

ANTI-CORRUPTION ASSESSMENT REPORT
JORDAN ROLP
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Introduction

It's been said that a society's commitment to combat corruption depends most critically upon the adequacy of its political and legal environment. Is there support from the Legislature and Government in fighting corruption or is there political interference? Are anti-corruption laws adequate and effective? And what is the standard of the public prosecutors and judges? As applied to Jordan, the answer to these important questions is varied.

There is no question that the government has made corruption a high priority. In meetings with stakeholders each stressed a commitment to its detection, reporting and prosecution. Yet one can easily point to drawbacks in various laws that frustrate independence and impede the effective prosecution of corruption in Jordan.

The flagship national institution for combatting corruption, the Anti-Corruption Commission, has flaws in its design and framework. A creature of the Parliament, to which it reports, the Anti-Corruption Commission's lack of independence raises accountability and transparency concerns.

Most saliently Jordan lacks a national coordination of its anti-corruption work. Efforts are spread across government agencies that interact on an *ad hoc* basis only. There is not a coordination of resources or a setting of priorities. If this is indeed a shortcoming, the natural follow-up question is whether the Anti-Corruption Commission is the appropriate vehicle for dealing with this deficiency. This paper will address that question and describe several strategies for improving the coordination and effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts.

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The report summarizes the findings and recommendations of the consultant based on his visit to Amman in March and April 2013.¹ The writer believes that despite current inadequacies Jordan is positioned to more effectively combat

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corruption. Taking steps towards a coordinated anti-corruption model should lead to a greater number of successful prosecutions and improvements in the public's perception that corruption is being taken seriously in the Kingdom.²

Summary of Findings and Recommendations

The findings and recommendations of the writer divide into two areas: 1) the national anti-corruption landscape, including the Anti-Corruption Commission, and 2) prosecution standards. In both of these areas the consultant comments on the adequacy of anti-corruption laws.

Findings

National Anti-Corruption Landscape

- The perception of corruption in Jordan is that it does not affect all levels of government and society. Rather, “relationship corruption” – nepotism, patronage and *wasta* (favoritism) in appointments and awarding contracts – is seen as allowing public officials to use their offices for private gain. This includes those working for regulatory bodies or companies in which they have financial interests. Embezzlement of state-owned property and transfer of illicit proceeds abroad are also major concerns.
- There are conflicting opinions regarding what can be considered corruption or not. Certainly though the definition of corruption in Jordan is broader than in many countries and includes certain crimes committed by directors and officers of publicly held companies.
- Stakeholders seem genuinely committed to identifying and combatting corruption. They understand their respective roles in the anti-corruption arena and point to Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) that formalize cooperation between their agencies.

² The consultant extends his gratitude to the ROLP staff for their tremendous support both prior to his arrival in Amman and during his stay. Robert Dean, Chief of Party, guided discussions between the consultant and his staff and provided valuable insights into Jordan's legal and prosecution environment. ROLP staff members Lamees Alhelou and Essa Maymoun spent long hours translating documents and worked tirelessly to shape the consultant's training scenarios to local settings. The consultant would also like to thank Rami Salah, Assistant Attorney General in Amman, for providing his perspectives on the prosecution of corruption in Jordan and in helping to arrange meetings with relevant officials.

- Stakeholders are sensitive to inadequacies in enabling laws that hinder the independent reporting of corruption. Presently, for example, the Audit Bureau cannot report corruption to prosecutors.
- Jordan lacks a national strategy for coordinating anti-corruption work. Efforts are largely diffused and stakeholders with anti-corruption mandates interact primarily on an *ad hoc* basis. As a result, opportunities for setting priorities and coordinating resources are lost and misconceptions of each other's work and statutory frameworks can fester.

The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), responsible for receiving and investigating corruption complaints, has some of the necessary components for effectively fighting corruption.

