


# COMMUNITY-BASED CRIME AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROJECT A Project Systematization

El Salvador, 2008–2012

December 2012



**USAID**  
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

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INTERNATIONAL



**USAID/El Salvador**

Bulevar y Urbanización Santa Elena  
Antiguo Cuscatlán  
La Libertad, El Salvador, C.A.  
El Salvador  
Tel: 011 (503) 2501-2999

Prepared by  
Charles E. Schnell, consultant for RTI

**RTI International**

3040 Cornwallis Road  
Post Office Box 12194  
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709-2194

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# Acronyms

<b>ADESCO</b> Community Development Association	<b>FUMA</b> <i>Fundación Maquilishuat</i>	<b>PNC</b> National Civilian Police ( <i>Policía Nacional Civil</i> )
<b>ASAPROSAR</b> Salvadoran Association for Rural Health ( <i>Asociación Salvadoreña Pro-Salud Rural</i> )	<b>FUNDASAL</b> <i>Fundación Salvadoreña de Desarrollo y Vivienda Mínima</i>	<b>PREPAZ</b> Directorate for Violence Prevention and Culture of Peace ( <i>Dirección General de Prevención de la Violencia Social y Cultura de Paz</i> )
<b>CARSI</b> Central American Regional Security Initiative	<b>FUNDEMOSPAZ</b> <i>Fundación para la Democracia, Seguridad y Paz</i>	<b>SSDTD</b> Sub-Secretariat for Territorial Development and Decentralization ( <i>Sub-Secretaría de Desarrollo Territorial y Descentralización</i> )
<b>CBO</b> community-based organization	<b>FUNPRES</b> <i>Fundación para la Educación Especial</i>	<b>US</b> United States
<b>CECI</b> Centre for International Studies and Cooperation	<b>FUNSALPRODESE</b> <i>Fundación Salvadoreña para la Promoción Social y el Desarrollo Económico</i>	<b>UNDP</b> United Nations Development Programme
<b>CIDEP</b> <i>Asociación Intersectoral para el Desarrollo Económico y el Progreso Social</i>	<b>FUSAL</b> <i>Fundación Salvadoreña para la Salud y el Desarrollo Humano</i>	<b>USAID</b> United States Agency for International Development
<b>CMPV</b> Municipal Violence Prevention Committee ( <i>Comité Municipal para la Prevención de la Violencia</i> )	<b>FUSALMO</b> <i>Fundación Salvador del Mundo</i>	<b>WHO</b> World Health Organization
<b>CNSP</b> National Council for Public Safety ( <i>Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública</i> )	<b>FY</b> fiscal year	
<b>COAMSS</b> Council of Mayors of the Greater Metropolitan Area of San Salvador ( <i>Consejo de Alcaldes del Área Metropolitana de SS</i> )	<b>GDP</b> gross domestic product	
<b>COMPTEC</b> <i>Complejo Técnico San Francisco de Sales</i>	<b>GOES</b> Government of El Salvador	
<b>COMURES</b> Council of Salvadoran Municipalities ( <i>Corporación de Municipalidades de la República de El Salvador</i> )	<b>HCOLC</b> host country-owned local currency	
<b>CONJUVE</b> National Youth Council ( <i>Consejo Nacional de Juventud</i> )	<b>IDHUCA</b> <i>Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana (UCA)</i>	
<b>CSO</b> civil society organization	<b>IIWG</b> Inter-institutional Work Group	
<b>CVP</b> crime and violence prevention	<b>ISD</b> <i>Iniciativa Social para la Democracia</i>	
<b>CVPP</b> Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project, El Salvador-USAID/RTI	<b>ISNA</b> <i>Instituto Salvadoreño de la Niñez y la Adolescencia</i>	
<b>ESCENICA</b> Cultural Association for Arts ( <i>Asociación Cultural para las Artes Escénicas</i> )	<b>KAPP</b> knowledge, attitudes, perceptions, and practices	
<b>FEPADE</b> <i>Fundación Empresarial para el Desarrollo Educativo</i>	<b>MEPERSA</b> <i>Mesa de Prevención del Riesgo Social Armeniense</i>	
<b>FIECA</b> <i>Fundación de Innovación Educativa Centroamericana</i>	<b>MEPREDIZAL</b> <i>Mesa de Prevención y Desarrollo Integral de Izalco</i>	
	<b>M&amp;E</b> monitoring and evaluation	
	<b>MINED</b> Ministry of Education ( <i>Ministerio de Educación</i> )	
	<b>MJSP</b> Ministry of Justice and Public Safety ( <i>Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública</i> )	
	<b>MSM</b> Salvadoran Women's Movement ( <i>Movimiento Salvadoreño de Mujeres</i> )	
	<b>NGO</b> nongovernmental organization	
	<b>ORMUSA</b> <i>Organización de Mujeres Salvadoreñas por la Paz</i>	



# Introduction

## The Salvadoran Context

Increasing crime and violence in El Salvador have been identified as leading constraints on citizen security, economic development, and democratic processes. One of the most violent countries in the world in the past two decades, El Salvador has had homicide rates among the world's highest, approaching 70 per 100,000 in 2011—seven times the rate considered epidemic by the World Health Organization (WHO) (Krug et al., 2002) and 14 times the United States (US) rate for 2010.<sup>1</sup> Since mid-2012, however, El Salvador's homicide rate has been reduced by more than half, mainly as a result of a truce between the country's principal gangs. This truce was facilitated in part by recent shifts in the Government of El Salvador's (GOES's) policy from almost exclusively relying on enforcement to supporting violence prevention (RTI, 2012; Martínez and Sanz, 2012).

El Salvador continues to pay a very high price in both human and economic terms for the crime and violence in its communities. Youth constitute the most-at-risk group, as both offenders and victims. Extortion continues to seriously affect commerce and daily life; many people do not report crimes out of fear or mistrust. Violence against women is alarmingly high, through domestic violence, sex crimes, and homicides. Economic losses are estimated at about 5% to 10% of the gross domestic product (GDP) (see text box). By 2009, crime had become the leading area of concern for Salvadorans, surpassing the economy, poverty, and unemployment, even at the peak of the recession (Cardoza et al., 2010, based on *Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública* public opinion polls). Accordingly, public insecurity resulting from crime and violence is a leading source of political debate, attracting rhetoric, resources, and responses at local as well as national and regional levels.

<sup>1</sup> Organization of American States Observatory on Citizen Security ([www.oas.org/dsp/Observatorio/database/countriesdetails.aspx?lang=en&country=USA](http://www.oas.org/dsp/Observatorio/database/countriesdetails.aspx?lang=en&country=USA)).

## Crime and Insecurity in El Salvador

The “shadow price” (the effect on the GDP if the constraint were removed) of crime is between 4.8% and 10.8 % of GDP (depending on whether health costs are included). Both of these figures are higher than the Central American average and more than double the figure for Costa Rica, the only country in Central America not classified as having an “epidemic” level of crime. Moreover, just under half of businesses surveyed by the World Bank Enterprise Survey report that crime is an obstacle to their operations—at least 15 percentage points more than the Latin American and lower-middle-income country average. In the Global Competitiveness Report, El Salvador ranks last out of 142 countries under the Organized Crime indicator, and 132 out of 142 countries in Business Costs of Crime and Violence.

US Department of State, 2011, p. 5.

Diverse underlying causes have been adduced (e.g., Cardoza et al., 2010, pp. 45–53). They include the impact of economic underdevelopment, with its pervasive poverty, scarcity of educational and economic opportunity for youth, high levels of income disparity, and weak police and justice systems. The heritage of violence and disruption from the civil war (1979–1992) and its surrounding circumstances has been a further influence. Such factors have fed continuing high emigration, mostly to the US, with remittances to family members who remain in El Salvador now comprising a significant part of family and national income (World Bank, 2010).

The introduction of many emigrant youth to gangs in Los Angeles and elsewhere, away from the influence of traditional extended families and community support, and the subsequent deportation to El Salvador of thousands of gang members led to the establishment and rapid growth of gangs with links to those in the US during the past two decades. At the same time, its geographic position between lucrative drug markets in the US and the main cocaine production areas in South



America has made El Salvador an increasingly important drug trafficking route. Trafficking in arms and contraband merchandise as well as human trafficking have also been factors in the spread of crime and violence (Cardoza et al., 2010); this trafficking involves organized crime and has been linked to gangs, corruption of authorities, and the widespread availability of arms.

These patterns have both contributed to and been reinforced by the separation and disintegration of families, widespread intra-familial violence, and breakdown of social support networks. The population has a high proportion of youth, many of whom have not been well integrated into families, school, and social structures. Social status and class-related stigma undermine inclusivity and solidarity and widen expectation gaps. Growing gang affiliation among disaffected, marginalized youth has been a response (World Bank, 2010).

The level of violence and crime in El Salvador is routinely attributed to a proximate factor—the rise of gangs in the country—even though other causes also clearly operate. Government, the media, and the public have largely responded by blaming gangs and youth as the source of the problem and supporting iron fist (“*mano dura*”) solutions. Since the 1990s, successive governments have introduced security policies (Cardoza et al., 2010) to reinforce police capacity to repress gangs and control their territories, and increasingly to involve the military. Crime and violence prevention (CVP) was not prioritized, although some pilot experiences were carried out.

By 2007, however, the tendency to identify the problem with the youth who express it, and consequently to advocate repression and incarceration of the actors<sup>2</sup> as virtually the only solution, had run into two problems. First, the “solution” was not working; crime and violence continued to spread and evolve, adopting new tactics, arms, and organization. Second, a repressive solution did not address the underlying situations that bred the growth

of violence and crime rates; in some ways, repression worsened the rates. Despite intense efforts on the part of the national government as well as attempts to get at-risk communities and civil society to work together on violence prevention, overall crime rates were not abating. Repression proved to be a less than fully effective response.

Growing awareness of this in some circles—sectors of GOES, international agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and bilateral donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)—led to a call for proposals for a CVP program in USAID RFA No. 519-07-A-003. RTI, in partnership with Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) and several local partners, responded with a proposal in September 2007 and was awarded the Cooperative Agreement in January 2008.

Five years later, it is clear that RTI’s USAID-funded Community-Based Crime and Violence Prevention Project (CVPP) has had a significant influence on the way El Salvador meets the growing challenge of violence and crime. The CVPP was a pioneer in broadening and improving the approaches available for CVP. The project was also instrumental in introducing primary and secondary violence prevention approaches to the affected municipalities and their communities, as well as to a range of actors in local and national governments, civil society, and the private sector.

This paper will summarize what was and was not accomplished in relation to what was expected, as well as areas where additional, unanticipated contributions were made. In doing so, it will review how the project functioned and will examine factors that appear to have increased success, those that have supported sustainability, and others that seem to have contributed to weaknesses or failures. It will highlight lessons learned, including lessons that deal with missed or emerging opportunities. The purpose is to inform and improve future CVP efforts.

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<sup>2</sup> This often included physical mistreatment, illegal detention, and in some cases, extra-judicial elimination.

## Methodology

This study is not a formal evaluation, but rather an attempt to learn from the project. It builds on the knowledge and ideas expressed by different sets of participants as the project's term was being finished. This information was obtained in interviews, focus groups, and workshops, as well as from project reports and documents. The study's aim is to capture these participants' thinking while it is "fresh" and to benefit from the creativity, dedication, and hope for a better world that have characterized their involvement with CVPP. To reach these goals, it was essential to use inclusive, participatory approaches at each step of information gathering.

Evaluations are essentially top-down, characterizing performance along predetermined lines; systematizations build information bottom-up, gathering the experience of the participants and distilling it into lessons, observations, and/or questions, depending on what information emerged (see text box). Systematizations proceed from practice to theory; they are inductive. Evaluations proceed from theory to practice, comparing actual results to expectations derived from theory. Turning knowledge into practice, the RTI motto, gains

### What is Systematization?

Systematization of experiences is a methodology that helps people involved in different kinds of practice to organize and communicate what they have learned. Over the past 40 years [it] has evolved and obtained recognition as a methodology for social reflection, in Latin America. It allows us to:

- Organize and document what we have learned through our work;
- Better understand the impact of our work and the ways in which change happens;
- Develop deeper understanding about our work and the challenges we face to inform new ways of working;
- Capture and communicate the complexity and richness of our work.

Hargreaves and Morgan, 2009, p. 1.

validity and timeliness when knowledge is constantly honed and refreshed by learning from practice.

Several groups were identified as key to be represented. These were the participants at the community and municipal levels, the project technical staff, partner civil society organization (CSO) personnel, the CVPP management team, representatives of collaborating





GOES agencies, and USAID. Time and resources constraints limited the sample sizes, but representatives from all groups were included in the interviews and focus groups. The one exception was USAID, for which an appointment was unavailable.

Open-ended approaches were used in the workshops, focus groups, and individual interviews. Questions were posed initially to orient the discussions, which were interactive and followed the interests and perceptions of the participants. Some examples of initial questions are as follows:

- What were the project's main achievements and failures? What were the unforgettable highlights?
  - What will the impacts be, and how do we know it?
  - Which factors fostered success and which limited it (internal and external factors)?
  - Which aspects contributed to or undermined sustainability?
- What were the main lessons we learned? How could we do the next project better?
- Specific queries were tailored to uncover details pertinent to the different types of participants. Examples are as follows:
- How did the municipal facilitation process work? How could it have been improved? (or management of partners, small grants, cost-share generation, policy liaison, sharing of results, etc.)
  - Which aspects were copied (replicated) in other communities and municipalities, or could be?
  - What evidence do you have that processes induced are being or will be sustained? How much time is needed to mature the systems you helped to build and make them self-sufficient?
  - How did the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system work? How else was progress tracked and performance evaluated?
  - Were there contributions or achievements that went beyond those planned?



# Antecedents and Sectoral Overview

The Crime and Violence Prevention Project (CVPP) was proposed by RTI in September 2007 in response to RFA No. USAID-El Salvador 519-07-A-003. A best and final offer in November 2007 was funded by USAID on January 10, 2008, under Cooperative Agreement No. 519-A-00-08-00010-00. The amount was \$2,298,951, with an estimated completion date of January 30, 2010 (Phase 1). In November 2009, RTI submitted an add-on proposal that resulted in an extension of the period of performance through December 31, 2011, increasing the funding to \$7,743,350 (Phase 2). A second add-on award extended the period of performance until December 31, 2012, and increased the total estimated funding to \$10,081,338 (Phase 3). From 2008 to 2011, CECI served as RTI's implementing partner; however, per USAID's guidance, the partnership formally ended in December 2011.

This effort built on extensive previous work. RTI had worked to strengthen local government, citizen participation, and policy dialogue in El Salvador with USAID funding since 1994, as well as in Central America and worldwide. RTI's experience in using interactive processes to generate grassroots participation, local ownership, and sustainability, and its familiarity with conditions and on-the-ground relationships in El Salvador positioned the organization to work closely and flexibly with national and local GOES, civil society, and private partners, enabling these participants to become effective, self-reliant protagonists. In addition, RTI drew on previous work involving community-based CVP programs in the municipalities of Zaragoza, Ahuachapán, Acajutla, and particularly Santa Tecla, which became known as a model program. These CVP programs developed as offshoots of earlier participatory municipal planning and civic action efforts.

In 2010, GOES developed a justice and security policy<sup>3</sup> to combat crime and violence based on five pillars, including a national strategy of municipally based violence prevention (*Estrategia de Prevención de la Violencia*

[EPV]).<sup>4</sup> CVPP provided substantial input for the design of the EPV and its policy framework, including field methods, manuals, policy liaison, and other technical assistance from 2008 to 2010. Since well before 2008, RTI, and later its CVPP team, has worked closely with national agencies and local governments, CSOs, high-risk communities, and the private sector to develop models for municipality-led, community-based CVP. Much of the early work was based on concepts adapted from practices in other countries that were validated in the Santa Tecla experience.

However, after its presentation in 2010, the EPV was not fully disseminated or applied. At that time, no agency was made responsible or funded to carry out the strategy, and an agency closely associated with it, the National Council for Public Safety (*Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Pública* [CNSP]), was restructured, with portions shifted to other ministries. Although many GOES actors had some part in CVP policy and activities, clarity was lacking (RESDAL, 2011; see text box). CVPP policy analyses and recommendations continued to be offered at the national and local levels, and new GOES counterparts were developed after the demise of the CNSP. By late 2011, the Directorate for Violence Prevention and Culture of Peace (*Dirección General de Prevención de la Violencia Social y Cultura de Paz* [PREPAZ]) emerged as the lead entity. In 2012, the EPV was revised and fully integrated into national policy. CVPP provided significant input to this version, as well as training for PREPAZ personnel.

## Institutions in Flux

Despite efforts to bring order to the institutional panorama, there exist multiple actors that have a role in this area. [CVP] programs are found in the Ministry of Justice and Public Safety (MJSP), the National Police (PNC), the municipalities, the National Security Council, and the Sub-Secretariat [for] Territorial Development and Decentralization. This task could be carried forward at the central level by a strong, well-trained entity.

RESDAL, 2011, p. 34 (translated by author).

<sup>3</sup> National Policy on Justice, Security and Citizen Coexistence.

<sup>4</sup> National Strategy for the Social Prevention of Violence in Support of Municipalities (EPV).

# Conceptual Framework and Project Design

CVPP's overall purpose was to build capability in national and local governments, as well as in civil society, to plan and carry out primary violence prevention measures adequate to meet the challenge of growing violence, gang activity, and crime at the community, municipal, and national levels.

CVPP's basic idea was to complement and improve on the results of the more traditional, repressive anti-crime actions being carried out by the police and the judicial system. This would be done by addressing underlying causes of crime and violence, including such factors as scarcity of employment and education opportunities for youth, the consequences of family and social disintegration, and the lack of social support systems that help provide alternatives to gangs for marginalized youth. CVPP focused on creating mechanisms to engage the citizenry in family, community, and municipal settings, through the involvement of local government and local representatives of national agencies.

This kind of approach is known as primary prevention, which addresses the general population of youth and

families living in high-risk areas (Wyrick, 2006).

