respondents SIKa-E districts report that their district governor is highly unresponsive to the needs of the people with respondents in Nerkh (85 percent) reporting the lowest levels of responsiveness and respondents in Baraki Barak (78 percent) reporting the highest. Similarly, when asked about the responsiveness of their provincial governor, a majority of respondents (55 percent) report poor responsiveness. At the district level, respondents in Waz Drazadran (71 percent) report the highest rates of unresponsiveness while respondents in Deh Yak (64 percent) report the highest levels of responsiveness in


\*Combination of "very" or "somewhat" responsive

their provincial governor.




The majority of participants in SIKAE districts report that Afghan government positions and organizations are responsive to the needs of the people in their area with regard to their district governor (73 percent), district government (65 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (66 percent), and their provincial governor (60 percent). Respondents, overall, report high levels of responsiveness from their district governor with respondents in Moqur (87 percent) and Qadis (88 percent) reporting high responsiveness.


Similarly, a majority of respondents report high levels of confidence with their district government except for respondents in Bala Boluk (58 percent) who report low responsiveness. When asked to report on the responsiveness of local village/neighborhood leaders, respondents report high levels of responsiveness while participants in Bala Boluk are more split with 48 percent reporting high responsiveness and 52 percent reporting high unresponsiveness. Sixty-one percent of respondents in Bala Boluk report the highest levels of unresponsiveness from their provincial governor while other SIKAE respondents report relatively high levels of responsiveness.



SIKA-S participants report, overall, that Afghan government positions and organizations are responsive to the needs of the people in their area regarding their district governor (65 percent), the district government (68 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (81 percent), and their provincial governor (61 percent). All respondents report favorably the responsiveness of their local village/neighborhood leaders with respondents in Qalat (95 percent) having the most favorable views. Similarly, the majority of respondents report high levels of responsiveness in their district governor and district government; however, respondents in Qalat (61 percent and 60 percent, respectively) report the highest levels of unresponsiveness. When asked about the responsiveness of their provincial governor, respondents remain positive; however, respondents in Qalat (60 percent) report low responsiveness.




Respondents in districts targeted by SIKA-N report high levels of responsiveness from their district governor (75 percent), the district government (73 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (77 percent), and their provincial governor (62 percent). At the district level, respondents in all districts report high responsiveness from their district governor (Khanabad, 83 percent), district government (Khanabad, 81 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (Imam Sahib and Khanabad at 84 percent, each), and their provincial governor (Baghlan-I-Jadid, 74 percent). Respondents in Ali Abad are split evenly (50 percent and 50 percent, respectively) in their perceptions of the responsiveness of their provincial governor.



Respondents in districts targeted by CCI report that their district governor (65 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (74 percent, each), the district government (64 percent), and provincial governor (56 percent) are responsive to their needs. Respondents in Sawkai (84 percent) and Marawara (83 percent) report the highest levels of responsiveness from their district governor while respondents in Barmal (90 percent) report low levels of responsiveness.\* When asked to report on the responsiveness of their district government, respondents in Nahr-I-Saraj (80 percent) and Marawara (78 percent) report high levels of responsiveness while respondents in Barmal (97 percent) report low levels of responsiveness.

Respondents in CCI districts report similar findings about their local village/neighborhood leaders with respondents in Qalat (95 percent) and Sangin (95 percent) reporting the highest levels of responsiveness. Respondents from Barmal are more split between low responsiveness (52 percent) and high responsiveness (48 percent). Respondents are the most divided when asked about the responsiveness of their provincial governor. Respondents in Musa Qala (71 percent) and Nahr-I-Saraj (70 percent) report the highest levels of responsiveness while respondents in Barmal (94 percent) report the lowest levels of responsiveness.




Similarly, respondents in CDP districts report that their district governor (66 percent), district government (66 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (75 percent), and the provincial governor (62 percent) are responsive to the needs of the people. Respondents from Lash Kar Gah (90 percent) and Shwak (85 percent) report high levels of responsiveness from their district governor while respondents from Waghaz (68 percent) and Tarnak wa Jaldak (67 percent) report low levels of responsiveness. Similarly, respondents in Dand wa Pattan (85 percent) and Lash Kar Gah (85 percent) report higher levels of unresponsiveness in their district government while respondents in Waghaz (76 percent) report poor responsiveness.

\*Combination of "somewhat" or "very" unresponsive

When asked about the responsiveness of their local village/neighborhood leaders, respondents in Kajaki (97 percent), Lash Kar Gah (97 percent), and Dand wa Pattan (96 percent) report high levels of responsiveness while respondents in Waghaz (73 percent) report low levels of responsiveness. Respondents in CDP areas also report high levels of responsiveness in their provincial governor in Lash Kar Gah (92 percent) and Dand wa Pattan (92 percent) while respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak (68 percent) and Andar (65 percent) report poor responsiveness.

## Effectiveness of Afghan Government Positions and Organizations

The majority of Afghan respondents report the following Afghan government positions and organizations as having improved\* in their abilities to get things done over the past year regarding their district governor (63 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (60 percent), the district government (54 percent), and their provincial governor (47 percent). When broken down by program area, similar results are evidenced across programs with the exception of SIKa-E, where respondents report consistently lower scores than in other program areas.




Respondents in SIKa-E districts report that Afghan government positions and organizations have improved in their ability to get things done with regard to their district governor (56 percent), district government (48 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (45 percent), and their provincial governor (37 percent). Respondents in Baraki Barak (80 percent) report high levels of improvement in their district governor while respondents in Nerkh and Deh Yak (85 percent) report poor improvement. Similarly, when asked about the effectiveness of their district government, respondents in Baraki Barak (76 percent) report the highest levels of improvement while respondents in Nerkh (34 percent) report low levels of improvement.

SIKa-E respondents report that their local village/neighborhood leaders have improved in their ability to get things done with respondents in Zurmat (59 percent) reporting the lowest levels of improvement and respondents in Nerkh (34 percent) reporting the highest. Similarly, when asked about the effectiveness of their provincial governor, respondents in Deh Yak (57 percent) report high levels of improvement while


\*Combination of "improved a lot" or "improved a little"

respondents in Zurmat (45 percent) report the highest rates of improvement. A majority of respondents in Andar, with regard to all government positions and organizations, believe there have been no changes over the past year.




Most participants in SIKA-W districts report that Afghan government positions and organizations have improved their abilities to get things done over the past year with regard to their district governor (65 percent), district government, local village/neighborhood leaders (51 percent, each), and their provincial governor (46 percent). Respondents, overall, report high levels of responsiveness from their district governor with respondents in Moqur (86 percent) and Qadis (86 percent) reporting high improvements.


Similarly, a majority of respondents in Qadis (73 percent) report high levels of improvement with their district government. When asked to report on the effectiveness of local village/neighborhood leaders, respondents in Qadis (64 percent) report high levels of improvement. Sixty-seven percent of respondents in Qadis report the highest levels of improvement from their provincial governor.



SIKA-S participants report, overall, that Afghan government positions and organizations have improved over the past year with regard to their district governor (67 percent), the district government (57 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (69 percent), and their provincial governor (52 percent). All respondents report favorably improvements in their district governor with respondents in Arghandab (79 percent) having the most favorable views. Similarly, the majority of respondents report high levels of responsiveness in their district government with respondents in Marjah (74 percent) reporting positive improvements. When asked about the responsiveness of their local village/neighborhood leaders, respondents in Garmser (91 percent) and Nad Ali (90 percent) report positive improvements. Respondents in Nad Ali (72 percent) and Marjah (71 percent) report that their provincial governor's abilities to get things done have improved.




Respondents in SIKA-N areas report high levels of improvements in their district governor (66 percent), the district government (59 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (65 percent), and their provincial governor (50 percent). At the district level, respondents report positive improvements from their district governor (Khanabad at 77 percent), district government (Khanabad at 70 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (Khanabad at 77 percent), and their provincial governor (Baghlan-I-Jadid at 58 percent).



Respondents in CCI districts report that their district governor (61 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (59 percent, each), the district government (52 percent), and their provincial governor (44 percent) have improved in their abilities to get things done over the past year. Respondents in Spin Boldak (76 percent) and Nahr-I-Saraj (76 percent) report the highest levels of improvement in their district governor while respondents in Qalat (46 percent) report that the district governor’s ability to get things done has worsened.\* Eighty-five percent of respondents in Barmal think the effectiveness of their district governor has stayed about the same. When asked to report on the effectiveness of their district government, respondents in Nahr-I-Saraj (80 percent) report high levels of improvement over the last year while respondents in Qalat (48 percent) report the lowest levels of improvement. Eighty-one percent of respondents in Barmal think the effectiveness of their district government has stayed about the same.

CCI participants report similar findings about their local village/neighborhood leaders with respondents in Sangin (93 percent), Nahr-I-Saraj (90 percent), and Musa Qala (89 percent) reporting the highest levels of improvement while respondents in Urgun (26 percent) report the lowest levels of improvement. Seventy-five percent of respondents in Barmal think the effectiveness of their local village/neighborhood leaders has stayed about the same. Respondents, overall, report the lowest levels of improvement in their provincial governor. Respondents in Musa Qala (71 percent) report the highest levels of improvement while respondents in Qalat (48 percent) report the lowest levels of improvement. Seventy-three percent of respondents in Barmal think the effectiveness of their Provincial Governor has stayed about the same.

\*Combination of “worsened a little” or “worsened a lot”



Respondents in CDP districts report that their district governor (62 percent), district government (52 percent), local village/neighborhood leaders (58 percent), and provincial governor (48 percent) have improved in their abilities to get things done over the last year. Respondents from Lash Kar Gah (82 percent) report the highest levels of improvement in their district governor while respondents from Waghaz (48 percent) report the lowest levels of improvement. When asked about their district government, respondents in Nahr-I-Saraj (80 percent) report high levels of improvement while respondents in Waghaz (52 percent) report poor improvement.


Similarly, when asked about the effectiveness of their local village/neighborhood leaders, respondents in Kajaki (96 percent) report high levels of improvement while respondents in Waghaz (53 percent) report poor improvement. Sixty percent of respondents in Andar think the effectiveness of their local village/neighborhood leaders has stayed about the same. Respondents also report high levels of improvement in their provincial governor in Lash Kar Gah (79 percent) while respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak (43 percent) and Waghaz (41 percent) report poor improvement. A majority of respondents in Dand wa Pattan, with regard to all government positions and organizations except for their local village/neighborhood leaders, believe there have been no changes over the past year.

### Perceptions of the District Development Assembly (DDA)


Respondents who have heard of the District Development Assembly (DDA) in their district were posed a series of questions to gauge their confidence in their DDA, the DDA's responsiveness to the peoples' needs, and if the DDA's ability to get things done has improved or not over the past year. Participants in SIKA program areas report high confidence in their DDA (SIKA-E, 67 percent; SIKA-N, 79 percent; SIKA-W, 81 percent; and SIKA-S, 80 percent) with respondents in Baraki Barak (93 percent), Khanabad (88 percent), Puli Khumri (88 percent), Moqur (87 percent), Pusht Rod (87 percent), and Marjah (87 percent) reporting the highest levels of confidence. Meanwhile, respondents in Nerkh (56 percent), Almar (31 percent), Bala Boluk (42 percent), and Qalat (43 percent) report the lowest levels of confidence. The

majority of respondents report high responsiveness of the DDA to the needs of the people (SIKA–E, 59 percent; SIKA–N, 73 percent; SIKA–W, 71 percent; SIKA–S, 71 percent) with respondents in Baraki Barak (85 percent), Khanabad (81 percent), Pusht Rod (81 percent), and Marjah (82 percent) reporting the highest levels of responsiveness and respondents in Chak (62 percent), Almar (33 percent), Char Darah (33 percent), Bala Boluk (45 percent), and Qalat (45 percent) reporting the lowest.

Respondents in SIKA areas also report positive improvements in the DDA’s ability to get things done over the past year (SIKA–E, 47 percent; SIKA–N, 62 percent; SIKA–W, 62 percent; SIKA–S, 59 percent) with respondents in Baraki Barak (80 percent), Khanabad (77 percent), Qadis (74 percent), and Marjah (79 percent) reporting the most improvement in their DDAs and respondents in Nerkh (48 percent), Almar (20 percent), Bala Boluk (32 percent), and Qalat (32 percent) reporting the least improvements in their DDAs. A majority of respondents in Chak (37 percent), Almar (33 percent), Kushk-I-Robat Sangi (44 percent), and Shah Wali Kot (42 percent) reported no change in their DDA’s abilities to get things done over the past year.




Similar to the SIKA district respondents, CCI district respondents reported high confidence in their DDAs (71 percent) with respondents in Zhari (92 percent) reporting the highest levels of confidence and respondents in Shahidi Hassas (73 percent) reporting the lowest. The majority of respondents report a high responsiveness of the DDA to the needs of the people (64 percent) with respondents in Urgun (80 percent) reporting the highest levels of responsiveness and respondents in Shahidi Hassas (72 percent) reporting the lowest. Respondents report positive improvements over the past year (50 percent) with respondents in Urgun (71 percent) reporting the most improvement in their DDA and respondents in Shahidi Hassas (43 percent) reporting the lowest. Forty percent of respondents in Shahidi Hassas report that there has been no change in their DDA’s abilities to get things done over the past year.



Respondents in CDP districts report high confidence in their DDA (80 percent) with respondents in Zhari (92 percent) reporting the highest levels of confidence and respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak (55 percent) reporting the lowest. Respondents report a high responsiveness of the DDA to the needs of the people (73 percent) with respondents in Mata Khan (89 percent) and Waghaz (89 percent) reporting the highest levels of responsiveness and respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak (55 percent) reporting the lowest. The majority of respondents report positive improvements over the past year (57 percent) with respondents in Khairkut (85 percent) reporting the most improvement in their DDA and respondents in Tarnak wa Jaldak (39 percent) reporting the lowest. Forty-two percent of respondents in Shah Wali Kot report that there has been no change in their DDA’s abilities to get things done over the past year.


### Perceptions of the Community Development Council

Respondents who have a Community Development Council (CDC) established in their area were posed a series of questions to gauge their confidence in their CDC, the CDC’s responsiveness to the peoples’ needs, and if the CDC’s ability to get things done has improved or not over the past year. Participants in the SIKA program areas report high confidence in their CDC (SIKA–E, 62 percent; SIKA–N, 76 percent; SIKA–W, 71 percent; and SIKA–S, 80 percent) with respondents in Waz Drazadran (87 percent), Khanabad (87 percent), Puli Khumri (87 percent), Pusht Rod (82 percent), and Qalat (93 percent) reporting the highest levels of confidence and respondents in Nerkh (64 percent), Almar (33 percent), Bala Boluk (52 percent), and Shah Wali Kot (30 percent) reporting the lowest. The majority of respondents report a high responsiveness of the CDC to the needs of the people (SIKA–E, 52 percent; SIKA–N, 73 percent; SIKA–W, 68 percent; and SIKA–S, 72 percent) with respondents in Waz Drazadran (84 percent), Khanabad (82 percent), Pusht Rod (80 percent), and Qalat (92 percent) reporting the highest levels of responsiveness and respondents in Nerkh (69 percent), Almar (32 percent), Qaisar (32 percent), Bala Boluk (55 percent), and Arghandab (44 percent) reporting the lowest.



SIKA district respondents also report positive improvements in the CDC’s ability to get things done over the past year (SIKA–E, 47 percent; SIKA–N, 65 percent; SIKA–W, 61 percent; and SIKA–S, 62 percent) with respondents in Baraki Barak (81 percent), Khanabad (80 percent), Qadis (72 percent), and Marjah (82 percent) reporting the most improvement in their CDC and respondents in Nerkh (55 percent), Char Darah (14 percent), Bala Boluk (30 percent), and Panjwai (24 percent) reporting the lowest. A majority of respondents in Sayed Abad (31 percent), Almar (31 percent), Kushk-I-Robat Sangi (39 percent), and Shah Wali Kot (35 percent) report that there has been no change in their CDC’s abilities to get things done over the past year.


Respondents in CCI program districts report high confidence in their CDC (72 percent) with respondents in Qalat (93 percent) reporting the highest levels of confidence and respondents in Shahidi Hassas (57 percent) reporting the lowest. The majority of respondents report a high responsiveness of the CDC to the needs of the people (63 percent) with respondents in Qalat (92 percent) reporting the highest levels of responsiveness and respondents in Shahidi Hassas (68 percent) reporting the lowest levels of confidence. Respondents report positive improvements by the CDC in getting things done over the past year (50 percent) with respondents in Qalat (81 percent) reporting the most improvements and respondents in Shahidi Hassas (45 percent) reporting the least. Forty-four percent of respondents in Barmal report that there has been no change in their CDC’s abilities to get things done over the past year.




Similarly, respondents in CDP districts report high confidence in their CDC (78 percent) with respondents in Ghazni (91 percent) reporting the highest levels of confidence and respondents in Shah Joy (37 percent) reporting the lowest. Respondents report a high responsiveness of the CDC to the needs of the people (71 percent) with respondents in Lash Kar Gah (92 percent) reporting the highest levels of responsiveness and respondents in Zhari (45 percent) reporting the lowest. The majority of respondents report positive improvements over the past year (57 percent) with respondents in Andar (80 percent), Khairkut (80 percent), and Lash Kar Gah (80 percent) reporting the most improvements in their CDC and respondents in Waghaz (26 percent) reporting the lowest. Fifty-two percent of respondents in Shwak report that there has been no change in their CDC’s abilities to get things done over the past year.

**Opinions of the District Government**

In this section, respondents were read a series of statements and asked whether or not they agreed with those statements. The first statement asked respondents if district government officials in their district were from that district. The majority of respondents in CCI districts (63 percent), CDP (67 percent), SIKA–N (74 percent), SIKA–W (74 percent), SIKA–E (62 percent), and SIKA–S (69 percent) agree with the statement.




The majority of respondents reported that they feel the district government cares about the people in their area. Respondents in CCI districts (58 percent), CDP (62 percent), SIKA-W (62 percent), and SIKA-S (69 percent) report that they agree with the statement. Respondents in SIKA-N districts (47 percent agree, 52 percent disagree) and SIKA-E (44 percent agree, 53 percent disagree) are more split in their opinions.




Respondents were asked to report on their feelings about whether the Karzai government should reconcile with armed opposition groups like the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami and allow them to be included in the government. The majority of respondents in CCI districts (67 percent), CDP (70 percent), SIKA-N (58

percent), SIKA-W (64 percent), and SIKA-S (75 percent) agree with the statement. Respondents in SIKA-E districts (53 percent agree, 46 percent disagree) are more split in their opinions.