- The ACC's Investigation and Information Department has a relatively large staff (over 30), including some investigators with financial expertise. There are five public prosecutors assigned to prosecutors' office in the ACC. There is a MOU between the General Security Directorate (GSD) and the ACC. Under the MOU, the ACC can draw on the surveillance capabilities of the GSD.
- In addition to an investigative role, the ACC is responsible for raising corruption awareness among the citizenry and corruption prevention. And under its enabling law the ACC has the task of cooperating and coordinating with local, regional and international entities "in order to enhance and develop special measures for combatting corruption."³

Despite positive components, the ACC's role as an effective, national, anti-corruption institution, falls short:

- It has not taken a leadership role in coordinating anti-corruption efforts across stakeholders. This may be the result of its (relative) institutional youth.⁴
- The ACC reports to Parliament. Corruption complaints are reviewed by the ACC's chairperson and six board members, each recommended by the Prime Minister (and appointed by the King), who vote on whether a case should be investigated and referred for prosecution. This institutional framework raises accountability and transparency concerns.

³ Anti-Corruption Commission Law (2006), Article 11(d).

⁴ The ACC has been operational since 2008.

- The ACC does not have jurisdiction over police and judicial corruption. Police corruption cases are handled in a special police court and the Judicial Council must approve the prosecution of a judge. Further, a minister of Parliament cannot be tried on corruption charges without the approval of 75% of the members of Parliament.
- The ACC also faces investigative challenges. Investigators do not have the authority to obtain bank records or place witnesses under oath. And investigators are apparently in need of basic investigative training and training in handling financial cases. Those with civil service backgrounds may not possess sufficient skills to handle corruption investigations involving complex financial transactions, especially securities fraud, a category of corruption that comprises a significant percentage of the ACC's caseload.
- And mirroring the typical relationship between prosecutors and the police found elsewhere, ACC investigators and prosecutors generally do not work closely together in developing cases. This is troublesome in corruption cases where a coordinated investigative/prosecution strategy is crucial to successful results.

Statutory Issues

- A 2011 constitutional amendment shifting the authority to adjudicate corruption cases from the State Security Court to civil courts was a significant positive step by the government. The Financial Disclosure Act, Access to Information Law, and recent amendments to the ACC's law (providing whistle-blower and witness protection) also show a commitment by the government to establish a legal framework for identifying and combatting corruption.
- However, the Financial Disclosure Law is currently ineffective as a prosecution tool. Assets disclosed by public officials in financial statements are not verified and privacy restrictions impede its use by prosecutors. And in the geographically small and close-knit society that is Jordan, the ability to protect witnesses and whistle-blowers is challenging.

Prosecution Standards

- There is a range of skills and competencies among prosecutors. Some are highly experienced and capable of handling complex corruption cases. A good percentage of prosecutors, however, have never handled a corruption case. These conclusions are based on a survey of prosecutors and training sessions conducted by the consultant.

- The lack of specialization and an independent and separate prosecution service hamper the development of expertise necessary to handle corruption cases.
- Training and specialization remain important areas for attention. Because many corruption cases involve complex financial transactions, prosecutors and judges need training and specialization to develop necessary skills and competencies.
- Corruption training for prosecutors is needed in several areas: debriefing of witnesses and interrogation of suspects, gathering and analysis of financial records and documents, securities fraud, and asset tracing and recovery.
- Prosecutors are not effectively tracing illicit proceeds or using the anti-money laundering law in corruption cases. There is a misconception on the part of some that money laundering is not an independent crime.
- A shortcoming in the prosecution of corruption cases is that police and prosecutors do not generally work as partners, especially in developing an investigative/prosecution strategy at the time a complaint is first received and investigated.
- Undercover and covert investigations are underutilized. This may be attributable to the lack of coordination between prosecutors and police and poses a serious hindrance to bringing successful corruption cases.
- Substantive criminal laws addressing corruption are generally adequate. These include bribery, abuse of public office, embezzlement of public funds and money laundering. However conspiracy should be added to the prosecutor's toolbox. Presently conspiracy charges can only be brought in the State Security Court.
- Amendments to the Jordanian Criminal Procedure are necessary to explicitly allow for plea-bargaining and the cooperation of insiders and accomplices in corruption cases.

