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## **AGRIBUSINESS AND TRADE PROMOTION (USAID ATP)**

*In fulfillment of the following deliverable under task A 3.1.1:*

### **Semi Annual Reports on Road Harassment on at least One Selected Trunk Route FY09 (Apr. – Sept. 2009)**

**Contract/ Project No.:** EDH-I-00-00005-08


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## IMPROVED ROAD TRANSPORT GOVERNANCE (IRTG) INITIATIVE ON INTERSTATE TRADE CORRIDORS Results for the period April 1 to June 30 2009



### Executive Summary

The global economic crisis is visible in West Africa's ports and landlocked countries as commercial activity has declined and transport prices have increased (notably road transport prices). As a result we have noted a fall in transport activities on both the Tema–Ouagadougou and Lomé–Ouagadougou corridors compared to the previous quarter.

Road harassment increased in the second quarter of 2009 which is the focus of the IRTG 8<sup>th</sup> report. Surveys indicate a jump in the number of checkpoints, bribes, and delays on the IRTG corridors.

This drop in transport activities seems to have increased the amount in bribes agents are collecting, which has reached \$3.58 in Togo and \$25.05 in Mali per 100 km. The number of checkpoints has increased, too: ranging from 2 per 100 km in Togo, Burkina Faso, and Ghana and 7 per 100 km in Mali. Delays rose, too, during the quarter, ranging from 7 minutes in Burkina Faso on the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor and 65 minutes in Burkina on the Tema-Ouagadougou corridor.

Bribes have increased on two of the three corridors due to the recent axel load restrictions that have been implemented where trucks found to be overloaded are fined and then pay without being given a receipt.

## Introduction

The Improved Road Transport Governance (IRTG) initiative began in 2005 as a joint effort of UEMOA and ECOWAS financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank's sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) with the West Africa Trade Hub as its implementing partner. The objective is good governance along primary trade corridors in West Africa.

IRTG, with decreasing road harassment its primary objective, reports on practices that impede the movement of road traffic on three corridors: Tema-Ouagadougou, Ouagadougou-Bamako and Lomé-Ouagadougou.

In 2009, the reporting will cover three new corridors:

-  Bamako - Dakar
-  Niamey - Cotonou
-  Ouagadougou - Abidjan.

A new feature that debuts with this 8<sup>th</sup> report is the presentation of data collected on the “onion trade corridor” that connects Madaoua (Niger) to Bitou (Burkina Faso). This corridor connects the region where onions are cultivated to the markets where they are traded in Ghana and Togo, passing by Bitou (a village near the Burkina-Ghana-Togo borders).

The conclusions drawn from this analysis of the data are disseminated to a wide audience, including public and private sector stakeholders, in order to discourage harassment practices.

At this time, the economic and financial crisis has not severely affected West Africa's trade with the world; however, some negative signs have become evident. The international economic slowdown will necessarily negatively impact transport activities in West Africa.

In this context, the project has observed a sustained and continued worsening in the three indicators presented in IRTG reports: the number of checkpoints, the value of bribes and the length of delays, due to:

- Inaction or non-application of appropriate corrective measures
- The appearance of new sources of bribery
- The reappearance or establishing of a new checkpoint.

Survey data is presented in two sections. In the first section, we focus on the traditional IRTG corridors (Tema-Ouagadougou, Ouagadougou-Bamako and Lomé-Ouagadougou); in the second, we focus on the “onion trade corridor.”

## **SECTION I:**

### **SURVEY RESULTS FOR TRADITIONAL IRTG CORRIDORS APRIL 1-JUNE 30, 2009**

In the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2009, the indicators for good road governance are disturbing. Bribery, which has always been elevated, again has worsened, particularly in Mali where a 46% increase was noted compared to the previous quarter. The number of checkpoints also increased in Mali by 40%. In Burkina Faso, delays caused by inspections at checkpoints increased by 48%.

The surveys also showed the appearance of new checkpoints and acts of extortion linked to a slow-down in transport activities and under the pretext of implementing axle-load limit rules.

The data analyzed in this report were collected from drivers in Burkina, Ghana, Mali and Togo by staff at the IRTG focal points in each country.

Table 1 below provides an overview of the number of checkpoints, value of bribes collected and length of delays experienced on the three traditional IRTG corridors. The table in the annex to this report presents detailed results of the surveys.