Participants were also asked to report if they feel that the district government understood the problems of the people in their area. Respondents from the following programs are more split in their response: CCI (53 percent agree, 46 percent disagree) and CDP (54 percent agree, 45 percent disagree). The majority of respondents in SIKA-N program districts (62 percent), SIKA-W (69 percent), and SIKA-S (59 percent) agree with the statement while respondents in SIKA-E districts (64 percent) disagree.



Similarly, respondents from the following programs are split in their response to the statement that district government officials in their district abuse their authority to make money for themselves: CCI (46 percent agree, 52 percent disagree), CDP (49 percent agree, 50 percent disagree), SIKA-E (52 percent agree, 47 percent disagree), and SIKA-S (50 percent agree, 48 percent disagree). Respondents in SIKA-N program districts (61 percent) and SIKA-W (55 percent) agree with the statement.

A majority of the respondents in SIKA-N districts (48 percent agree, 52 percent disagree) are split in their opinion of whether or not district government officials visit their area. Respondents in CCI districts (55 percent), CDP (57 percent), SIKA-W (60 percent), and SIKA-E (54 percent) agree with the statement while respondents in SIKA-S districts (63 percent) disagree.



Respondents, when asked to report if they feel that district government officials were doing their jobs honestly, are split in their responses with regard to the following programs: CCI (50 percent agree, 48 percent disagree) and CDP (54 percent agree, 44 percent disagree). Respondents in SIKA-W (56 percent) and SIKA-S (58 percent) districts agree with the statement, while respondents in SIKA-N (57 percent) and SIKA-E (57 percent) districts disagree.

Again, respondents in CCI districts (53 percent agree, 46 percent disagree) are split in their opinions that the district government delivers basic services to their area in a fair manner. Respondents in CDP (56 percent), SIKA-W (56 percent), and SIKA-S (61 percent) districts agree with the statement while respondents in SIKA-N (57 percent) and SIKA-E (58 percent) districts disagree.


## Service Provision and Development

### Overall Government Services


Almost half of those surveyed (47 percent) say government services in their area have improved in the past year.\* When comparing districts served by stabilization programs, respondents in SIKA-W districts

\*Combination of “improved a lot” and “improved a little” responses


are the most positive about government services. The majority of these respondents (57 percent) report improvements in services from the government over the past year. Respondents in SIKA-E districts are the least likely to report improvement, with nearly one-fourth of participants (24 percent) saying government services have gotten worse. About half of those in SIKA-S (50 percent) or SIKA-N (48 percent) districts believe government services have improved.




Although participants in SIKA-E districts are less likely to report improvements in government services, opinions differ across individual districts. The majority of those living in Deh Yak (64 percent) say government services have improved, while the same percentage (64 percent) of respondents in Waz Drazadran say that government services in their area have not changed.




Similar to overall responses, almost half of respondents in SIKA–N districts (48 percent) believe government services have improved in the past year. One-third of respondents to be served by SIKA–N (33 percent) say services have not changed, while 19 percent believe they have gotten worse. Respondents living in Kunduz (63 percent) or Char Darah (61 percent) are the most positive with majorities reporting improvements in government services. However, in Puli Khumri, about one-third of respondents (32 percent) believe government services have gotten worse, while another third (32 percent) believe it has improved.



Half of the participants on SIKA–S districts (50 percent) say government services in their area have improved over the past year, while 17 percent say they have gotten worse, and 32 percent say they have not changed at all. Those living in Nad Ali (68 percent) and Marjah (67 percent) are the most likely to report improvements in services from the government. However, almost half of respondents in Qalat (46 percent) say that they have gotten worse. The majority of those in Arghandab (55 percent) say that government services have not changed at all.



In comparison with other programs, respondents in SIKA–W districts are the most positive about government services. A majority of these respondents (57 percent) report improvements in services from the government over the past year. Similar to respondents overall, 32 percent say there has been no change in the quality of government services and eleven percent of respondents believe government services have gotten worse. Those living in Qadis are the most likely to believe services have improved (72 percent).




## District Government’s Provision of Services

Overall, the majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the provision of services by their district government\*. Of all services, clean drinking water receives the most satisfaction from interviewees, with 71 percent being satisfied.† Noticeably fewer participants are satisfied with the provision of other services. Forty-nine percent of respondents are satisfied with water for irrigation and uses other than drinking. The majority of respondents are dissatisfied with the provision of the following services: agricultural assistance (53 percent), retaining flood walls (58 percent), roads and bridges (55 percent), medical care (54 percent), and electricity (58 percent).‡ Twenty-seven percent of Afghan respondents report that electricity is not provided by the district government. When asked about the district government’s provision of schools, a slight majority of respondents (53 percent) are satisfied with schooling for boys, while a smaller percentage (37 percent) is satisfied with schooling for girls.


\* MISTI acknowledges that at this time the delivery of basic services is not viewed as a function of district government across Afghanistan, and that it may be more appropriate to ask this question in relation to municipalities. Nonetheless, it has been noted that in some of the more stable districts, where district governments are well established, the delivery of basic services is something that Afghans are paying greater attention to as expectations rise.

† Combination of “very satisfied” and “somewhat satisfied” responses


‡ Combination of “very dissatisfied” and “somewhat dissatisfied” responses



Compared with respondents from other program districts, respondents in SIKAN districts are less satisfied with the following provisions: clean drinking water (58 percent), water for irrigation or uses other than drinking (46 percent), agricultural assistance (23 percent), and retaining flood walls (14 percent). Those living in districts that are served by CDP are the most likely to report satisfaction with the district government's provision of clean drinking water (80 percent); however, a much smaller percentage (50 percent) are satisfied with water for irrigation or uses other than drinking. Although a majority of respondents overall (53 percent) are dissatisfied with the government's provision of agricultural assistance, a majority of those living in SIKAS districts (53 percent) are satisfied with the agricultural assistance in their area.




Those living in control districts are more satisfied with the following provisions by the district government: roads and bridges (51 percent), medical care (51 percent), school for girls (75 percent), school for boys (84 percent), and electricity (29 percent) compared with those who live in districts targeted by stabilization programs.




**Knowledge of Development Projects in Local Area**

Overall, half of the participants have seen or heard about development projects in their local area. Compared with respondents overall, those served by SIKa-E (63 percent) or SIKa-N (64 percent) are much more likely to have not seen or heard about development projects in their areas. The majority of those living in CCI districts (53 percent), CDP (57 percent), or SIKa-S (65 percent) say they have seen or heard about such projects. Participants in SIKa-W districts are split in their exposure to development projects, with 49 percent reporting they have seen or heard about them and 48 percent saying they have not.




Overall, the majority of respondents have seen or heard about development projects for drinking water (83 percent), irrigation (54 percent), and agricultural assistance (52 percent). A smaller percentage of participants have seen or heard about development projects for farm produce (29 percent).

Participants in SIKa-S and SIKa-E districts are more likely to have seen or heard about development projects for drinking water (SIKA-S, 88 percent; SIKa-E, 88 percent), irrigation (SIKA-S, 68 percent; SIKa-E, 61 percent), agricultural assistance (SIKA-S, 68 percent; SIKa-E, 57 percent), and farm produce (SIKA-S, 48 percent; SIKa-E, 52 percent). In comparison with districts targeted by stabilization programs, the control districts are less likely to have seen or heard about the following development programs: drinking water (52 percent), irrigation (23 percent), agricultural assistance (38 percent), and farm produce (16 percent).



Overall, the majority of Afghan respondents have also seen or heard about development projects for roads and bridges (59 percent), schools (62 percent), and medical facilities (56 percent). However, much smaller percentages have seen or heard about projects for retaining flood walls (38 percent) and electricity (17 percent).

Respondents from control districts are less likely to have seen or heard about development projects for retaining flood walls (17 percent), roads and bridges (52 percent), and medical facilities (39 percent) compared with participants living in districts targeted by stabilization programs. Respondents in SIKA-E are the most likely to have seen or heard about development projects for retaining flood walls (55 percent) and electricity (32 percent), while those living in SIKA-W are more likely to have seen or heard about development projects for roads and bridges (71 percent) and schools (69 percent). Respondents in SIKA-S are the most likely to have seen or heard about projects for medical facilities (66 percent).



Overall, the majority of those who reported to have seen or heard about development projects also believe these projects have improved life for the people in their areas. These projects are as follows: drinking water (87 percent), irrigation (70 percent), agricultural assistance (71 percent), farm produce (66 percent), retaining flood walls (71 percent), roads and bridges (76 percent), medical facilities (74 percent), schools (77 percent), and electricity (71 percent).

## Rule of Law


### Disputes: Land or Water Issues

Respondents were asked where they would go to get justice in the event they, or a family member, are involved in a dispute. When asked about disputes related to land or water, 36 percent of respondents say they would use government courts, 56 percent say they would use local/tribal elders, and 6 percent say they would use armed opposition groups. These results differ significantly from our control districts, where 29 percent of people say they would use government courts, 67 percent say they would use local/tribal elders, and 0 percent say they will use armed opposition groups.

Forty percent of respondents in SIKA–N said they would use government courts for disputes over land and water, as did 30 percent in SIKA–E, 39 percent in SIKA–S, and 43 percent in SIKA–W. Thirty-four percent of respondents in CCI districts and 38 percent of respondents in CDP districts said they would use a government court. By contrast, 56 percent of respondents in SIKA–N districts said they would use local/tribal elders, as did 54 percent in SIKA–E, 51 percent in SIKA–S, and 53 percent in SIKA–W, 59 percent in CCI districts, and 52 percent in CDP districts.

Comparably, only 2 percent of respondents in SIKA–N, 0 percent in SIKA–E, 0 percent in SIKA–S, and 0 percent in SIKA–W say they would go to armed opposition groups for disputes over land or water. The high points were found in CCI districts and CDP districts where 6 percent and 8 percent, respectively, responded positively to using armed opposition groups for these disputes.

Within CCI districts, there is wide variation in responses to this question. The figure below concentrates on the three main response categories (government court, local/tribal elders, and armed opposition groups) across the respective districts served by CCI. We see that Barmal is the area where the overwhelming majority of respondents would prefer to use local/tribal elders to handle disputes, whereas an area such as Qalat has almost 30 percent of respondents saying that armed opposition groups would be the choice. CCI districts in particular have the most varied response to this question, with very distinct preferences or disinclinations present.




## Disputes: Assault, Murder, or Kidnapping

When asked where respondent would go to get justice if they, or a family member, is involved in a dispute related to an assault, murder, or kidnapping, 42 percent of respondents say they would use a government court, 44 percent say they would use local/tribal elders, and 9 percent say they will use armed opposition groups overall. This is a significant difference from the control districts where 50 percent of respondents say they would use government courts, 24 percent say they would use local/tribal elders, and only 1 percent say they would use armed opposition groups. Furthermore, 13 percent of respondents in the control district indicate they would use the police (compared with just 1 percent overall) or provincial office (5 percent in control versus zero percent overall).

Fifty-seven percent of respondents in SIKA–N said they would use a government court for disputes related to assault, murder, or kidnapping as did 33 percent in SIKA–E, 39 percent in SIKA–S, and 46 percent in SIKA–W. Thirty-six percent of respondents in CCI districts and 42 percent in CDP districts say they would use a government court for these disputes. By contrast, 50 percent of respondents in CCI districts said they would use local/tribal elders, as did 43 percent in CDP districts, 30 percent in SIKA–N, 50 percent in SIKA–E, 43 percent in SIKA–S, and 44 percent in SIKA–W.

Although only 4 percent of respondents in SIKA–N say they would use armed opposition groups for the abovementioned disputes, 16 percent in SIKA–E, 11 percent in SIKA–S, and 4 percent in SIKA–W say they would do so. Further, 11 percent of respondents in CCI districts and 12 percent in CDP districts affirm that they would also use armed opposition groups for justice.

The greatest variation in opinions of where justice would best be found in the event of a serious offense (assault, murder, or kidnapping) was seen in SIKA–E districts. The following figure shows a district level analysis of the SIKA–E area. Nerkh, Chak, and Sayed Abad stand out as the areas in which the largest percentage of respondents would be receptive to using armed opposition groups for justice in the event of the above mentioned disputes. The interest in seeking justice from these groups runs from 28 percent in Nerkh to 25 percent in Sayed Abad and 24 percent in Chak on the high end.




## Disputes: Theft

When asked where respondents would go for justice in disputes related to theft, 33 percent of respondents say they would use government courts, 47 percent say they would use local/tribal elders, and 12 percent say they would use armed opposition groups overall. This is quite different from the control districts where 40 percent of respondents say they would use government courts, 33 percent say they would use local/tribal elders, and only 3 percent say they would use armed opposition groups.

Thirty-nine percent of respondents in SIKA–N districts say they would use a government court for disputes related to theft, as did 29 percent in SIKA–E, 29 percent in SIKA–S, and 42 percent in SIKA–W, as well as 33 percent of respondents in CCI districts and an identical 33 percent in CDP districts. On the other hand, 51 percent of respondents in CCI districts say they would use local/tribal elders, as did 47 percent in CDP, 42 percent in SIKA–N, 48 percent in SIKA–E, 48 percent in SIKA–S, and 44 percent in SIKA–W.

Although only 6 percent of respondents in SIKA–N districts say they would use armed opposition forces for disputes related to theft, we see substantially higher numbers in other areas: 21 percent in SIKA–E, 13 percent in SIKA–S, 7 percent in SIKA–W, 15 percent in CCI, and 14 percent in CDP.

Once again, the area to be served by SIKA–E stands out as districts that are most receptive to the use of armed opposition forces for justice. Although the districts are all higher than average, Waz Drazadran (5 percent) is more in line with other districts in the country than the SIKA–E region. The following figure highlights these discrepancies.



## Confidence to Fairly Resolve Disputes: Local/Tribal Elders

When asked how much confidence respondents have in local/tribal elders to fairly resolve disputes, 91 percent of respondents affirmed confidence\* overall. This is a moderate difference from the control

\* Responding either “a lot of confidence” or “some confidence” condensed categories

districts where 98 percent of respondents showed confidence, however, the specific category of “a lot of confidence” differed vastly between both the stabilization (47 percent) and control (71 percent) districts.

It should come as no surprise that we saw relative uniformity across all the areas of Afghanistan when it came to confidence in local/tribal elders to solve disputes. Ninety-five percent of respondents in SIKA–N had confidence in the ability of local/tribal elders, as did 85 percent in SIKA–E, 93 percent in SIKA–S, 91 percent in SIKA–W, 90 percent in CCI, and 91 percent in CDP.


Within SIKA–E, the area with the lowest levels of confidence, the districts that truly fall outside of the norm by having sizeable populations express “no confidence” in local/tribal elders are Nerkh (9 percent), Deh Yak (5 percent), Sayed Abad (4 percent), and Chak (4 percent).

### Confidence to Fairly Resolve Disputes: Government Courts

When asked how much confidence respondents have in government courts to resolve disputes fairly, 71 percent of respondents indicated confidence in government courts to resolve disputes fairly, overall. This is a significant difference from control districts where 82 percent of respondents affirmed the same confidence.

Eighty-two percent of respondents in SIKA–N districts expressed confidence in the ability of government courts to resolve disputes fairly, as did 64 percent in SIKA–E, 68 percent in SIKA–S, 75 percent in SIKA–W, 68 percent in CCI, and 67 percent in CDP districts.

Once again, SIKA–E stands out as the district with the least confidence in the ability of government courts to resolve disputes. In particular, we see a stark contrast between Andar and Nerkh with districts such as Baraki Barak and Muhammad Aghah that more closely resemble districts in other areas to be served by alternate SIKA programs. Given the relative proximity of these districts, they provide examples for institutional resiliency strategies that can be leveraged in other areas to be served by SIKA–E.



## **Confidence to Fairly Resolve Disputes: Armed Opposition Groups**

When asked how much confidence respondents have in the ability of armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly, 34 percent affirmed confidence in armed opposition groups overall. Thirty-nine percent responded that they had “no confidence” in armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly overall. The control districts affirmed 12 percent confidence while 75 percent of respondents stated they had “no confidence” in the ability of armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly.

Forty-eight percent of respondents in SIKA–N districts affirmed confidence in the ability of armed opposition groups to resolve disputes fairly, as did 48 percent in SIKA–E, 46 percent in SIKA–S, 25 percent in SIKA–W, 39 percent in CCI, and 40 percent in CDP districts. Conversely, 56 percent of respondents in SIKA–N districts stated they had “no confidence” in said groups, as did 23 percent in SIKA–E, 28 percent in SIKA–S, 48 percent in SIKA–W, 32 percent in CCI districts, and 34 percent in CDP districts. A stable percentage (from 21 percent to 28 percent across all districts) viewed such groups with “not much confidence” in resolving disputes fairly.

## **Respect for Sharia: Local/Tribal Elders**

When asked how much respect local/tribal elders have for Sharia, 84 percent of respondents said that they have respect (noting “a lot” or “some” respect) for Sharia overall. In control districts, 99 percent of respondents state that local/tribal elders have respect for Sharia (totaling both categories).

As with the previous question regarding local/tribal elders, we saw only minor variation across all the districts. Ninety-six percent of respondents in SIKA–N affirmed confidence, as did 73 percent in SIKA–E, 81 percent in SIKA–S, 90 percent in SIKA–W, 80 percent in CCI, and 81 percent in CDP districts. The only significant outlier was Waghaz district to be served by CDP, where 34 percent of respondents affirmed that local/tribal elders have no respect for Sharia.

## **Respect for Sharia: Government Courts**

When asked how much respect government courts have for Sharia, 74 percent of respondents indicated that they have respect (stating “a lot” or “some” respect) for Sharia overall. This is significantly different from control districts where 84 percent of respondents affirm that government courts have respect (totaling two categories) for Sharia.

Eighty-eight percent of respondents in SIKA–N districts affirm that government courts have respect for Sharia (responding “a lot” or “some” respect) as do 65 percent in SIKA–E, 71 percent in SIKA–S, and 75 percent in SIKA–W, 69 percent in CCI, and 71 percent in CDP districts.


The largest outlier was Qalat district to be served by CCI, in which 29 percent of respondents say that government courts had “no respect” for Sharia. This stands out even against other districts with highly critical views of government courts: Gelan district (18 percent), Sangin district (16 percent), and Urgan district (14 percent).

## **Respect for Sharia: Armed Opposition Groups**

Overall, 41 percent of respondents affirmed that armed opposition groups have respect for Sharia (responding “a lot” or “some” respect) with 29 percent responding that said groups have “no respect” for Sharia. In the control districts, 16 percent of respondents stated that armed opposition groups have some respect for Sharia (totaling “a lot” and “some” respect) with 68 percent stating said groups have “no respect” for Sharia.