Secondary prevention, which focuses on children and adolescents at risk for gang involvement, was less systematically addressed, although at-risk youth were targeted by several activities in every target municipality. Tertiary prevention, dealing with gang members (including gang leaders and serious offenders), remained the purview of the police and justice agencies; however, in many municipalities, less-hardened gang members who expressed interest in CVPP-supported programs were allowed to participate in training and recreational activities.

Building on previous participatory local development approaches was key to the project design. These approaches have long been used by RTI to strengthen municipalities and their communities, helping them take advantage of opportunities to construct democratic processes that lead to equitable social and economic development in the context of the national (and regional) movement toward municipal decentralization. Citizen security in the face of crime and violence was one



facet of such local development processes. It had already been used successfully as a focal point to drive interest in local development processes in places like Santa Tecla. Citizen involvement, improved local infrastructure, economic and educational opportunities, and other aspects that are central to CVP programs integrate well with more general municipal development needs and motivate citizen participation in these programs. Centering the project on municipalities with local development programs also provided a good framework for sustainability.

Starting in January 2008, CVPP introduced a municipality-led, community based approach to CVP that had produced tangible results in previous pilot work—Santa Tecla, Altavista, and Zaragoza. The project developed municipal inter-institutional roundtables on citizen security, now known as Municipal Violence Prevention Committees (CMPVs).<sup>5</sup> This approach was built on seven pillars:

1. Participatory municipal planning, citizen engagement, and community organization for local development
2. Improved, more reliable, and easily interpretable information on crime and violence and on prevention efforts
3. Cultivation of a culture of peace and peaceful coexistence
4. Recuperation of community spaces and civic empowerment
5. Improved opportunities for social and economic integration, especially for youth
6. Development of improved policy links, planning, and institutional support
7. A communication strategy to share information effectively, systematize it, and make results readily available both locally and nationally

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<sup>5</sup> Previously known as Inter-institutional Working Groups (IIWGs), Municipal Violence Prevention Commissions or Councils, Peace and Security Round Tables (Mesas) or Councils, etc.; here we will follow the adoption by PREPAZ (GOES) of the CMPV terminology—*Comité Municipal para la Prevención de la Violencia*.

Applying participatory, bottom-up methods proved to be an effective method to generate local development processes that improve citizen security and to link them to municipal planning and budgeting processes. National-level efforts in training and policy development laid the foundation to sustain these efforts and to replicate them via GOES agencies in other municipalities.

Per the cooperative agreement, CVPP interventions had two basic objectives: (1) inducing and supporting participatory municipal processes to organize a response to local CVP priorities and (2) developing skills and policies at the national level to sustain and replicate the municipal-level work while addressing national CVP needs more integrally. These objectives correspond to Activities 1 and 2 in the cooperative agreement. A third activity, added in Phase 2, focused on addressing the requirements of a particular funding stream within USAID, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). However, Activities 1 and 3 are very similar in all essential respects. Most Activity 1 indicators are identical to those in Activity 3, with the other indicators covering peripheral items (Annex 2). Thus with few exceptions, Activities 1 and 3 will be analyzed together.

**ACTIVITY 1**, “Municipality-led, Community-based Crime and Violence Prevention,” supported the approach to CVP outlined above via two types of interventions: (1) facilitating and providing technical assistance to establish and run CMVPs and (2) providing small grant support to plan and implement CMPVs’ prioritized activities.

CVPP facilitators worked closely with the municipal councils, local institutions, and community groups to organize a participatory process to structure CMVPs in which local government, the national police and representatives of other national institutions active in the municipality, community organizations (usually Community Development Associations [ADESCOs]), CSOs, and private-sector actors were represented in a balanced fashion.



Each CMPV went through a participatory planning process to diagnose the situation, identify and prioritize needs, and produce a CVP plan for the locality. Four to nine high-risk but willing, interested, and committed communities were selected in each municipality as pilot sites to receive intensive CVP interventions. This covered approximately 5%–15% of each municipality's communities, allowing for later expansion of the CVP programs developed. During implementation, the municipal CVP plan provided the basis for calls for proposals from technical assistance sources to carry out CVP programs in the target communities. Based on proposals from local or national CSOs and other private-sector entities, reviewed and selected by the CMPVs, the project awarded small grants to the selected CSOs. In addition, CVPP provided technical assistance to CMPVs to monitor each grantee's performance and approve payments.

**ACTIVITY 2**, “National Leadership and Support for Crime and Violence Protection,” provided technical assistance to strengthen GOES's capacity to prevent crime and violence. This included training officials; providing support for policy initiatives; and developing improved systems to collect, manage, and use data on crime and violence. Examples of initiatives proposed include the following.

### Phases 1 and 2

- Providing technical assistance to an Inter Institutional Executive Committee (later restructured) to coordinate CVP efforts at the national level
- Advising on the development of a set of standardized CVP indicators, training GOES staff in data collection and analysis to put them into use, and encouraging partner institutions to adopt them
- Training national-level GOES staff on the use of CVPP modules and activities to extend the community-based CVP process to additional municipalities
- Facilitating case studies on CVP processes via grants to universities

- Engaging the private sector to support CVP initiatives at both the national and local levels
- Conducting studies on El Salvador's crime and prevention policy and proposing pertinent recommendations (Phase 2 only)
- Encouraging financial or in-kind contributions to CVPP projects by GOES agencies (Phase 2 only)

### Phase 3

- Providing consulting support to PREPAZ officials to establish, in a participatory manner, a comprehensive set of indicators that will be the base of a national tracking and mapping system for prevention interventions carried out in high-risk municipalities
- Designing and executing a CVP plan to implement the EPV in at least three municipalities (carried out in cooperation with PREPAZ in Ayutuxtepeque, Mejicanos, and Cuscatancingo)
- Developing with GOES counterparts a national tracking and mapping system on CVP interventions to help design new activities, monitor progress, and adjust strategies and policies in at-risk municipalities. (In accordance with USAID's request, this result was omitted because it was integrated within other GOES activities.)
- Training at least 25 government officials on CVPP's approach to community-based CVP processes.

**ACTIVITY 3** was added at the beginning of Phase 2 to facilitate the use of CARSÍ funding. It provided technical and financial assistance to seven municipalities in Phases 2 and 3. CVPP selected municipalities after evaluating competitive proposals submitted by interested municipalities; the selection criteria included willingness to commit resources to the process and to make it sustainable. The participatory process used in those municipalities to induce and strengthen the CMPVs, select high-risk target communities, develop a CVP plan, and carry out the interventions was the same as in Activity 1.

# Intervention Model

The actions leading to the fulfillment of the basic objectives are summarized in the following section.

## Key Elements of the CVPP Model

Several factors work together to make the CVPP model effective. These factors were identified from feedback obtained from CMPV participants, government agencies, CSO partners, and CVPP technical staff.

### I. Municipal Organization

Support for municipality-led processes within the context of recent decentralization efforts and the encouragement of participatory local planning is CVPP's main strategy. Participatory municipal development processes, supported by decentralized resource flows, provide a potentially equitable and sustainable platform for the development of community-based CVP programs. The facilitation process is described in CVPP-produced training manuals (RTI and CECI, 2009a, 2010) and in subsequent manuals and systematizations (IDHUCA, 2011a, 2011c, 2011d; ISD, 2011a; Plan, 2011a).

**Municipalities as hubs.** A key aspect of CVPP interventions is the focus on the municipal level as a framework to organize community-level CVP actions. Both communities and national agencies are linked to the local governments to plan and operationalize violence prevention measures. Citizen safety is within the mandate of the decentralized municipalities; the political process motivates local leaders to address the highly visible problem of crime and violence. With their convening power and access to resources, municipalities can support and sustain the CVP processes and extend them to additional communities.

**Clear expression of interest** on the part of municipal authorities and the municipal council. A key success factor lies in working with municipalities where the local authorities are in favor of the process and willing to explore the methodology.



### Participatory approaches/development of protagonism.

CVPP engaged citizens and government counterparts at each level and encouraged them to express their concerns and to take part in developing solutions. Training in induction and facilitation of participatory processes may be needed, including training in self-expression and leadership skills for participants (depending on previous experience and skill levels). However, participation is structured, as discussed in the next two items.

### Selection of participants/representatives.

The participants in CMPVs and other working groups represent their communities or institutions. Representatives are designated by election or by position in the institution (e.g., an ADESCO may elect a representative, whereas the local functionary of the Interior or Labor ministries may be designated ex officio; the chair of the CMPV is often designated by the mayor).

**Structured inclusivity/balance.** CVPP emphasized the importance of a balanced representation of all relevant entities active in a municipality to ensure well-rounded discussion of the needs and priorities of all sectors. In



addition to representatives from local government and the communities, this included representatives from central government agencies, such as health officials; police; schools; and others; as well as faith-based, civil society, and private-sector organizations.

**Evidence-based approaches.** Participatory diagnostic processes to verify the conditions in a municipality and create a shared factual basis for proposing actions and setting priorities are essential approaches to determine real needs and avoid the appearance of bias or arbitrary procedures. The resulting municipal CVP plan provides a consensus to guide the development of programs and actions, focusing first on communities prioritized because of their high-risk characteristics and the feasibility of achieving results. Participatory evaluation processes are carried out annually; plans are renewed periodically.

**Nonpartisan stance/focus on addressing shared priorities.** Work is organized in response to evidence-based planning and prioritization and focuses on agreed needs. Any suggestion of political influence or patronage is avoided.

## 2. CVP Interventions in Communities

The central theme of CVPP is community-based action to address violence and its causes. This is done on a range of fronts, in combinations that are tailored by each community to its situation and needs. Communities are represented by their local development associations (ADESCOs) or leaders of similar community-based organizations (CBOs). Facilitation methods are documented in the CVPP training manuals and supporting materials (RTI and CECI, 2009, 2010; IDHUCA 2011a, 2011c, 2011d; ISD 2011a; Plan 2011a). Community-level CVP interventions typically included a variety of approaches, summarized in the following paragraphs. Many of these community-level interventions were supported by broader campaigns in the municipality.

**Raising awareness of the impact of violence, crime, and related issues.** CVPP raised awareness by providing improved public information on local conditions, CVP planning and progress, and emerging situations (via announcements, posters, community radio, local churches, etc.). The project also improved data collection on crime, violence, and prevention measures; improved communication on CMPV plans and activities; and involved the public, especially youth, in participatory diagnosis and planning as well as the activities such as those that follow.

**Creating safer spaces.** Reducing risks in the area by improving lighting, fencing, or policing eliminated gathering sites for gangs and drug sales points and discouraged bars, brothels, etc. These actions ultimately provided safe spaces for community activities, sports, after-school study, etc.

### Beach Soccer in the Foothills

The Ciudad Arce CMPV accepted a proposal from the Santa Lucia community to install a regulation beach soccer field to give at-risk youth a chance to play both in local leagues and in national competitions. Fifty miles from the ocean, this greatly expanded the range of the sport in the country. Beach soccer was chosen because it does not require use of shoes, which excludes poor children. River sand was used to avoid beach erosion.

Recently a venue for a Central American championship, this field is a safe space used daily by scores of at-risk youths.

Interview, October 19, 2012.

**Engaging youth in meaningful activity.** Providing extracurricular activities for students and the many out-of-school youth is a vital link in building self-esteem and skills and providing an alternative to joining a gang. CVPP facilitated the following activities:

- Special classes to improve academic performance
- Performance arts and artisanal classes (theater, dance, puppets, music groups, drum corps, drawing and painting, ceramics, silk screening, etc.)

- Sports schools and leagues (soccer, karate, basketball, etc.)
- Events for youth (exhibitions of their handiwork, concerts, fairs, excursions, etc.)
- Community service programs and projects
- Youth groups (church sponsored, scouts, etc.)
- Job skills training (carpentry, masonry, cooking, baking, metal working, cosmetology, sewing, etc.), which was often accompanied by entrepreneurship and/or work ethics and interview skills training (See text box.)
- Life skills and values training, often integrated with one or more of the preceding activities

### Vocational Training Pans Out

Miguel, a youth at risk for gang association in La Chacra, took one of the first CVPP job skills and entrepreneurship classes. Three years later, he has leveraged the baking skills learned into a prosperous micro-business, with his own oven and three female employees making daily house-to-house deliveries of a variety of breads. He knows three other bakers from his class who have made similar places for themselves in nearby high-risk communities.

Interview, October 17, 2012.

**Increasing economic and educational opportunities for youth.** CVPP-funded activities provided internship and job opportunities, placement programs, training in resume preparation and interviewing techniques, negotiation of full or partial academic scholarships, summer job placement, etc. CVPP also formed links with employment programs in the GOES and in job creation projects supported by USAID and other agencies.

**Promoting a culture of peace.** In addition to sponsoring public events and conducting publicity campaigns to promote the concept, CVPP funded conflict resolution training for targeted groups;

psychological support for troubled families, students, and youths; music and arts groups; etc. These activities were often linked with the following two items.

### Creative Response to Conflict

When asked what the main changes in their lives due to their CVP program had been, most community leaders at La Chacra cited the lowered levels of aggression, adoption of non-violent approaches, and the use of conflict resolution skills that had been internalized by many of their peers after two years of *Fe y Alegría* programming.

CMPV interview, October 17, 2012.

**Reducing domestic violence.** A CSO partner, *Fe y Alegría*, developed a very effective Strong Families program, adapted from methods developed in the Ministry of Education (MINED) and carried out as a pilot project in San Salvador District 6 and Zaragoza. Credited by participants with improving inter- and intra-family relations and reducing use of violence to resolve conflict, it taught nonviolent methods and helped parents and children apply those skills to their lives (*Fe y Alegría*, 2011). Training modules (up to 37 weekly sessions) covered parenting, positive discipline, stress management, problem solving, and communication skills.

**Providing access to psychological support/mental health services.** Family and youth services offered by *Fundación para la Educación Especial* (FUNPRES), Ministry of Health community mental health programs, *Fe y Alegría*, and *Fundación Salvadoreña de Desarrollo y Vivienda Mínima* (FUNDASAL) were reported to be effective by participants (see text box on the next page). These programs and services help youth and adults deal with the difficult situations underlain by broken or dysfunctional families, extreme poverty, and lack of economic and educational opportunities. CVPP-funded grantees provided alternatives to violence as a means of conflict resolution.



## Community Psychology Promotes Better Living

FUNPRES psychologists provided Creative Conflict Response and Stress Management training to over 9,000 children and adults from high-risk neighborhoods to work on violence-related issues in 9 municipalities. Two stories from the scores related by clients in Zaragoza:

- A seventh grader notably improved her level of self-acceptance and was able to stop isolating herself and integrate into a circle of friends after participating in self-esteem exercises in a basic Creative Conflict Response workshop. On hearing her peers speak of the positive qualities they saw in her, she began to feel more important and sure of herself and could begin to accept herself and relate more to others.
- After attending a Stress Management workshop and an emotional intelligence study circle, a first-grade teacher changed her treatment of unruly students, whom she had not been able to control in class with anger, shouting, and striking. She learned to orient them through reasoning about their responsibilities in a soft voice.

Case reports, May–October 2012, and CVPP grant records.

## Coordinating with PNC and community policing.

CVPP cooperated closely with the national police (PNC) delegations or sub-delegations in each municipality; fostered their inclusion in the CMPV structures; and encouraged them to take leading roles in further developing local CVP efforts, building on those which in most places had been started under the aegis of the PNC during previous years. Community policing was developed or strengthened in many places as part of the CVP programming carried out by the CMPVs in partnership with the PNC. CVPP partner *Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Centroamericana* (IDHUCA) produced a handbook on procedures for community police based on the Santa Tecla model (2011b). Improved communications on violence and crime and mapping of CVP events and risk factors through wireless reporting systems was pursued by RTI specialists with the PNC under a Qualcomm grant, first in Santa Tecla and then in other municipalities in the Greater San Salvador Metropolitan Area.

## Using Information and Communication Technology for CVP

RTI used its expertise in technology to innovate solutions for CVP and M&E:

- A Qualcomm-funded wireless crime reporting project that helps Santa Tecla police to assess and respond in real time is being extended to Greater San Salvador.
- Issues with municipal services can be reported by texting.
- Geo-referenced analysis of violent events is conducted in the Santa Tecla Observatory, with enhanced data availability and visualization, as well as spatial statistics.

## 3. Focus on Youth

Diagnosing the situations faced by local youth and addressing them was a main axis of the municipal CVP plans. Traditionally “invisible,” youth were considered to be the principal victims of violence in the family and the community, as well as from the gangs; at the same time, they were also among the main perpetrators of violence and crime. Awareness of their situation and needs was billed as a precursor to change. CVP plans focused on ways to provide safe spaces and opportunities to keep their lives safer, more meaningful, and productive. Often this meant building capacity among families and other role models to interact constructively with at-risk youth.

## 4. Small Grant Process

The small grants allowed for development of a combination of intervention activities in the targeted high-risk communities, prioritized by the municipal CVP plans. This process allowed CMPVs to access the talent and experience of CSO technical assistance providers that responded to calls for proposals, which were based on the participatory CVP planning processes.

The development of an effective small grant management mechanism to supply high-caliber services while strengthening both the CMPVs and the partner CSOs was an important contribution of this project. CVPP

produced a training manual (RTI, 2012) that documents the methodology of this innovative small grants process. More than 30 civil society entities received training in 2012. Between fiscal year (FY) 2008 and FY 2013, 35 partner CSOs received and managed a total of 71 grants (detailed in Annex 2). The value of these projects was just under \$8 million, including \$5.31 million in USAID funds, \$2.02 million in grantee cost-share, and \$0.64 million in host country-owned local currency (HCOLC) funds via GOES. Number of awards by fiscal year was as follows:

FY 2008: 5 grants	FY 2011: 11 grants
FY 2009: 13 grants	FY 2012: 26 grants
FY 2010: 13 grants	FY 2013: 3 grants

## 5. Municipal and Community Leadership Skills

By providing training and technical assistance, CVPP built capacity in facilitating democratic processes, effectively communicating with constituencies, resource mobilization and stewardship, and monitoring progress and evaluating results. Training workshops covered organizational and leadership skills as well as facilitation and planning methods; ways to empower youth, community groups, and others; and basic approaches to financial management and accountability.