Table 1

IRTG Results: April 1-June 30, 2009 : Checkpoints, Bribes and Delays							
Corridor	Distance (km)	Average number of checkpoints by voyage		Average value of bribes (US\$)		Delays (minutes)	
		Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km
Tema – Ouagadougou	1057	24.18	2.29	\$69.08	\$6.54	301	29
Ouagadougou – Bamako	920	35.88	3.90	\$130.29	\$14.16	148	16
Lomé – Ouagadougou	1020	22.14	2.17	\$43.93	\$4.30	86	8

In the analysis that follows, the number of checkpoints per 100km has been rounded to the nearest whole number.

## I. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHECKPOINTS PER VOYAGE

The Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor suffers a disturbing level of bad road governance practices, particularly demonstrated by its number of checkpoints: There were 36 reported per voyage (the highest density of all the corridors), with a ration of four (4) per 100 km. This average is reached mainly due to the number that occurs on the Malian section of the corridor, which reached 28 per voyage compared to 8 along the Burkina segment of the corridor. The Lomé-Ouagadougou corridor shows the least checkpoints this quarter (22), or 2 per 100 km.

In Mali, the gendarmerie is responsible for the greatest number of the checkpoints followed by agents at axle-load weighbridges, the Customs service and finally the Police service.

## II. BRIBERY PER VOYAGE

The level (already elevated) of bribery saw a new record by reaching US\$130.29 per voyage this quarter on the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor (see Table 1).

This level is mainly due to bribery paid along the Mali segment of the corridor, which is US\$108.34 per voyage (of which US\$38.59 was collected at weighbridges), beating the sad record of the highest level of bribes paid along a corridor during a voyage, and far ahead of Burkina Faso, which, along the same corridor on its territory recorded a level of US\$21.95 per voyage.

Another notable result concerns the payment of bribes at axle-load weighbridges, which represented 38% of the total value of bribes collected on the Tema-Ouagadougou corridor and 30% on the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor.

The Lomé-Ouagadougou corridor showed the lowest level of bribery, with US\$43.93 per trip.

In Ghana, agents operating toll booths and weighbridges collected the most in bribery, followed by Customs agents and Police officers.

In Burkina, the Customs service was the most incriminated ahead of the Police and Gendarmerie. Still, the IRTG statistics show that the Police and Gendarmerie in Burkina have made many efforts to reduce the number of checkpoints along their segments of the three corridors.

In Togo, the Customs is singularly the worst offender, ahead of the Gendarmerie and then the Police.

In Mali, the most incriminated in decreasing order are: agents collecting axle-load violation penalties (without issuing receipts), the Police, the Gendarmerie and, finally, Customs.

### III. DELAYS BY VOYAGE

Delays along the corridors during the reporting period are as follows:

- Tema-Ouagadougou (1,057 km): 301 minutes, or 29 minutes per 100 km
- Bamako-Ouagadougou (920 km): 148 minutes, or 16 minutes per 100 km
- Lomé-Ouagadougou (1,020 km): 86 minutes, or 8 minutes per 100 km

The longest delays occur on the Tema-Ouagadougou corridor, with an average 29 minutes per 100 km per voyage.

### IV. TREND ANALYSIS

The results of this quarter's surveys reveal a worrying worsening in road governance that calls for appropriate corrective measures to be taken. Below, this quarter's results (**T2-09**) are compared to:


- Results from the first quarter of 2009 (**T1-09**)
- Results from the first semester of 2008 (**S1-08**)

#### IV.1. Change in the average number of checkpoints per voyage, by state crossed

Table 2: Average number of checkpoints on each corridor

Corridor	Checkpoints per voyage			Checkpoints per 100 km		
	S1-08	T1-09	T2-09	S1-08	T1-09	T2-09
<b>Tema-Ouaga</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
Ghana	21	17	18	2	2	2
Burkina	4	7	6	2	4	4
<b>Ouaga-Bamako</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
Burkina	6	9	8	1	2	2
Mali	13	20	28	3	5	7
<b>Lomé-Ouaga</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
Togo	18	15	15	2	2	2
Burkina	5	8	8	2	3	3

Graphic 1: Change in the number of checkpoints over the three periods.