Recommendations

National Anti-Corruption Environment

The consultant proposes several options for improving Jordan's anti-corruption environment. These are framed within the broad inquiry of what role the ACC should play in the future implementation of an anti-corruption strategy. Should efforts be made to build-up the ACC or should its role shift away from investigations to prevention and public awareness? Would anti-corruption efforts benefit from the establishment of a nation-wide corruption "strike force" coordinating anti-corruption efforts across stakeholders? Or can the ACC take on this task?

As described below, the writer makes recommendations for both improving the ACC and for the creation of a national anti-corruption strike force. These recommendations should be seen as fluid and applicable to each proposal as well as other models and strategies that may be developed. In short, the consultant's goal is to provide a starting point for conceptualizing improvements to Jordan's anti-corruption efforts.

Of course the proposals outlined below carry pros and cons. An obvious benefit to building up the ACC is that it enjoys a status as the national anti-corruption agency born out of Jordan's ratification of UNCAC.⁵ However, making changes to the ACC's institutional framework may prove difficult, suggesting that the creation of a national anti-corruption coordinating committee or strike force comprised of all relevant stakeholders holds greater promise for improving the country's anti-corruption efforts.

Recommendations for Improving the ACC

In order to make the ACC a more effective anti-corruption agency, the following is recommended:

- ❖ Enhancing the ACC's investigative competencies through training and hiring qualified personnel with financial and forensic expertise.
- ❖ Developing formal procedures for investigators and prosecutors to meet and discuss an investigative/prosecution strategy when complaints are referred by the ACC Commissioners.

⁵ United Nations Convention Against Corruption. Jordan ratified UNCAC in 2005.

- ❖ Developing procedures for regular interaction between ACC investigators and prosecutors and the police so that investigative strategies are considered, including the value and viability of undercover and covert investigations.
- ❖ Amending the criminal procedure law so that ACC investigators may obtain bank records and take sworn statements from witnesses and suspects.
- ❖ Assessing the value of a statute that would make it a criminal offense for any civil servant or public official to accept gifts, loans or discounts unless they are strictly for private reasons.
- ❖ Enhancing the ACC's prevention work by creating corruption prevention guides for various government and business sectors. These would provide tips for closing corruption loopholes and best practices for preventing corruption. ACC staff would offer advice and practical help to enable government agencies, companies and organizations to introduce systems and procedures that are resistant to corruption.
- ❖ Expanding the ACC's prevention role by developing and implementing an integrity-testing program. Testing would have both a deterrent and detection function and would be used strategically in government and business sectors.
- ❖ Enhancing the ACC's corruption awareness role through public messaging.
- ❖ Developing and implementing a strategy for the ACC to take the lead in creating effective partnerships and coordination between anti-corruption stakeholders. As part of this strategy the ACC would chair regular meetings of stakeholders in which each would report on their anti-corruption work.
- ❖ Amending the ACC's enabling law to address accountability and transparency concerns. Several amendments should be considered, including shifting its line of reporting away from Parliament to someone chosen from outside of government. This "untouchable" would be accountable to the King, minimizing the current state of diffused accountability.
- ❖ Leveraging and coordinating resources with other donor organizations that are committed to strengthening the ACC.

Recommendations for the Establishment of a Strike Force

- ❖ Establish a national anti-corruption coordinating committee or strike force comprised of anti-corruption stakeholders. The committee's director would be drawn from outside of government, "untouchable", and as described above be accountable to the King not Parliament.
- ❖ Committee members would include representatives from the panoply of anti-corruption stakeholders: ACC, Audit Bureau, Controller of Companies, Jordan Stock Exchange, Ombudsman Bureau, Financial Disclosure Department, General Security Directorate, Income and Sales Tax Department⁶, Anti-Money Laundering Unit, Government Procurement Department, Attorney General, Judicial Council, and other representatives, including from civil society, as appropriate.
- ❖ The strike force would have dedicated investigative and prosecution teams who would report to an operations director. The ACC would continue to handle corruption prevention and citizen awareness responsibilities but its investigative and public prosecutor staff would move to the strike force or to a specialized corruption unit within the Public Prosecutors Office.
- ❖ Alternatively, the strike force would focus strictly on coordination between stakeholders and investigative responsibilities would remain with the ACC.
- ❖ The committee or strike force would assist the prevention role of the ACC by communicating identified "corruption hazards" discussed by stakeholders.