In SIKA–N districts, 30 percent of respondents state that armed opposition groups have respect for Sharia (responding “a lot” or “some” respect), as do 51 percent in SIKA–E, 46 percent in SIKA–S, 29 percent in SIKA–W, 45 percent in CCI, and 45 percent in CDP as well. In contrast, 22 percent of respondents in CCI districts affirm that armed opposition groups have no respect for Sharia, as do 24 percent in CDP districts, 45 percent in SIKA–N, 19 percent in SIKA–E, 20 percent in SIKA–S, and 43 percent in SIKA–W.

As we have seen elsewhere, SIKA–E is the outlier for this question as well. The belief that armed opposition groups are showing respect for Sharia is highest in Chak and Muhammad Aghah and lowest in Deh Yak. This lines up with previous questions regarding government courts as a reliable foil.



The major outlying districts for opposition to armed opposition groups are found in SIKA–N, where 75 percent of respondents in Baghlan-I-Jadid and 65 percent of respondents in Puli Khumari respond that armed opposition groups have “no respect” for Sharia. These two districts help to pull the average response for “no respect” up to 45 percent for the sum of the districts to be served by SIKA–N, making it the least likely to view armed opposition groups as being respectful of Sharia.

### Respect Decisions: Local/Tribal Elders

Overall, when asked if people in the village/neighborhood respect decisions made by local/tribal elders, 37 percent of respondents stated that they “always “ respected these decisions with an additional 39 percent stating that they “mostly” respect those decisions; only 5 percent of respondents state that people in the area “never” respect the decisions of local/tribal elders. In the control districts, 67 percent of respondents stated that people in the area “always “ respect decisions by local/tribal elders, with an additional 28 percent who responded that people “mostly” respect those decisions. Only 1 percent of respondents in the control districts affirmed that people “never” respect decisions by local/tribal elders.

Combining “always” and “mostly” together, 88 percent of respondents in SIKA–N districts affirmed that decisions by local/tribal elders are respected, as did 64 percent in SIKA–E, 73 percent in SIKA–S, 79 percent in SIKA–W, 71 percent in CCI districts, and 71 percent in CDP districts. Five percent of respondents in CCI districts stated that people in the area “never” respect decisions by local/tribal elders,


as did 7 percent in CDP districts, zero percent in SIKA–N, 10 percent in SIKA–E, 5 percent in SIKA–S, and 3 percent in SIKA–W.

### Respect Decisions: Government Courts

Overall, when asked if people in the village/neighborhood respected decisions made by government courts, 23 percent affirmed that those decisions are “always” respected, with an additional 40 percent stating that those decisions were “mostly” respected. Eight percent of respondents, overall, affirmed that such decisions are “never” respected. When compared with the control districts, there is a substantial difference with 34 percent of respondents stating decisions are “always” respected” and 43 percent responding that decisions are “mostly” respected. Further, only 3 percent of respondents affirm such decisions are “never” respected.

In SIKA–N districts, 77 percent of respondents affirm that decisions by government courts are “always” or “mostly” respected (totaling both categories together), as do 55 percent in SIKA–E, 64 percent in SIKA–S, 65 percent in SIKA–W, 69 percent in CCI, and 61 percent in CDP districts. Two percent of respondents in SIKA–N districts state that such decisions are “never” respected, 12 percent in SIKA–E, 12 percent in SIKA–S, 5 percent in SIKA–W, 10 percent in CCI, and 11 percent in CDP districts affirm the same.

The districts where people responded that people in general have no respect for decisions by government courts were found in SIKA–E and SIKA–S. Particularly, Qalat (43 percent), Nerkh (22 percent), and Deh Yak (22 percent), which are names that should be familiar as they have been outliers on multiple questions thus far in this module.



### Respect Decisions: Armed Opposition Groups

Overall, when asked if people in the village/area respect decisions made by armed opposition groups, 30 percent affirmed that these decisions were “always” or “mostly” respected, with 41 percent responding that such decisions are “never” respected. This is vastly different from the control districts where 9

percent of respondents affirm that decisions are “always” or “mostly” respected by armed opposition groups, with a massive 79 percent of respondents affirming that such decisions are “never” respected.

In SIKA–N districts, 17 percent of respondents affirm that people in the area “always” or “mostly” respect decisions made by armed opposition groups as did 40 percent in SIKA–E, 38 percent in SIKA–S, 24 percent in SIKA–W, 35 percent in CCI, and 35 percent in CDP districts. In CCI districts, 33 percent of respondents affirm that such decisions are “never” respected by armed opposition groups, as did 35 percent in CDP districts, 61 percent in SIKA–N, 29 percent in SIKA–E, 29 percent in SIKA–S, and 50 percent in SIKA–W.


Similar to the cases above, Qalat again stands out for respondents who affirm that people have the most respect for decisions made by armed opposition groups (34 percent responding that they “always” respect these decisions). This is right in line with all of the previous data regarding opinions in Qalat.

## Corruption

### Is Corruption a Problem in This Area

When asked if corruption is a problem in their area generally, 79 percent of respondents overall affirmed that it is a problem for them. We see similar numbers in each district: 76 percent in SIKA–N, 69 percent in SIKA–E, 81 percent in SIKA–S, and 74 percent in SIKA–W, 81 percent in CCI, and 80 percent in CDP. In control districts, 83 percent of respondents affirm that corruption is a problem in their areas. In RC–North, 76 percent of respondents state that corruption is a problem in their area as do 74 percent in RC–West, 77 percent in RC–East, and 83 percent in RC–South.


In CCI districts, there are wide variations in perceptions of corruption. The following figure illuminates these differences across CCI districts. Of note is Sar Hawza, the only district in which fewer than half of the population (48 percent) identifies corruption as a major problem in the area, whereas more than 90 percent of respondents in Sangin and Marawara identify corruption as a problem in the area. CCI districts stand out because of these extreme disparities in perceptions of corruption—showing both the best and worst of Afghanistan’s future in one area.




## Bribery Within the Last Year

When asked how many times respondents have been asked to pay a bribe in the last year, 43 percent of respondents say they have not been asked (zero times) overall. Twenty-six percent affirm they have been asked to pay a bribe once, and 20 percent state they have been asked to pay a bribe two or three times. Eight percent of respondents overall have been asked to pay a bribe four or five times, and 3 percent have been asked to pay a bribe more than five times.

In SIKA–N, 63 percent of respondents have not been asked to pay a bribe in the last year, along with 33 percent in SIKA–E, 30 percent in SIKA–S, 60 percent in SIKA–W, 38 percent in CCI, and 33 percent in CDP districts. Sizable numbers of respondents affirm that they have had to pay a bribe once within the last year: 20 percent in SIKA–N, 24 percent in SIKA–E, 32 percent on SIKA–S, 20 percent in SIKA–W, 29 percent in CCI, and 31 percent in CDP districts.



SIKA–E is of intrinsic interest as it is the area with the largest percentage of people (6 percent) that have had to pay bribes more than five times within the past year. Within SIKA–E districts, Zurmat stands out as the district with the largest proportion of people who say they have paid bribes more than five times in the past year (19 percent). Zurmat, combined with Nerkh (10 percent) and Chak (6 percent), raises the entire area’s statistic for this category to almost three times the average for other districts (average of 2 percent across the other six districts). Moreover, these three districts stand out among all the surveyed districts in this regard. The following chart underscores the discrepancy between the three aforementioned districts and others across the entire SIKA–E district area.



## Corruption in Local Government


Respondents were asked to identify the department or sector of local government most often associated with corruption. Overall, the top sources of corruption identified were the police (12 percent) and courts (12 percent). All government offices (7 percent) and district offices (7 percent) were commonly mentioned. Perhaps most interesting, 15 percent of respondents—the largest group—did not know which sector of government is corrupt.

Those in CCI program districts report the police (13 percent) and courts (10 percent) as the two most common sources of corruption. Additional mentions were district offices (7 percent), the Ministry of Education (6 percent), district/office of attorney (5 percent), and all government entities (5 percent). Terezayi district stood out for having the highest percentage of respondents identifying the courts as sources of corruption at 25 percent, and Barmal stood out for having the fewest (zero percent, zero mentions).

As we have seen overall, respondents in CDP districts cite the police (14 percent) and courts (10 percent) as the two areas where people most often complain about corruption. Additional popular mentions included the district office (8 percent), Ministry of Education (5 percent), all government offices (5 percent), and Arbakies (5 percent). In the district of Maiwand, 35 percent of respondents identified the police as an area of local government most often cited for corruption—far ahead of the next nearest source at 27 percent (Jaji district).

In the SIKA–N districts, we again saw courts as a top mention (16 percent), as well as all government offices (13 percent) and the Ministry of Education (9 percent). Only five percent of people mentioned the police as a source of corruption, far below the averages for other areas. The courts, the most common entity of corruption identified by respondents, varied by district between 29 percent (Almar district) and 9 percent (Puli Khumuri), underscoring key problem areas while also presenting cases for institutional resiliency strategies.

In SIKA–E districts, the police were identified as the entity in which people most often complained about corruption (22 percent). Additionally, courts (16 percent) and all government offices (10 percent) were mentioned. For these districts, a majority of people identified the police as being the most corrupt. The standout district within SIKA–E, for both perceived corruption by police and government offices, is Muhammad Aghah, which holds the highest response percentages for both categories (34 percent for the police, 31 percent for government offices).



For SIKA–S districts, the most commonly cited source of corruption was the police (13 percent), followed by district offices (9 percent), courts (7 percent), and all government offices (7 percent) generally. Perceptions of police corruption varied greatly: 21 percent in Panjawi, 21 percent in Daman, and 20 percent in Arghanddab versus 1 percent in Garmser, 3 percent in Nad Ali, and 4 percent in Marjah.

SIKA–W districts, as we have seen overall, the most frequently mention sources of corruption were the courts (14 percent) and the police (6 percent). Additional items mentioned include the district/attorney office (6 percent) and customs (5 percent). Customs is unique to SIKA–W, as it was virtually unmentioned in other areas. Within SIKA–W, customs was identified with corruption in Bala Boluk (17 percent) and Pusht Rod (9 percent).

## **Has Corruption Increased in the Last Year**

When prompted to evaluate their perception changes in corruption within the last year, 42 percent of all respondents stated that corruption had increased within the past year, with an additional 37 percent noting that corruption had stayed the same overall.

In SIKA–N, 54 percent of respondents state that corruption had increased within the past year, as did 42 percent in SIKA–E, 37 percent in SIKA–S, and 39 percent in SIKA–W. Additionally, 39 percent in CCI districts, and 43 percent in CDP districts identified an increase in corruption within the past year.

SIKA–N districts noted the largest overall increased in corruption within the past year. For respondents who claim that corruption had increased a lot, the range was only from 14 percent (Imam Sahib district) to 26 percent (Ali Abad district). Curiously, Imam Sahib district also had the largest group of respondents who say that corruption had decreased a lot (27 percent)—far ahead of the next nearest district (Ali Abad, 6 percent). This is likely a reference to the level of corruption within the past year rather than a statement of how low corruption is today, relative to other districts.

SIKA–E districts had a few outliers in perceptions of changes in corruption over the past year. Zurmat district is of intrinsic interest in the number of people who responded that corruption has “increased a lot” within the past year (36 percent). Respondents in Deh Yak, conversely, identify the largest decrease (responding “decreased a lot”) in corruption at 28 percent.

Within the SIKA–S districts, the highest reported increased in corruption over the past year were observed by respondents in Daman (22 percent respond “increased a lot” with an additional 26 percent responding “increased a little”) as well as Qalat (25 percent “a lot” and 22 percent “a little”). Marjah saw the largest perceived decrease in corruption since the previous year (27 percent).


Across the six SIKA–W districts, Pusht Rod was perceived as having the greatest increase levels of corruption (32 percent of respondents indicate an increase of “a lot” with an additional 21 percent stating “increased a little”), followed by Qadis (12 percent indicate corruption has increased by a lot, but a surprising 42 percent indicate corruption has increased a little). The respondents who identified decreases in corruption remained stable across the districts excluding Pusht Rod and Qadis, which given their high perceived increases in corruption, fell far below the average.

The CCI districts that have seen the largest increase in corruption (responding “increased a lot”) are Qalat (25 percent), Khas Kunar (24 percent), Marawara (23 percent), and Sarkani (23 percent). Conversely, the districts that saw the greatest decrease in corruption (responding “decreased a lot”) are Qalat (12 percent), Nahr-I-Saraj (10 percent), Sar Hawza (9 percent), and Khas Kunar (9 percent). Of particular note, Khas Kunar has both a top rating for “corruption increased a lot” as well as “corruption decreased a lot”: 24

percent say it has increased a lot, 22 percent say it has increased a little, 30 percent say it has stayed the same, 11 percent say it has decreased a little, and 9 percent say it has decreased a lot.

The CDP districts showed significant variations among those who identify large increases in corruption: from 34 percent in Waghaz, 33 percent in Ajah Ahmad Khel, and 31 percent in Shah Joy to 4 percent in Nahr-I-Sarj and zero percent (zero mentions) in Maiwand. Additionally, districts such as Deh Yak saw a significant decrease in corruption (28 percent responding “decreased a lot”; 14 percent responding “decreased a little”) even though perceptions of corruption still ran high in some areas.


Forty-one percent of respondents in CCI districts say that corruption has stayed the same within the past year, as did 39 percent in CDP, 26 percent in SIKa-N, 33 percent in SIKa-E, 41 percent in SIKa-S, and 41 percent in SIKa-W.



## Quality of Life


### Overall Satisfaction

Respondents were asked to rate their overall satisfaction with their lives today. A majority in all program areas say they are either “very” or “somewhat” satisfied. Respondents living in SIKa-E districts were slightly less likely than the average to report satisfaction, with 23 percent who say they are “very satisfied” and 40 percent who say they are “somewhat satisfied.” Throughout all stabilization districts, 25 percent say they are “very satisfied” and 46 percent say they are “somewhat satisfied” with their lives as a whole right now.




**Financial Outlook**

When asked about their household financial situation, respondents responded less favorably than they did about their lives overall. Throughout all stabilization districts, 14 percent report being “very satisfied” and 43 percent report being “somewhat satisfied.” Respondents in SIKA–E districts are least optimistic about their financial situations with 39 percent who say they are “somewhat dissatisfied” and another 20 percent who say they are “very dissatisfied.” SIKA–E is the only program area where a majority report being dissatisfied with their household financial situation.




## Basic Needs

Just under half of respondents in stabilization districts report that their ability to meet basic needs has increased “a little” (14 percent) or “a lot” (33 percent) in the past year. By this measure, respondents in control districts look similar to respondents in stabilization districts as half of these respondents report seeing an increase in the past year. Respondents in SIKA–N districts are the least likely to report an increase in their ability to meet basic needs (11 percent “a lot” 32 percent “a little”) while respondents in SIKA–E districts are most likely to report a decrease with 5 percent who say it has decreased “a lot” and 21 percent who say it has decreased “a little” in the past year.




When asked to project how well they will be able to meet their basic needs over the next year, 27 percent of respondents in stabilization districts say they are “not worried” while 47 percent say they are “a little worried” and 25 percent say they are “very worried.” Respondents in SIKA–E are most likely to express concern with 35 percent saying they are “very worried.” Respondents in SIKA–S districts tend to be the least concerned with 31 percent saying they are “not worried.”




## Planning for the Future

When asked if the situation in their area is certain enough to make plans for the future, respondents in most program areas tended to be uncertain about the situation in their areas. In stabilization districts, 44 percent of respondents say it is “certain enough” and 54 percent say it is “too uncertain.” Respondents in SIKA–E are the least optimistic about future planning with two-thirds who say it is “too uncertain” and one-third who say it is “certain enough.” This compares with respondents in control districts who are significantly more optimistic about future planning; in these districts, only 36 percent say it is “too uncertain” while 62 percent say the situation is “certain enough.”




Within the SIKA–E districts, only respondents in Deh Yak expressed more optimism than pessimism about the future and their ability to plan for it. Large majorities of respondents say the future is too uncertain to make future plans in Andar (90 percent), Waz Drazadran (88 percent), Baraki Barak (85 percent), and Zurmat (82 percent).



## Economic Activity\*

### Accessibility to Local Markets

Although the Afghan economy seems to be on the upswing for some, others are still struggling. Overall, while 55 percent of respondents say their ability to get to local markets is better now than a year ago, 18 percent say their ability to get to the markets has worsened.



Forty-seven percent of Afghans in SIKA–E districts report that their ability to access local markets has increased while 24 percent report that their ability to access local markets has decreased. Compared with other SIKA–E districts, more respondents in Muhammad Aghah report that their ability to access local markets has improved (67 percent) from the past year.

A majority of respondents in SIKA–N districts report that their ability to access local markets is better (52 percent) now than it was in the past year. Twenty percent, however, report that their ability to get to these markets has worsened.

Sixty-three percent of SIKA–S respondents state that their ability to access local markets is better now, while 15 percent report that it is worse. The decreased ability to access local markets is highest in Shah Wali Kot (48 percent).

SIKA–W district respondents report that their ability to get to local markets is better than it was a year ago (54 percent). More so than other SIKA–W districts, respondents in Qadis report that their ability to access local markets has improved (71 percent). Only 13 percent of respondents in SIKA–W districts report that their ability to get to local markets has worsened.

Fifty-six percent of respondents in CCI districts state that their ability to get to local markets has improved, while 18 percent say it has gotten worse. More participants in Zhari report that their ability to access local markets is better (79 percent), while the majority in Shahidi Hassas (62 percent) report that their ability to get to local markets has worsened.


The majority of respondents (62 percent) in CDP districts describe their ability to get to local markets as

\*Responses that have a five-point scale have been compressed into a three-point scale, such that high, mid, and low-level responses are represented.

better. Only 15 percent say that it has gotten worse. Eighty-one percent of respondents in Nahr-I-Saraj report that their access has improved in the past year, while 51 percent of respondents in Waghaz report that their ability to get to local markets has worsened.

### Availability of Goods

When asked about the availability of basic goods and services in their local area, respondents are most likely to say that the availability of food (47 percent), drinking water (43 percent), and healthcare (41 percent) has remained the same compared with a year ago. Afghan respondents are divided with regard to irrigation water, services from the Afghan government, and good roads, with 34 percent saying each of these goods/services are less available than before and 37 percent saying the availability of each is about the same as it was a year ago. At least half of respondents say services from armed opposition groups (58 percent) and electricity (51 percent) have been unavailable over the past year. For most respondents in Afghanistan, prices for basic goods have increased at least a little (53 percent).




Respondents in SIKAE districts report that the availability of health care (48 percent), food (47 percent), and drinking water (41 percent) is the same as a year ago. However, 72 percent of participants in Muhammad Aghah report that more food is available now. A little over half of the respondents (52 percent) in SIKAE districts also report that prices of goods are higher than they were a year ago. Prices are higher in Deh Yak, where 63 percent of participants report an increase in the price of goods.