## 6. Actors: Partners and Counterparts

The 35 CSO implementing partners are listed in Annex 2 along with brief descriptions of the small grant projects they implemented. GOES counterparts consisted of both national and local government officials. At the national level, the counterparts were associated principally with the CNSP and its successor PREPAZ (falling under the MJSP and its Sub-Secretariat for Territorial Development and Decentralization [*Sub-Secretaría de Desarrollo Territorial y Descentralización*, SSDTD]). Other national institutions such as the PNC, MINED and the school systems, the Ministry of Health with its local clinics, the National Youth Council (CONJUVE) and the National Youth Institute (INJUVE), the Ministry of Labor with

its *Bolsas de Trabajo* and other employment programs, and the Salvadoran Children and Adolescents' Institute (ISNA) also collaborated closely, often through local representatives. Local-level counterparts included the mayors of the municipalities, other municipal officials and council members, local representatives of national institutions, local CSOs, community groups, and private businesses. Private-sector actors were important partners at both national and local levels, as was the Council of Mayors of the Greater Metropolitan Area of San Salvador (COAMSS).

## 7. Sites and Phasing

CVPP worked with different modalities in a total of 18 municipalities (see Table 1) plus the Altavista site, a large urban housing development that spans parts of San Martín, Ilopango, and Tonacatepeque—each of which was also targeted separately. CVPP focused on developing effective, sustainable CMPVs in 14 municipalities (excluding Santa Tecla and the PREPAZ-managed municipalities). A 15th site, Altavista, received similar focused intervention beginning even before the inception of CVPP, under GOES funding for community policing. CMPVs provided facilitation to strengthen the municipalities (Table 1, triangles). Including Santa Tecla, 15 municipalities received small grants (Table 1, circles). Because Santa Tecla already had an established, successful CMPV, CVPP provided grant support to strengthen only its model Municipal Crime and Violence Observatory. Three more municipalities (Table 1, squares) were supported indirectly via PREPAZ, the agency charged with continuing this work in the future. This was a pilot experience in building capacity in PREPAZ personnel; CVPP trained a cadre of PREPAZ staff to serve as facilitators in those three municipalities.

CVPP implementation occurred in three phases corresponding to the period of performance in the original cooperative agreement and its two extensions. In Phase 1 (2008–2009), CVPP began working in Izalco, Altavista, Armenia, and San Salvador District 6,



**Table 1. Timeline, Locations, and Types of CVPP Activity: Small Grants and CMPV Strengthening**

Years	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Phases	1		2		3
Izalco	● ▲	● ▲	● ▲	● ▲	
Altavista	● ▲	● ▲	● ▲	● ▲	
Armenia		● ▲	● ▲	● ▲	
San Salvador, District 6		● ▲	● ▲	● ▲	
Santa Tecla		●	●	●	
Ahuachapán			● ▲	● ▲	
Ciudad Arce			● ▲	● ▲	▲
Nahuizalco			● ▲	● ▲	▲
San Juan Opico			● ▲	● ▲	▲
Zaragoza			● ▲	● ▲	▲
San Martín		● ▲	● ▲	● ▲	▲
Ilopango		●		●	▲
Tonacatepeque		●		●	▲
Soyapango					● ▲
Nejapa					● ▲
San Antonio del Monte					● ▲
Ayutuxtepeque					■
Mejicanos					■
Cuscatancingo					■

- Grants disbursed through partners
- ▲ CMPV strengthening –MOUs with municipality
- CMPV facilitation via PREPAZ

continuing for two to three years in each. Support for the Santa Tecla Observatory also began during Phase 1. In Phase 2 (2010–2011), CVPP supported Ahuachapán, Ciudad Arce, Nahuizalco, San Juan Opico, Zaragoza, and San Martín (where some grants had been awarded in Phase 1 in conjunction with the work in Altavista). Phase 3 (2012) addressed Ilopango, Tonacatepeque, Soyapango, Nejapa, and San Antonio del Monte, as well as Ayutuxtepeque, Mejicanos, and Cuscatancingo via PREPAZ. In some municipalities, CVPP support continued seamlessly from one phase into the next, as reflected in Table 1.

In each of the 14 core municipalities and in Altavista, the CMPV developed a CVP plan that prioritized four to nine high-risk communities, based on diagnostic studies and risk mapping. Criteria for selection of these focus communities were set by the CMPVs as part of their participatory processes, with CVPP advice and input from the PNC. In some cases, new communities were included during the course of the project. A total of 86 communities benefitted from CVPP support (Annex 1).

## 8. National Context/Policy Framework

Activity 2 focused on improving the policy context and technical capacity of GOES agencies to support and extend the CVP work in the municipalities. In addressing the burgeoning problems of violence and crime in the country and the virtual absence of prevention measures, CVPP built on the policies of municipal decentralization and participatory planning that had been promoted beginning in the 1990s, in significant part by RTI. Efforts were made to gain acceptance for the idea of prevention as both an alternative and a complement to repression—a co-equal part of any real solution. With the emission of a national CVP strategy that largely adopted the CVPP approach, project emphasis turned to training GOES technical personnel to manage and replicate the municipal-level processes nationally, moving toward providing adequate resources to address the challenge.

# Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Systems

The **M&E Plan** was approved by USAID in April 2008. It covered Phase 1 and was updated for Phases 2 and 3 to address the modifications of the cooperative agreement in 2010 and 2012. The M&E Plan delineated regular, uniform data collection, analysis, reporting, and information sharing. M&E information was used to inform project management, identify and correct problems, show approaches and activities that worked well, and make evidence-based decisions throughout the project. It was also used to foster communication about project performance to the project team, national and local partners, USAID, and GOES. Indicators were designed to measure progress toward results expected from project activities, which were included in quarterly, semiannual, and annual reports.

The **indicators** adopted are shown in Annex 3, including those added for Phases 2 and 3. Indicators for Activities 1 and 3 are shown together because for the most part they are identical; however, the differences are also reflected, as are the achievements attributed to each. As noted above, the indicators are essentially process indicators and do not reflect the effects or impacts of the interventions carried out.

It is not the purpose of this paper to evaluate overall project performance as shown by the indicators; the 2012 Annual Report and the CVPP Final Report address those aspects. However, the project results appear to have been outstanding, not only as reflected in the indicators but also as shown by the general achievements and by other measures available (as detailed in the next section). Because the indicator data set the scene and provide insight into the processes experienced and lessons to be learned about CVP, they will be reviewed in the Results Section below.

**Other instruments for tracking and assessing** were also developed during implementation. Some address the need to assess effects and impact at least partially.

**Fourteen baseline studies in as many municipalities.** Despite the term “baseline,” some of these studies were



conducted months or even more than a year after project activities began. This delay was due, at least in part, to the time it took to establish good relationships with communities and train local youth to conduct interviews (i.e., CVPP used this method to improve local buy-in and decrease the communities’ suspicions of having “outsiders” conducting the survey). Using data from a variety of sources, including household surveys, they focused on four areas:

1. General geographic information on target municipalities and communities (data on population, public services, relevant infrastructure, etc.)
2. Crime report statistics on patterns of reporting and of different crimes committed, from national police data
3. Risk maps developed by the CMPVs and based on observations of participating residents and officials, showing numbers and locations of risk factors (e.g., sites of muggings, bars and dance halls, drug houses, gang hangouts, etc.) and of factors favorable to violence prevention (e.g., schools, churches, sports facilities, training centers, police posts, etc.)
4. Household surveys that covered topics like experiences with crime and violence, history of reporting crimes, awareness and opinions of gang activity, neighborhood and personal security measures taken, and improvements made to the home. Opinions were



solicited on a variety of perceptions, including the risk of becoming a crime victim in the next months; how the security situation and the gang problem are evolving; how effective the work of police, local authorities, and private security firms has been and how it is changing; and awareness of local CVP organizations and activities.

The baseline data informed the development of the local CVP plans and was used for comparison to data from intermediate/follow-up evaluations using the same framework. The risk maps and household surveys were designed to facilitate before-and-after comparisons that measure change in perceptions, practices, and attitudes relevant to assessing effects and impacts.

**Four intermediate evaluations.** The potential to compare baseline data to that of later surveys was realized in the four municipalities targeted in Phase 1: Altavista, Armenia, Izalco, and San Salvador District 6. CVPP conducted intermediate evaluations after an interval of 14 to 22 months (see Table 3 below) to measure the change that had occurred in perceptions, attitudes, participatory risk maps, and the police reports while the CVPP interventions took place. Data collection was completed by July 2010.

No subsequent survey data were collected in these municipalities or the 10 other sites with baseline studies; therefore, no longer-term comparisons are available. The results of these four intermediate evaluations were promising, and, as noted below, it is clear that the municipal CVP processes continued to mature, making it probable that future studies would have shown more dramatic improvements. If data had been collected in 2012, they might have been able to provide information on aspects of sustainability as well, since these four sites had “graduated” during or at the end of Phase 2 in 2011.

**Annual self-evaluations by the CMPVs.** At municipal level, CMPVs conducted annual self-evaluations of their progress in relation to plans and of the current overall situation of violence and crime in the municipality. Initially led by CVPP facilitators and then turned over to CMPVs, these procedures follow criteria defined by the municipalities following CVPP guidelines. The results have not been synthesized across the project as a whole.

**Systematizations of components.** Systematizations of processes carried out, as well as handbooks, training manuals, or implementation guides, have been developed on a score of topics (see the Results Section, below, and the publications list in the References Section).

**Impact studies.** USAID contracted Vanderbilt University to conduct impact studies on two of the CVPP target municipalities (Zaragoza and San Juan Opico), as well as others in the Creative Associates intervention zone (Santa Ana, Chalchuapa). The studies’ results will provide insight on the degree of change achieved in the targeted communities. However, no information on the studies or their results has been shared with the CVPP team, their GOES counterparts, or the participating communities (at least one of which has refused to continue to allow data to be collected under those conditions, which it considers exploitative and unethical).

## Issues not fully addressed

In retrospect, this M&E effort was quite different than was originally conceived. The difference becomes clear when reviewing the objectives and expected results in the cooperative agreement (reproduced in Annex 5). The program description in the cooperative agreement expressed the idea that M&E would be integrated with project management. Rather than being external to local and national activities, tracking these activities' performance but not contributing to their results, M&E was conceived as an integral component of the learning processes induced by the project. At the local level, M&E was planned as a means to build capacity to follow progress after the end of the project, increasing effectiveness and sustainability. This original conception is reflected in the following excerpts from the program description in the cooperative agreement:

### **Subactivity 1.5 Build local capacity to monitor progress, evaluate results, and to adjust as needed.**

Local monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity will be developed based on capabilities acquired and procedures learned from project Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (PMEP) tasks, adopting many aspects to follow local progress after the end of the project (EOP). With inputs from CVPP [technical assistance] TA and training, the monitoring of local crime and violence indicators will be included in municipal CVP plans. Indicators will be determined in consultation with the local PNC and the national indicators list to be developed under Action 2. Baselines will be measured at the start of each municipal CVP project; M&E routines will be established; and local capacity to track and map crime patterns will be improved as will capacity to analyze results and share conclusions with participants, partners, national actors, and violence observatories (Cooperative Agreement, p. 15).



### **E.R. 1A Crime and gang activity reduced in targeted communities of selected municipalities**

- i. Increase in perceived citizen security in target communities/municipalities and satisfaction with local authorities (reflected in surveys conducted yearly by local people).
- ii. Lower indices of specific crimes and gang activity (e.g., homicides, robberies, and domestic violence; from standardized list to be developed under Objective 2) (Annex 5).

### **Illustrative Indicator 1.5: # of municipalities monitoring CVP results and sharing them with an observatory (Cooperative Agreement, p. 23).**

At the national level, GOES M&E capabilities were to be strengthened during implementation:

### **E.R. 2D National capabilities for monitoring, evaluation, systematization enhanced and in use**

- i. Key indicators selected for national and municipal use (e.g., homicides, etc.)



- ii. Baseline methodology developed for national and local levels
- iii. Case studies, best practices systematized, published, and disseminated (Annex 5)

The expected results and illustrative indicators addressed questions of impact, both directly and using surrogate measures. At the local level, this is reflected in the aforementioned expected results and by Illustrative Indicator 1.1 on perceived security and satisfaction with authorities (below), as well as by the GOES and municipal data on crime rates that was to be used and

shared with USAID but not reported as an indicator (because of lack of control over external factors):

**1.1: Degree of security felt by community and degree of satisfaction with authorities**

Data to be used by the CVPP and shared with USAID: % decrease of specific crimes (e.g., homicide, domestic violence, etc.) (Cooperative Agreement, p. 23).

These original expectations were lowered or largely eliminated in the course of project implementation, beginning with the agreement on the Phase 1 M&E Plan (which omitted measurement of perceived security in target communities/municipalities and satisfaction with local authorities—items that RTI had tracked successfully in previous projects).

Thus, although the project has achieved many of its goals, the opportunity to demonstrate impact, either directly or via surrogate effect indicators, was not fully exploited. The evidence for success is subjective and testimonial rather than analytical. Additionally, the CMPVs are not as well prepared to continue monitoring their own results as they might have been.

**LESSON LEARNED.** Playing it safe by lessening commitment to measure impact when negotiating an M&E plan can waste an excellent opportunity to demonstrate an organization’s expertise and strength in implementation by documenting outstanding results. It may also lessen the efficiency, self-sufficiency, and sustainability of the local CVP operations left in place.

# Results

In CVPP, RTI and its local partners have exceeded the results expected, surpassing targets for creating municipal CVP councils (CMPVs), catalyzing civic action, improving citizen security, helping develop a model crime and violence observatory, training national and municipal GOES staff, designing technical and policy tools, engaging the private sector, and leveraging resources via private-sector partnerships.

CVPP's most fundamental accomplishment has been contributing to a new approach to address crime and violence in El Salvador. Rather than continuing to rely on repressive measures as almost the only solution, GOES programs now support the use of preventative approaches. That shift in national policy has been largely due to CVPP's demonstration of the feasibility and usefulness of RTI's participatory community-based, municipal-led approach to violence prevention, by fostering strengthened CMPVs and/or violence observatories in 18 municipalities. It has been paralleled by a broadening of attitudes in GOES sectors and the press about how to address crime and violence.

Other main accomplishments to date are the following:

- i. An increase in citizen participation in CVP and the consolidation of municipal capacity to organize CVP in 86 targeted communities at 15 locations in 14 municipalities (Annex 1)
- ii. Strengthened capability of municipalities to cooperate with CSOs to implement a gamut of CVP activities and carry out local CVP plans (Annex 2)
- iii. Participation in the development of improved policy and practices at the national and local levels to reduce crime, violence, and the impact of gangs
- iv. Support for development of Santa Tecla's model Municipal Violence Prevention Observatory (strengthened through small grant support only)
- v. Capacity building and the development of materials to enable the national and local governments and civil society to maintain and expand all of these



measures and CVP program coverage in coming years. This includes guiding work in three additional municipalities that have begun to organize CMPVs under the leadership of facilitators-in-training from the agency charged with replication (PREPAZ).

The CVPP results that have contributed to this evolution in perceptions, attitudes, capacities, and actions are discussed below under two headings:

1. Performance as measured by the indicators initially agreed upon under the cooperative agreement, with subsequent additions to accommodate expanded project activities
2. Achievements reflected in products and outcomes not covered by the indicators.

Both categories of achievements are summarized in relation to the expected results in Annex 6.

## Performance as Measured by the Indicators

The cumulative indicator reports consolidated in Annex 3 focus on processes rather than outcomes. With that limitation, they reflect a high level of performance. Of the 45 indicators used, more than three-quarters attained at least 100% of the target levels (35 of 45; see Table 2, below); 60% exceeded 100% of targets. Of the



remaining indicators, 9% reached 50% to 99% of target levels; 13% (6) were below 50%, with two of those at zero. The more important indicators, those central to the overall success of the project, consistently met or exceeded the target levels.

A note on procedure: many of the 106 indicators originally enumerated in the quarterly results reports were repetitious, with the same indicator listed up to four times to disaggregate performance in different activities, phases, or locations. These separate listings were consolidated into 54 unique indicators, combining both target levels and accumulated results across all listings. Nine of those 54 had not been used by agreement with USAID, due to changed circumstances, and were reported as zeros. These indicators were eliminated to obtain the final list of 45 indicators. Indicators at the zero level were maintained in cases where the zero represented under-performance or under-reporting rather than an agreed-upon change in the set of indicators in use (there are two such cases).

**Table 2. Indicator Performance Levels**

Levels of performance (% of target)	Activities in which indicator appears				Total
	Both 1 and 3	Activity 1 only	Activity 3 only	Activity 2	
> 100%	19	2	2	4	27
= 100%	1	1	2	4	8
50% – 99%	2		1	1	4
1% – 49%			2	2	4
= 0%		1		1	2
<b>Totals</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>45</b>

Source: Annex 3, excluding unused indicators.

Table 2, Indicator Performance Levels, reflects these high levels of performance in the first two rows, greater than 100% compliance (27 indicators) and 100% (8 indicators). It also shows that four indicators reached between 50% and 99% of target levels, four were above zero but less than 50%, and two were at zero. According to accounts by CVPP staff, each of the zero indicators had been substantially complied with, but proper, timely documentation had not been submitted.