In addition to these recommendations, the future implementation of an anti-corruption program should include:

- Providing support to the government so that assets disclosed in financial statements are verified and amending the Financial Disclosure Law so that consistent with legitimate privacy concerns prosecutors would have greater access to reports.
- Bringing police corruption cases into the jurisdiction of public prosecutors so that corruption cases involving law enforcement are heard in civil not police courts, consistent with best international practices.

⁶ It is reported that approximately 800 million JD (1.1 billion US dollars) in tax revenue remains uncollected annually.

Prosecution Function

- Work toward the creation of a specialized corruption unit within the Public Prosecutors Office. Prosecutors assigned to the unit would serve for a minimum number of years so that experience and expertise are developed. Career enhancements, such as a Court of Cassation appointment, might be offered as part of the assignment.
- Consider the appointment of special prosecutors outside of the Ministry of Justice. These independent prosecutors would serve a five-year term.
- Increase training in several areas including gathering and analysis of financial records, debriefing of witnesses, interrogation techniques, securities fraud, and tracing and recovery of assets.
- Develop formal procedures for prosecutors and investigators/police to meet and discuss an investigative/prosecution strategy when complaints are received.
- Develop a formal mechanism for interaction between the security police and prosecutors so that undercover and covert investigations are considered and employed where feasible and productive.

Sources, Meetings and Work Completed

Sources

In preparation for the consultant's work in Amman he reviewed various background materials including *Jordan Justice Sector Assessment Report*, prepared by Tetra Tech DPK (April 2011), *Jordan Rule of Law Assessment and Evaluation of USAID Judicial Interventions – Final Report* (January 2008) and a consultant's assessment of the prosecution function.⁷

Relevant criminal statutes and anti-corruption laws as contained in the Jordanian Penal Code (1960), Criminal Procedures Law (1961), Economic Crimes Law (1993), Anti-Money Laundering Law (2007), Financial Disclosure Law (2006), Guarantee the Right to Access Information Law (2007),

⁷ *Enhancing the Public Prosecution in Jordan: Supporting a Force For Good In Difficult Times* (March 2012), prepared by consultant Paul Scoggin for Tetra Tech DPK. The writer would like to thank Mr. Scoggin for his valuable briefings on Jordan's prosecution environment prior to the consultant's trip to Amman.

Ombudsman Bureau Law (2008), Jordan Election Law (2012) and Anti-Corruption Commission Law (2006) were also reviewed.

Additionally, the consultant familiarized himself with the institutional frameworks of the Jordan Securities Commission (JSC), Audit Bureau (AB), and Controller of Companies (COC).

During his time in Amman, the consultant had the opportunity to discuss the ACC with the chief of the EU Twinning Project supporting the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Commission. The chief shared the project's report and it provides additional background for the writer's findings and recommendations.⁸

Meetings with Anti-Corruption Stakeholders

The consultant met with a number of representatives of government agencies with an anti-corruption role. These were: the Anti-Corruption Commission, Anti-Money Laundering Unit (AMLU)⁹, Controller of Companies, Jordan Securities Commission, and Audit Bureau. The consultant also met with members of the Attorney General's Office and Public Prosecutors (Amman Attorney General, Chief Prosecutor General, and Chief Prosecutor Amman Central District). In addition to discussions with the chief of the EU Twinning Project, the consultant met with representatives of the EU-funded, Supporting Criminal Justice Improvement In Jordan, project. Finally, members of a USAID assessment team debriefed the consultant.