Electricity in SIKAN seems to be a scarce resource, as 67 percent of participants report that electricity is not available. This number is even greater in Puli Khumri where 92 percent report that this service is unavailable. Perceptions about the availability of food is split, with 40 percent reporting that food is available in the same amount as the year prior and 39 percent reporting that it is more available than in the

last year. Almost two-thirds of SIKAN area respondents (65 percent) further report that the price of basic goods has gone up from the year before.

SIKAS area respondents are divided when asked about the availability of food. Forty-four percent say that the availability of food has increased and 44 percent state that the availability is the same as it was the previous year. Forty-four percent also report that the availability of drinking water remains similar to the year prior. Forty-seven percent of SIKAS respondents also report that prices of goods have increased, while 40 percent report that it has stayed the same. In Qalat, 72 percent of respondents report at least a small price increase in goods.



SIKAW area respondents report that the availability of health care (51 percent), food (48 percent), and drinking water (47 percent) has remained the same in the past year. Fifty-seven percent report services from armed opposition groups to be unavailable. When asked about the pricing of basic goods, a majority of respondents in SIKAW districts (55 percent) report that prices have increased from the prior year. Thirty-five percent of the SIKAW respondents also report that prices have stayed the same.

Respondents in CCI districts report that the availability of food (55 percent), good roads (37 percent), and health care (37 percent) has remained the same compared with the previous year. A majority of respondents report that electricity (46 percent) and services from armed opposition (55 percent) groups are not available. Almost half of the participants in CCI districts (46 percent) report that the prices of these basic goods have increased. This percentage is far greater in Bak, where 81 percent of respondents state that the prices of goods have gone up a little. Conversely, in Shahidi Hassas, 53 percent of respondents report that the prices of goods have decreased a little.

The availability of food (50 percent), drinking water (47 percent), health care (41 percent), services from the Afghan government (41 percent), and good roads (41 percent) are the same when compared with a year ago. Fifty percent report that electricity is not available.

Respondents in CDP districts also report that the prices of goods have gone up (51 percent) while 31 percent report that they have stayed the same. In Dand 93 percent of participants report that prices have increased at least a little.

### Availability of Paid Jobs


In general, 40 percent of respondents in Afghanistan say there are more paid jobs available than there were a year ago. Thirty percent report that the number of paid jobs has remained the same and 29 percent say there are fewer paid jobs available than there were a year ago.

Respondents in SIKAE districts report that the availability of paid jobs has increased from the year before (43 percent). Thirty percent, however, report that the availability of paid jobs is less than it was a year ago. Respondents in Muhammad Aghah report an increase in paid jobs more often than other SIKAE district (69 percent).

Thirty-eight percent of respondents in SIKAN districts report the paid jobs have decreased compared with the past year. Other respondents in the districts are divided with 30 percent reporting that paid jobs have increased and 31 percent reporting that it has stayed the same.

The majority of SIKAS respondents (51 percent) report that there are more paid jobs available. Panjwai respondents report that the availability of paid jobs has increased when compared with other districts (67 percent), while the majority of Qalat respondents report that the availability of paid jobs has decreased compared with last year (51 percent).

The majority of respondents in SIKAW districts (42 percent) report that access to paid jobs has stayed the same in the last year. Meanwhile, more respondents in Qadis (47 percent) report that job availability has increased.



Forty-three percent of respondents in CCI districts report that job availability has increased, while the same percentage of respondents report that the availability of paid jobs has stayed the same (29 percent) and decreased (28 percent). Respondents in Panjwai report that the availability of paid jobs has increased (67 percent) more than respondents in other CCI districts.


Respondents in CDP districts report that there are more paid jobs available than a year ago (49 percent). Twenty-five percent say that the availability of jobs has decreased. A noticeably greater amount of participants in Tarnak Wa Jaldak report that the availability of paid jobs has decreased compared with a year ago (89 percent).

## Community Cohesion and Resilience

### Disruptions From *Outside* the Village/Neighborhood


A plurality of Afghan respondents report problems in their daily life because of things that occur outside of their village/neighborhood. When asked how often these external issues disrupted their normal lives, only 8 percent say it happens “often,” while 32 percent say “sometimes,” and 12 percent report that things outside their village/neighborhood “rarely” create problems in their area. Nearly half of respondents (47 percent) say this “never” happens.

When respondents were asked how often things outside their areas created problems in their village/neighborhood, little variation is found across districts targeted by different stabilization programs. Across all stabilization districts, close to half say this “never” happens. However, participants in SIKA-S districts are the most likely to say things from outside their area “often” or “sometimes” disrupt normal life in their area (43 percent).




Similar to respondents overall, almost half (46 percent) of those living in CCI districts report that things from outside their village/neighborhood never disrupt their normal life. However, majorities in Barmal (77 percent), Muqur (63 percent), and Marawara (51 percent) say it happens sometimes. Almost one-third

(30 percent) of respondents living in Marawara say things from outside their village/neighborhood often create problems in their area.




Thirteen percent of those living in SIKA-E districts say that things from outside their village/neighborhood “often” create problems that disrupt normal life in their area, including 22 percent in Baraki Barak and 27 percent in Waz Drazadran. A majority of those in Andar (53 percent) say things outside their village “sometimes” create problems.




When respondents were asked how often people in their village were able to solve problems that come from outside their village, almost half (46 percent) say “sometimes.” Thirty-percent of those surveyed say people in their village are “rarely” able to solve problems that come from outside their village, and 11

percent say people are “often” able to. Only 8 percent report that people in their village are “never” able to solve these problems.

Forty-two percent of participants living in districts targeted by SIKA–E, SIKA–N, and SIKA–W say people are “rarely” or “never” able to solve problems that originate outside their village/neighborhood. Respondents in districts targeted by CDP (62 percent) or SIKA–S (60 percent) are the most likely to report that people in their areas are “often” or “sometimes” able to solve problems that come from outside their village/neighborhood.



Similar to respondents overall, almost half (49 percent) of those living in districts targeted by CCI report that people in their village are “sometimes” able to solve problems that come from outside their village. However, a majority of respondents from Khas Uruzgan (63 percent) say this “rarely” happens.



### Disruptions From *Inside* the Village/Neighborhood


When respondents were asked how often things from inside their village/neighborhood disrupted normal life in their area, a slight majority (52 percent) say it “never” happens. Similar to overall respondents, about half of those targeted by CCI (51 percent) and SIKA–E (48 percent) say things from inside their

areas “never” create problems to disrupt normal life. More than half of those targeted by CDP (55 percent), SIKA–N (56 percent), and SIKA–W (59 percent) say this “never” happens.

The percentage of respondents who say internal problems “often” disrupt normal life is highest in districts targeted by SIKA–E. This is mostly due to one-third (33 percent) of respondents in Zurmat and nearly half (49 percent) of those in Baraki Barak who report that problems originating inside their village/neighborhood “often” create everyday problems.

When respondents were asked how often people in their village/neighborhood were able to solve problems that originate within their village/neighborhood, nearly half (45 percent) say people are “sometimes” able to solve problems and 15 percent say this happens “often.” Thirty percent report people are “rarely” able to solve problems in their area, and only 6 percent say people in their village/neighborhood are “never” able to solve them.


A majority of participants in districts targeted by CCI (58 percent) say that people in their areas are “often” (12 percent) or “sometimes” (46 percent) able to solve problems coming from inside their village/neighborhood. Overwhelming majorities in Barmal (91 percent), Marawara (80 percent), Qalat (80 percent), and Sangin (73 percent) say this “often” or “sometimes” happens. However, the majority of those in Shahidi Hassas (64 percent) say people are “rarely” or “never” able to solve internal problems in their village/neighborhood.



Majorities in districts targeted by SIKA–E (59 percent), SIKA–N (62 percent), SIKA–S (63 percent), and CDP (63 percent) report that people in their areas are “often” or “sometimes” able to solve internal problems. Nearly half of those in districts targeted by SIKA–W (49 percent) say the same.

A plurality of Afghan respondents (44 percent) says the villages/neighborhoods in their area “sometimes” work together to solve problems. Twenty-two percent of participants say villages/neighborhoods “often” work together to solve problems, while another 24 percent say they “rarely” work together and 9 percent say villages/neighborhoods “never” work together.

The majority of respondents in districts targeted by CCI (64 percent) say villages/neighborhoods in their area “often” (18 percent) or “sometimes” (45 percent) work together to solve problems in their area. However, overwhelming majorities of participants living in Shahidi Hassas (78 percent) and Khas Uruzgan (70 percent) say villages/neighborhoods “rarely” (Shahidi Hassas, 40 percent; Khas Uruzgan, 49 percent) or “never” (Shahidi Hassas, 38 percent; Khas Uruzgan, 21 percent) work together to solve problems.



Of those living in districts that are to be served by CDP, nearly half (48 percent) say villages/neighborhoods “sometimes” work together to solve problems in their area. Similarly, majorities living in districts targeted by SIKA–E (62 percent), SIKA–N (68 percent), SIKA–W (59 percent), and SIKA–S (70 percent) say villages/neighborhoods “often” or “sometimes” work together to solve problems in their area.

### Interests Considered by Local Leaders

Overall, when Afghan respondents were asked how often the interests of ordinary people in their area were considered when local leaders made decisions that affect their village/neighborhood, 43 percent say their interests are “sometimes” considered, while another 27 percent say they are “often” considered. Smaller percentages report that the interests of ordinary people are “rarely” (17 percent) or “never” (11 percent) considered when local leaders make decisions in their area.

Similar to the respondents overall, a majority of those in districts targeted by CCI (73 percent) or CDP (78 percent) say the interests of ordinary people in their area are “often” or “sometimes” taken into account by decision-makers. A majority of respondents in SIKA–E districts (68 percent), SIKA–N (71 percent), and SIKA–S (80 percent) report the interests of ordinary people are “often” or “sometimes” considered by leaders who make decisions. However, half of those in SIKA–W districts (50 percent) say this “rarely” or “never” happens.

Compared to those who believe the interests of ordinary people are often considered by local leaders, a smaller percentage say the interests of women are “often” considered in decision-making (16 percent). A plurality of overall respondents (38 percent) say the interests of women are “sometimes” taken into account, while another 33 percent say they are “rarely” considered. Thirteen percent of participants say women’s interests are “never” considered by local leaders when making decisions.


Similar to respondents overall, 37 percent of those in CCI districts say women’s interests are “sometimes” considered when local leaders make decisions, while 36 percent say their interests are “rarely” considered. An overwhelming majority in Barmal (83 percent) say the interests of women in their area are “sometimes” taken to account. However, 73 percent of those living in Shahidi Hassas say women’s interests are “rarely” considered by local leaders. Slightly more respondents in CDP districts say the interests of women are “sometimes” (41 percent) or “often” (15 percent) considered when local leaders make decisions in their area.

About half of those in SIKA–E districts (51 percent) and half of those in SIKA–W districts (50 percent) say the interests of women are “often” or “sometimes” considered by local leaders when they are making decisions in their area. Majorities in districts targeted by SIKA–N (71 percent) and SIKA–S (60 percent) say women’s interests are “often” or “sometimes” considered by decision-makers.

### Participation in Decision-Making

Overall, a majority of respondents (58 percent) do not participate in local decision-making activities, such as village/tribal shuras. Although the majority of participants in CCI districts (57 percent) do not participate in local decision-making activities, the opposite is true in a number of individual districts. A majority of those living in Gelan (51 percent), Muqur (58 percent), Musa Qala (70 percent), Sangin (64 percent), Sar Hawza (57 percent), Shahidi Hassas (65 percent), and Urgun (66 percent) do participate in local decision-making activities, such as village/tribal shuras.

**Q43a. Do you participate in local decision-making activities such as village/tribal shuras, or not? (CCI districts)**




Respondents living in districts targeted by SIKA-E (38 percent) and SIKA-W (36 percent) are somewhat less likely to participate in local decision-making activities than those in SIKA-N (41 percent), SIKA-S (43 percent), CCI (42 percent), and CDP (43 percent) districts. However, overall, the majority of respondents in districts targeted by stabilization programs do not partake in decision-making.

### Value of Opinions in Village/Tribal Shura

A majority of those surveyed (61 percent) believe their opinions are “highly valued” (23 percent) or “somewhat valued” (38 percent) when they participate in a village/tribal shura. Thirty-one percent believe their opinions are “valued a little,” while 9 percent do not think their opinions are valued at all.

About half of those in districts targeted by CCI (51 percent) believe their opinions are “highly” or “somewhat valued” in village/tribal shuras, while the other half (48 percent) believe their opinions are “valued a little” or “not valued at all.” However, differences are reported among the individual districts to be served by CCI programs. The majority of respondents living in Marawar (76 percent), Sarkani (80 percent), and Qalat (93 percent) say their opinions are “highly” or “somewhat valued” when they participate in local shuras. However, an overwhelming majority in Shahidi Hassas (92 percent) believe their opinions are “valued a little” or not at all.




Participants living in districts served by SIKA-N (74 percent) are more likely to believe their opinions are highly or somewhat valued in local shuras than respondents in districts targeted by CCI (51 percent), CDP (61 percent), SIKA-E (55 percent), SIKA-W (62 percent), SIKA-S (56 percent), or CDP (61 percent).

### Effectiveness of Local Leaders in Securing Funds

When asked about the effectiveness of local leaders in securing funds for their village/neighborhood from the district or provincial government, nearly half of respondents (46 percent) say they are somewhat effective and 22 percent say they are very effective. Twenty-two percent say local leaders are somewhat ineffective at securing funds for their area, and 9 percent believe they are very ineffective.

Similar to responses overall, 69 percent of those in districts targeted by CCI say their local leaders are effective at obtaining sufficient funds from the district/provincial government. However, the majorities of those living in Khas Uruzgan (52 percent) and Shahidi Hassas (61 percent) believe their local leaders are ineffective in securing funds.\* Although a majority of participants in CDP districts (73 percent) believe their local leaders are effective in securing funds for their village/neighborhood, 78 percent of those living in Waghaz claim their local leaders are ineffective in securing funds from the district/provincial government. A majority of respondents who live in districts to be served by SIKA-E (64 percent), SIKA-N (69 percent), SIKA-W (55 percent), and SIKA-S (74 percent) agree their local leaders are able to effectively secure funds for their area.



### Belonging to Social Groups


Overall, the majority of respondents (81 percent) do not belong to any groups where people get together to do activities or discuss issues of common interests. In districts targeted by CCI, one out of every five respondents (20 percent) belong to a group where people get together to discuss common interests or participate in group activities. Eighteen percent of those in districts targeted by CDP, SIKA-W, SIKA-N, or SIKA-S belong to these types of social organizations. However, only 8 percent of respondents living in districts targeted by SIKA-E belong to a group like this.

### Freedom of Expression


When respondents were asked how often they are able to freely express their opinions about certain persons or groups, most were reluctant to offer opinions about armed opposition groups. A plurality (42 percent) of respondents report they cannot express any opinions about armed opposition groups, while one-third (33 percent) say they can “only carefully” express their views on them. A majority of respondents believe they can freely (either “very” or “somewhat”) express their opinions about the

\*Combination of “very ineffective” and “somewhat ineffective” responses

following persons or groups: the district governor (76 percent), the Afghan National Police (64 percent), local elders (71 percent), and the Afghan National Army (59 percent).



Respondents living in control districts are more likely to report freedom in expressing their opinions on the district governor (91 percent), the Afghan National Police (84 percent), local elders (88 percent), district courts (81 percent), the Afghan National Army (74 percent), and armed opposition groups (41 percent) compared with those living in districts targeted by stabilization programs. In a comparison of respondents targeted by stabilization programs, those living in districts to be served by SIKa-E are the least likely to say they are free to express their views on the district governor (67 percent), the Afghan National Police (57 percent), local elders (58 percent), district courts (47 percent), and the Afghan National Army (48 percent). Those in SIKa-N districts are the least likely to express freedom to voice their opinions about armed opposition groups (8 percent). Compared with districts targeted by other stabilization programs, participants in SIKa-S districts are more likely to say they are free to express opinions about the district governor (83 percent), the Afghan National Police (63 percent), local elders (79 percent), district courts (62 percent), the Afghan National Army (66 percent), and armed opposition groups (38 percent).



## Grievances\*


### Problems That Create Stress or Tension in This Area

Respondents were asked to identify the two biggest problems discussed by people in their area. The problems that create stress or tension in their area that are most often discussed were insecurity (27 percent; total of two mentions), unemployment (25 percent), lack of electricity (16 percent), and the lack of paved roads (10 percent).

Respondents in SIKA-E districts most often mention insecurity (42 percent), unemployment (33 percent), poverty (12 percent), and lack of paved roads (11 percent) as the biggest issues that cause stress in their area. Unemployment is mentioned more often in Chak (56 percent) and Nerkh (52 percent), while insecurity is mentioned more often in Andar (68 percent), Sayed Abad (53 percent), and Muhammad Aghah (51 percent). Poverty is mentioned as a major issue that causes stress in Nerkh (39 percent), more so than any other district.

Participants in SIKA-N districts mention the lack of electricity (33 percent), unemployment (31 percent), lack of paved roads (18 percent), and insecurity (17 percent) as the biggest issues that cause stress in their districts. Respondents in Kunduz (40 percent) mention paved roads more often than respondents in SIKA-N districts. Insecurity is also mentioned as a problem with greater frequency in Almar (39 percent) and Qaisar (25 percent).

When participants in SIKA-S districts are asked about the problems that cause them stress, the most common responses are insecurity (24 percent), unemployment (22 percent), lack of electricity (18 percent), and high prices (10 percent). Respondents in Shah Wali Kot (39 percent) and Arghandab (34 percent) mention insecurity as an issue more often than respondents in other SIKA-S districts.



SIKA-W districts most often mention insecurity (28 percent), unemployment (23 percent), lack of electricity (17 percent), and illiteracy (12 percent) as the biggest problems in their area. Bala Boluk

\*Responses that have a five-point scale have been compressed into a three-point scale, such that a high, mid, and low-level response is represented.

mentions insecurity (54 percent) and illiteracy (29 percent) as concerns more often than participants in other SIKA–W districts.

Similar to respondents overall, those in CCI districts report insecurity (27 percent), unemployment (23 percent), lack of electricity (11 percent), and corruption (10 percent) as issues that create stress or tension. Respondents in Barmal (95 percent) report insecurity as being the top issue that causes stress more frequently than overall respondents in CCI districts. Conversely, Nahr-I-Saraj (9 percent) and Sangin report insecurity as a problem far less frequently than CCI targets overall.