**Highlights**

- The number of communities that participated in CVP programs via CVPP was 86, which is 47% more than the 59 anticipated.
- The number of women (217) elected to CMPVs was more than four times the target of 47.
- 100% of small grants had cost sharing from third-party contributions, better than the 95% targeted.
- More than twice as many municipal staff and six times as many community representatives received CVPP training in CVP modules as had been targeted.
- The number of communities with CVP programs where the social risk factors reported by participatory (spoken) maps decreased by 5% or more was twice the targeted number.
- The number of communities in CVP programs where social protection factors reported by participatory mapping increased by 5% or more was triple the targeted number (actually far more than triple, but many cases were not fully documented).
- The small grants program trained 55% more subgrantees than targeted (31) in presenting sound proposals, managing grants in accordance with RTI and USAID rules and regulations, and communicating their results effectively.
- 394% more small grants than targeted were approved by CMPVs in support of their CVP plans (71 grants [Annex 2] rather than 18).
- 2,513 youths received vocational and basic education training rather than the original target of 1,400 (180%).
- 803 youth leaders received leadership training instead of 525 (153% of target).
- 208 national-level GOES staff received CVPP training in CVP modules and activities rather than 20 (more than 10 times the target).
- 260% of targeted GOES partner agencies (13 agencies versus 5) made financial or in-kind contributions with HCOLC funds to CVPP projects.

## Achievements, Products, and Outcomes Not Specified by Indicators

Many of CVPP's contributions are not fully captured by the indicator framework. These will be explored here in three sections: some illustrative highlights, a summary of the available evaluation data (measuring before and after CVPP interventions), and a discussion of salient themes such as gender.

### ALTAVISTA A Success Story that Faltered and Recovered

Predating CVPP, a pilot project in Altavista began in 2007 in response to serious gang-related crime and violence in a densely populated housing development that spans parts of three municipalities. Under one of the first CMPVs, community organization to provide safer spaces, lighting, sports facilities, and community policing brought initial success. However, lack of association with a particular municipality and failure to provide for independent legal standing limited stable access to public- and private-sector resources. Long-range planning was made difficult by the nebulous and overlapping relationships with the municipalities.

During the period of 2009–2012, all three local governments were in the hands of a single party (this party was also leading the national government). Activists from that party had a majority in the Altavista CMPV. Close coordination and plentiful support from each of the municipalities was secured through political affinity rather than via more permanently structured relationships. Results were excellent in the short term: the CVP programs prospered; violence and gang influence were perceived as having abated. The Altavista program was among the four seen to be sustainable and “graduated” from CVPP support in 2011.

When the governing party lost all three mayors' offices in the 2012 municipal elections, the CMPV remained in the power of what was now the opposition party. None of the three local governments continued to support the CMPV; budgetary flows that had supported salaries and programs were cut off. The Altavista CVP program fell into crisis and seemed on the brink of disappearing.



But wiser heads and strong community organization prevailed. Governance arrangements were restructured to attach the CMPV to the Tonacatepeque municipality (where 60% of the Altavista territory is located), and non-partisan community leaders replaced the party activists. A new action plan was developed. After a rocky transition, core CVP programs are back on track, running sustainably with no CVPP inputs.

**LESSONS LEARNED** include the importance of the following:

- Legal standing and permanent resource flows for sustainability, usually via formal integration into local government programs
- A non-partisan political stance, based on meeting consensus needs of an at-risk population

Interview, November 15, 2012.

## Highlights

The following list summarizes CVPP's innovative results beyond those foreseen, both broad and narrow:

- CVPP has worked in more municipalities and communities than anticipated, and these efforts have been continued and expanded in many instances. Previous to RTI's CVPP work, CVP efforts were spotty and isolated. Linking them to the local participatory development processes has made them consensus-based and non-partisan, tied to local development, sustainable, and potentially replicable to the rest of the country and beyond.
- All four of the original CMPVs, begun in 2007 and 2008, continue to function a year after interventions stopped (Altavista, Armenia, Izalco, and San Salvador District 6).
- No CMPV process has been lost to electoral change. Altavista had some problems after the 2012 municipal elections, in which all three component municipalities changed parties, but is now functioning again after restructuring. RTI's steady non-partisan stance has allowed the CVP programs to continue unaffected by changes in governments in the 2009 and 2012 local elections and the 2009 national election.
- More than 60 small infrastructure projects improved safe spaces for use by youth and adults: neighborhood sports fields, community centers, better lighted bus stops, etc. The beneficiary communities and municipalities contributed local counterpart investments.
- More than 8,000 youths were trained in job skills and entrepreneurship in programs supported by the CMPVs through small grants and local matches. These youth developed skills through hands-on courses in more than 20 subject areas. Demand was highest for computer operation and maintenance, baking and food preparation, cosmetology, clothing design and fabrication, and auto maintenance.
- Innovative programs in high-risk neighborhoods have offered Creative Conflict Resolution training and psychological support to more than 7,000 vulnerable children, youth, and adults.
- More than 500 families have received socio-psychological support from the Strong Families program developed by *Fe y Alegría* in San Salvador District 6. Resources mobilized by *Fe y Alegría* enabled this support to continue in 2012, a year after CVPP funding finished, showing the potential sustainability of such efforts by partners.
- Sustainable local finance mechanisms are working in at least half of the CVPP municipalities; RTI has received considerable private-sector support for CVP processes, both by building up *Fundación Empresarial para el Desarrollo Educativo's* (FEPADE's) contacts and by approaching firms working in at-risk municipalities with the local CMPV.
- CVPP played an active role in developing the EPV. In 2009 and 2012, RTI supported the planning phases and GOES activities to roll out both the first EPV and its updated version to cover a wide range of municipalities.
- CVPP led training workshops using project-developed materials on the EPV to train PREPAZ staff and three CMPVs fostered by PREPAZ in late 2012.
- When Creative Associates was asked to carry out a similar CVP approach in three municipalities, the CVPP team facilitated a learning process and helped make contacts with a key GOES agency (SSDTD) and municipalities where RTI had worked in the past on participatory local development processes.
- Three model outreach centers have been founded through CMPVs and are operating sustainably for at-risk youth: two in Nahuizalco and one in Nejapa.
- A collaborative relationship has been established with the PNC through RTI's longstanding work with them on CVP projects, in developing improved data collection and analysis systems, and in developing the procedures handbook on community policing (IDHUCA, 2011b).
- Youth now actively participate in local initiatives, especially those aimed at supporting younger children. These youth have assumed leadership roles in community processes and present proposals to CMPVs for programming.

- The grant management system handled 71 grants and is recognized as a technical advance contributed by CVPP. RTI developed a guide for use in future projects with small grants (RTI, 2012d).
- CVPP provided key technical support and funding to strengthen Santa Tecla's Municipal Violence Prevention Observatory.
- RTI has instituted human subject study standards and certification for surveys that meet US Federal requirements, such as providing for fully informed consent and avoiding queries that might harm subjects.
- CVPP developed a cell phone-based wireless crime reporting system in Santa Tecla, leveraging private-sector and UNDP funding. With QualComm grants and RTI training and technical assistance, it is being extended to six municipalities selected as pilots from the 14-municipality Greater San Salvador Metropolitan Area.
- Manuals, guides, toolkits, and supporting materials have been developed and validated on a range of topics (see References Cited):
  - Participatory CMPV set-up and operation (RTI and CECl, 2010; IDHUCA, 2011a; ISD, 2011a)
  - How to facilitate participatory community-based CVP processes (RTI and CECl, 2009a, 2010)
  - Communications strategies for communities (RTI and CECl, 2011)
  - Training in culture of peace and citizen coexistence (RTI and CECl, 2009, n.d.)
  - Crime and violence observatory set-up and operation (IDHUCA, 2009, 2011c)
  - Monitoring and evaluation for observatories and CMPVs (IDHUCA, 2011d)
  - Municipal gender violence policy (IDHUCA, 2011a)
  - Crime and violence prevention policies in Central America (FUNDAUNGO, 2009)
  - Community victimization surveys (RTI, 2012a)
  - Community police handbook (IDHUCA, 2011b)
  - Conflict mediation (IDHUCA, 2011e)
  - Services available for youth in El Salvador (Diakonia, 2010)
  - The small grant management process for USAID/RTI projects (RTI, 2012d)
  - Procedures for transfer of municipal small grant funds to local CVP organizations (GMP-Santa Tecla, n.d.)
- Systematizations
  - The La Chacra (San Salvador District 6) community-based CVP process (Galdamez, 2012)
  - The comparative inventory of CVP policy in Central America (FUNDAUNGO, 2009)
  - The Strong Families intervention in La Chacra (Fe y Alegría, 2011)
  - Conflict Mediation in Santa Tecla (IDHUCA, 2011e)
  - Systematization of the CVPP as a whole (this document)



# Before-and-After Evaluation Data

The indicator framework adopted by agreement with USAID in the M&E plans did not include impact measurement or effect indicators, and thus the CVPP was not obliged to report on them. Indeed, measuring impact directly by showing reductions in crime and violence levels linked to project activity would be a complex task. Among the reasons is that crime and violence rates fluctuate on a larger scale in response to factors beyond the project's control. Between 2008 and 2009, for example, homicide rates grew by 38% in the country as a whole, although they dropped by 9% in both the preceding and following years. Since May 2012, homicide rates have dropped by more than half nationally due to a truce between the main gangs. Attempts to measure the impact of CVPP on homicide rates at specific localities would have to show results that were clearly in addition to those broader patterns. Similar challenges arise in comparing other crime rates.

A second level of complication is introduced by the difficulty of getting accurate and comparable before-and-after data in the high-risk communities being targeted, due to the danger of working there (especially to outsiders) and the fear of many residents to respond candidly or even to be seen collaborating with the study. Outsiders cannot obtain baseline information, and it cannot be obtained before the inception of activities. Instead, confidence-building work has to start, participatory risk mapping and diagnostics have to be underway, and a rapport must be established with local youth who can be trained as survey interviewers. It takes several months before reasonably accurate baseline data can be obtained. Later, when measurements are repeated, greater accessibility, decreased fear, and the presence of a cadre of trained census takers may provide more abundant and more accurate information, but comparability may be affected. For instance, if more people characterize the gang problem as getting worse, as happened at Altavista (see Table 3), it may be either because that is how it is perceived or because more people were openly talking about the gang problem (i.e., increase in empowered citizenry and decreased fear of gang reprisals for speaking out).

**Baseline studies.** Despite these difficulties, CVPP conducted 14 baseline studies in as many municipalities. The questionnaires included basic information about the geography and population of the places targeted; participatory (spoken) mapping of risk and protection factors; summaries of police data on crime reports; and carefully designed surveys to measure knowledge, attitudes, perceptions, and practices (KAPP) on a series of topics. Most of these do not directly address the question of impact but serve as proxy or surrogate variables. The KAPP data permit assessment of householders' opinions on the prevalence and danger of crime and violence in their neighborhood and homes, the degree of problems with gangs, measures adopted to lower risk in the home and the neighborhood, the effectiveness of the police, the existence and efficacy of CVP activities, and similar topics. In addition, respondents are asked about the tendency for change in these areas—whether the situations with citizen security, violence, crime, gangs, police response, and CVP programs are perceived as improving or worsening. In most areas, redundancy is used: multiple questions addressing similar aspects are asked in different ways to produce a more robust composite portrait. Even with redundancy, the total number of questions is less than three dozen, organized in hierarchies so that not all must be asked of every respondent. Well done and well presented, the baseline studies are a key product of the project and have been used effectively in the local processes to select priority communities and to formulate CVP plans.

**Intermediate evaluations.** In the first four cases in which baselines were established (Phase 1), a second measurement was made 17 to 25 months later and analyzed comparatively. A summary of the comparisons is given in Table 3 below. The original intermediate evaluation reports are much more extensive and well worth examining (RTI, 2012a, 2012e, 2012f, and 2012g). Unfortunately, additional comparative measurements were not conducted, despite the promising results—especially given the short time



spans covered by the comparisons and the improved approaches used at later sites.

Among the results in these four intermediate evaluations are the following:

- Police records in all show a reduction in crime reported in the second evaluations. The overall effect was a decrease from 239 to 139 crimes reported in a standardized period, a reduction of 42%.
- Risk factors identified in participatory (spoken) mapping significantly increased in two municipalities but decreased to a lesser extent in the other two.
- Protection factors increased in all four municipalities, in part due to actions taken under the municipal CVP plans, but the effect was much lower in Izalco than in the other three municipalities.
- The perception that there is only a low or very low chance of being a crime victim increased, as might be expected, everywhere but in Armenia, where more respondents felt vulnerable than 19 months before.
- The neighborhood security situation was perceived as improving by more of the population in the

second evaluation at each site, although in Izalco and Armenia this was still a minority view.

- Knowledge of local CVP activities increased at each of the sites, in some cases more than doubling. However, by the second evaluation, only 2.4% to 27% of respondents were aware of CVP activities, not a high level overall. It would be of great interest to learn how that evolved subsequently.

Some of the overall results raise questions that warrant further investigation. For example, investigating the sharp rise in risk factors mapped at Izalco and Altavista or the very low level of knowledge about local CVP activities in Armenia can lead to programmatic adjustments to improve future results. Such improvements could be made in each place by the CMPVs as they continue their work, including periodic surveys, after CVPP support has ended.

These surveys are relatively simple to conduct after community engagement has occurred and are well documented. Local CMPVs could conduct these follow-up surveys because they have been trained and mentored by CVPP facilitators. The youth who administered

**Table 3. Change in Crime Reports and Citizen Perceptions Where Before-and-After Surveys Were Conducted**

Place	Trends of Results									
	Source =>	Police Records	Participatory Mapping		Perception Surveys					
	Survey Dates	Crimes Reported	Risk Factors Mapped	Protection Factors Mapped	Chance of Being Crime Victim is Low	Security Situation in Neighborhood is Improving	Gangs are a Serious Problem	Gang Problem Getting Worse	Police Improved in Past Year	Knowledge of Local CVP Activities
<b>Izalco</b>	May 2008–June 2010	Down 10% 21 to 19	Up 58% 73 to 115	Up 13% 8 to 9	Up 5% 22% to 27%	Up 16% 19% to 35%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a. Up 8% 6% to 14%	Up 8% 6% to 14%
<b>Altavista</b>	Sept 2007–Feb 2009	Down 36% 102 to 65	Up 92% 39 to 71	Up 57% 23 to 36	Up 9% 9% to 18%	Up 15% 87% to 72%	Down 3% 88% to 85%	Up 4% 3 5% to 39%	Up 9% 35% to 43%	Up 15% 9% to 24%
<b>Armenia</b>	Sept 2008–July 2010	Down 54% 48 to 22	Down 13% 55 to 48	Up 67% 9 to 15	Down 23% 42% to 19%	Up 9% 11% to 20%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Up 1% 1.6% to 2.4%
<b>La Chacra/ San Salvador Distr. 6</b>	Sept 2008–May 2010	Down 51% 68 to 33	Down 29% 68 to 48	Up 50% 18 to 27	Up 32% 20% to 52%	Up 48% 21% to 69%	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Up 6% 21% to 27%

Sources: RTI, 2012a, 2012e, 2012f, and 2012g.

the KAPP questionnaires were local and could recruit and train peers for future evaluations. The potential for contributing to evidence-based decision making, to fundraising among local businesses that want to see proof of results, to gaining further political support, and thus to sustainability is evident.

**LESSON LEARNED.** Simple results surveys appear to be a feasible and valuable tool for managers of local CVP projects to use periodically to assess impact, identify weaknesses, inform stakeholders of results, and garner political and material support.

In general, the results of these four intermediate evaluations reflect substantial and consistent positive outcomes for CVPP, especially considering the short time periods covered. Crime reports decreased and presumably overall crime and violence as well. Perceptions of the situation were positive. Protection factors were on the rise, as was awareness of the CVP programs in each municipality.

Many other aspects reported by the surveys, not shown here, also supported that conclusion, as well as pointed toward some potentially educational inconsistencies or shortcomings. Assessment of the conditions in 2012 at these and the other 11 sites where baselines were established would have provided valuable information.

### Other Sources of Before-and-After Evaluation Data

It is anticipated that the Vanderbilt University impact study that has been independently contracted by USAID will provide information on the outcomes of the CVPP activities in a dozen communities in Zaragoza and San Juan Opico. Two types of communities are being followed for comparison: those targeted by CVPP and others that are similar but not targeted. Neither the identity of the control groups, the nature of the survey, nor the preliminary results of the study have been revealed to date.



### Salient Crosscutting Themes

CVPP produced several results in crosscutting areas that are particularly important. Among them are those regarding gender balance and equity, visibility and leadership of youth, capacity for self-adjustment of municipal CVP programs, and improved community-police relations.

**Gender of participants.** Improving on some initial expectations, women were equally or better represented than men in training events and decision-making bodies, as well as in the CVPP staff. The 538 female community representatives trained in CVP methods, 57.2% of the total (Indicator 1.L, Annex 3), was significantly more than the 403 men ( $P < 0.001$ , based on a chi-square comparison to an even distribution). However, in other activities the ratio between the genders was not distinguishable—i.e., women and men were equally represented. Women were 217 of 460 or 47% of the CMPV members elected in the 15 supported municipalities (Indicator 1.E). However, this result is not statistically significant. Similarly, the number of female municipal staff trained in CVPP’s participatory CVP methodology (47), though somewhat greater than the number of males (38), was not statistically distinct



## Gang Youth Turning Their Lives Around

When a CVPP job skills program began in San Bartolo, Ilopango, it targeted non-gang youth at risk on the streets and in the schools. But 23 local gang members saw a chance to learn skills, become employed, and reintegrate into society, leaving illegal activity aside.

They approached the mayor and the CMPV to work out an arrangement: their group would be trained in metal work and entrepreneurship; in return, they committed to no longer loiter around the school or harass local youth, and to repair a sports field and a community center that needed metal work (it became their classroom). They also received the consent of their gang leadership.

While learning metal work, they took the initiative of practicing by doing community service, rehabilitating local structures in need of repair, like doors, balconies, and window bars of a childcare center and of neighborhood homes. Eight of the trainees were hired to perform repairs more widely by a CVPP-supported CSO.

After completing the internship, they formed a microenterprise to provide metal products and repairs in their neighborhood, as well as baked goods (some had previous training as bakers). With the owner's consent, they are repairing a gutted house to use as a shop, bakery, and living quarters. The mayor has donated an oven.