## Checkpoints

**B**etween the first quarter (T1-09) and the second of 2009, the total number of checkpoints per voyage on all of the corridors increased by 9%, increasing from 76 to 83.

This is due largely to checkpoints on the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor, which saw a 24% increase compared to 0% along the two other corridors.

Mali saw a 40% increase in checkpoints: from 20 (T1-09) to 28 (T2-09).

In Ghana, the number of checkpoints increased by one, or 6%.

In Togo, the number of checkpoints did not change.

In Burkina, the number of checkpoints saw a slight change of more or less one checkpoint compared to the first quarter of 2009.


Between the first semester of 2008 (S1-08) and the second quarter of 2009 (T2-09), checkpoints increased 24% overall on the three corridors. This is largely explained by the increase in checkpoints in Mali, which rose from 13 (S1-08) to 28 (T2-09), or a 115% increase.

## IV.2. Change in the value of bribes collected by voyage, by country crossed

Table 3: (in US\$)

Corridor	Bribes per trip			Bribes per 100 km		
	S1-08	T1-09	T2-09	S1-08	T1-09	T2-09
<b>Tema-Ouaga</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>59.11</b>	<b>69.79</b>	<b>3.78</b>	<b>5.96</b>	<b>6.60</b>
Ghana	28.89	40.22	49.72	3.33	4.57	5.64
Burkina	11.11	18.89	20.07	6.67	10.71	11.40
<b>Ouaga-Bamako</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>98.67</b>	<b>131.62</b>	<b>10.00</b>	<b>10.72</b>	<b>14.31</b>
Burkina	25.56	24	21.18	5.56	4.90	4.54
Mali	64.44	74.67	109.44	14.44	17.30	25.33
<b>Lomé-Ouaga</b>	<b>48.89</b>	<b>47.56</b>	<b>44.38</b>	<b>4.44</b>	<b>4.67</b>	<b>4.35</b>
Togo	30	27.56	27.04	4.44	3.70	3.62
Burkina	18.89	20	17.33	6.67	7.24	6.32

Note: 1 US\$ = 450 FCFA and 1 US\$ = 0.96 GH¢

Graphic 2: Change in bribery

**B**ribery, considered across all of the corridors, has increased 20% compared to the first quarter of 2009, with US\$245.79 collected (T2-09) against US\$205.33 collected (T1-09) per trip, a change of US\$40.46.

The same increasing trend (plus 37%) occurs when comparing this quarter to the first semester of 2008. The greatest increase was noted on the Bamako-Ouagadougou corridor – 33%. The Tema-Ouagadougou corridor followed with an increase of 18%.

The only drop in the value of bribes collected occurred on the Lome-Ouagadougou corridor, which declined by 7%.


The value of bribes collected in Mali increased by 47% with US\$109.44 collected (in T2-09) against US\$74.67 collected (in T1-09), for a variation of US\$34.78 compared to the previous quarter. Ghana saw an increase of 24%. The increase seen in both countries is largely due to axle-load violation « penalties » drivers are paying – without being given receipt when they pay. For instance, in Mali, weighbridge agents extorted US\$38.99 or 36% of the total amount of bribes collected in Mali. Agents at weighbridges in Ghana collected US\$26.59 or 53% of the total collected in the country by voyage.

On the other hand, a 2% decrease in the value of bribes collected was recorded in Togo and a 5% decrease in Burkina (for all corridors) compared to the first quarter of 2009.

### IV.3. Change in delays caused by checkpoints, per trip and state crossed

Table 4:

Corridor	Delay (minutes) per 100 km		
	S1-08	T1-09	T2-09
<b>Tema-Ouagadougou</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>29</b>
Ghana	17	19	21
Burkina	24	44	65
<b>Ouagadougou-Bamako</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>16</b>
Burkina	25	10	6
Mali	7	32	28
<b>Lomé-Ouagadougou</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>
Togo	3	7	7
Burkina	26	9	12

Graphic 3: Change in checkpoint delays per 100 km

## Delays

**T**he delays caused by checkpoints increased 4% compared to the previous quarter by an average 18 minutes (per 100 km) in T2-09 against an average of 17 minutes in T1-09 on the three corridors together.