Respondents in CDP districts most often mention insecurity (29 percent), unemployment (22 percent), corruption (12 percent), and lack of electricity (12 percent) as the top issues that cause stress in their areas. More participants in Andar (68 percent) and Ghazni (51 percent) report insecurity as a problem in their area, while only 10 percent of participants in Kajaki mention insecurity as an issue.


### **District Entities' Interest in Addressing Local Concerns**

A majority of Afghan respondents report that the district governor (63 percent), local shuras and community leaders (57 percent), and the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF] (55 percent) are at least somewhat interested in addressing their concerns when they have problems that create tension or stress. However, most respondents are of the opinion that armed opposition groups (75 percent) and district courts (55 percent) are not interested in addressing their concerns. Opinions are divided regarding community development councils, with 39 percent of respondents reporting they are interested in addressing their concerns and 40 percent saying they are disinterested in addressing their concerns about problems that cause tension or stress in their areas.

The majority of participants in SIKA–E districts report the district governor (54 percent) is at least somewhat interested in addressing their concerns. The districts were divided when asked about the ANSF and local shuras and community leaders; forty-nine percent respond that the ANSF is interested in solving their problems and 44 percent respond that the ANSF is disinterested in solving their problems. However, 84 percent of respondents in Baraki Barak respond that the ANSF is concerned with solving the people's issues. In SIKA–E districts, 47 percent of respondents report that local shuras and community leaders are interested in solving their problems, while 44 percent report that shuras and community leaders are disinterested in addressing their concerns.

A majority of respondents in SIKA–E districts report that armed opposition groups (69 percent), district courts (58 percent), and the community development council (55 percent) are not interested in addressing their concerns. However, in Deh Yak, the community development council (60 percent) and district courts (53 percent) are viewed as being interested in addressing the concerns of the people in the area.

Respondents in SIKA–N districts report that the district governor (68 percent), ANSF (66 percent), and local shuras and community leaders (62 percent) are at least somewhat interested in addressing their concerns when they have problems that create tension or stress. Although a majority of SIKA–N district respondents affirm that the ANSF is interested in addressing their concerns, 52 percent of respondents in Almar report that the ANSF is not interested in addressing the people's concerns. Eighty-three percent of respondents in SIKA–N districts report that armed opposition groups are disinterested in addressing concerns that cause tension for the people. Respondents are split with regard to district courts, as 48 percent report that the district courts are interested and 49 percent report that the district courts are uninterested in addressing issues that cause them stress.



Participants in SIKA–S districts report that local shuras and community leaders (62 percent), the district governor (60 percent), and ANSF (53 percent) are interested in addressing people’s concerns. However, a majority of respondents in Qalat (57 percent) and Shah Wali Kot (51 percent) report that the district governor is disinterested in solving their issues. Similarly, respondents in Shah Wali Kot (61 percent) and Panjwai (60 percent) report that local shuras and community leaders are disinterested in addressing the people’s concerns. Seventy-three percent of respondents in SIKA–S districts report that armed opposition groups are disinterested in addressing their concerns. Fifty-two percent also report that district courts are not interested in addressing their concerns.

Respondents in SIKA–W districts report that district governors (77 percent), ANSF (58 percent), and local shuras and community leaders (54 percent) are interested in addressing the people’s concerns. They also report that armed opposition groups (78 percent) are disinterested in addressing their concerns. Respondents were split when asked about the district courts: 48 percent report that district courts were interested in helping people with their concerns, while 49 percent disagreed.

Fifty-nine percent of respondents in districts targeted by CCI report that district governors and local shuras and community leaders (54 percent) were at least somewhat interested in addressing their concerns when they have problems that create tension or stress. Contrary to other CCI districts, 86 percent of Shahidi Hassas and 78 percent of Khas Uruzgan report that local shuras and community leaders are disinterested in addressing their concerns. Respondents in CCI districts were divided when asked about the ANSF, as 49 percent report that the ANSF was both interested and disinterested in addressing their concerns. Seventy-two percent of participants in CCI districts report that armed opposition groups and district courts (58 percent) are disinterested in addressing their concerns. These reports are higher in Sangin (97 percent) and Shahidi Hassas (95 percent).

CDP district respondents report that the district governor (59 percent), local shuras and community leaders (57 percent), and ANSF (52 percent) are at least somewhat interested in addressing their concerns. Local shuras and community leaders are considered more interested in addressing the people’s concerns in Kajaki (93 percent) and Tarnak Wa Jadak (90 percent), and less interested in doing so in Spin Boldak (66 percent) and Zhari (64 percent). Seventy percent of respondents in CDP districts report that armed

opposition groups and district courts (57 percent) are not interested in addressing the people's concerns. However, 43 percent of respondents in Shah Joy and 42 percent in Khairkut report that armed opposition groups are interested in addressing issues that cause them stress.

## Media

Respondents in Afghanistan were asked about their media preferences and communication behavior. Specifically, the survey attempted to assess how respondents receive information about various issues. Respondents most often mention relying on radio, friends/family, elders, and the mosque/mullah for news and information. Respondents are least likely to mention getting information from newspapers or posters.

### Radio

The vast majority of Afghan respondents (90 percent) report that they use the radio to communicate with others and/or get news and information. This is consistent among respondents in the control districts (91 percent) and those in districts targeted by stabilization programs (90 percent).

Sixty-five percent of respondent rely on the radio to get information about government services. Respondents in districts targeted by SIKA-S are more likely to report turning to the radio for information about government services (75 percent).

### Friends and Family

Ninety percent of all respondents (92 percent in control districts and 90 percent in districts targeted by stabilization programs) admit turning to friends and family members for news and information. Those in districts targeted by SIKA-E are less likely to mention friends and family as an information source (78 percent), particularly respondents in the SIKA-E district of Muhammad Aghah (65 percent).

Nearly half of all respondents (45 percent, compared with 38 percent in the control districts) mention getting information about government services from friend and family. This is consistent across districts targeted by stabilization programs (45 percent).

### Elders

Across all districts, more than three-fourths of respondents (77 percent) rely on elders for news and information. More than 8 in 10 respondents (or 83 percent) in control districts turn to elders for information, while 77 percent of respondents in stabilization districts do the same. Respondents in districts targeted by SIKA-S (70 percent) are less likely to depend on elders for information. Those in the SIKA-S districts of Garmser (55 percent) and Marjah (56 percent) are the least likely to go to elders for news and information.


However, respondents are less likely to mention elders as a source of information about government services (25 percent). Those in districts targeted by SIKA-E (34 percent) are the most likely to mention seeking this type of information from elders.

### Mosque/Mullah

Overall, nearly two-thirds of respondents (66 percent) say they use the mosque/mullah to communicate with others and/or get news and information. This is similar to findings in control districts where 65% of respondents report they use the mosques/mullah for these purposes. There is no significant difference when looking at aggregated data for control districts (65 percent) and those districts targeted for

stabilization programs (66 percent). Those in SIKA–W are most likely to report getting information from this source (78 percent). This is especially true for respondents in the SIKA–W districts of Moqur (93 percent) and Bala Boluk (92 percent).

Seventeen percent of respondents mention getting information about government services from their mosque/mullah (compared to 10 percent of respondents in control districts). This is consistent across the districts targeted for stabilization efforts (17 percent).



### Cell Phone

Overall, 37 percent of respondents use a cell phone to communicate with others and/or get news and information. Those in districts targeted by SIKA–E (56 percent) tend to report using a cell phone to communicate or get information more often than other respondents, particularly those in the SIKA–E districts of Baraki Barak (74 percent), Chak (72 percent), and Nerkh (70 percent).

### Television

For respondents in areas targeted by stabilization programs, television is not a primary source of information. Overall, only 30 percent of respondents say they use TV to communicate with others and/or get news and information (compared with 67 percent of respondents in the control districts). Those in districts targeted by CCI are the least likely to rely on television to get information (21 percent). Respondents targeted by SIKA–W (37 percent) were more likely than those in districts targeted by other programs to get news and information from TV.

Seventeen percent of respondents—compared with 47 percent of those in control districts—mention that they get most of their information about government services from television. This is consistent across districts targeted by stabilization efforts (15 percent).

## **Other Information Sources**

Less than one-fourth of all respondents rely on posters/billboards (24 percent), newspapers (8 percent), and the internet/email (3 percent) to communicate with others or get news and information.

## CONCLUSIONS

### Security

While the overall majority of Afghan respondents believe the security situation in their area is good, respondents living in SIKA-E districts rate the security situation more poorly than those in other program areas. These respondents are also most likely to feel unsafe in and around their homes, both during the day and at night; to believe the roads they use are insecure; to perceive that security has deteriorated over the past year; and less likely to expect security improvements over the next year. Respondents in SIKA-E also report the highest perceived levels of crime at all levels (petty, serious nonviolent crimes and serious, violent crimes) and express the least optimism about crime decreasing in the coming year. Generally, Afghan respondents believe the ANA and ANP have improved security in their area and have faith that they will continue to do so. However, the majority of study participants believe that ethnic disputes will continue to hamper lasting peace in Afghanistan.

**Points for consideration:** Programming efforts should be made to support security initiatives so that people feel more secure in their communities and surrounding areas, especially during the night in the East. Street lighting, electricity, and programs aimed at strengthening Afghan identity and unity against ethnic, sectarian, and tribal divisions would support gains made in security by the ANSF.

### Governance

The majority of respondents say the government is well regarded in their area and express confidence in the district governors and local leaders. However, respondents in SIKA-S districts are most likely to report not having confidence in their district government or provincial government. These respondents overwhelmingly say that local leaders are most responsive to their needs. While the majority of respondents are familiar with the District Development Assembly, respondents served by the SIKA-S and SIKE-E are less likely to be familiar with that entity. In general, respondents believe the district government understands their problems, but those served by SIKA-E and SIKA-S are less likely to hold this opinion. A majority of those served by SIKA-N believe the government does not care about the people in their area. While most respondents (overall) support government reconciliation with opposition groups, a majority of respondents served by the SIKA-E program oppose reconciliation actions.

**Points for consideration:** Stabilization programs across Afghanistan must continue to bridge gaps between the district/provincial governments and local leaders. Programs should connect the government with local leaders to be more responsive to the needs of the people. When practical, government entities should continue to work through local liaisons to engender the trust of local leaders. This partnership should be promoted and communicated to Afghan citizens.

### Service Provision and Development

Pluralities of respondents believe government services have improved, but those served by SIKA-S and SIKA-E are less likely to share that opinion. Respondents are most unsatisfied with the government's provision of agricultural assistance, flood retaining walls, and electricity. Nearly half of respondents served by CDP have no access to electricity. The majority of respondents are also dissatisfied with the condition of roads and bridges, medical care, and schools for girls. About half of the study participants have heard about or seen development projects happening in their areas.

**Points for consideration:** Provision of basic services (clean water, passable roads and bridges, electricity, etc.) remains poor in most parts of Afghanistan, especially in rural areas. Stabilization programs should continue to recognize that the Afghan government's ability (at all levels of government) to provide reliable electricity, roads, clean drinking water, irrigation systems for agriculture, medical clinics, and a better education system will have an impact on people's perceptions of, and willingness to support, the government. While respondents see some improvements in infrastructure, they report limited impacts of these projects on the services they receive. Development achievements should continue to be promoted and communicated to the Afghan people. Plans and timelines for the completion of development activities should also be shared with the people, and contractors should be held accountable for meeting them.

## Rule of Law

Afghan respondents clearly prefer to settle most disputes through tribal elders instead of government courts. Overwhelming majorities of respondents express greater confidence in tribal elders and believe that elders have more respect for Sharia law.

**Points for consideration:** Programs aimed at increasing the Afghan people's confidence in government courts should consider engaging with tribal elders. If practical, elders could receive some elementary legal training and be encouraged to engage with government judges and accompany people from their villages to the government courts.

## Corruption

More than three-fourths of respondents believe that corruption is a problem in their areas. Despite the fact that many respondents would not admit to having paid a bribe personally, pluralities of respondents in every program area perceive that corruption is on the rise. People most often mention the courts and police as being corrupt. This may help explain why Afghans would rather work with tribal elders to settle disputes.

**Points for consideration:** Corruption is a difficult issue to tackle. However, programs that work with government agencies to provide oversight that is rooted in local structures may help. It may be advantageous to integrate tribal elders into this process as they benefit from lower perceived levels of corruption in general. Also, promoting checks and balances in government systems and agencies to curtail corruption, and communicating successes in these efforts to the Afghan people, may also be helpful.

## Quality of Life

A majority of study participants are satisfied with their lives on the whole and their households' financial situation. Respondents living in SIKAE districts are most likely to report dissatisfaction with life, finances, and basic needs. Meeting basic needs is still an issue for some, but it does seem to be getting easier for others. A majority of respondents are at least a little worried about meeting their basic needs over the next year; respondents living in SIKAE districts report being much less able to make plans for their future.

**Points for consideration:** It is difficult to target solutions which improve overall satisfaction levels without stating the obvious: the variety of problems highlighted throughout this report contribute to declines in quality of life measurements. However, finding ways to make people more secure about the future and providing them with hope so they can begin making plans can be a potential inroad to changing quality of life attitudes, particularly in eastern districts.

## Economic Activity

There seems to be little improvements in the availability of basic goods and services. Most respondents say prices for goods and services have increased or remained the same compared to a year ago. However, a majority of respondents also say their ability to get to the local market is better now when compared to a year ago. Study participants served by SIKA-E are most likely to report that it is more difficult to get to the markets. Many respondents in Afghanistan perceive that there are more paid jobs available now than there were a year ago. Those served by SIKA-N are most likely to report that there are fewer paid jobs available than there were a year ago.

**Points for consideration:** Improved access to markets and security in traveling to markets can be a leading indicator of stability in an area and should continue to be monitored closely. The lack of job opportunities, on the other hand, can often lead to undesirable stability outcomes. Areas where Afghans feel that job opportunities are declining, rather than increasing, should be considered areas of opportunity for destabilizing forces, such as armed insurgent groups. Where possible, partnerships with businesses, vocational training centers, and other organizations that could help stabilize the economic situation in those areas should be encouraged and monitored.

## Community Cohesion and Resilience

A majority of respondents perceive that their interests are considered by local leaders when making decisions about things that affect their neighborhood, and tend not to participate in local decision-making activities. They also believe their local leaders are effective in securing funds for their village's needs. Study participants express apprehension about freely expressing opinions about armed opposition groups. Respondents tend not to belong to groups where people get together to discuss social and political issues.

While most respondents say things never or rarely happen inside or outside their neighborhoods that create problems that disrupt their normal lives, those served by SIKA-E are more likely to disagree with that sentiment. Respondents most often mention the presence of the Taliban, ethnic disputes, land disputes, disputes over water, insecurity, roadside bombs/suicide attacks, destruction of roads, small crimes/theft, and family problems as interferences that disrupt their normal lives.

**Points for consideration:** Trust in local leaders by Afghan citizens should be respected and understood when trying to reach out to the population. Given the disparity between levels of trust in local political, tribal, and religious leaders and the national government, care should be taken to engender the trust of the local leadership when attempting to influence the overall stability of a district.

## Grievances

Problems with security, unemployment, electricity, and roads are mentioned most often as the issues that create stress or tension for Afghan respondents. Most perceive that the district governor, local shuras/community leaders, and the ANSF are interested in addressing their problems and concerns.

**Points for consideration:** Stabilization programs should remain aware of the issues that are most important to respondents. Problems with security were mentioned by respondents throughout the study. Stabilization teams need to remain aware of areas with low levels of security and understand that security issues will continue to impact overall stabilization efforts.

## Media

Radio, friends/family (word of mouth), and elders are the best avenues to disseminate information to the Afghan people.

**Points for consideration:** Effective communication is essential to the success of any stabilization program. Mass communication efforts should be made primarily through radio as opposed to other mass media outlets. However, to change opinion and/or behaviors, buy in must be gained from village elders and local religious leaders. Word of mouth communication and trust in tribal elders and religious leaders can be leveraged to add credibility to messaging efforts, when possible.

# APPENDIX A

## MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey

M-1. Respondent Identification Number \_\_\_\_\_

M-2. Wave Number 1

M-2a. Sample

1. Sample A
2. Sample B

M-3. Region

- |                  |                  |                     |
|------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Central/Kabul | 4. South Western | 7. Central/Hazarjat |
| 2. Eastern       | 5. Western       |                     |
| 3. South Central | 6. Northern      |                     |

M-4. Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: \_\_\_\_\_

M-5. Geographic Code

- |             |          |         |                   |
|-------------|----------|---------|-------------------|
| 1. Villages | 2. Towns | 3. City | 4. Metros (Kabul) |
|-------------|----------|---------|-------------------|

M-6. Province

- |            |                |               |              |              |
|------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. Kabul   | 9. Khost       | 17. Kunduz    | 25. Farah    | 33. Panjshir |
| 2. Kapisa  | 10. Ningarhar  | 18. Balkh     | 26. Nimroz   | 34. Dehkondi |
| 3. Parwan  | 11. Laghman    | 19. Samangan  | 27. Helmand  |              |
| 4. Wardak  | 12. Kunar      | 20. Juzjan    | 28. Kandahar |              |
| 5. Logar   | 13. Nooristan  | 21. Sar-I-Pul | 29. Zabul    |              |
| 6. Ghazni  | 14. Badakhshan | 22. Faryab    | 30. Uruzghan |              |
| 7. Paktia  | 15. Takhar     | 23. Badghis   | 31. Ghor     |              |
| 8. Paktika | 16. Baghlan    | 24. Herat     | 32. Bamyān   |              |

M-7. Year of Interview: 2012

**M-8. Month of Interview**

- |             |          |              |              |
|-------------|----------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. January  | 4. April | 7. July      | 10. October  |
| 2. February | 5. May   | 8. August    | 11. November |
| 3. March    | 6. June  | 9. September | 12. December |

**M-9. Date of Interview:** \_\_\_\_\_

**M-10. Day of Interview**

- |             |              |             |
|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| 1. Friday   | 4. Monday    | 7. Thursday |
| 2. Saturday | 5. Tuesday   |             |
| 3. Sunday   | 6. Wednesday |             |

**M-11. Interviewer Code:** \_\_\_\_\_

**M-12. Interview Completed on the ...**

- |                  |                   |                  |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1. First Contact | 2. Second Contact | 3. Third Contact |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|

**M-13. Supervisor Code:** \_\_\_\_\_

**M-14. Record Time Interview Began (Using 24 Hour Clock):**

(Record Time Began Starting With Q-1)

**M-15. Record Time Interview Ended (Using 24 Hour Clock):**

(Fill in all four data positions)

**M-16. Record Length of Interview in Minutes:**

**M-17. Date Formatted Field: AUG 2012**

**M-18. Keypuncher Code** \_\_ \_\_

**M-19. Language of Interview:**

- |           |         |          |
|-----------|---------|----------|
| 1. Pashto | 2. Dari | 3. Other |
|-----------|---------|----------|

**M-20. Coder Code** \_\_ \_\_

**M-21. District Code** \_\_ \_\_ \_\_

**M-22. Language of the Questionnaire**

1. Pashto
2. Dari

**M-23. Village Name:** \_\_\_\_\_

M-24. Sampling Point Coordinates: \_\_\_\_\_

M-25. Field Provider

1. ACSOR
  2. Afghan Youth Consulting
- 

### **Informed Consent**

**INTERVIEWER READ:** *Much work is being done in Afghanistan to create an environment where better government and development can flourish. The purpose of this survey is to ask people like yourself about how this might be better achieved in your local area.*

*We would like your views on this issue.*

*We will not ask for your name and the answers you and others provide will be held in strict confidence. Your responses to the survey questions are strictly voluntary. If we come to a question you do not wish to answer, please tell me and we'll move on. However your answers can be beneficial by providing information which may help to improve stability and minimize conflict in your area, so please answer as truthfully as you can.*

*Do you give your consent for me to proceed?*

M-25. Informed Consent \_\_\_\_\_ (tick)

**Record the Time the Actual Interview Began (M-I4)  
And Use a 24-Hour Clock (14:24, for 2:24 p.m.)**

## Survey

**Q1.** Generally speaking, are things in [*name the district*] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction? Is that a lot or a little?