The writer also met with the Director of the Jordan Institute of Justice and, at his invitation, delivered a presentation to the incoming students of the future judges program on prosecution of public corruption cases. The presentation covered the importance and challenges of corruption cases and illustrations from the consultant's career.

Training

The consultant conducted corruption training for approximately 50 prosecutors and judges. The training was held in two groups and each training session lasted two days. Attendees included public prosecutors assigned to the ACC and several highly experienced prosecutors from the Amman Central District.

⁸ *Training Needs Assessment, Training Programme and Strategy for Strengthening the Capacity of the Anti-Corruption Commission in Jordan.*

⁹ The AMLU serves as Jordan's Financial Investigative Unit (FIU). Jordan's FIU receives and processes information from both financial and non-financial entities and transmits disclosures to the appropriate prosecution authorities for investigation.

The training used several case scenarios designed to elicit discussion on the investigation and prosecution of a corruption case. The scenarios used Arabic names and were adjusted to better fit a Jordanian setting. Although Jordanian prosecutors do not presently handle police corruption cases, a police corruption scenario was used to raise awareness of international best practices in this area and to discuss the challenges of dealing with corruption evidence provided by criminals in any kind corruption case. This scenario led to some very lively discussions and dialogue about creative ways to handle these issues.

Specific topics covered during the training included developing a case theory and investigative plan; obtaining and analyzing financial records; use of undercover/covert operations; witness and interrogation issues; and organizing evidence for prosecution. The trainings were well attended and included several prosecutors who have handled high profile corruption cases. At the close of the training the consultant provided participants with a checklist for the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases.

In preparation for the training ROLP staff and the consultant developed a needs assessment questionnaire that was distributed to approximately 100 public prosecutors. 33 prosecutors responded and the results provided a window into experience levels and training needs. The results also described changes prosecutors suggest to improve their anti-corruption work.

A summary of the questionnaire's highlights is useful for this report:

- A high percentage of respondents indicated a sufficient general knowledge of corruption related laws, although only half of the respondents indicated that they had handled a corruption case.
- Nearly all respondents believe judges and prosecutors who handle corruption cases need specialized training. Training should focus on interrogation and witness debriefing skills, drafting decisions and working collaboratively with the police.
- Respondents suggested that prosecutors need access to dedicated experts, including those with financial backgrounds.
- Respondents noted a lack of cooperation with the security police that deprives prosecutors of using the important tool of undercover investigations.
- An overwhelming number believe that amendments to anti-corruption laws and statutes are necessary. Amendments should address prosecution independence from the judiciary, the financial disclosure law, and the ACC's lack of independence from Parliament.

- In the area of stakeholder coordination, nearly all of the respondents believe in developing more formal relationships between prosecutors and police, government agencies with an anti-corruption role, and financial institutions. Prosecutors should be able to review and be aware of all initial corruption investigations by the police.

Discussion of Findings and Recommendations

The findings and recommendations of this report must be viewed in light of the length of time spent in Amman and the scope and breath of the consultant's preparation and work. Having stated this, overlapping comments of stakeholders, prosecutors, and donor partners provide some confidence in the findings made in this report. The discussion of these findings and recommendations tracks the meetings and topics covered with stakeholders and prosecutors.

The Anti-Corruption Commission

Meetings with ACC representatives, prosecutors outside of the ACC, and stakeholders interacting with the ACC lead to the conclusion that the ACC has flaws in its institutional framework and resource needs that currently impair its effectiveness as anti-corruption agency.

ACC Operations

At the time of the consultant's visit four out of five public prosecutors assigned to the ACC have civil, not criminal backgrounds. The consultant spoke with one of the ACC prosecutors who did not have criminal experience. She did have a background in the insurance industry, which would benefit her work as a prosecutor handling corruption cases with financial dimensions. That being said, the power and influence of certain corruption targets requires that a prosecutor be able to "hunt with a big gun when going after an elephant." Seasoned criminal prosecutors are needed to improve the ACC's public corruption work.