However, the Tema-Ouagadougou corridor is the only to show an increase (of 26%) in delays during this second quarter of 2009. Here, the Burkina segment is negatively presented with a 48% increase against an 11% increase in Ghana, going from 44 minutes (in T1-09) to 65 minutes (in T2-09), or a variation of 21 minutes, which is very high.

The Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor recorded a decrease (the only) of 20%, dropping from 20 minutes (in T1-09) to 16 minutes (in T2-09). Here the two segments posted a drop, respectively of 40% and 13%.

The change in inspection times did not change on the Lomé-Ouagadougou corridor between T1-09 and T2-09. Still, the Burkina worsened with an increase of 33% in delays due to inspections at checkpoints.

Comparing the results of the second quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2008 shows an increase in inspection times by 300% in Mali, increasing from 7 minutes (in S1-08) to 28 minutes (in T2-09). Similarly, a 171% increase in inspection times was seen in Burkina (on the Tema-Ouagadougou corridor) and 133% in Togo compared to the first quarter of 2008.

## **CONCLUSION**

During the second quarter of 2009, road governance worsened. The three IRTG indicators are “in the red”, with unacceptable and unprecedented increases. In effect, practices harmful to the free movement of goods and vehicles have increased making household purchases more expensive as the world experiences an international economic and financial crisis.

Bad road governance is illustrated by the road harassment on the primary interstate trade corridors presented in this report and has never been worse.

The daily work for drivers on the corridors was more difficult during this second quarter of 2009. In effect, bribery has increased by 20%, from US\$205.33 (first quarter of 2009) to US\$245.79 (second quarter of 2009), an increase of about US\$40.46.

The greatest increase was seen on the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor (see Table 1), which recorded value of bribery per trip reaching US\$131.62, an increase of 33% compared to the previous quarter. Responsibility for this increase goes to Mali, which, with US\$109.44 in bribes paid per trip (\$38.99 of which went only to weighbridge agents), occupies first place for the highest rate of bribery per corridor and country per trip.

The sums extorted for alleged violations of axle-load weight limits represented 38% of the total collected on the Tema-Ouagadougou corridor and 30% on the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor.

In terms of checkpoints, the total number on the IRTG traditional corridors saw an increase a 9% increase passing from 76 (first quarter of 2009) to 83 (second quarter of 2009).

This road harassment situation has its origins in the lack of professionalism among uniformed services' agents who are not working in a conscientious manner and taking care of their personal interests. In effect, weighbridge agents, Police and Customs agents are generally fingered as the primary extorters in the three countries.

The IRTG advocacy actions (received favorably) to the states and civil society have seen difficulty bringing sustainable change over time. In effect, no observable change over time or on the ground has been seen in road harassment.

In light of this corruption, IRTG invites the states to intensify awareness-raising activities to fight road harassment on one part and to take corrective measures called for on the other part, in order to stop these practices that impede the fluid transport of people and goods on the primary corridors.

“The need for efficient transport, more rapid and at competitive prices remains fundamental” for the integration of West Africa. Without continuous improvement, the delays and the costs will continue to weigh on the region's economic development.”<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> **Joe Lamport** in [http://www.watradehub.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=1269](http://www.watradehub.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1269).

## ANNEX 1: Overview Table: Results of surveys, April 1 to June 30, 2009

Table 5: Global results obtained from analysis of data collected on the three corridors.