1. Right direction (a lot)
2. Right direction (a little)
3. Wrong direction (a little)
4. Wrong direction (a lot)

\_\_\_\_\_

97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

### MODULE I. SECURITY and CRIME

**Q2a.** Would you say security in your local area is good, fair, or poor? Is that “very good/poor”?

1. Very good
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
5. Very Poor

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q2b.** Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago? Is that “much more/less secure” or “somewhat more/less secure”?

1. Much more secure
2. Somewhat more secure
3. About the same
4. Somewhat less secure
5. Much less secure

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't know (vol.)

**Q2c.** And what about a year from now, do you expect your local area will be more secure, just as secure, or less secure than it is now? Is that “much more/less secure” or “somewhat more/less secure”?

1. Much more secure
2. Somewhat more secure
3. About the same
4. Somewhat less secure
5. Much less secure

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don’t know (vol.)

**Q3a.** I would like to know about security on the roads you use in this area. Overall, would you say that security on the roads you use in this area is very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad?

1. Very good
2. Somewhat good
3. Somewhat bad
4. Very bad

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**Q3b.** Would you say that security on the roads you use in this area has improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that “improved/worsened a little or a lot”?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don’t know (vol.)

**Q4a–f.** Please tell me how secure do you feel when you are ... [*insert situation*]? Is that very secure, somewhat secure, somewhat insecure, or very insecure?

	Very Secure	Somewhat Secure	Somewhat Insecure	Very Insecure	Ref. (vol.)	Don't Know (vol.)
a) ...in your home during the day?	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) ...in your home during the night?	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) ...outside the home in your area during the day?	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) ...outside the home in your area during the night?	1	2	3	4	98	99
e) ...traveling to a neighboring village?	1	2	3	4	98	99
f) ... traveling to the district or provincial capital?	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q5a-c.** How would you rate the level of...[insert item] in your area? Is there a lot, a little, or none at all?

	A Lot	A Little	None At All	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...petty crime and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand Afs)	1	2	3	98	99
b) ...serious, nonviolent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 Afs)	1	2	3	98	99
c) ...serious violent crimes (murder, assault, or kidnapping)	1	2	3	98	99

**Q5.2a-c.** Compared with last year, how would you rate the level of ...[insert item] in your area? Is it much less, a little less, the same, a little more or much more?

	Much Less	A little Less	The Same	A Little More	Much More	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...petty crime and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand Afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) ...serious, nonviolent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 Afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) ...serious violent crimes (murder, assault or kidnapping)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

**Q5.3a-c.** In the next year, do you expect the level of ... [Insert Item] in your area will increase, decrease, or stay the same? Is that “increase/decrease a little or a lot”?

	Increase A Lot	Increase A Little	Stay the Same	Decrease A Little	Decrease A Lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...petty crimes and offenses (theft of food or goods worth less than a few thousand Afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) ...serious, nonviolent crimes (theft of goods worth more than 5,000 Afs)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) ...serious violent crimes (murder, assault, or kidnapping)	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

**Q6.1a-f.** How would you rate the presence of [insert item] in your area?

	A Lot	Some	None	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	98	99
b) Arbaki	1	2	3	98	99
c) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	98	99
d) Armed Opposition Groups	1	2	3	98	99

e) Afghan Local Police	1	2	3	98	99
f) ISAF	1	2	3	98	99

**Q6.2a–f.** Overall, how much confidence do you have in ...[insert item] to make your area safe? Would you say you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, a little confidence, or no confidence at all? (If respondent answered 3 “None” to an item in Q6.1, please record the corresponding item in Q6.2 as 97 “Not Applicable”)

	A lot of confidence	Some confidence	A little confidence	No confidence at all	Not asked/Not applicable (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) ...the Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) ...Arbaki	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
c) ...the Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
d) ...Armed Opposition Groups	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
e) ...the Afghan Local Police	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
f) ...ISAF	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

**Q7a–b.** Overall, has the ability of the [insert item] to provide security in your area improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that “improved/worsened a little or a lot”?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	Stayed the same	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

**Q8a–b.** In the next year, do you think the ability of the [insert item] to secure your area will get better, get worse, or stay the same? Is that “much or a little better/worse”?

	Much better	A little better	Stay the same	A little worse	Much worse	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Afghan National Army	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) Afghan National Police	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

**Q9.** Compared with a year ago, how would you describe the number of armed opposition group fighters from this area who have decided to stop fighting against the foreign forces or the Karzai government? Has the number increased, decreased, or stayed the same? Is that “increased/decreased a little or a lot”?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

- \_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q10a–c. INTERVIEWER: For 10a, b and c, please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair.**

I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

10a.

1. Armed Opposition Groups like the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami will reconcile with the Afghan government when foreign soldiers leave.
2. Armed Opposition Groups like the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami will *not* reconcile with the Afghan government when foreign soldiers leave.

- \_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

10b.

1. The Afghan government effectively supports the reintegration of former armed opposition group fighters back into normal life.
2. The Afghan government *does not* effectively support the reintegration of former armed opposition group fighters back into normal life.

- \_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

10c.

1. Ethnic disputes in Afghanistan are so strong that lasting peace is impossible.
2. Ethnic disputes in Afghanistan are *not* strong enough to stand in the way of lasting peace.

- \_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

## **MODULE 2. GOVERNANCE**

**Q11. INTERVIEWER: Please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair.**

I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

1. The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.
2. The Afghan government is **not** well regarded in this area.

98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q12a-d.** How much confidence do you have in your [insert position/organization]? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) District Government	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Provincial Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q13a-d.** How responsive do you think your [insert item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? Is [insert item] very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) District Government	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Provincial Governor	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q14a-d.** Over the past year, has the [insert item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that "improved/worsened a little or a lot"?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District Governor's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
b) District Government's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
c) Local Village/Neighborhood Leaders'	1	2	3	4	5	98	99
d) Provincial Governor's	1	2	3	4	5	98	99

**Q15a.** Please, tell me, do you know of/have you heard of District Development Assembly in your district?

1. Yes **(Go to Q15b)**
2. No **(Skip to Q16a)**

98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q16a)**  
 99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q16a)**

**Q15b. [Filtered, if “yes” to Q15a]** How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Not asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q15c. [Filtered, if “yes” to Q15a]** How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area? Is it very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Not asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q15d. [Filtered, if “yes” to Q15a]** And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly’s ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that “improved/worsened a little or a lot”?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Not asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
District Development Assembly	1	2	3	4	5	7	98	99

**Q16a. (ASK ALL)** Please, tell me, do you have Community Development Council established in your area?

1. Yes (Go to Q16b)

2. No (Skip to Q17)

98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to Q17)

99. Don’t Know (vol.) (Skip to Q17)

**Q16b. [Filtered, if “yes” to Q16a]** How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Not asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q16c. [Filtered, if “yes” to Q16a]** How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area? Is it very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat unresponsive, or very unresponsive?

	Very responsive	Somewhat responsive	Somewhat unresponsive	Very unresponsive	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	7	98	99

**Q16d. [Filtered, if “yes” to Q16a]** And over the past year, has the Community Development Council’s ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that “improved/worsened a little or a lot”?

	Improved a lot	Improved a little	No change	Worsened a little	Worsened a lot	Not Asked	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	5	7	98	99

**Q17a–h. [ASK ALL] INTERVIEWER: For each of 17a–h, please read the following introduction followed by the statement pair.**

I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

**Q17a.**

1. The District Government officials in this district are from this district.
2. The District Government officials in this district are *not* from this district.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**Q17b.**

1. The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.
2. The District Government *does not* understand the problems of people in this area.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**Q17c.**

1. The District Government cares about the people in this area.
2. The District Government *does not* care about the people in this area.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**Q17d.**

1. District Government officials in this district abuse their authority to make money for themselves.
2. District Government officials in this district *do not* abuse their authority to make money for themselves.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**Q17e.**

1. District Government officials visit this area.
2. District Government officials *do not* visit this area.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**Q17f.**

1. In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.
2. In general, the District Government officials are *not* doing their jobs honestly.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q17g.**

1. The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.
2. The District Government *does not* deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner.

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q17h.**

1. The Karzai government should reconcile with armed opposition groups like the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami, and allow them to be included in the government
2. The Karzai government should *not* reconcile with armed opposition groups like the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami, and allow them to be included in the government

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**MODULE 3. SERVICE PROVISION AND DEVELOPMENT**

**Q18.** Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened, or not changed in the past year? Is that “improved/worsened a lot or a little”?

1. Improved a lot
2. Improved a little
3. Not changed
4. Worsened a little
5. Worsened a lot

\_\_\_\_\_  
 98. Refused (vol.)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q19a-i.** Generally speaking, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the district government’s provision of [insert item]. Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Service not provided (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Clean drinking water	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) Water for irrigation and uses other than drinking	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

c) Agricultural assistance ( <i>seed fertilizer, equipment</i> )	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
d) Retaining and flood walls	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
e) Roads and bridges	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
f) Medical care	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
g) Schooling for girls	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
h) Schooling for boys	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
i) Electricity	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

**Q20a.** In the last year, have you seen or heard about any development projects in your local area, or not?

1. Yes (Go to Q20b)  
 2. No (Skip to Q21)

98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to Q21)  
 99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to Q21)

**Q20b.** (Ask respondent if answered code 1 “yes” in Q–20a). What development projects have you seen or heard about in your local area? (INTERVIEWER: READ OUT PRECODES. Circle each response mentioned.)

**Q20c.** (Ask if respondent answered code “1” in Q20b. If item is not circled in Q20b, circle “97”) Did the project improve life for people in this local area?

<i>Q20b. What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area?</i>	<i>Q20c. If project type is mentioned in Q20b, ask Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area? If project type is not mentioned in Q20b, circle “97.”</i>				
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Not Mentioned
a) Drinking water	1	2	1	2	97
b) Irrigation/water maintenance systems	1	2	1	2	97
c) Agricultural assistance ( <i>seed fertilizer, equipment</i> )	1	2	1	2	97
d) Farm produce processing or storage facilities	1	2	1	2	97
e) Retaining and flood walls	1	2	1	2	97
f) Roads and bridges	1	2	1	2	97
g) Medical facilities	1	2	1	2	97
h) Schools	1	2	1	2	97

<b>Q20b. What development projects have you seen or heard about in this area?</b>			<b>Q20c. If project type is mentioned in Q20b, ask Did the project/s improve life for people in this local area? If project type is not mentioned in Q20b, circle "97."</b>		
i) Electricity	1	2	1	2	97
j) Other (specify)	1	2	1	2	97

**Q21a–b. (ASK ALL)** Looking forward to the next year, what type of development projects are most needed in this area? You may mention two. Please start with the most needed, then the next most needed.

**INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED. (Write down two responses.)**

Q21a. (Most needed): \_\_\_\_\_

Q21b. (Next most needed): \_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

#### MODULE 4. RULE OF LAW

**Q22a–c.** If you or a family member was involved in a dispute concerning [insert item], please tell me who or where you would go to get justice? **[INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED]**

	Govt. Court	Local/Tribal Elder/s	Armed Opposition Groups	Other (write in)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Land or water	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
b) Assault, murder, or kidnapping	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99
c) Theft	1	2	3	96 _____	98	99

**Q23a–c.** How much confidence do you have in [insert item] to fairly resolve disputes? Is it a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?

	A lot of conf.	Some conf.	Not much conf.	No conf.	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q24a–c.** How much respect do you think [insert item] have for the Sharia? Is it a lot of respect, some respect, not much respect, or no respect at all?

	A lot of respect	Some respect	Not much respects	No respect	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q25a-c.** Do you think that people in your village/neighborhood always, mostly, sometimes, or never respect the decisions made by [insert item]?

	Always	Mostly	Sometimes	Never	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Local/tribal elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Government courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

## MODULE 5. CORRUPTION

**Q26.** Is corruption a problem in this area, or not?

1. Yes
2. No

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q27.** How many times have you been asked for a bribe in the past year?

0. Never
1. Once
2. Two or three times
3. Four or five times
4. More than five times

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q28.** From what you know or have heard about, which department or sector of the local government do people most complain about corruption? **INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED. (Write down one response.)**

Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q29.** In the last year, has the level of corruption in this area increased, decreased, or stayed about the same? Is that "increased/decreased a little or a lot"?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed about the same
4. Decreased a little

5. Decreased a lot

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

## MODULE 6. QUALITY OF LIFE (WELL-BEING AND STANDARD OF LIVING)

**Q30.** All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q31.** How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation? Would you say you are very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied?

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q32.** Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs has increased, decreased, or stayed the same? Is that "increased/decreased a little or a lot"?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q33.** How worried are you about being able to meet your basic needs over the next year? Are you not worried, a little worried, or very worried?

1. Not worried
2. A little worried
3. Very worried

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q34.** I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.

1. The situation in this area is certain enough for me to make plans for my future.
2. The situation in this area is *too uncertain* for me to make plans for my future.

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

## **MODULE 7. ECONOMIC ACTIVITY**

**Q35.** Compared with a year ago, how would you describe your ability to get to your local markets? Is it much better, a little better, about the same, a little worse, or much worse?

1. Much better
2. A little better
3. About the same
4. A little worse
5. Much worse

---

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q36a-i.** In the past year, have the following basic goods and services in your local area become more available, less available, or remained about the same?

	More available	About the same	Less available	Have not been available (vol.)	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Food	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) Health care	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Drinking water	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) Irrigation water	1	2	3	4	98	99
e) Good roads	1	2	3	4	98	99
f) Electricity	1	2	3	4	98	99
g) Services from the Afghan government	1	2	3	4	98	99
h) Services from international military or NGOs	1	2	3	4	98	99
i) Services from the armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

**Q37.** Compared to a year ago, how have prices for basic goods changed in your local markets? Have they increased a lot, increased a little, stayed about the same, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?

1. Increased a lot
2. Increased a little
3. Stayed about the same
4. Decreased a little
5. Decreased a lot

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q38.** Compared to a year ago, how would you describe the availability of paid jobs in your local area? Are there a lot more, a little more, about the same, a few less, or a lot less paid jobs available in your local area?

1. A lot more
2. A little more
3. About the same
4. A little less
5. A lot less

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

## MODULE 8. COMMUNITY COHESION AND RESILIENCE

**Q39a.** How often do things from outside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q39b. (Ask those who answered 1, 2, or 3 to Q39a)** What is the most common type of interference from outside the village/neighborhood that creates problems in this area? What is the next most common type of interference? **INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED. (Write down two responses)**

Q39b.            1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Q39b.            2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q39c. (Ask those who answered 1, 2, or 3 to Q39a)** How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_  
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q40a.** How often do things from inside your village/neighborhood create problems in this area to disrupt normal life? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q40b. (Ask those who answered 1, 2, or 3 to Q40a)** What is the most common type of interference from inside the village/neighborhood that creates problems in this area? What is the next most common type of interference? **INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED. (Write down two responses)**

Q40b. 1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Q40b. 2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q40c. (Ask those who answered 1, 2, or 3 to Q40a)** How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village? Is it often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often

2. Sometimes

3. Rarely

4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q41. (ASK ALL)** When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem? Is that often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often

2. Sometimes

3. Rarely

4. Never

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q42a.** When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, and how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered? Are they considered often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often (Go to Q42b)
2. Sometimes (Go to Q42b)
3. Rarely (Go to Q42b)
4. Never (Skip to Q43a)

---

98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to Q43a)  
99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to Q43a)

**Q42b.** (Ask if answered codes 1, 2, or 3 in Q42a) In your opinion, when decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of women considered? Are they considered often, sometimes, rarely, or never?

1. Often
2. Sometimes
3. Rarely
4. Never

---

97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q43a.** (ASK ALL) Do you participate in local decision-making activities such as village/tribal shuras, or not?

1. Yes (Go to Q43b)
2. No (Skip to Q44)

---

98. Refused (vol.) (Skip to Q44)  
99. Don't Know (vol.) (Skip to Q44)

**Q43b.** (Ask those who responded code 1 "Yes" to Q43a) When you participate in a village/tribal shura, do you feel your opinions are highly valued, somewhat valued, valued a little, or not valued at all?

1. Highly valued
2. Somewhat valued
3. Valued a little
4. Not valued at all

---

97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q44. (ASK ALL)** How effective or ineffective are your local leaders in securing funds for your village/neighborhood’s needs from the district and/or provincial government? Are they very effective, somewhat effective, somewhat ineffective, or very ineffective?

1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Somewhat ineffective
4. Very ineffective

- 
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**Q45a–b.** Do you belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together? Examples may include sports clubs, women’s groups, business associations, trade unions, farmers’ associations, development councils, religious welfare organizations, or charities, etc.

**Q45a.**

1. Yes **(Please list below in Q45b)**
2. No **(Skip to Q46)**

- 
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to Q46)**  
99. Don’t Know (vol.) **(Skip to Q46)**

**Q45b. (Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” to Q45a) INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED. (Write down up to two responses.)** What type of group(s) do you belong to?

**Q45b–1.** Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

**Q45b–2.** Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

- 
97. Not Asked  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don’t Know (vol.)

**Q46a–f. (ASK ALL)** How freely can you express your views/opinions to others in public about the following persons and groups? Would you say you can express your views and opinions about [insert item] very freely, somewhat freely, only carefully, or not at all?