The CMPV job training program might have attracted opposition from the gang because it cut into their recruiting base; instead it has their support and participation. It has successfully engaged and reintegrated gang youth into the community, expanding CVPP's range of action.

Interview, November 14, 2012.

(Indicator 1.K). The CVP staff's gender ratio during the period of performance was never significantly different from even.

**Visibility and inclusion of youth.** An important but unquantified characteristic of the CVPP results is the project's success with engaging youth in leadership roles, with adults serving as advisors. This provided effective role models and sources of future leadership that could be widely appreciated. Outstanding examples were found in Nejapa, Zaragoza, Ciudad Arce, and the gang-affiliated youth of Ilopango who led a successful initiative that increased the inclusivity and impact of a local job training program (see text box).

**Capacity for self-adjustment.** In several municipalities, the local governments and/or CMPVs found the initial CVP programs lacking and took measures to adjust them to meet the communities' needs. Measures included changing the CMPV structure, its membership, the municipal CVP plan, the selection of target populations (as in permitting inclusion of gang members in job training in Ilopango; see text box), or decision-making processes. Examples include Armenia, which restructured the CMPV, engaged a more representative membership, and switched the target from in-school youth to more at-risk out-of-school youth. Parallel adjustments were made in Izalco, Zaragoza, and elsewhere.

**Improved relations between communities and police.** Closer work with the national PNC and municipal police has been both a success factor and a product of the CVPP. CMPVs include police representatives as members; plan ways to involve police with youth and communities in low-profile, non-repressive ways; and benefit from the improved coordination and two-way information flow that results. The Santa Tecla community policing model has been systematized in a handbook for police (IDHUCA, 2011b).

# Voices of Participants

During preparation of this systematization, interviews, focus groups, and workshops with participants at all levels gathered stakeholders' inputs on CVPP strengths and weaknesses; highlights and unanticipated products; and factors that influenced success, failure, and sustainability. Much of this information has been integrated into the preceding sections. A summary of those points that a number of participants found of particular value, more detailed and perhaps of narrower interest, is presented here. Additional information is found in Annex 7.

## Strengths of CVPP

### 1. CVPP approach to organization of local CVP programs (consensus of all respondents)

Positive, bottom-up approach to each municipality: RTI accepts existing municipal development processes and is seen as an ally, helping to focus on CVP needs and contributing with technical assistance and funding.

The organization of CMPVs is an effective model of democratic governance; participatory mapping and diagnosis of the situation in communities provides an objective basis for an informed and realistic prioritization process, resulting in an executable CVP plan that is more likely to be sustainable.

Focus on objective circumstances and actual needs, avoiding partisan considerations, earned widespread support and sustainability in the face of political changes.

RTI has earned the reputation of being a transparent, fair agent that can be trusted to work objectively, bringing together diverse actors to work together in pursuit of shared goals.

Both the catalytic role of RTI as link between mayor's office and the CMPV and the capacity to change the dynamic in municipalities from against CVP to supporting CVP initiatives (e.g., Zaragoza, Armenia, San Juan Opico, etc.) have been fundamental strengths.

### 2. Focus on youth as protagonists (CSO responses)

CVPP works in economically disadvantaged schools.

Training content reflects needs and aspirations of youth in communities as well as CVPP goals.

Innovative methods like peer education and youth camps can improve learning and consolidate networks of youth from different communities (in contraposition to the gangs' habit of impeding interchange between localities).

Citizenship is developed by youth working on local initiatives of their own that support neighborhood children.

Choice of strategic "neutral spaces" allows leaders and youth from settlements controlled by distinct gangs to convene.

Space is made for intergenerational support and growth among adult leaders and youth groups.

### 3. Community leadership trained in organization and advocacy for violence prevention (CSO respondents)

Relationships are built between communities by sharing training spaces, with mutual recognition of common problems and parallel histories.

Material can be tailored to the situation and needs of the community organizations.

Exchanges with model community CVP programs show examples of self-empowerment; appropriation of contents; and sustainability of organizational, educational, and advocacy activities.

Self-reliance is built through training in project development and resource mobilization.

Organizational skills and consolidation of CBOs around CVP activities further legitimates them.

### 4. Improvement of community infrastructure to support CVP plan (all participants)

CVP awareness building and education is included in the process of improving public spaces.



Community organizations lead the promotion of local participation in recuperation of spaces.

Mutual aid on infrastructure work by extensive mobilization (brigades) of neighbors and nearby communities avoids delays in completion.

Infrastructure work was often scheduled in the evening or on weekends to avoid interfering with day jobs.

Youth begin to use recuperated spaces even before work is finished.

The educational process culminates with training in the Operation and Maintenance Manual for the rehabilitated spaces in each community, contributing to sustainability.

#### 5. Small grants management (all participants)

CSOs are trained in the CVPP model of municipal/community CVP work.

Performance is monitored to assure work in close cooperation with the CMPV and the target communities.

#### 6. Family-centered, multi-generational orientation (CSO respondents)

Focus is on youth and gang reduction within a social and familial context.

Reinforcement of familial and intergenerational relationships is key to stabilizing, orienting, and motivating youth. This emphasis was developed during the project, based on the successful experience of partners such as *Fe y Alegría*, FUNPRES, and FUNDASAL.

### Lessons Learned: Errors or Missed Opportunities and Ways to Improve

- **Strengthening local capacity to manage and sustain CVP processes.** CMPV participants and CVPP staff identified weaknesses in three areas of municipal-level operations that are vital to long-term survival and renewal of participatory local

development processes: (1) the capacity to self-assess performance and make evidence-based improvements, (2) the ability to communicate effectively and engage with participating communities and other key audiences, and (3) the know-how to maintain essential resource flows via local fundraising and resource mobilization.

CMPV representatives interviewed had little knowledge of whether their activities had produced the in-depth results expected or how to adjust activities to improve impact. Some local representatives expressed surprise at the low levels of change in attitudes and in awareness of CVP activities revealed by the intermediate evaluations in two of the target municipalities. These responses indicate that the CMPVs had not been trained to assess the effects of their efforts, nor had they incorporated regular evaluation into their program activities, evaluation that could inform on levels of success and areas for improvement. These points apply as well to their local communication and resource mobilization activities. The CMPVs did not regularly disseminate news of activities nor request feedback on their programs. They also did not use participating youth to talk to families and neighbors about their activities and the possibility of becoming involved. In addition, their responses revealed that, with some exceptions, they were not working closely with the local business community and had little knowledge of how to engage it in support of violence prevention and gang reduction activities in areas of interest to those firms. These gaps could be closed, as was shown in a few exceptional cases, by working with facilitators—both CVPP and partner staff—to develop more results-oriented approaches and to model them in their own work. This should be reinforced by a more robust M&E strategy, inclusive and participatory communication activities, and resource mobilization coordinators who would apply strategic approaches and hands-on learning processes.

- **Small grants.** The performance of CSO partners in carrying out small grant projects was not sufficiently supervised, nor was the CMPV put in a position to play that role fully, according to CMPV members and some CVPP staff. CMPVs felt at times that CSO partners worked too independently of the approved plans. The CSOs noted that changes made in their work plans by RTI and cuts in their budgets were not communicated to the communities, resulting in expectation gaps. (Original project plans often exceeded budgetary limitations, and not every aspect of those plans was always approved. Unaware of changes made during the approval process, CMPVs and communities wanted CSOs to comply with their original proposals.)
- **Use of international CSO partners.** This did not work well in most cases. The CSOs were well qualified for selection, but during implementation, they did not always adhere to community decisions and priorities, nor were accounts rendered transparently to CMPVs. With some exceptions, these CSOs tended to be oriented toward RTI as the client, not toward the CMPVs and the communities where they had projects to carry out.
- **Process over outcome: emphasis on quantity rather than quality.** At times, CVPP appeared to award small grant projects as rapidly as possible, with facilitators concentrating on getting grants approved and set in motion, ignoring other priorities. Intervention schedules often did not include enough time to encourage quality work, both initially in fostering CMPV establishment and planning and later for the small grants. This lack of sufficient time limited thoughtful development of careful, lasting efforts as well as outcome measurement.
- **Selection of municipalities.** The selection process might have been improved by avoiding places where local organization was weak or the mayor was uncooperative. Several locations in this category experienced a reversal before eventually achieving positive results, but the costs of lost time and resources during a difficult year or more limited the potential for achievements on other fronts.
- **Communication strategies and tactics.** CVPP and RTI were less than optimally visible, both locally and nationally. The same was true in most places for CMPV efforts and the local CVP activities organized. The insufficient visibility was reflected in the low levels of public awareness about the CVP programs measured in target communities in the four intermediate evaluation surveys, conducted after roughly two years of presence at each municipality (only 2.4%–27% of respondents knew about the efforts; see Table 3). A few local communication efforts excelled, setting an example of what could be achieved.
- **Strategic alliance with MINED.** The CVPP project missed an opportunity to scale up successful CVP work with the local and regional school systems in many municipalities to the national level. A strategic alliance with MINED could build on the outreach potential of the *escuelas abiertas*, among other programs, taking advantage of MINED’s universal presence; resources; and ability to work with at-risk students, families, and communities.
- **Private-sector partnership.** In many municipalities, development of alliances with the private sector and other potential sources of support was limited. Some CMPVs were successful in relating to the local private sector, as in San Juan Opico. Other exceptions were mostly organized by the CVPP management rather than the CMPVs; these efforts were successful but not clearly sustainable. Examples include the work with FEPADE and its board, which potentially will be sustained, and several one-off successful efforts that have not been continued or built on: APPEX/BBDO provided media and communication designs for free; the *Tres Puntos* Store sold Felix and Pax tee-shirts to raise funds; Wal-Mart provided venues in Armenia, Alta Vista, and Izalco for Felix and Pax events; Shell



Oil funded Junior Achievement for Alta Vista; and *Grupo Roble* co-financed the Altavista Sports Complex rehabilitation. In a recent case where La Constancia supported vocational training for youth in Nejapa and Soyapango, sustainability is more likely, given the manner in which local protagonists were put to work directly with the firm's social responsibility team to agree on a joint program. CMPV initiatives in both Zaragoza and Nejapa, advised by a CVPP facilitator, engaged local businesses via breakfast presentations and led to successful support for youth employment programs and other activities in late 2012.

Attention could be given to (1) extending the municipal organization effort to involve the private sector with the CMPV and its working committees (as in San Juan Opico), (2) training CMPV operatives on how to create confidence and show firms ways to design and place successful investments in CVP, and (3) creating a component for the private sector that focuses on youth employability. The experience with La Constancia has been very positive, but the partnership has come at the end of the project, too late to build on its outcomes. Project outcomes would have benefitted from the incorporation of a hands-on specialist in local private-sector resource mobilization to lead learning-by-doing activities in the municipalities.

- **False economies in staffing.** CVPP experienced gaps in some areas, which coincided with staffing reductions. One such area was communications, especially in terms of strengthening local-level efforts, essential for establishing alliances with potential funders and collaborators, maintaining public awareness, and generating support. Expertise in developing local fundraising talent was not provided at the municipal level, despite having been planned for originally. Better supervision and accompaniment of facilitators (perhaps by a head facilitator) could have avoided inefficacious activities and increased impact in locations that experienced initial conflicts such as Armenia, San Juan Opico, and Zaragoza.
- **Management of partners.** Not only CMPV and CVPP staff, but partner CSOs themselves expressed the need to cultivate fuller interactions by CMPVs and CVPP staff with small grant holders on a technical level. (In contrast, the administrative grants management relationships appeared to be satisfactory.) This would include more engagement—for example, meeting with CSO partners periodically for exchange of ideas and mutual feedback. This type of hands-on approach would increase coordination and help facilitate more effective interventions. (The CSOs in the workshop for this systematization pointed out that the workshop was their first chance to compare notes and learn from each other and from CVPP staff in an informal setting. This opportunity to learn need not have waited to the end of the project.) At the municipal level, CMPV capacity should be built to provide closer, more supportive management of CSO partners leading small grant CVP activities. When multiple interventions are being planned or carried out simultaneously, appropriate mechanisms should be established for coordination.

- **Supportive supervision of facilitators.** Mechanisms to provide supportive supervision and back-up for facilitators in the field, engaging with them to review and analyze the complex situations that they must address, would help standardize approaches, aid them to develop options and avoid potential issues, reduce delays in project implementation, and raise morale. Medical and psychological practitioners consult with professional colleagues or supervisors for similar purposes. Such a practice would have helped avoid some of the frustrations and loss of time and resources in complicated settings like those of Armenia, Izalco, Zaragoza, or San Juan Opico. A project as large and complicated as CVPP can ill afford to trust its results to unaided individual efforts, no matter how dedicated the individuals. Nor is it fair that individuals be left to defend institutional priorities and address problems with institutional collaborators in isolation, especially when acrimonious situations arise.
- Other specific suggestions** from the participants include the following. Additional participant comments have been gathered in Annex 7.
- Improve integration with secondary and tertiary prevention; take into account the dynamics of violence for interventions with at-risk youth, particularly those who have family members in gangs. One lesson learned has been that the reality of at-risk youth and their families often cannot be separated from the level of gang members, who are often the sons, brothers, and cousins of community members, living in the same places, subject both to police action and to prevention and rehabilitation programs. Community support for prevention is greater where gang-associated loved ones whom they hope may be reformed are not simply written off and treated as the enemy, vulnerable to arrest on sight if they participate in activities like job training. Prevention programs lose efficacy if they draw the line too sharply.
  - Review and share with PREPAZ the draft on a system of municipal CVP indicators; help put it into pilot use.
  - Further empower the CMPVs by giving them more resources to manage directly. The pilot cases (e.g., Armenia) have shown that when given more responsibility, people tend to meet the challenge.
  - Increase project visibility, locally and nationally. Coordinate integrated inaugurations and closings, as well as sharing of annual evaluation and planning results, to create greater visibility for CVPP.
  - Strengthen the degree to which CVPP draws on the participatory local development movement, adapting or adopting approaches and tools that use or build on local development criteria.
  - Update the CVPP facilitation manual, combining it with case study examples of what facilitators can do in municipalities and how to do it, step by step.
  - Improve the induction of facilitators to familiarize them with CVPP methods and RTI's participatory approach to municipalities. Although the facilitators that are hired may be experienced, they are not necessarily familiar with CVPP methods.
  - Incorporate family-oriented, multi-generational psychosocial interventions more widely, building on the successes of *Fe y Alegría*, FUNPRES, and FUNDASAL.
  - Provide three years as a norm for the induction of municipal CVP programs, to allow for careful nurturing and maturing of processes and the development of sustainability.
  - Include organizational capacity building at the community level, as required. Target communities differed greatly in their previous organizational experience and skill levels. Some communities were inexperienced enough to undermine the CVP process, but they were not offered strengthening in key organizational skills.



- Build better local and national capacity to track CVP activities and results, enabling more evidence-based decision making, both during and after the project.
- Improve support and supervision (perhaps via peers) of facilitators; many of them have been in difficult situations without much input or the possibility to discuss options and develop wider perspectives.
- Prioritize a focus on settlements with fewer resources, less middle class in nature, nearer to the more intractable intra-familial and gang violence.
- The time used in promoting and obtaining small grants should not take away from the time needed to implement educational, organizational, and infrastructure activities.
- Focus more on preparing CMPVs to assume a leadership role in steering the project as a whole.
- Provide standard models for labels under the USAID/ RTI branding plan.

Factors found to enhance or limit success or sustainability are presented in Tables 4 and 5 below.

**Table 4. Factors that Enhance or Limit Success**

Type of Factor	Internal	External
<b>Enhances Success</b>	Tailoring municipal CVP plans to explicit community needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Availability of innovative construction technology to make infrastructure projects safer and quicker</li> <li>• Political will and support of mayors</li> <li>• Availability of GOES funding for target municipalities</li> <li>• External funding sources in target municipalities</li> <li>• Presence of other CVP or related projects (PROJOVENES, etc.)</li> </ul>
	Mapping and diagnostics of conditions on the ground helps make CVP plans realistic.	
	Availability of resources (small grants) to jump-start CVP plans	
	Regular CMPV meetings provide opportunities to share progress, address problems, and coordinate solutions.	
	Communities organized into networks.	
	Close coordination with local government: where coordination was weak, barriers arose and needed to be addressed.	
	Appropriation of project goals by both adults and youth	
	Use of local purveyors if feasible builds the local economy and buy-in.	
	Involvement of local schools and local, regional MINED officials	
	Non-partisan stance of CVPP and of CMPV plans, participants	
	Active participation of local actors in CMPVs, community steering groups, and approval of proposals for funding	
	Inter-generational involvement	
	The importance of the facilitator's role; the need for support and teamwork	
	Role of accompaniment, modeling, links to local actors	
	Rise of property values in neighborhoods after physical improvement projects are completed	
	Empowerment of CMPVs and community organizations (awareness and training); building capacity to sustain processes; follow-up by them on actions	
	Involvement of (government) service agencies in sustaining components	
	Social fabric organized, trained, strengthened	
	Coordination between RTI and CMPVs	
	Identification of capacities	
	Participation of entire families in the activities	
	Generation of confidence within the family units	
	Accessibility of psychological support and willingness of population to use it	
	Motivation of participants; identification of leaders (women and men)	
Teamwork among partners, leaders, all		
Consolidation, interest, inter-institutionality, and experience of CMPVs		
Influence of women, children and youth, local actors, institutions, working groups, CMPVs, and municipal councils—all working together		
Appropriation by communities of initiatives implemented at municipal level		

(continued)

**Table 4. Factors that Enhance or Limit Success (continued)**

Type of Factor	Internal	External
<b>Limits Success</b>	Lack of strategic alliance with MINED at national level: MINED shares the concern for CVP and has high levels of presence, resources, and contact with youth and communities, but these were not systematically engaged to increase program size, reach, and impact.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gang control of territory restricts movement and interchange among communities.</li> <li>• High-handed attitudes on the part of local leaders who assume overlapping roles (in CBOs, on CMPVs, etc.)</li> <li>• Initial opposition (passive or active) of a few mayors</li> <li>• Low organizational capacity in communities, particularly in urban areas</li> <li>• Partisan attitudes in municipal participants</li> <li>• Changes of government (not always smooth)</li> <li>• Internal conflicts of local governments</li> </ul>
	CSO partners did not participate in measuring indicators of violence reduction in target municipalities.	
	Organizational level in municipalities, communities often a limiting or facilitating factor (limiting in Armenia, Opico, etc.; facilitating in Nejapa, San Antonio del Monte)	
	Some CSO partners did not have previous experience in their municipalities.	
	Budgetary pressures on/from the mayor's office or municipal council; lack of budget lines for CVP	
	Lack of resources on the part of the donor, or of ability to approve certain types of interventions	
	Political attitudes on the part of some CSOs	
	Partners' lack of knowledge of CVP plan contents	
	<b>Small Grant Management</b>	
	Extremely short time periods for proposal development and implementation, especially for larger, more complex CSO projects	
	In some places, delay in award of small grants undermined results and limited community roles.	
	Implementation times were limited by overly long project proposal and approval processes.	
	CMPV expectations of small grant partners at times exceeded what was ultimately approved and financed. Unaware of changes made in the process, they demand compliance with the original proposals. Facilitators needed to intermeditate more.	