Comments made by an ACC Commissioner overlapped with the EU Twinning Project's conclusion that ACC investigators are in need of basic training and most certainly training in the area of financial investigations. Training should focus on asset tracing, analyzing financial transactions and the use of financial statements and bookkeeping records in corruption cases. Both the Commissioner and the Twinning Project noted inadequate skills in computer forensics and the use of digital evidence. Separately, the Twinning Project noted the need for training in managing investigations, handling informants and

understanding the difference between “intelligence” and “evidence” in a criminal investigation.

The senior public prosecutor assigned to the ACC and the Commissioner both highlighted that the majority of the ACC’s cases involve securities related fraud. As noted elsewhere in this report, the definition of corruption in Jordan includes certain crimes committed by officers and directors of publicly held companies. Securities fraud is a highly specialized area of prosecution and the scope of the ACC’s jurisdiction requires enhanced training in this area.

The meeting with the senior prosecutor at the ACC provided background on their work. He pointed out that the ACC investigators do not generally coordinate with the public prosecutors, although it does occur at times. He offered prosecution statistics indicating that between June 2011 and late March 2013, 543 cases have been referred to court.¹⁰ Given Amman’s place as a center for government and business, not surprisingly Amman public prosecutors handled most of the referrals.

The largest categories of crimes were embezzlement, preparing false certificates, fraud, forgery, abuse of power, failure to comply with public office duties and misuse of public office. It’s worth noting here that the Chief of the AMLU commented that the FIU received only one referral from the ACC in all of 2011. The EU project has noted that a number of cases are not transferred to court because of the lack of evidence.

Stakeholder perceptions of the ACC are also instructive. A commissioner of the JSE offered that her impressions of the ACC have grown more positive over time, noting that ACC investigators are asking pertinent questions. She also pointed out that JSC staff regularly liaison with ACC staff. The director of the COC echoed this point; the COC has a designated ACC liaison. He noted that as of late March 2013 the COC had made four referrals to the ACC. He also held positive views of the ACC but believes its staff needs more technical training and resources. Separately, the director of the AB noted that within the last year the AB and the ACC signed a MOU and have participated in joint corruption training.

¹⁰ The statistics also indicate that during this time frame the ACC Information and Investigation Department referred 584 cases to ACC public prosecutors. More work would need to be done to fully understand these statistics and confirm their reliability. Sources outside of the ACC cite significantly lower referral numbers. Bertelsmann Stiftung, for example, states that in 2010 the ACC referred just over 100 cases to court. See Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2012 – Jordan Country Report.

The Amman Attorney General commented that the ACC public prosecutors should be located in the Attorney General's office and that any future resources providing for corruption specialization should be placed there. He believes the ACC should focus on corruption prevention and that the ACC's investigative resources should be folded into the AG's office.

ACC Accountability and Transparency

The consultant had a very interesting meeting with one of the ACC's commissioners. The commissioner offered pointed comments regarding the ACC's lack of independence but stressed that the ACC does not shy away from cases involving suspects with power and influence in society. While the consultant was impressed with the commissioner's comments, these should be viewed against the backdrop of controversial incidents that have shaken the ACC.

A commissioner of the ACC was arrested in 2012 for alleged graft over the purchase of trucks when she was on Amman's municipality board. And in 2012, an economist who served as the deputy head of the ACC resigned in protest to what he described as the ACC's lack of professionalism in handling a high profile case. In his view the case was brought by the ACC to settle political scores. These incidents damage the credibility of the ACC in the eyes of the public and other stakeholders. If the ACC is to be a viable and effective anti-corruption agency its board members must be beyond reproach and it must conduct independent, professional investigations in all cases.

Stakeholders and Statutory Issues

A meeting with the director of the Audit Bureau highlights the need for statutory changes so that corruption is addressed more effectively. As noted, the AB cannot report corruption to prosecutors but must report it to Parliament. Such reports are shared with the subject ministry or government department. A parliamentary committee then deliberates on whether or not the matter should be referred to a prosecution office.