	Very freely	Somewhat freely	Only carefully	Not at all	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District governor	1	2	3	4	98	99
b) ANP	1	2	3	4	98	99
c) Local elders	1	2	3	4	98	99
d) District courts	1	2	3	4	98	99
e) ANA	1	2	3	4	98	99
f) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	98	99

## MODULE 9. GRIEVANCES

**Q47a–b.** Thinking about the different problems that people in this area talk about, what are the two biggest problems that create stress or tension in this area? Please try to be specific, starting with the biggest problem.

**INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED. (Write down two responses.)**

Q47a. Biggest problem: \_\_\_\_\_

Q47b. Next biggest problem: \_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**Q48a–f.** When people in this area have problems that create stress or tension, how interested or disinterested is/are [insert item] in addressing their concerns? Are they very interested, somewhat interested, somewhat disinterested, or very disinterested?

	Very interested	Somewhat interested	Somewhat disinterested	Very disinterested	Does not exist in area	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) District governor	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
b) ANSF	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
c) Local shuras and community leaders	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
d) District courts	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
e) Community Development Council	1	2	3	4	97	98	99
f) Armed opposition groups	1	2	3	4	97	98	99

## MODULE 10. MEDIA

**Q49a–i.** Do you use any of the following to communicate with others and/or get news and information?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a) Television	1	2	98	99
b) Radio	1	2	98	99
c) Mosque/mullah	1	2	98	99
d) Friends and family	1	2	98	99
e) Elders	1	2	98	99
f) Cell phones	1	2	98	99
g) Posters and billboards	1	2	98	99
h) Newspapers	1	2	98	99
i) Internet/email	1	2	98	99

**Q50a–b.** From where do you get most of your information about government services? From where do you next get your information about government services? **INTERVIEWER: OPEN ENDED. (Write down two responses.)**

Write Response(s):

Q50a. \_\_\_\_\_

Q50b. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

## MODULE 11. INDIRECT QUESTIONS

**Q51a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q51b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that people be allowed to vote in elections to select the members of their district council. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q52a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that expensive new prisons be constructed in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support with this policy

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q52b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that expensive new prisons be constructed in every district to help alleviate overcrowding in existing prisons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q53a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that the weak Independent Election Commission be strengthened to prevent election fraud. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose with this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q53b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that the weak Independent Election Commission be strengthened to prevent election fraud. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q54a.** It has recently been suggested by the Afghan government that the weak Office of Oversight for Anticorruption be strengthened by allowing it to collect information about government officials suspected of wrongdoing. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q54b.** It has recently been suggested by the Taliban that the weak Office of Oversight for Anticorruption be strengthened by allowing it to collect information about government officials suspected of wrongdoing. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q55a.** Despite the possible risks, the democratically elected government of Afghanistan wants the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces to happen sooner than is now planned. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q55b.** Despite the possible risks, the Karzai administration wants the full transition of security responsibilities to Afghan forces to happen sooner than is now planned. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q56a.** Despite the poor results of past anticorruption campaigns, the democratically elected government of Afghanistan wants to do a new campaign to eliminate corruption. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q56b.** Despite the poor results of past anticorruption campaigns, the Karzai administration wants to do a new campaign to eliminate corruption. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q57a.** The democratically elected government of Afghanistan wants to make a new law that makes it a crime for mullahs to preach antigovernment messages or to incite violence during their Friday sermons. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused  
99. Don't know

**Q57b.** The Karzai administration wants to make a new law that makes it a crime for mullahs to preach antigovernment messages or to incite violence during their Friday sermons. Do you oppose or support with such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q58b.** The democratically elected government of Afghanistan has called for improved access to education for women and girls. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

**Q58b.** The Karzai administration has called for improved access to education for women and girls. Do you oppose or support such a policy, or are you indifferent to this policy? Do you strongly or only somewhat oppose/support?

1. I strongly oppose this policy
2. I somewhat oppose this policy
3. I am indifferent to this policy
4. I somewhat support this policy
5. I strongly support this policy

---

98. Refused

99. Don't know

## DEMOGRAPHICS

**INTERVIEWER READ:** Now I would like to ask you some questions for statistical purposes.

**D1.** Gender (**INTERVIEWER: Do not ask, just code based on your observation of the person's gender**)

1. Male
2. Female

**D2a.** (**Ask All**) How old were you on your last birthday? (**Record actual age; if respondent refuses, please estimate.**)

— —

**D2b.** In the previous question (D2a) is this:

1. An estimated age
2. An actual age

**D3.** How many years of formal education from primary school through university education have you completed?

Years (write in): \_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D4.** And, apologies to be asking this, but regardless of your attained level of education, can you fluently perform each of the following in your native language?

	Yes	No	Ref (vol.)	DK (vol.)
a. Read a letter	1	2	8	9
b. Write a letter	1	2	8	9
c. Read a book	1	2	8	9

**D5a.** What is your job status now? Are you...

1. Fulltime farmer
2. Working full time
3. Working part time
4. Unemployed—looking for work
5. Unemployed—not looking for work
6. Housewife (not working outside of the home)
7. Student/apprentice
8. Retired/disabled

\_\_\_\_\_

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D5b.** (Ask if respondent is working, unemployed, or retired in D5a codes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 8): What is/was your primary occupation? (INTERVIEWER: For those who answered “unemployed” or “retired/disabled,” ask the respondent what their occupation was when they were working. Record below and code.)

**INTERVIEWER WRITE OCCUPATION:** \_\_\_\_\_

1. Government Employee Support Staff
  2. Government Employee Midlevel (Supervisory)
  3. Government Employee Senior Level Officer
  4. Agricultural Laborer
  5. Farming On Own Farm
  6. Farm Owner Employing Laborers
  7. Unskilled Worker
  8. Semiskilled Worker
  9. Skilled Worker
  10. Private Employee Support Staff
  11. Private Employee Midlevel (Supervisory)
  12. Private Employee Senior Officer
  13. Private Business Sole Proprietor
  14. Private Business Employing 1 to 5 Workers
  15. Private Business Employing More Than Five Workers
  16. Military/Police
  96. Other
- 
97. Not Asked
  98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D5c.** (Ask if respondent answered code 5 “Farming on own land” in D5b) What is the *main* crop that you grow? (CODE ONE RESPONSE)

Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

97. Not Asked
98. Refused (vol.)
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D6.** Are you the head of household?

1. Yes
  2. No
- 
98. Refused (vol.)
  99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D7.** How many people live in your household?

Interviewer: (code response) \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_

- 98. Refused (vol.)
- 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D8.** What is your marital status now? Are you currently...

- 1. Married?
- 2. Widowed or divorced?
- 3. Single?

- 
- 98. Refused (vol.)
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D9.** What is your household's total monthly income in Afghani from all sources, that is, all types of income for all the people living at this address?

- 1. 1,000 Afghani or less
- 2. From 1,001 to 1,600
- 3. From 1,601 to 2,400
- 4. From 2,401 to 4,000
- 5. From 4,001 to 6,000
- 6. From 6,001 to 8,000
- 7. From 8,001 to 12,000
- 8. From 12,001 to 16,000
- 9. From 16,001 to 20,000
- 10. From 20,001 to 24,000
- 11. From 24,001 to 40,000
- 12. Greater than 40,000 Afghani

- 
- 98. Refused (vol.)
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D10.** When asked "who are you?" some people answer by indicating their occupation, others state their nationality, ethnicity, Qawm, religion, or the region/province they are from. If asked this question, what would you indicate about yourself in the first place?

- 1. Occupation
- 2. Nationality
- 3. Ethnicity/Qawm
- 4. Religion
- 5. Province/region

- 
- 96. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_
  - 98. Refused (vol.)
  - 99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D11.** Do you consider yourself to be...

1. Pashtun
2. Tajik
3. Uzbek
4. Turkmen
5. Hazara
6. Baloch
7. Kirghiz
8. Nuristani
9. Aimak
10. Arab
11. Kuchi
12. Other

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D12.** What is your religious affiliation? **(If respondent says Muslim ask):** Do you consider yourself to be Shia or Sunni?

1. Shia Muslim
2. Sunni Muslim
3. Other

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D13.** What is your Qawm?

Qawm: \_\_\_\_\_ (write in)

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D14.** Were you born in this district, or not?

1. Yes
2. No

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.)  
99. Don't Know (vol.)

**D15a.** Have you or has any other member/s of this household been injured or killed as a result of the fighting since the Taliban was removed from power?

1. Yes **(Go to D15b)**
2. No **(Skip to M26)**

\_\_\_\_\_  
98. Refused (vol.) **(Skip to M26)**  
99. Don't Know (vol.) **(Skip to M26)**

**D15b. (Ask if answered code 1 “Yes” at D15a) Which group/s was/were responsible for the injury(s) or death(s)? (Do not read PRECODES, code up to two responses.)**

D15b. 1. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

D15b. 2. Write Response: \_\_\_\_\_

Precodes:

1. Taliban
2. ISAF
3. ANSF
4. Haqqani
5. Other (Specify: \_\_\_\_\_)

97. Not Asked

98. Refused (vol.)

99. Don't Know (vol.)

**M26.** Have you previously participated in a public opinion survey?

- 1. Yes (Go to M27)
  - 2. No (Skip to M28)
- 
- 8. Refused (Vol.) (Skip to M28)
  - 9. Don't Know (Vol.) (Skip to M28)

**M27.** (Ask if answered "yes" to M26) How long ago did you participate in the survey?

- 1. Less than 1 month
  - 2. 1–3 months ago
  - 3. 4–6 months ago
  - 4. 7–9 months ago
  - 5. 10–12 months ago
  - 6. More than 1 year ago
- 
- 7. Not Asked
  - 8. Refused (vol.)
  - 9. Don't Know (vol.)

**M28.** (Ask All) Would you be willing to participate in another of our surveys next year?

- 1. Yes
  - 2. No
- 
- 8. Refused (Vol.)
  - 9. Don't Know (Vol.)

**RECORD THE TIME (USING 24 HOUR CLOCK) INTERVIEW WAS COMPLETED AND THE LENGTH OF THE INTERVIEW (M-15 AND M-16)**



**M33. SES Level: Interviewer,** try to ask participant about access to water and electric (for electric, it can be either municipal electric or a generator). Make your own decision about quality of the road. Select the code that is closest to the appearance and situation of the household. Code 1 represents the highest household economic situation and Code 5 the lowest household economic situation.

1. A/B [High quality road, access to water and electric 6 to 7 days]
2. C+ [Good road, access to water and electric 4 to 5 days per]
3. C, C- [Fair road, access to water and electric only a 1 to 3 days per week]
4. D [Poor road, access to water and electric 1 day a week, or less]
5. E [Poor or no road, no or very infrequent access to water and electric]

To be completed by the supervisor:

**M34.** Was the interview subject to quality control/back-check?

1. Yes
2. No

**M35.** Method of quality control/back-check

1. Direct supervision during interview
2. Back-check in person by supervisor
3. Back-check from the central office
4. Not applicable

## MISTI Stabilization Trends and Impact Evaluation Survey

### M36 Supplemental Question

**INTERVIEWER Instructions:** The supplemental question (M36) is to be completed by the interviewer after completing his/her interviews in the sampling point. Interview is to fill out one for each sampling point completed.

**M2.** Wave Number 1

**M4.** Sampling Point/District Where the Interview Was Completed: \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_

**M11.** Interviewer Code: \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_

**M36. INTERVIEWER:** Please judge which situation best describes this village:

1. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; no Taliban activity or presence has been reported.
2. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; some Taliban activity or presence has been reported, especially at night.
3. ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby but do not move freely at night; village administrators usually do not sleep in their homes, and Taliban activity takes place regularly.
4. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; ISAF or Afghan security forces may visit the village on occasion but do not stay.
5. Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; no ISAF or Afghan security force presence or activity at all.
6. Local Arbaki control this village; minimal Taliban, ISAF, or Afghan security force presence at all.
7. There are no ISAF, Taliban, Afghan security forces, or Arbaki controlling this village.

## APPENDIX B. STABILITY INDEX COMPONENTS, VARIABLES, WEIGHTS, AND SCALING

Indicator	Overall Weight	Variables	Var Weight	Values	Rescale
<b>Component A. MISTI SURVEY INDEX (0.75 of Stability Index)</b>					
<b>1</b>	<b>7a. Percent of Afghans reporting their area has become more stable</b>				
	0.25				
		Q2b Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	5.000	1. Much more secure	5
				2. Somewhat more secure	5
				3. About the same	Missing
				4. Somewhat less secure	1
				5. Much less secure	1
<b>2</b>	<b>7b. Percent of Afghans reporting their district is moving in the right direction</b>				
	0.25				
		Q1. Generally speaking, are things in [name the district] going in the right direction or in the wrong direction?	5.000	1. Right direction (a lot)	5
				2. Right direction (a little)	5
				3. Wrong direction (a little)	1
				4. Wrong direction (a lot)	1
				97. Neither right nor wrong direction (vol.)	Missing
<b>3</b>	<b>7c. Percent of Afghans reporting increased confidence in their local government</b>				
	1.50				
		Q11. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	0.500	1. The Afghan government is well regarded in this area.	5
				2. The Afghan government is not well regarded in this area.	1

			Q12b. How much confidence do you have in your [insert position/organization]? District Government	1.500	1. A lot of confidence	5
					2. Some confidence	5
					3. Not much confidence	1
					4. No confidence at all	1
			Q13b. How responsive do you think your [insert item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area? District Government	0.500	1. Very responsive	5
					2. Somewhat responsive	5
					3. Somewhat unresponsive	1
					4. Very unresponsive	1
			Q14b. Over the past year, has the [insert item] ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change? District Government	0.250	1. Improved a lot	5
					2. Improved a little	5
					3. No change	Missing
					4. Worsened a little	1
					5. Worsened a lot	1
			(Filtered) Q15b. How much confidence do you have in your District Development Assembly?	0.125	1. A lot of confidence	5
					2. Some confidence	5
					3. Not much confidence	1
					4. No confidence at all	1
			(Filtered) Q15c. How responsive do you think your District Development Assembly is to the needs of the local people in this area?	0.125	1. Very responsive	5
					2. Somewhat responsive	5
					3. Somewhat unresponsive	1
					4. Very unresponsive	1

		(Filtered) Q15d. And over the past year, has the District Development Assembly's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	0.125	1. Improved a lot	5
				2. Improved a little	5
				3. No change	Missing
				4. Worsened a little	1
				5. Worsened a lot	1
		(Filtered) Q16b. How much confidence do you have in your Community Development Council?	0.125	1. A lot of confidence	5
				2. Some confidence	5
				3. Not much confidence	1
				4. No confidence at all	1
		(Filtered) Q16c. How responsive do you think your Community Development Council is to the needs of the local people in this area?	0.125	1. Very responsive	5
				2. Somewhat responsive	5
				3. Somewhat unresponsive	1
				4. Very unresponsive	1
		(Filtered) Q16d. And over the past year, has the Community Development Council's ability to get things done in this area improved, worsened, or has there been no change?	0.125	1. Improved a lot	5
				2. Improved a little	5
				3. No change	Missing
				4. Worsened a little	1
				5. Worsened a lot	1
		Q17a-g. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion (averaged).	1.500		
		Q17a.			

				1. The District Government officials in this district are from this district.	5
				2. The District Government officials in this district are <b>not</b> from this district.	1
			Q17b.	1. The District Government understands the problems of people in this area.	5
				2. The District Government does not understand the problems of people in this area.	1
			Q17c.	1. The District Government cares about the people in this area.	5
				2. The District Government does not care about the people in this area.	1
			Q17d.	1. District Government officials in this district abuse their authority to make money for themselves.	1
				2. District Government officials in this district do not abuse their authority to make money for themselves.	5
			Q17e.	1. District Government officials visit this area.	5
				2. District Government officials do not visit this area.	1
			Q17f.	1. In general, the District Government officials are doing their jobs honestly.	5
				2. In general, the District Government officials are not doing their jobs honestly.	1

			Q17g.		1. The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner.	5
					2. The District Government <b>does not</b> deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner.	1
<b>4</b>	<b>7d. Percent of Afghans reporting that their quality of life has changed for the better</b>	0.75				
			Q30. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?	0.750	1. Very satisfied	5
					2. Somewhat satisfied	5
					3. Somewhat dissatisfied	1
					4. Very dissatisfied	1
			Q31. How satisfied are you with your household's current financial situation?	0.750	1. Very satisfied	5
					2. Somewhat satisfied	5
					3. Somewhat dissatisfied	1
					4. Very dissatisfied	1
			Q32. Thinking about the past year, would you say overall that your ability to meet your basic needs increased, decreased, or stayed the same?	0.500	1. Increased a lot	5
					2. Increased a little	5
					3. Stayed the same	Missing
					4. Decreased a little	1
					5. Decreased a lot	1
			Q33. How worried are you about being able to meet your basic needs over the next year?	0.500	1. Not worried	5
					2. A little worried	3
					3. Very worried	1

			Q34. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to your opinion.	1.000	1. The situation in this area is certain enough for me to make plans for my future.	5
					2. The situation in this area is <b>too uncertain</b> for me to make plans for my future.	1
			Q2b. Is your local area more secure, about the same, or less secure than it was a year ago?	1.500	1. Much more secure	5
					2. Somewhat more secure	5
					3. About the same	Missing
					4. Somewhat less secure	1
					5. Much less secure	1
<b>5</b>	<b>7e. Percent of Afghans reporting that resilience has improved in their local area</b>	0.75				
			(Filtered) Q39c. How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from outside the village?	0.500	1. Often	5
					2. Sometimes	4
					3. Rarely	2
					4. Never	1
			(Filtered) Q40c. How often are the people here able to solve these problems that come from inside the village?	0.375	1. Often	5
					2. Sometimes	4
					3. Rarely	2
					4. Never	1
			Q41. When there is a problem in this area, how often do the villages/neighborhoods in this area work together to solve the problem?	1.000	1. Often	5
					2. Sometimes	4
					3. Rarely	2
					4. Never	1