**Table 5. Factors that Enhance or Limit Sustainability**

Type of Factor	Internal	External
<b>Enhances Sustainability</b>	Municipal leadership in fostering democratic educational and organizational processes for youth and communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provision of local counterpart funding for new CVP activities carried out under local initiative</li> <li>• Awareness of private sector; existence of model business-supported CVP programs</li> <li>• Availability of support from national and international cooperation programs</li> </ul>
	Local government funding for sports fields, street lighting, video cameras to monitor danger zones, sports and arts programs	
	Municipal budget support for CVP plan	
	Interactions between communities forged mutual understanding and links.	
	Follow-up with operating and maintenance manuals in caring for infrastructure improvements	
	Engagement of local business, private-sector organizations	
	Good local communications strategies and implementation, connecting CVP programs to communities and public; capacity building for these strategies	
<b>Limits Sustainability</b>	Little preparation of CMPVs to conduct resource mobilization and establish partnerships with the private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Municipalities that carry out activities that support CVP but do not report them as such</li> <li>• Partisan attitudes in municipal participants</li> <li>• Impoverished condition of some municipalities</li> </ul>
	Somewhat "bare-minimum" approaches at times (low counterpart funding, doing participants' work, etc.)	
	Weak development of communications skills and capacities	
	Limited ability of CMPVs to track success and areas for improvement to adjust programs accordingly	

# Observations and Recommendations

## Recurring Themes

In addition to the factors discussed above, some salient themes emerged from different perspectives in the course of the systematization process, suggesting a robust consensus on the following points:

- A. The need to induce long-lasting, local processes in the context of a short-term, external project is key to sustainable outcomes. This contradiction introduces a certain dissonance or tension to this project and others. The perceived need to manage for compliance with short-term goals clearly limited the quality of some results.
  - i. Long-range time frames are needed to properly diagnose, plan, and nurture the participatory municipal development processes that underlie effective CVP programming; the project format limits long-range time frames, requiring results to be shown, albeit imperfect or incomplete ones, on what are often suboptimal time scales, undermining impact and sustainability.

In-depth evaluation of processes is needed—periodic measurement and comparison of evolving attitudes and perceptions—yet a project format

leads management to focus on process more than results and to be hesitant about committing to measure effects and impacts, especially those that may not become robust in a short time span.

Deeper evaluation drives a move toward creation of durable CVP programs and agencies, housed with their support systems in permanent institutions that can provide long-term frameworks.

- ii. Many of the problems identified in relation to CVPP by its participants were seen to derive from the short-term project focus that was required by the situation but may have been emphasized to a degree that limited the performance of the project.

Several examples have been discussed in previous sections; two instances that clearly illustrate this issue at different levels were (1) the elimination of comparative measurements as impact evaluation tools to demonstrate outcomes, discussed under the M&E section above; and (2) the greatly reduced time frame available for the small grant processes in some years (i.e., small grant projects such as vocational skills training and others



were designed, proposed, selected, implemented, and reported on by CSOs in periods as short as two to three months, affecting the degree to which maximizing quality and sustainability can be achieved). In both cases the decisions made were sound from a short-term view of project management, but less so in terms of the larger, long-term goal of building the strongest possible CVP programs.

**RECOMMENDATION.** RTI should work with host countries, donors, and project managers to position such projects as catalytic support mechanisms to initiate or strengthen ongoing programs, not as ends in themselves, and to provide for maturation of key processes, including time extensions where they would be cost-effective. A greater focus on demonstrable quality of the product rather than nominal compliance with processes can only enhance RTI's contributions.

B. A need for better local capacity building in three key areas—M&E, communications, and resource mobilization—would have improved project results.<sup>6</sup> Factors identified as in need of strengthening were the following:

- i. Integration of M&E into the learning processes implemented, especially at the local level, building capacity for before-and-after comparison of outcomes and ongoing support for evidence-based decision making
- ii. Local capability to develop communications strategies and mechanisms to inform and engage the populations of target communities and municipalities using available, inexpensive media
- iii. Municipal capacity to mobilize private-sector and civil-society support to sustain local CVP programs

<sup>6</sup> These items appear to have been casualties of the short-term project focus discussed in point A. Each was addressed in the proposal and the cooperative agreement but was not fully carried out for reasons of cost reduction and simplification.



C. Strengthening the management of CVPP facilitators is another factor that would almost certainly have improved outcomes.<sup>7</sup> Peer-led supportive supervision could have lessened the isolation of facilitators faced with resistant municipal authorities or other difficult situations and hastened the discovery of solutions, reducing time and resources lost while regaining profitable relationships. Although assigning time for supervisory and backstopping activities may have appeared expensive, losing momentum in a target municipality is far more costly.

D. Robust combinations of interventions (activities) in targeted communities, where favorable factors mutually reinforce each other, are important. This basic principle of development projects is clearly demonstrated here. It was fundamental to the success of the municipal and community-based CVP programs that were being promoted. This approach should be extended in future projects to include interventions in secondary and tertiary prevention (see G, below).

E. The need for a sustainable entity to oversee and maintain community-level CVP processes is critical. Indeed, under CVPP, municipalities were responsible for oversight and maintenance. The case of Altavista,

<sup>7</sup> Similar points could be made in favor of preparing CMPVs for closer, more supportive management of CSO partners leading small grant CVP activities.

where no single municipality was initially in charge, is instructive, as is that of Ahuachapán, where the municipality abstained from participation. Even when CMPV operations and CVP activities were at their peak, access to several types of resources was limited by the lack of adequate legal and institutional frameworks. This led to a change in governance in one case and closing the project in the other.

This is related to the need to link with other programs and agencies at multiple levels, to create a self-sustaining webwork of municipal progress: economic development, decentralization, education systems, social services, police, etc.

- F. The success and acceptance of RTI's structured yet participatory approach to inducing CVP in municipalities and their communities is clearly related to a wider necessity: that of consolidating democratic governance at the local level in general. RTI may be able to capitalize on its expertise in both areas.



- G. An obvious next step is to integrate CVPP's primary CVP with secondary and tertiary prevention measures. This will better enable municipalities to address the complex realities that arise in gang territory, where virtually all CVP participants and other community members have relatives, acquaintances, and daily encounters with people who are gang members. Many participants are themselves part of the gang support networks. Their motivation to support reduction of violence and development of opportunities for youth is often both powerful and complicated. It makes little sense to exclude implications for secondary and tertiary prevention from the family- and youth-oriented interventions being carried out for primary prevention when the different levels are intertwined in the complex relationships of the participants. Such complications should be embraced as opportunities and prepared for.

- H. For the future, RTI has identified needs and opportunities to extend and enhance El Salvador's violence prevention and citizen safety system, taking the CVPP experience to scale. This includes working with well-qualified national and local partners to build capacity within GOES that will enable it to attain its CVP goals, using El Salvador's rapidly consolidating institutional and policy frameworks. Fuller integration of primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention work is a priority that can be approached by tapping the expertise of the LA Mayor's Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (LA-GRYD) for strategic input and place-based, data-driven intervention models to implement and validate in one or more municipalities, training local service providers and GOES agencies to adapt in a culturally congruent manner the community-based, family-centered CVP principles and practices developed for areas impacted by Salvadoran gangs.



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# Annex I. Participating Municipalities and Communities

Municipality	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
<b>ACTIVITY I</b>			
<b>Armenia</b>	Barrio Nuevo Barrio San Juan Barrio San Sebastián Colonia San Damián Colonia Sigüenza Colonia Divina Providencia Colonia San Fernando II	Barrio Nuevo Barrio San Juan Barrio San Sebastián Colonia San Damián Colonia Sigüenza Colonia Divina Providencia Colonia San Fernando II	
<b>Ahuachapán</b>		Comunidad El Triunfo Comunidad Getsemani Comunidad Los Girasoles I Comunidad Los Girasoles II Comunidad La Labor Comunidad Los Ausoles Comunidad Los Cocos Comunidad Los Rodríguez Comunidad Santa Lucia	
<b>Izalco</b>	Colonia Las Palmeras Colonia Santa Emilia Colonia Lourdes Colonia San José Colonia Barrios San Juan Colonia Santa Cruz Colonia Galana	Colonia Las Palmeras Colonia Santa Emilia Colonia Lourdes Colonia San José Colonia Barrios San Juan Colonia Santa Cruz Colonia Galana	
<b>San Salvador</b>	Comunidad Francisco Morazán Comunidad la Chacra Comunidad Quiñonez I Comunidad Quiñonez II Comunidad San Luis I Comunidad San Martin Municipal	Comunidad Francisco Morazán Comunidad la Chacra Comunidad Quiñonez I Comunidad Quiñonez II Comunidad San Luis I Comunidad San Martin Municipal	
<b>Tonacatepeque</b>	4 communities in Altavista	4 communities in Altavista	Los Henriquez Comunidad Los Naranjos La Ermita
<b>Ilopango</b>			Colonia San Bartolo 9a etapa Colonia Bosque de la Paz Sector Santa Lucia Comunidad Dolores de Apulo Comunidad Banco Hipotecario
<b>San Martín</b>		Comunidad Tierra Virgen Comunidad Los Olivos Centro Comunidad Los Olivos Oriente Comunidad Los Olivos Poniente	Colonia Santa Gertrudis Lotificación San Andrés Valle las Delicias Proyecto Santa Teresa

Please note that the communities shaded gray are the same. CVPP continued working with the same communities during our phased implementation to maximize technical assistance and ensure impact.

(continued)

## Annex I. Participating Municipalities and Communities (continued)

Municipality	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
<b>Activity 3</b>			
<b>Ciudad Arce</b>		Comunidad Santa Rosa Comunidad Santa Lucia zona 1 Comunidad Santa Lucia zona 2 Comunidad San Andrés Urbanización San Francisco	Comunidad Santa Rosa Comunidad Santa Lucia zona 1 Comunidad Santa Lucia zona 2 Comunidad San Andrés Urbanización San Francisco
<b>Nahuizalco</b>		Caserío Centro de canton Pushtán Caserío Centro de canton Sisimitepec Comunidad Milagrosa II Comunidad Xochilt-Ixtatec Barrio Las Mercedes Barrio La Trinidad Barrio San Juan	Caserío Centro de canton Pushtán Caserío Centro de canton Sisimitepec Comunidad Milagrosa II Comunidad Xochilt-Ixtatec Barrio Las Mercedes Barrio La Trinidad Barrio San Juan
<b>San Juan Opico</b>		Comunidad El Papayal Comunidad Las Flores Comunidad Jabalincito Comunidad Buenos Aires Comunidad Nueva Candelaria Comunidad Sitio El Grande	Comunidad El Papayal Comunidad Las Flores Comunidad Jabalincito Comunidad Buenos Aires Comunidad Nueva Candelaria Comunidad Sitio El Grande
<b>Zaragoza</b>		Comunidad Esmeraldita II Comunidad Los Cedros Comunidad El Corralito Comunidad El Zaito II Colonia San Antonio I Colonia San Antonio II Colonia Miramar	Comunidad Esmeraldita II Comunidad Los Cedros Comunidad El Corralito Comunidad El Zaito II Colonia San Antonio I Colonia San Antonio II Colonia Miramar
<b>Nejapa</b>			Colonia Nuevo Ferrocarril Colonia Nueva Esperanza Comunidad Bonete Comunidad Cedral-Rosario
<b>San Antonio del Monte</b>			Colonia El Mirador Colonia El Carmen Residencial San Antonio Urbanización Lomas de San Antonio II etapa
<b>Soyapango</b>			Colonia San Fernando Colonia Los Santos I Colonia Bosques de Prusia Colonia San José
<b>Total by Phase</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>24</b>

86 Communities Participated

Please note that the communities shaded gray are the same. CVPP continued working with the same communities during our phased implementation to maximize technical assistance and ensure impact

## Annex 2. Small Grants Awarded, 2008–2012

Project No.	Partner	Action	Geographic Area	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Funding: Activity #
<b>FY 2008</b>						
08-01	FEPADE	Integrated technical and entrepreneurial training program for the population of Altavista and Tonacatepeque	Altavista	30-06-08	31-12-08	1 & 2
08-02	RED NACIONAL DE PASTORES	Youth development via education, culture, and environment in Altavista	Altavista	22-07-08	31-01-09	1 & 2
08-03	UNIVERSIDAD EVANGELICA	Systematization, monitoring and evaluation of the national CVP and social peace plan in Altavista and systematization of the MSPJ nocturnal sports project	Altavista	15-08-08		1 & 2
08-04	FUSAL	Rehabilitation of the sports complex	Altavista	22-09-08	30-03-09	1 & 2
08-05	FEPADE	Integrated technical and entrepreneurial training program for the population of Izalco	Izalco	30-09-08	30-12-09	1 & 2
<b>FY 2009</b>						
09-01	ATLETAS CONTRA EL SIDA	Training of violence prevention trainers aimed at evening sports committees of Greater San Salvador	San Salvador	04-11-08	30-03-09	1 & 2
09-02	CARE	Empowering Izalco: organization and implementation of violence prevention strategies	Izalco	14-11-08	31-10-09	1 & 2
09-03	EMPRESARIOS JUVENILES	Entrepreneurship	Izalco and Armenia	28-12-08	31-10-09	1 & 2
09-04	FUSAL	Rehabilitation of sports complex	Altavista, San Martín, Ahuachapán	01-12-08	30-03-09	1 & 2
09-05	Fe y Alegría	Educational proposal for violence prevention	San Salvador	30-11-08	31-10-09	1 & 2
09-06	FUMA	Promote leadership and youth participation	District 6	07-01-09		1 & 2
				01-12-08	31-10-09	1 & 2
09-07	FEPADE	Vocational and entrepreneurship training	San Salvador	07-01-09	31-10-09	1 & 2
09-08	FUNDASAL	Prevention program to generate opportunities for training and rehabilitation of public spaces	District 6	23-01-09	23-03-09	1 & 2
09-09	IDHUCA	Technical assistance to Santa Tecla municipality	Santa Tecla	01-03-09	31-10-09	1 & 2
09-10	VISION MUNDIAL	Rehabilitation of sports facilities in schools	District 6	01-05-09	31-10-09	1 & 2
09-11	FUNDAUNGO	Comparative analysis of violence prevention policies in El Salvador and Central America	San Salvador	01-07-09		1 & 2
09-12	FUNPRES	Mediation and conflict resolution	San Salvador, Tonacatepeque, Izalco, and Armenia	28-03-08	31-10-09	1 & 2
09-13	FUNDASAL	Prevention program to generate opportunities for training and rehabilitation of public spaces	Tonacatepeque, San Martín, Ilopango	13-09-09	15-12-09	1 & 2
<b>FY 2010</b>						
10-01	MEPREDIZAL	Izalco for peace	Izalco	15-Oct-09	30-Jul-11	1 & 2
10-02	MEPERSA	Violence prevention and integrated development of Armenia	Armenia	15-Nov-09	31-Jan-10	1 & 2
10-03	Fe y Alegría	Integrated education proposal for District 6	San Salvador	01-Jul-10	28-Feb-11	1 & 2
10-04	ORMUSA	Preventing and attending to intra-familial violence	Izalco and Armenia	15-Jul-10	30-Jun-11	1 & 2
10-05	FUSALMO	Social entrepreneurs	Altavista, San Martín, Ahuachapán	01-Aug-10	31-Jul-11	1 & 2
10-06	ASAPROSAR	Entrepreneurial skills in youth	Arce, Opico, and Nahuizalco	01-Aug-10	31-Jul-11	3

Source: December 1, 2012 Grants Tracker.