IRTG Results April 1 to June 30 2009																				
Checkpoints, Bribery and Delays																				
Country	Number of trips	Distance traveled (km)	Average number of checkpoints by service								Average bribes (US\$) by service								Delays (minutes)	
			Police	Border Police & Immigration	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipal, Union, Health Agents, Tema Motorway	Other ***	Total	Per 100 km	Police	Border Police & Immigration	Customs	Gendarmerie	Mayor, Unions, Health	Other ***	Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km
<b>Tema – Ouagadougou</b>																				
Ghana**	68	881	6.51	0.88	9.62	0.01	0.00	0.71	17.74	2.01	6.34	0.88	15.89	0.02	0	26.59	49.72	5.64	186	21
Burkina	68	176	1.03	1.00	3.35	1.01	0.01	0.03	6.44	3.66	2.99	2.96	9.74	4.15	0.03	0.20	20.06	11.40	115	65
By corr,	68	1057	7.54	0.94	12.97	1.03	0.01	0.74	24.18	2.29	9.33	3.83	25.63	4.16	0.03	26.78	69.78	6.60	301	29
<b>Ouagadougou – Bamako</b>																				
Burkina	51	488	0.88	0.84	5.14	0.82	0.02	0.00	7.71	1.58	4.10	3.96	10.37	3.70	0.04	0	22.18	4.54	28	6
Mali	51	432	6.02	1.00	6.20	6.88	1.84	6.24	28.18	6.52	27.35	5.74	3.62	27.24	6.49	38.99	109.44	25.33	120	28
By corr,	51	920	6.90	0.92	11.33	7.71	1.86	6.24	35.88	3.90	31.45	9.71	6 294	30.95	6.54	38.99	131.61	14.31	148	16
<b>Lomé – Ouagadougou</b>																				
Togo	98	746	3.61	0.77	6.76	3.44	0.02	0.01	14.60	1.96	6.98	1.74	13.99	7.88	0.15	0.02	27.04	3.62	52	7
Burkina	98	274	1.93	0.91	3.61	1.07	0.01	0.01	7.54	2.75	5.84	2.95	4.55	3.92	0.02	0.02	17.31	6.32	34	12
By corr,	98	1020	5.54	0.84	10.37	4.51	0.03	0.02	22.14	2.17	12.82	4.70	14.81	11.80	0.17	0.04	44.35	4.35	86	8

Notes: \*1 US\$ = 425 FCFA and 1 US\$ = 0, 98 GH¢. The FCFA is the currency used in the analysis. \*\* There is no gendarmerie in Ghana.

Other\*\*\* : This column appears because of the bribes collected for alleged axle-weight load violations at weighbridges – receipts are not issued to drivers for these payments that occur on certain corridors.




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# IMPROVED ROAD TRANSPORT GOVERNANCE (IRTG) ON THE MADAOUA (Niger) – BITOU (Burkina Faso) CORRIDOR

Results for the period April 1 to June 30, 2009



## **SECTION II:**

### **RESULTS TABULATED FROM SURVEYS IMPLEMENTED ON THE “ONION CORRIDOR” APRIL 1 TO JUNE 30, 2009**

The Agribusiness and Trade Promotion project (ATP), based in Accra, Ghana, and in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, is a USAID regional initiative in support of ECOWAS and UEMOA to implement a common agricultural policy with as:

- Principal objective: To grow the value and volume of intraregional agricultural commerce in West Africa, and
- Secondary objective: To improve agricultural productivity.

The first quarter of 2009 saw the beginning of ATP activities in the program to reinforce a market information system to assist maize, onion and livestock value chain stakeholders on the Madaoua (Niger) – Bitou (Burkina Faso) corridor.

With the growth in consumption of perishable food products (maize, onions, tomatoes and meat, etc.), emerges a notion of time, a significant issue because the time to consume is often very short. These products must be moved rapidly.

The movement by road of these perishable food products is not achieved without harassment. This is why IRTG decided to examine data collected by ATP on road harassment that occur on the corridor.

#### ***It is important to note that:***

- The surveys conducted concern only the transport of onions. On the traditional corridors, IRTG follows trucks regardless of what they are transporting.
- The protocol for distributing data collection sheets was not totally respected. Usually, drivers must fulfill the following conditions before participating in IRTG data collection: 1. Have a basic education and be literate; 2. Have a driver’s license appropriate for the truck they are driving; 3. The truck in question conforms to technical norms for regional commerce; 4. Have complete and correct documentation for the product being transported; 5. Be ready to drive the truck for the entire length of the corridor, correctly fill out the data sheet and submit it to a focal point agent in the destination country. For ATP, conditions 1, 3 and 4 are not always verified (see explanation below).
- This corridor is not a part of those identified and followed by IRTG

This section of the report presents the results and analysis of data collected on the “Onion Trade Corridor” during the second quarter of 2009 and compares them to those collected during the first quarter of the same year. The data collected in this section were collected in Niger and in Burkina by transporters and traders of onions under the supervision of ATP agents.