		Q42a. When decisions affecting your village/neighborhood are made by local leaders, how often are the interests of ordinary people in the village/neighborhood considered?	0.375	1. Often 2. Sometimes 3. Rarely 4. Never	5 4 2 1
		Q44. How effective or ineffective are your local leaders at securing funds for your village/neighborhood's needs from the district and/or provincial government?	0.500	1. Very effective 2. Somewhat effective 3. Somewhat ineffective 4. Very ineffective	5 5 1 1
		Q45a. Do you belong to any types of groups where people get together to discuss issues of common interest or to do certain activities together?	0.250	1. "Yes" 2. "No"	5 1
		Q12. How much confidence do you have in your [insert position/organization]?		1. A lot of confidence 2. Some confidence 3. Not much confidence 4. No confidence at all	5 5 1 1
		a) District Governor	0.250		
		b) District Government	0.250		
		c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	0.250		
		d) Provincial Governor	0.250		
		Q13. How responsive do you think your [insert item] is/are to the needs of the local people in this area?		1. Very responsive 2. Somewhat responsive 3. Somewhat unresponsive 4. Very unresponsive	5 5 1 1
		a) District Governor	0.250		
		b) District Government	0.250		
		c) Local village/neighborhood leaders	0.250		
		d) Provincial Governor	0.250		

<b>6</b>	<b>7.2.Ic.</b> Percent of Afghans reporting improved GIRoA–delivery of basic services	0.75				
			Q18. Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened, or not changed in the past year?	5.000	1. Improved a lot	5
					2. Improved a little	5
					3. Not changed	Missing
					4. Worsened a little	1
					5. Worsened a lot	1
<b>7</b>	<b>7.2.Id.</b> Percent of Afghans reporting corruption in their local government	0.25				
			Q26. Is corruption a problem in this area, or not?	5.000	1. Yes	1
					2. "No"	5
<b>8</b>	<b>Presence of armed opposition groups</b>	0.50				
			Q6.Id. How would you rate the presence of [Insert item] in your area?			
			Armed Opposition Groups	5.000	1. A lot	1
					2. Some	3
					3. None	5
	<b>Total weight</b>	<b>5.00</b>				
<b>Component B. AREA CONTROL ASSESSMENT (observation by survey enumerators) 0.10 of Stability Index</b>						
			ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; no Taliban activity or presence has been reported		1	5
			ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby; some Taliban activity or presence has been reported, especially at night		2	4
			ISAF or Afghan security forces are permanently based in this village or nearby but do not move freely at night; village administrators usually do not sleep in their homes, and Taliban activity takes place regularly		3	2

		Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; ISAF or Afghan security forces may visit the village on occasion but do not stay	4	1
		Taliban forces are permanently based in this village or nearby and operate freely; no ISAF or Afghan security force presence or activity at all	5	1
		Local Arbaki control this village; minimal Taliban, ISAF, or Afghan security force presence at all	6	4
		There are no ISAF, Taliban, Afghan security forces, or Arbaki controlling this village	7	5
<b>Component C. ACSOR ACCESSIBILITY TRACKER (0.10 of Stability Index)</b>				
		Completely safe	1	5
		Safe	2	4
		Somewhat safe but sometimes problems. Women enumerators can work here.	3	3
		Unsafe. Women enumerators cannot work here.	4	2
		Totally unsafe. Inaccessible.	5	1
<b>Component D. SECURITY INCIDENT SCORE (0.05 of Stability Index)</b>				
		Security incidents (Sep–Dec 2012)	0–10	5
			11–25	4
			26–50	3
			51–100	2
			101–150	1

## APPENDIX C. SURVEY INDEX RESULTS BY OVERALL AND DISTRICT

	7a	7b	7c	7d	7e	7.2.1c	7.2.1d	Q6.1d	Survey Index
Ab-e Kamari*	4.78	4.66	4.26	4.50	3.67	4.98	1.54	3.42	4.14
Ali Abad	3.87	3.67	3.62	3.41	3.45	4.02	1.62	3.76	3.55
Almar	1.86	2.84	3.43	2.81	3.43	3.24	1.82	2.63	3.04
Andar	2.23	2.09	2.88	2.51	3.19	3.38	1.68	2.58	2.78
Arghandab	4.46	3.06	3.78	3.77	3.39	4.31	1.84	2.65	3.59
Aybak	4.55	4.65	3.94	4.14	3.61	4.23	2.10	4.92	4.03
Baghlan i Jadid	4.35	3.78	3.93	3.58	3.71	3.53	1.79	4.15	3.71
Bak	4.02	3.44	3.63	3.48	3.46	3.30	1.48	3.73	3.45
Bala Boluk	2.44	2.78	3.06	2.86	2.80	4.42	2.18	2.50	3.05
Baraki Barak	2.15	2.06	3.77	2.30	3.58	4.53	1.41	1.47	3.12
Barmal	3.47	2.60	1.85	3.21	2.86	3.85	2.68	2.96	2.78
Chak	2.37	2.35	2.97	2.66	3.03	2.52	3.40	2.70	2.80
Chamkani	4.48	4.03	3.48	3.76	3.71	3.82	1.29	3.72	3.60
Char Darah	3.73	3.39	3.61	3.42	3.38	4.26	1.88	3.48	3.54
Charikar	4.73	4.02	4.11	3.99	3.93	3.66	1.46	4.94	3.98
Daman	4.02	3.35	3.68	3.62	3.53	4.23	1.87	3.01	3.57
Dand	4.38	3.74	3.53	3.69	3.61	4.33	1.50	3.64	3.65
Dand wa Pattan	4.64	4.18	4.28	3.88	4.26	4.74	1.24	2.99	4.02
Deh Yak	3.72	3.67	3.60	3.77	3.50	3.81	3.24	3.94	3.67
Doshi	4.54	3.91	3.78	3.62	3.69	3.62	1.98	4.17	3.71
Farah	4.27	4.31	4.08	4.04	3.79	4.85	1.44	4.29	4.06
Garmser	4.24	4.19	4.11	4.00	3.84	4.24	1.33	2.91	3.83
Gelan	3.37	3.03	3.19	3.07	3.29	3.50	1.96	2.88	3.14
Ghazni	4.08	4.08	3.56	3.91	3.76	4.67	1.46	3.45	3.74
Gorbuz	4.07	3.39	3.65	3.38	3.50	3.65	1.51	4.12	3.54
Imam Sahib	4.42	4.16	3.91	3.96	3.62	4.14	2.76	4.12	3.91
Jaji	3.97	3.58	3.90	3.52	3.97	3.14	1.45	3.06	3.52
Kajaki	3.97	4.29	4.36	3.92	4.01	4.50	1.00	2.76	3.91

	7a	7b	7c	7d	7e	7.2.1c	7.2.1d	Q6.1d	Survey Index
Khairkut (Zarghoon Shahr)	3.74	3.45	3.76	3.65	3.49	3.36	2.45	2.59	3.45
Khanabad	4.61	4.09	3.90	3.90	3.68	4.45	1.91	4.48	3.95
Khas Kunar	4.34	4.00	3.83	3.74	3.60	3.74	1.44	3.93	3.69
Khas Uruzgan	2.48	2.13	2.85	2.54	2.65	2.22	2.22	2.67	2.58
Khost (Matun)	4.21	3.73	3.59	3.60	3.52	4.27	1.47	4.21	3.68
Khvajah Omari	3.91	3.76	3.94	3.38	3.72	3.70	1.64	2.83	3.55
Kunduz	3.92	3.71	3.66	3.54	3.54	4.26	1.80	3.65	3.64
Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	3.72	3.48	3.49	3.18	3.30	4.06	2.62	3.97	3.52
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	3.23	2.95	3.65	3.32	3.80	3.52	1.68	3.05	3.39
Lajah-Mangal	4.18	3.21	3.80	3.36	3.71	3.49	1.51	3.78	3.55
Lash Kar Gah	4.64	4.55	4.27	4.06	4.12	4.59	1.11	3.49	4.06
Maiwand	3.81	2.97	3.63	3.35	3.23	4.65	2.95	2.54	3.52
Marawara	2.51	2.10	3.62	2.66	3.77	4.45	1.09	2.28	3.23
Marjah	4.36	4.21	4.22	4.03	3.95	4.40	1.41	3.14	3.94
Mata Khan	4.06	3.93	3.98	4.06	3.67	3.71	1.98	2.64	3.67
Moqur	4.59	4.15	4.30	3.98	3.38	4.79	1.43	3.57	3.98
Muhammad Aghah	3.86	3.38	3.52	3.42	3.37	4.16	2.14	2.54	3.42
Muqur	4.28	3.48	3.31	3.64	3.54	4.60	1.60	2.67	3.49
Musa Qala	4.02	4.13	4.09	3.95	3.76	4.11	1.28	2.69	3.74
Nad 'Ali	4.41	4.22	4.09	4.05	3.90	4.32	1.32	3.02	3.87
Nadir Shah Kot	3.85	3.26	3.48	3.23	3.42	3.75	1.46	3.98	3.43
Nahr-i-Saraj	4.22	4.19	4.18	4.10	3.78	4.27	1.31	2.73	3.83
Naw Zad	3.77	3.75	3.85	3.65	3.72	3.88	1.34	2.74	3.56
Nerkh	2.69	2.48	2.86	2.95	2.87	3.71	2.23	2.55	2.91
Panjwai	4.02	2.90	3.51	3.43	3.38	3.89	1.86	2.95	3.39
Puli Khumri	4.51	3.80	3.85	3.59	3.85	2.98	1.86	3.98	3.62
Pusht Rod	4.04	3.80	3.79	3.87	3.67	4.42	1.72	3.48	3.76
Qadis	4.62	4.49	4.17	4.14	3.65	4.83	1.33	3.73	4.04
Qaisar	2.54	2.74	3.56	2.97	3.44	3.55	2.08	2.84	3.21
Qalat	2.58	2.53	2.75	2.67	3.36	2.71	2.39	2.39	2.75
Qarabagh	3.79	3.22	3.41	3.45	3.54	3.90	2.33	2.95	3.42

	7a	7b	7c	7d	7e	7.2.1c	7.2.1d	Q6.1d	Survey Index
Salang	4.98	3.61	3.80	4.05	3.48	3.98	1.22	4.99	3.86
Sangin	4.03	4.08	4.07	4.02	3.81	4.22	1.02	2.56	3.74
Sar Hawza	3.61	3.63	3.74	3.51	3.44	4.05	3.07	2.90	3.58
Sarkani	4.23	4.05	3.70	3.69	3.60	3.56	1.66	3.56	3.59
Sawkai	4.48	4.08	3.78	3.87	3.43	3.34	1.53	3.69	3.60
Sayed Abad	3.15	3.22	3.14	3.12	3.25	3.08	2.08	2.61	3.04
Sayed Karam	3.80	3.15	3.85	3.31	3.75	3.83	1.26	3.01	3.50
Shah Joy	3.00	2.72	2.73	3.16	3.37	2.82	2.37	1.97	2.82
Shah Wali Kot	3.90	3.42	3.54	3.55	3.42	4.22	1.61	2.96	3.48
Shahidi Hassas	2.87	1.84	3.10	2.92	2.53	1.11	1.40	2.64	2.48
Shamal (Dwamunda)	3.92	3.16	3.35	3.26	3.54	3.62	1.35	3.95	3.38
Sharana	3.85	3.79	3.88	3.89	3.55	3.93	2.17	2.81	3.64
Shindand	3.11	3.09	3.56	2.91	3.31	3.80	2.49	3.27	3.33
Shwak	3.57	3.49	3.70	3.36	3.63	3.10	1.66	3.99	3.46
Spin Boldak	3.63	3.25	3.34	3.29	3.44	4.10	1.66	2.84	3.34
Tani	4.23	3.38	3.62	3.51	3.50	3.47	1.35	4.18	3.52
Tarnak Wa Jaldak	2.66	2.30	2.49	2.82	3.42	2.81	1.94	2.12	2.66
Terezayi	4.08	3.38	3.47	3.41	3.36	3.44	1.38	3.61	3.38
Urgun	3.73	3.38	3.69	3.67	3.39	3.77	2.17	2.80	3.47
Waghaz	2.58	2.68	2.46	2.16	2.66	1.73	1.57	2.45	2.31
Waz Drazadran	1.66	1.41	2.95	1.84	2.94	3.07	1.39	1.62	2.45
Yousuf Khil	4.01	3.79	3.82	3.96	3.63	4.17	1.93	2.68	3.67
Zhari	3.82	3.20	3.62	3.38	3.39	4.17	2.01	3.01	3.48
Zurmat	2.34	2.54	3.06	2.27	3.24	2.92	1.26	3.07	2.80
<b>Overall Average</b>	<b>3.76</b>	<b>3.43</b>	<b>3.61</b>	<b>3.46</b>	<b>3.51</b>	<b>3.81</b>	<b>1.78</b>	<b>3.21</b>	<b>3.47</b>

\* Light blue indicates the seven control districts

## APPENDIX D. STABILITY INDEX WEIGHTS AND SCORES BY DISTRICT



1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (Sep-Oct 12)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Ab-e Kamari*	4.14	3.78	5.00	5.00	4.23
Ali Abad	3.55	4.00	3.00	5.00	3.61
Almar	3.04	2.66	2.00	3.00	2.90
Andar	2.78	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.49
Arghandab	3.59	2.67	4.00	4.00	3.56
Aybak	4.03	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.28
Baghlan i Jadid	3.71	3.88	2.00	2.00	3.47
Bak	3.45	2.13	3.00	4.00	3.30
Bala Boluk	3.05	3.01	2.00	2.00	2.89
Baraki Barak	3.12	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.79
Barmal	2.78	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.53
Chak	2.80	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.75
Chamkani	3.60	4.18	4.00	5.00	3.77
Char Darah	3.54	4.00	4.00	4.00	3.66
Charikar	3.98	5.00	5.00	4.00	4.18
Daman	3.57	2.94	4.00	5.00	3.62
Dand	3.65	2.16	4.00	1.00	3.40
Dand wa Pattan	4.02	3.69	4.00	5.00	4.03
Deh Yak	3.67	2.73	3.00	3.00	3.47
Doshi	3.71	3.85	3.00	5.00	3.72
Farah	4.06	4.90	5.00	3.00	4.18
Garmser	3.83	2.23	3.00	4.00	3.59
Gelan	3.14	2.56	2.00	4.00	3.01
Ghazni	3.74	4.36	5.00	1.00	3.79
Gorbuz	3.54	3.26	4.00	3.00	3.53
Imam Sahib	3.91	4.00	4.00	5.00	3.98
Jaji	3.52	3.68	2.00	5.00	3.46

1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (Sep-Oct 12)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Kajaki	3.91	1.46	2.00	3.00	3.43
Khairkut (Zarghoon Shahr)	3.45	4.64	4.00	5.00	3.70
Khanabad	3.95	3.48	3.00	4.00	3.81
Khas Kunar	3.69	2.85	3.00	4.00	3.55
Khas Uruzgan	2.58	1.74	2.00	3.00	2.46
Khost (Matun)	3.68	3.95	3.00	1.00	3.50
<b>Khvajah Omari</b>	<b>3.55</b>	<b>2.10</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>5.00</b>	<b>3.62</b>
Kunduz	3.64	4.00	5.00	2.00	3.73
Kushk-i-Robat Sangi	3.52	3.87	3.00	5.00	3.57
Lajah-Ahmad Khel	3.39	2.23	2.00	5.00	3.22
Lajah-Mangal	3.55	2.00	2.00	5.00	3.31
Lash Kar Gah	4.06	2.81	3.00	2.00	3.73
Maiwand	3.52	2.96	2.00	1.00	3.18
Marawara	3.23	1.84	2.00	3.00	2.96
Marjah	3.94	1.93	3.00	3.00	3.60
Mata Khan	3.67	1.55	3.00	4.00	3.41
Moqur	3.98	2.46	3.00	4.00	3.73
Muhammad Aghah	3.42	2.07	4.00	4.00	3.37
Muqur	3.49	2.37	2.00	3.00	3.21
Musa Qala	3.74	1.46	2.00	3.00	3.30
Nad 'Ali	3.87	2.61	3.00	2.00	3.56
Nadir Shah Kot	3.43	3.56	3.00	4.00	3.43
Nahr-i-Saraj	3.83	1.81	3.00	1.00	3.41
Naw Zad	3.56	1.41	2.00	4.00	3.21
Nerkh	2.91	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.93
Panjwai	3.39	1.94	3.00	1.00	3.09
Puli Khumri	3.62	4.35	5.00	3.00	3.80
Pusht Rod	3.76	3.27	2.00	4.00	3.54
Qadis	4.04	2.75	4.00	4.00	3.91


1 = very negative 5 = very positive	Survey Index	M36	ACSOR Accessibility Tracker (Sep-Oct 12)	Security Incident score	Stability Index
<b>Weights</b>	<b>0.75</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.10</b>	<b>0.05</b>	
Qaisar	3.21	2.69	3.00	2.00	3.08
Qalat	2.75	2.14	4.00	4.00	2.87
Qarabagh	3.42	2.28	3.00	3.00	3.24
Salang	3.86	5.00	5.00	5.00	4.14
Sangin	3.74	1.95	2.00	3.00	3.35
Sar Hawza	3.58	3.83	3.00	4.00	3.57
Sarkani	3.59	3.26	2.00	2.00	3.32
Sawkai	3.60	3.52	3.00	3.00	3.50
Sayed Abad	3.04	4.00	3.00	1.00	3.03
Sayed Karam	3.50	2.69	3.00	5.00	3.44
Shah Joy	2.82	1.26	3.00	4.00	2.74
Shah Wali Kot	3.48	3.18	2.00	3.00	3.28
Shahidi Hassas	2.48	1.38	2.00	3.00	2.35
Shamal (Dwamunda)	3.38	1.95	3.00	5.00	3.28
Sharana	3.64	4.47	4.00	3.00	3.73
Shindand	3.33	3.07	3.00	3.00	3.26
Shwak	3.46	2.05	2.00	5.00	3.25
Spin Boldak	3.34	3.87	4.00	4.00	3.49
Tani	3.52	3.11	4.00	3.00	3.50
Tarnak Wa Jaldak	2.66	2.16	3.00	5.00	2.76
Terezayi	3.38	2.57	4.00	2.00	3.29
Urgun	3.47	4.43	5.00	4.00	3.75
Waghaz	2.31	1.73	3.00	4.00	2.40
Waz Drazadran	2.45	2.00	1.00	5.00	2.39
Yousuf Khil	3.67	3.68	4.00	4.00	3.72
Zhari	3.48	3.46	3.00	2.00	3.35
Zurmat	2.80	2.00	1.00	4.00	2.60
<b>Overall</b>	<b>3.47</b>	<b>2.94</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>3.47</b>	<b>3.38</b>

\* Light blue indicates the seven control districts


# APPENDIX E. STABILITY INDEX SUB-INDICES




**CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT**  
 MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)




**QUALITY OF LIFE**  
 MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)




**RESILIENCE IN LOCAL AREA**  
 MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)



**IMPROVEMENT IN SERVICES FROM THE GOVERNMENT**  
 MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)



**CORRUPTION IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT**  
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)



**PRESENCE OF ARMED OPPOSITION GROUPS**  
MISTI Stabilization Perception Survey Districts: Wave 1 (Sept-Dec 2012)