This framework presents a number of barriers to effective anti-corruption work. First, because the report is made to Parliament and the subject ministry there is an opportunity for the matter to be "swept under the rug." Second, the viability of a proactive, covert investigation is compromised because the subject ministry or department would have an interest in getting out in front of the case early, thereby jeopardizing the ability of an investigation to proceed confidentially.

The director shared a draft amendment to the Audit Bureau law that would allow the AB to report corruption findings to prosecutors. This proposed amendment, as well as others, are designed to “ensure that the Bureau perform its duties without any external influences.”¹¹

As pointed out in this report, the financial disclosure law is ineffective as a prosecution tool. Assets are not verified and the reports are indefinitely sealed unless there is a complaint against the public official. Only then does the Minister of Justice review it. This not only prevents its use as prosecution tool but also undermines its potential as a deterrent to corruption.

The Chief of the AMLU noted that in her view prosecutors do not understand the anti-money laundering statute and mistakenly believe that there must be a conviction for the underlying crime in order to sustain an anti-money laundering conviction.¹² She also noted that prosecutors are generally not referring cases to the AMLU for investigation and do not “follow the money.” The director of the COC made a similar comment. And in a view shared by a number of stakeholders and prosecutors, the AMLU chief cited the frequent transfer of prosecutors to judicial positions as a detriment to prosecutors gaining expertise in anti-money laundering and corruption cases.

Future Work with Stakeholders and Prosecutors

Work with Stakeholders

The consultant believes there would be great value in bringing together the various anti-corruption stakeholders for a round table discussion. The anti-corruption round table would focus on the recommendations made in this report, as well as other topics brought to the round table by participants. The consultant would moderate the discussion. The round table would provide an opportunity for “face time” and dialogue between stakeholders. Among others, topics would include:

- Reports on stakeholder anti-corruption issues and work.
- Where are anti-corruption resources most needed? And where would they be most effective?

¹¹ Draft Law No. ___ of 2013 Amending the Audit Bureau Law. The draft law is currently before Parliament. The director also seeks an amendment expanding the scope of the AB’s work by permitting the AB to monitor publically traded companies where the government owns at least 25% of the shares. Under current law, the AB can only monitor a company if the government owns at least 50% of the shares.

¹² It would be worthwhile to determine whether or not the Court of Cassation has issued a decision consistent with this view.

- Feasibility and value of convening a regular meeting of stakeholders in which status reports, corruption hazards and legislative issues are discussed.
- How should success in anti-corruption work be measured?

Should the future implementation of an anti-corruption strategy include the creation of a national strike force or coordinating committee, the roundtable discussion would provide an opportunity to see how stakeholders work together. This would apply equally if the ACC were to play a greater role in future anti-corruption coordination.

Work with Prosecutors

Future training of prosecutors should build on the 2-day training conducted by the consultant. The training would use closed Jordanian corruption cases to focus on specific training areas. The use of closed Jordanian cases will provide the dual benefit of centering training on local corruption cases and “nuts and bolts” discussion of a prosecutor’s case file.

Selected parts of the files would be distributed to participants. These would include witness interviews and interrogation reports; documents gathered in support of the prosecution; and charging instruments. The trainer would lead discussions in which participants would be asked to comment on and evaluate the strength of the case and quality of the prosecutor’s file. Specific topics would include: interrogations of suspects and targets; witness interviews; documents and evidence gathered and how they supported the prosecutor’s case; and indictment drafting. The Amman Attorney General has expressed his support for this training and has offered to make available several closed files.

Conclusion

Looking ahead, the implementation of an anti-corruption strategy for Jordan should develop measurements for progress in combatting corruption. These should most certainly include public perceptions of the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions and whether corruption cases are successfully prosecuted. Jordan is poised to significantly improve its anti-corruption efforts. Time will tell whether with the support of donors this will be the outcome.

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