(continued)

## Annex 2. Small Grants Awarded, 2008–2012 (continued)

Project No.	Partner	Action	Geographic Area	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Funding: Activity #
<b>FY 2010 (continued)</b>						
10-07	FUMA	Youth leaders promoting social co-existence	District 6 and Armenia	15-Jul-10	30-Aug-11	1 & 2
10-08	Complejo Técnico S. Francisco Sales	Raising job capabilities	District 6	01-Aug-10	31-Aug-11	1 & 2
10-08	Complejo Técnico S. Francisco Sales	Raising job capabilities	Arce, Opico, Nahuizalco, and Zaragoza	01-Aug-10	30-Apr-11	3
10-09	FUNPRES	Violence prevention in schools	Arce, Opico, Nahuizalco, and Zaragoza	01-Aug-10	30-Jun-11	3
10-10	Plan International USA	Promoting youth leadership	Opico and Arce	01-Sep-11	31-Jul-11	3
10-11	FUNPRES	Violence prevention in schools and Creative Conflict Resolution in District 6, San Salvador	Izalco and Ahuachapán; La Chacra	01-Aug-10	31-Aug-11	1 & 2
10-12	IDHUCA (Activity 2)	Santa Tecla Observatory and Prevention Council	Santa Tecla	15-Jul-10	30-Jun-11	1 & 2
<b>FY 2011</b>						
11-01	FUNSALPRODESE		Altavista	01-Nov-10	30-Jun-11	1 & 2
11-02	FIECA	Strengthening capacity, ability, and competency for managing, sensitizing, and prevention of social and gender violence	Zaragoza	01-Nov-10	15-Oct-11	3
11-03	ESCENICA	Performance Arts for Peace	Arce and Opico	01-Nov-10	31-Aug-11	3
11-04	FUNDASAL	Promote community peaceful coexistence by improving social and community infrastructure in each municipality.	Arce, Opico, Nahuizalco	10-Feb-11	31-Aug-11	3
11-05	MSM	Citizens active in defense and prevention of social violence	Nahuizalco	15-Dec-10	30-Aug-11	3
11-06	AGAPE	Communities united for a better municipality	Izalco and Armenia	15-Dec-10	31-Aug-11	1 & 2
11-07	ISD	Strengthening local capacity for violence prevention	Arce and Opico	03-Jan-11	30-Jul-11	3
11-08	FEPADÉ	Strengthening technical capacity, entrepreneurship, and productivity	Arce, Opico, Nahuizalco, Zaragoza	28-Dec-10	30-Aug-11	3
11-09	FUNDEMOSPAZ	Stronger spaces for citizen participation in violence prevention	Zaragoza	05-May-11	31-Oct-11	3
11-09	FUNDEMOSPAZ (Activity 1)	Stronger spaces for citizen participation in violence prevention	San Martín, Ahuachapán, Altavista, Ilpango, Tonacatepeque	22-Nov-10	30-Aug-11	1 & 2
11-11	CIDEP	Preventing violence among youth: developing technical, entrepreneurial, and leadership capacity	Arce, Opico, Nahuizalco, Zaragoza	18-Feb-11	31-Aug-12	3

Source: December 1, 2012 Grants Tracker.

(continued)

## Annex 2. Small Grants Awarded, 2008–2012 (continued)

Project No.	Partner	Action	Geographic Area	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Funding Activity #
<b>FY 2012</b>						
12-01	ASAPROSAR	Strengthening social businesses and promoting entrepreneurial culture	Ciudad Arce	12-Apr-11	31-Oct-12	3
12-02	Fe y Alegría	Integrated family education for prevention	Zaragoza	04-Dec-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-03	FUNDASAL	Creating public spaces and youth and adult leadership training with community participation in El Corralito, El Zaito, Los Cedros, San Antonio 1, San Antonio 2, Esmeraldita, and Miramar	Zaragoza	18-Apr-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-04	FUSAL	CHANCE NAHUIZALCO: Contribute to reducing violence, crime and insecurity via social and community interventions aimed primarily at young people and children, to retrieve the security, raise the common welfare, to promote the culture of peace, encourage citizen participation, and strengthen social cohesion	Nahuizalco	05-Jan-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-05	ESCENICA	Strengthening the culture of peace and youth leadership via social art for prevention of community and municipal violence	Zaragoza ,Arce, Opico	05-Jan-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-06	FEPADÉ	Comprehensive vocational, technical, and business training	Zaragoza and Opico	30-Apr-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-07	FUNPRES	Promoting coexistence and social peace in schools, community organizations, and communities	Zaragoza and Opico	19-Apr-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-08	FUNPRES	Promoting coexistence and social peace in schools, community organizations, and communities	San Anotnio del Monte	20-May-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-09	ESCENICA	Strengthening the culture of peace and youth leadership via social art for prevention of community and municipal violence	San Antonio del Monte	16-Jun-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-10	UCA	Strengthening CMPV communication capacities for community-based violence and crime prevention and promotion of a culture of peace with citizen involvement	Ciudad Arce and Opico	19-Jun-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-11	AGAPE	Communities united for a better municipality	San Antonio del Monte	29-Jun-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-12	FUNDASAL	Creation of public spaces for peaceful community coexistence	San Antonio del Monte	29-Jun-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-13	FUNPRES	Promoting coexistence and social peace in schools, community organizations, and communities	San Martín	18-Jul-12	31-Oct-11	1 & 2
12-14	SIRAMA	Building life skills and occupational training as an alternative to open horizons for women at risk	Ilopango	18-Jul-12	31-Oct-11	1 & 2
12-15	FUSAL	CHANCE TONACATEPEQUE	Tonacatepeque	24-Jul-12	31-Oct-11	1 & 2
12-16	FUNDASAL	Creating public spaces and youth and adult leadership training with community participation in Santa Teres, Valle las Delicias, Santa Gertrudis, Valle San Andres, and the Municipality of San Martín	San Martín	01-Aug-12	31-Oct-11	1 & 2
12-17	FEPADÉ	Comprehensive vocational, technical, and business training	Ilopango	01-Aug-12	31-Oct-11	1 & 2
12-18	COMPTEC SFS	Raising productive technical capacities	Ilopango Tonacatepeque	10-Aug-12	31-Oct-11	1 & 2
12-19	CASART	Craft workshops and entrepreneurial culture	Nejapa	21-Aug-12	31-Oct-12	3

Source: December 1, 2012 Grants Tracker.

(continued)

## Annex 2. Small Grants Awarded, 2008–2012 (continued)

Project No.	Partner	Action	Geographic Area	Project Start Date	Project End Date	Funding: Activity #
<b>FY 2012 (continued)</b>						
12-20	FIECA	Strengthening social businesses and promoting entrepreneurial culture	Nejapa	21-Aug-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-21	TUTELA	Driving public policy advocacy on youth	San Martín	23-Aug-12	31-Oct-11	1 & 2
12-22	CONEXIÓN	Building life opportunities without violence, through computer and handicraft classes	Soyapango	31-Aug-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-23	COMPTEC SFS	Raising productive technical capabilities	Soyapango	28-Aug-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-24	FUNDASAL	Creating public spaces and youth and adult leadership training with community participation	Soyapango	28-Aug-12	31-Oct-12	3
12-25	FUNDASAL	Creating public spaces and youth and adult leadership training with community participation in Col. Bosques de la Paz, Col. Jardines de Santa Lucía, Com. Banco Hipotecario, Col. San Bartolo	Ilopango	05-Sep-12	10-Nov-12	1 & 2
12-26	FUNDASAL	Creating public spaces and youth and adult leadership training with community participation in Com. Nueva Esperanza, Com. Nuevo Ferrocarril, Com. El Cedral-Rosario, and Com. El Bonete	Nejapa	17-Sep-12	15-Nov-12	3
2013-01	Municipalidad San Antonio del Monte	Outreach centers (2)	San Antonio del Monte	18-Oct-12	16-Nov-12	3

Source: December 1, 2012 Grants Tracker.

# Annex 3. Consolidated Indicator Summary

Performance Indicator	Activity 1		Activity 3		End-of-Project Target Activity 1 and 3 Combined	Total Accumulated	Percent Delivered
	End-of-Project Target	Total Accumulated	End-of-Project Target	Total Accumulated			
I.A, I.A, 3.A, 3.1.1: No. of U.S. government-assisted communities in crime prevention programs	30	49	29	37	59	86	146%
I.B, I.B, 3.B, 3.1.2: No. of targeted municipalities that have approved a crime and violence prevention (CVP) policy	5	2	7	6	12	8	67%
I.C, I.C, 3.C, 3.1.3: No. of targeted municipal governments that have approved an ordinance recognizing a local CVP inter-institutional committee	8	5	7	5	15	10	67%
I.D, I.D, 3.D, 3.1.4: No. of local CVP inter-institutional committees in targeted areas that have established a local IIWG	8	8	7	7	15	15	100%
I.E, I.E, 3.E, 3.1.5: No. of women who have been elected to serve on the municipal CVP inter-institutional committee	13	249	64	211	47	217	462%
I.F, I.F, 3.F, 3.1.6: No. of CVP IIWGs in targeted areas that have developed Municipal Crime Prevention Plans.	7	8	7	7	14	15	107%
I.G, I.G, 3.G, 3.1.7: No. of CVP IIWGs in targeted areas that have implemented one or more activities proposed in their Municipal Crime Prevention Plans	7	8	7	7	14	15	107%
I.H, I.H, 3.H, 3.1.9: No. of targeted municipalities that have systematically evaluated CVP programs according to evaluation criteria as advised by CVPP	7	8	7	7	14	15	107%
I.I, I.I, 3.I: Percent of CVPP-approved grants with cost sharing (CS) from third-party contributions (in cash, labor, or in-kind)	95%	100%	95%	100%	95%	100%	105%
I.J: No. of nontargeted municipalities that have established IIWGs based on the CVPP model [there are two I.Js; see following indicator also]	1	2			1	2	200%
I.K, I.J, 3.J, 3.1.10: No. of municipal staff (and national GOES staff in I.J) in target areas who have received CVPP training in CVP modules and activities [Note: two indicators are labeled I.K in the original report and two as I.J; one of each is here and the others in the following and preceding lines]	13 M, 13 W	17 M, 24 W	10 M, 10 W	21 M, 23 W	23 M, 23 W	38 M, 47 W	165% M 204% W 185 % avg.
I.L, I.K, 3.K, 3.1.11: No. of community representatives (community-based organizations, local leaders, etc.) in target areas who have received CVPP training in CVP modules. [Note: Two indicators are labeled I.L in the original document, and two are labeled I.K; one of each is shown here, while the other I.K is in the previous line and the other I.L is in the next]	29 M, 29 W	179 M, 186 W	50 M, 50 W	224 M, 352 W	79 M, 79 W	403 M, 538 W	510% M 681% W 596% avg.
I.L, 3.O, 3.1.12: No. of CVP IIWGs initiatives oriented to fundraising or obtaining technical or financial cooperation from third parties	2	0	7	4	9	4	44%
<b>COMMENT.</b> This includes only 2 with CECl in San Juan Opico and Nahuizalco. Also includes the support of ILC to Nejapa and Soyapango.							
I.M, 3.1.13: No. of baseline studies conducted in the targeted areas (a)	2	9	3	7	5	16	320%
I.N, 3.R: No. of Intermediate Evaluations studies conducted in the targeted areas (b)	1	0	2	4	3	4	133%

Source: Indicator Report for 4th Quarter 2012 (to November 19, 2012); M, men; W, women; NA, not applicable.

(continued)

### Annex 3. Consolidated Indicator Summary (continued)

Performance Indicator	Activity 1		Activity 3		End-of-Project Target Activity 1 and 3 Combined	Total Accumulated	Percent Delivered
	End-of-Project Target	Total Accumulated	End-of-Project Target	Total Accumulated			
1.O, 3.S: No. of U.S. government-assisted communities in crime prevention programs where the delinquency and crime acts reported by the official police data decreased by 5% or more	1	0	2	4	3	4	133%
1.P, 3.T: No. of U.S. government-assisted communities in crime prevention programs where the social risk factors reported by participatory talking maps decreased by 5% or more	1	0	2	6	3	6	200%
1.Q, 3.U: No. of U.S. government-assisted communities in crime prevention programs where the social protection factors reported by participatory talking maps increased by 5% or more	1	0	2	9	3	9	300%
1.R, 3.W: No. of U.S. government-assisted communities in crime prevention programs where the households participating actively in the prevention activities increased by 5% or more	1	10	2	12	3	22	733%
1.S, 3.X, 3.2.1: No. of subgrantees trained and capabilities reinforced in presenting sound proposals, managing them in accordance with RTI and USAID rules and regulations, and communicating their outcomes with CVPP's requisites	10	2	10	29	20	31	155%
1.T, 3.Y, 3.2.2: No. of approved grants in a participatory fashion with IIWGs, in response to their CVP plans	6	9	12	25	18	34	189%
1.U, 3.Z, 3.2.3: No. of CVPP-approved grants by RTI with at least 25% cost sharing (CS) from third-party contributions (in cash, labor or in-kind)	6	9	12	17	18	26	144%
1.3.1: No. of municipal staff officially assigned to operate the municipal observatory of crime and violence	3	5			3	5	167%
1.3.2: No. of municipal observatory of crime and violence staff who had been the recipient of technical assistance in statistics organization, database management, and constructing indicators	0 M, 0 W	0 M, 0 W			0 M, 0 W	0 M, 0 W	NA
1.3.3: No. of administrative manuals designed and established for collecting, processing, and producing data and indicators of local crime and violence	3	3			3	3	100%
1.3.4: No. of reports and analysis produced by the municipal observatory of crime and violence	3	0			3	0	0%
<b>COMMENTS.</b> The only supported violence observatory able to produce information on a weekly basis is the Santa Tecla Observatory. But we don't have the reports. Although, the other three observatories produce information, they do not produce it on a weekly basis.							
3.L: No. of centralized of crime and violence observatories established in the San Salvador Metropolitan Area			1	1	1	1	100%
3.M: No. of municipalities from the San Salvador Metropolitan Area supported to create or strengthen crime and violence observatories			5	4	5	4	80%
3.N: No. of activities contemplated in the Municipal Crime Prevention Plans in targeted areas in which the FEPADE Crime Prevention Consortium has been involved			4	0	4	0	0%
<b>COMMENT.</b> FEPADE consortium is not on the field yet.							

Source: Indicator Report for 4th Quarter 2012 (to November 19, 2012); M, men; W, women; NA, not applicable.

(continued)

### Annex 3. Consolidated Indicator Summary (continued)

Performance Indicator	Activity 1		Activity 3		End-of-Project Target Activity 1 and 3 Combined	Total Accumulated	Percent Delivered
	End-of-Project Target	Total Accumulated	End-of-Project Target	Total Accumulated			
3.P, 3.1.14: No. of systematized success stories of local violence prevention			3	2	3	2	67%
3.Q, 3.1.15: No. of events organized for the public dissemination of systematized success stories of local violence prevention			3	0	3	0	0%
<b>COMMENT.</b> Local actors could not form consensus to enable the realization of these events.							
3.1.8, 3.1.16: No. of activities contemplated in the Municipal Crime Prevention Plans in targeted areas in which the FEPADE Crime Prevention Consortium has been involved			3	0	3	0	0
<b>COMMENT.</b> FEPADE consortium is not on the field yet.							
3.3.1, 4.A: No. of youths in target areas who have received vocational and basic education training			1,400	2,513	1,400	2,513	180%
3.3.2, 4.B: No. of youth leaders in target areas who have received training in leadership			525	803	525	803	153%

Source: Indicator Report for 4th Quarter 2012 (to November 19, 2012); M, men; W, women; NA, not applicable.

Performance Indicator	Activity 2		
	End-of-Project Target	Total Accumulated	Percent Delivered (%)
2.A. No. of targeted Inter-institutional Executive Committee (IIEC) partner members who have made financial or in-kind contributions with host country-owned local currency funds to CVPP projects	5	13	260%
2.B: No. of public safety initiatives self-initiated by targeted IIEC partner members based on the CVPP model	1	1	100%
2.C: No. of targeted municipalities that have shared risk map data with the PNC	7	1	14%
2.D: No. of GOES employees who have received CVPP training in CVP data collection and analysis according to the project-advised standard indicator list	3 W, 3 M	0	0%
<b>COMMENT.</b> CVPP did not produce this list. This was part of the EPV update conducted by GOES with another donor.			
2.E. No. of national level GOES staff who have received CVPP training in CVP modules and activities	10 W, 10 M	99 W, 109 M	990% W, 1,090% M
2.F: No. of targeted IIEC partner members who have collected standardized indicator data from the CVPP-advised list	3	0	0%
<b>COMMENT.</b> CVPP did not produce this list. This was part of the EPV update conducted by GOES with another donor.			
2.G: No. of CVP case studies produced by universities that have received CVPP grants	7	5	71%
2.H: No. of studies of El Salvador's crime and prevention policy and proposal of pertinent recommendations	1	1	100%

Source: Indicator Report for 4th Quarter 2012 (to November 19, 2012); M, men; W, women.

### Annex 3. Consolidated Indicator Summary (continued)

Performance Indicator	Activity 2		
	End-of-Project Target	Total Accumulated	Percent Delivered (%)
2.I. No. of targeted GOES institutions who have made financial or in-kind contributions to CVPP projects	4	4	100%
2.J. No. of joint CVP plans to implement the EPV in three focal municipalities	1	2	200%
2.K. No. of PREPAZ and/or CONJUVE staff trained in the EPV content	20 W, 20 M	17 W, 26 M	85% W, 130% M
2.L. No. of municipal staff and CVP IIVGs members of at least 3 municipalities trained in the EPV content	30 W, 30 M	23 W, 21 M	76% W, 70% M
2.M. No. of public events celebrated with local actors for the public diffusion of the EPV	3	0	0%
<b>COMMENT.</b> GOES/PREPAZ moved this activity to 2013.			
2.N. No. of FEPADE consortium staff trained in the EPV content	10 W, 10 M	2 W, 1 M	20% W, 10% M
2.P. No. of municipal activities carried out under the joint CVP plans to implement the EPV in three focal municipalities	6	2	33%
2.2.1: No. of national tracking and mapping system for municipal prevention interventions designed and implemented in a central governmental institution	1	0	0%
<b>COMMENT.</b> USAID removed this requirement because of shift in political focus/priorities. Therefore, no national CVP tracking & mapping system was established.			
2.2.2: No. of government agencies staff trained in the content and functioning of the national tracking and mapping system for municipal prevention interventions	3 W, 2 M	0	0%
<b>COMMENT.</b> USAID removed this requirement because of shift in political focus/priorities. Therefore, no national CVP tracking & mapping system was established.			
2.2.3: No. of COMURES informed about the national tracking and mapping system for municipal prevention interventions	15 W, 15 M	0	0%
<b>COMMENT.</b> USAID removed this requirement because of shift in political focus/priorities. Therefore, no national CVP tracking & mapping system was established.			
2.2.4: No. of FEPADE consortium staff trained in the national tracking and mapping system for municipal prevention interventions	5 W, 5 M	0	0%
<b>COMMENT.</b> USAID removed this requirement because of shift in political focus/priorities. Therefore, no national CVP tracking & mapping system was established.			
2.2.5: No. of municipal staff and/or CVP IIVGs members of at least 30 municipalities involved the national tracking and mapping system for municipal prevention interventions that are sensitized about its content	75 W, 75 M	0	0%
<b>COMMENT.</b> USAID removed this requirement because of shift in political focus/priorities. Therefore, no national CVP tracking & mapping system was established.			
2.2.6 No. of public events where results of tracking and mapping system for prevention interventions are publicly presented	1	0	0
<b>COMMENT.</b> USAID removed this requirement because of shift in political focus/priorities. Therefore, no national CVP tracking & mapping system was established.			

Source: Indicator Report for 4th Quarter 2012 (to November 19, 2012); M, men; W, women.

# Annex 4. Sources of Information: Interviews, Focus Groups, Workshops

The following persons participated in the interviews, focus groups, and workshops, sometimes in more than one. Additional sources include the references cited in Annex 8.

## RTI International

Aldo Miranda, Regional Operations Director: three interviews and participation in staff meeting, workshop

**CVPP staff:** addressed in two staff meetings, a 1-day workshop, and numerous individual interviews

Guillermo Garcia, COP

Ana Maria de Diaz, Grants Manager

Karla de Cabezas, Grants Assistant

Ximena Diaz, Administrative Assistant

Alicia Hernandez, Facilitator: Zaragoza, Nejapa, and Soyapango

Natalia Garay, Facilitator: Ciudad Arce and San Juan Opico

Juan Carlos Torres, Facilitator: San Martín, Ilopango, and Tonacatepeque

Mario Gómez, Facilitator: Nejapa and Soyapango.

Rutilia Alvarez, Facilitator: Nahuizalco and San Antonio del Monte.

Fidel Orellana, Facilitator: Mejicanos, Cuscatancingo, and Ayutuxte.

Esmeralda Bonilla, Communicator

Andrea Rosales, Assistant

Ernesto Galdámez, M&E Consultant

## Staff, national agencies

PREPAZ: Santiago Flores, Director PREPAZ, 18 October 2012

Fidel Orellana, formerly PREPAZ and currently consultant strengthening PREPAZ staff, multiple interviews

Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Publica (CNSP)/ PROJOVENES: Juan Carlos Torres, former PROJOVENES facilitator at CNSP, multiple interviews

Ministerio de Trabajo Maria Antonia Castillo Urbina, Bolsa de Empleo, San Juan Opico, 18 October 2012

PNC: Efrain Casteneda, Jefe PNC Zaragoza, 11 October 2012

Edgar Molina, Agente PNC Armenia, 17 October 2012

Ofreciano Rivas, Inspector PNC and head of Sub-delegation, San Juan Opico, 19 October 2012

INJUVE: Hilton Aguilar, representative, Armenia, Izalco, 17 October 2012

Mario Gómez, formerly INJUVE, multiple interviews

Ministerio de Gobernacion: Jorge Cortez, Civil Protection Delegate, Zaragoza, 11 October 2012

## CMPV focus groups

**Zaragoza.** 10 CMPV members (vice mayor; 7 community leaders, PNC chief, and Ministry of Interior Civil Protection delegate), as well as visits by groups of youths in dance and community activities, 11 October 2012. Visited community youth initiatives/crafts fair; 20 October 2012

**Nejapa.** CMPV Youth Commission—10 youth leaders with adult community leader/advisor; 19 October 2012

**Armenia.** 10 CMPV members (Head of Municipal Social Services, 4 community leaders, representatives of PNC, World Vision, INJUVE, Casa Cultural), 17 October 2012

**La Chacra (San Salvador District 6).** 4 CMPV members (all community leaders); 1 local entrepreneur; 17 October 2012

**San Juan Opico.** 5 CMPV members (in three separate interviews, Municipal Administrator; councilwoman, Social Promotion Head, PNC chief, and Ministry of Labor representative (recently resigned), 18-19 October 2012

**Ciudad Arce.** CMPV Youth Commission (~30 persons, including CMPV youth representative), 18 October 2012

## Partner CSO representatives (small grant recipients)

### ÁGAPE

Oscar García, Coordinador de Proyectos

Karla Toledo, Coordinadora Técnica

### SIRAMÁ

Aída Molina, Coordinadora de Proyectos

Celina Juárez, Coordinadora de Capacitaciones Técnicas

### FUNPRES

Elizabeth Castillo, Directora Técnica

### ESCÉNICA

Alexander Córdova, Productor Artístico

María Velis, Coordinadora de Proyecto

(continued)

**FUNDASAL**

Claudia Handal, Coordinadora del Área Social de Desarrollo Urbano

Carolina Salguero, Técnica de Monitoreo

**UCA/Audiovisuales**

Carmen Urbano, Técnica del Área de Comunicaciones

**UCA/IDHUCA**

Roberto Deras, Técnico

Evelyn Hernández de Martínez, Coordinadora de Proyecto San Juan Opico

**Fe y Alegría**

Víctor Orellana, Coordinador de Planificación y Gestión

**FUSAL**

José Siliézar Rivas, Coordinador de Proyecto

**FIECA**

Maribel Gómez, Coordinadora de Proyecto

# Annex 5. Objectives and Expected Results

The Program Description of the cooperative agreement gives the following objectives and expected results. They represent the original intentions of the proposal and of the project at its inception. Some of them were not fully addressed by the project as it was implemented; this is discussed further in the main body of the report and in Annex 6.

## Activity 1. Municipality-led, Community-based Crime and Violence Protection

### Objective (sub-IR) 1. Community-based crime and violence prevention programs (CVP) improved and expanded

Expected Results for Activity 1 (with measures of success)

- A. Crime and gang activity reduced in targeted communities of selected municipalities
  - i. Increase in perceived citizen security in target communities/municipalities and satisfaction with local authorities (reflected in surveys conducted yearly by local people).
  - ii. Lower indices of specific crimes and gang activity (e.g., homicides, robberies, and domestic violence; from standardized list to be developed under Objective no. 2).
- B. Increased capacity for participatory approaches to CVP
  - i. Municipalities with approved CVP policies and action plans
  - ii. Municipal CVP programs staffed and funded with local resources
  - iii. Municipalities conducting local monitoring and analysis of crime and violence (and linked to observatories on violence)
- C. Small grants program supporting community-based CVP projects prioritized by municipalities in at least 10 communities
  - i. Counterpart contributions above 33% leveraged at local level
  - ii. Grant volume increased 50% by national private sector support
  - iv. Success stories circulated from funded projects
- D. Successful approaches to municipal-led, community-based CVP systematized, disseminated, and replicated
  - i. Self-teaching training materials developed and validated
  - ii. CVP program replicated in additional (non-targeted) communities and municipalities
  - iii. Communications materials created and disseminated
  - iv. Municipalities pursuing strategies to promote a culture of peace in communities

- E. Partnerships established between community-based CVP programs, national institutions (PNC, CNSP, SJ, COMURES), and private sector
  - i. National institutions sharing crime-related information at the local level (at least PNC)
  - ii. Private sector contributing to municipal CVP programs

## Activity 2: National Leadership and Support for Crime and Violence Protection

### Objective (sub-IR) 2: GOES capacity for the prevention of violence and crime increased

Expected Results for Activity 2 (with measures of success)

- A. Comprehensive, National Crime Prevention Plan and policy developed
  - i. PNP initiatives being implemented, with participation of national institutions
  - ii. National CVP policy drafted and under consideration
- B. Enhanced GOES capability to promote citizen security through municipal-led, community-based crime prevention
  - i. Improved local-national coordination mechanisms in place
  - ii. Self-teaching training materials adopted, available on Web, and in use for replication
  - iii. Replicas of successful municipal CVP programs being facilitated by GOES
- C. Working relationships between GOES entities, private sector, and civil society strengthened
  - i. National PNP pilot project (\$300K) identified, designed, approved, and implemented
  - ii. Participation of the National Inter-Institutional Committee representatives in projects implemented by municipalities under Objective 1
  - iii. Private sector participation and support (cash and in-kind contributions of more than 35%)
- D. National capabilities for monitoring, evaluation, systematization enhanced and in use
  - i. Key indicators selected for national and municipal use (e.g., homicides, etc.)
  - ii. Baseline methodology developed for national and local levels
  - iii. Case studies, best practices systematized, published, and disseminated



## Annex 6. Achievements in Main Areas of Expected Results

The main headings from the Expected Results are shown below with a brief summary of the results produced in each.

### **Reduction in crime and gang activity.**

While not measured, the vast majority of participants interviewed believe that crime and gang activity have been reduced in the communities where CVPP intervened. No exceptions were noted. However, under the agreement with USAID on the M&E Plan, the post-intervention evaluation studies originally planned to show change in crime rates, risk and protection factors, and community perceptions and attitudes were not carried out. Fourteen pre-intervention baseline studies were done.

### **Fortify links between local and national level CVP programs and actors.**

Links between national institutions, particularly those with representation at the local level—such as INJUVE, the health system, the school system, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Governance, and the national police—have been strengthened by their inclusion and engagement in the CMPVs in each targeted municipality. Work with PREPAZ and its predecessors on the national level has led to engaging them in CVP work at the local level, much of which has been incorporated into successive versions of the national violence prevention strategy, EPV. PREPAZ staff members have been trained to facilitate the participatory processes at the municipal level.

### **Increased capacity for participatory approaches to CVP**

#### **Model of Municipality-led Community-based CVP Planning and implementation of municipal-led, community-based CVP programs**

These Expected Results were fully realized. The municipal-led, community-based CVP model was validated and published in various formats; 15 such programs were planned and implemented.

### **Implement competitive small grants program.**

#### **Small grants program supporting community-based CVP projects prioritized by municipalities in at least 10 communities**

The competitive small grants program was both successful and larger, operating in 86 communities pertaining to 15 CMPV sites. A guide for small grant administrators was developed to replicate the model in other USAID projects (RTI, 2012d).

### **Successful approaches to municipal-led, community-based CVP systematized, disseminated, and replicated**

#### **Documentation of CVPP**

The successful CVPP approach to municipal-led, community-based CVP has been amply documented and disseminated for replication in more than 50 CVPP publications listed under References Cited (Annex 8). At least 15 more are expected to be in circulation by December 2012. These include systematizations, guides, handbooks, bulletins, and other documentation. They have been used to replicate the CMPV and related CVP processes in the three new municipalities currently being intervened with PREPAZ facilitation (Ayutuxtepeque, Mejicanos, and Cuscatancingo).

#### **Observatories**

The strategies and procedures used in the Santa Tecla Municipal Violence Observatory have been documented and published (IDHUCA, 2011c, 2011d). Four other municipal CVP Observatories have made use of that documentation to replicate the Observatory practices.

### **Promote replication and sustainability.**

#### **Capacity for Replication**

#### **Sustainability**

#### **Partnerships between community-based CVP programs, national institutions (PNC, PREPAZ, etc.), and private sector**

The potential for replication is very high, as is that for sustainability; two municipalities replicated the CVPP process in Phase I, and four have sustained it for a year after CVPP funding ended. PREPAZ personnel are trained in facilitation to replicate the intervention widely throughout the country.

On the other side of the ledger, several sustainability factors originally planned at the municipal level were not fully put into place. These include strong CMPV capacity for M&E to assess the quality of activities performed and inform evidence-based decision making, strengthened local capacity for design and implementation of communication strategies, and local capacity to mobilize resources and to work with the private sector in each municipality.

## **National policy framework for CVP programs improved**

### **Comprehensive, National Crime Prevention Plan and policy developed**

The National Violence Prevention Strategy (EPV) constitutes a comprehensive, national crime prevention plan. It and related policy have been disseminated and used in training programs for PREPAZ staff and municipal CMPV participants. CVPP was a key partner of GOES in formulating this strategy in 2010 and revising it in 2012.

## **Build capacity of national CVP programs to carry out the National Prevention Plan (PNP).**

### **Enhanced GOES capability to promote citizen security through municipal-led, community-based crime prevention**

### **Assist the PNP Inter-institutional Committee to design a specific initiative.**

The PNP became known as the EPV, discussed in the previous point. The national-level Inter-Institutional Committee never really functioned and was replaced with other mechanisms of coordination, to which CVPP provided policy advice and technical assistance. GOES capability to promote citizen safety through municipal-led, community-based crime prevention has been greatly enhanced.

## **Working relationships between GOES entities, private sector, and civil society strengthened**

The CVPP track record in establishing and strengthening working relationships with civil society and local government entities is unsurpassed. Very good relations were also maintained with PREPAZ and other relevant national agencies. Private-sector relations were successfully pursued with a score of national firms via an alliance with FEPADE, which was then spun off as an independent actor that continues to be active in the CVP field with a wide range of private supporters.

**Private-sector involvement facilitated.** CVPP facilitated the relations with FEPADE and its Board of Directors, all heads of large national and Central American economic groups, for support of CVP activities by several large national firms. In addition, APPEX/BBDO provided all the media and communication designs pro bono; Tres Puntos Store sold Felix and Pax tee-shirts to raise funds; Wal-Mart provided venues in Armenia, Alta Vista, and Izalco for Felix and Pax events in its stores; Shell Oil provided funding to Junior Achievement for Alta Vista; and Grupo Roble co-financed the rehabilitation of the Alta Vista Sport Complex.

Local relationships were built with the private sector by most of the CMPVs, some with facilitation by CVPP (e.g., Industrias La Constancia is investing \$80,000 in support of the Nejapa CVP plan and will pursue something similar in Soyapango), and some done directly by local participants (e.g., in San Juan Opico, two local factories provide annual support [Hanes-Braun, HilaSal], and a third [Kimberly Clark] has given regular donations—all pursued by the mayor's office and amounting to about \$30,000/year). Many CMPVs regularly receive small-scale support from local commercial and industrial firms for specific events and programs. Private-sector firms almost always support CVP programs in the vicinity of their factories and to a lesser extent in the bedroom communities where their employees live.

However, compared to the impressive potential for private-sector engagement demonstrated by other RTI projects (e.g., Alianzas), it must be admitted that a full range of resource mobilization skills has not been transmitted to CVPP participants and partners.

## **National capabilities for monitoring, evaluation, systematization enhanced and in use**

### **Initiatives at the national and local levels systematized and disseminated**

As discussed in the M&E section above, national and local capacities in this area were enhanced, but not as fully as might have been the case. Process indicators rather than impact measurements were the main focus, and although M&E was carried out for the project, it was only partly integrated into the strengthening processes at the municipal and national levels.

# Annex 7. Voices of Participants—Additional Comments

## Things that Worked

### Comments of CSO partners:

- Active participation of local actors in CMPVs, community steering groups, and approval of proposals for funding
- Inter-generational involvement in conflict resolution, peace-building, and family strengthening activities
- Involvement of CMPVs in community interventions by CSO partners
- Offering a range of opportunities to all sectors and ages, emphasizing underprivileged children and youth
- Great openness/flexibility to redesign and adjust directions when needed to improve results
- The autonomy of the CMPVs and of their working groups—political priorities were not imposed.
- Level of integration of the CVPP intervention, with creative proposals emerging at many levels
- Focus on those municipalities with the highest indices of violence
- Focus on youth as principal at-risk population
- Visibility given to youth carrying out positive activities
- In-depth effects on the lives of participants, with changes in perceptions, attitudes, conduct
- Art and sport as alternatives in violence prevention
- Effective selection of methods and of participants, following transparent criteria
- Inclusion of CVP in agendas of the ADESCOs
- Strengthening local development by integration of actors
- Effective coordination and synergy (committees, schools, ADESCOs, implementers, etc.)
- Empowerment and commitment
- Skills and capabilities acquired in the process
- Replication capacity of local actors
- Improved technical capacity of CMPVs
- The grant management system is an advance, a credit to the project.

## Success Factors

### Comments of CVPP team and CSO partners

- Previous to RTI's involvement in CVPP, work on CVP was spotty and isolated.
- The RTI/CECI team was favorably positioned initially and throughout by its close contacts with the CNSP and later PREPAZ, and by its significant contributions to the National Violence Prevention Strategy (EPV).
- RTI's steady non-partisan stance has allowed it to continue unaffected by changes in local and national governments.
- Santa Tecla is a model for municipal-led CVP programming (based on earlier Colombian experiences); RTI's previous work with Santa Tecla allowed the municipality to quickly and effectively adopt RTI's methods.
- A collaborative atmosphere has been established with the PNC through RTI's long-standing work with them in CVP projects and in developing improved data collection and analysis systems.
- RTI has leveraged substantial private-sector support for CVP processes, particularly via FEPADE and La Constancia.
- Youth now actively participate in local initiatives, especially those aimed at supporting younger children. These youth have assumed leadership roles in community processes and present proposals to CMPVs for programming.
- Recognition of art as a model for prevention and a project of a productive life
- Sports schools as pillars of primary and secondary prevention
- Development and implementation of the program to strengthen families: Strong Families, Happy Families, Assertive Families, etc.—totaling more than 30 modules—Fe y Alegría
- Community psychological clinics—FUNPRES
- Dissemination of legal instruments to protect children and adolescents from violence and exploitation
- Women have cooperated to set up businesses.
- Elections have brought change in the party in power both locally and nationally, without disruption to CVPP projects.
- Full support from teachers and local and regional school system leadership
- Some students who are involved in gangs want to develop job skills.
- PNC police have participated in project activities without acting repressively.

Follow-up to job skills training by contacting groups with microfinance organizations

Culture of Peace festivals

Cross-visits among municipalities to exchange CMPV experiences

Learning to link CVP activities to commemorative dates (e.g., cultural hero's birthday) to create synergy between learning processes and cultural rescue

Presence of mayors in their capacity as CMPV presidents at different moments

Dissemination of legal tools that strengthen protection of children and adolescents

Cross-community events that create bonds of friendship and solidarity among youths and adults from different places

Indirect (untargeted) formation of grassroots networks in the wake of base-level organizational work

Youth camps as a way to impact young people and integrate generations

Multiplier effects on CVP where youth carry out projects with younger children

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