The result is clear: Road harassment is more accentuated when drivers do not entirely conform to the rules. They become the prey of traffic control agents. In effect, the number of checkpoints and the rates of bribery are very high, particularly the indicator “bribery,” which reaches US\$530.74 per trip, or US\$50.64 per 100 km against US\$131.62 per trip or US\$14.31 per 100 km on the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor (the worst of the traditional IRTG corridors) during the same period.

Table 1 below gives an overall view of the average number of checkpoints, the average level of bribery and of average delays on the Madaoua-Bitou corridor and compares these values to those of the same type of corridor, Ouagadougou-Bamako.

The overview table in Annex 1 provides detailed results of the surveys.

**Table 1**

Results: April 1-June 30, 2009: Checkpoints, Bribes and Delays							
Corridor	Distance traveled on each corridor (km)	Average number of checkpoints per trip		Average bribery (US\$) per trip		Delays (minutes)	
		Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km
Madaoua-Bitou	1048	37.9	3.6	530.74	50.64	116	11
Ouagadougou – Bamako	920	35.88	3.9	131.62	14.31	148	16

Note: Survey results from the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor (followed by IRTG) are presented here for comparison. In the analysis that follows, the number of checkpoints per 100 km has been rounded to the nearest whole number.

## **I. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHECKPOINTS ON THE CORRIDOR**

The number of checkpoints is very high. In effect, checkpoints abound on the corridor, with 38 stops per trip noted, or about 4 per 100 km, the same ratio seen on the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor.

The services most often inspecting trucks on the corridor are: in first place, the customs agents, in second place, the gendarmerie and finally, the police.

## **II. AVERAGE BRIBERY ON THE CORRIDOR**

Bribery on the corridor is very high due to the nature of the products and the conditions indicated previously, and particularly these three:

1. Owners of onions being transported, almost all illiterate, do not master the documentation (nor the legislation) relative to interstate transport of raw products;
2. They must rely totally on transit agents or their representatives for customs formalities as they do not know the rules concerning transit of goods;
3. The drivers are mostly illiterate (more onion owners are illiterate than truck drivers).

These factors lead to the payment of high sums with fear and under pressure in order to avoid unloading the goods or, worse, deliver products that have spoiled.

The rate of bribery is inexorably elevated. The second quarter saw a rate of bribery reaching US\$530.74 per trip on the Madaoua-Bitou corridor (see Table 6). Most of the bribery occurs in Niger, where agents at checkpoints collected US\$346.13 per trip (of which US\$176.09 was collected by Customs agents, 60% of total collected per trip in Niger). This is far ahead of the sum collected in Burkina Faso, where US\$184.61 was extorted.

In Niger, the Customs service is particularly fingered, followed by the Gendarmerie and Police. In Burkina, the Customs service is also the first source of harassment followed by the Police and Gendarmerie.

### III. AVERAGE INSPECTION TIMES AND DELAYS CAUSED ON THE CORRIDOR

Because the product being moved is a perishable food product (onions), the delays should be very short. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Inspection times of 11 minutes on average per 100 km were observed, or 116 minutes total for a trip. The delays noted in minutes per trip are:

- In Niger, 648 km segment: 69 minutes, or 11 minutes per 100 km
- In Burkina, 400 km segment: 47 minutes, or 12 minutes per 100 km

### IV. CHANGE IN RESULTS OVER TIME ON THIS CORRIDOR


The table below compares second quarter (T2-09) results to first quarter (T1-09) results in 2009.

#### IV.1. Change in the average number of checkpoints on the corridor, by state crossed

Table 2: Average number of checkpoints

Corridor	Number of checkpoints per trip		Number of checkpoints per 100 km	
	T1-09	T2-09	T1-09	T2-09
<b>Madaoua-Bitou</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>3.6</b>
Niger	30	24	4.6	3.7
Burkina	14	14	3.5	3.5

Graphic 1: Change in the number of inspections for the two periods analyzed



#### Checkpoints

**B**etween the first and second quarters 2009, the total number of checkpoints on the corridor declined 14%, falling from 44 (T1-09) to 38 (T2-09). This can be attributed to Niger, which saw checkpoints fall from 30 to 24, or 20%.


In Burkina, the number of checkpoints did not change.

#### IV.2. Change in the average value of bribes paid, by state crossed

Table 3: (in US\$)

Corridor	Bribes per trip		Bribes per 100 km	
	T1-09	T2-09	T1-09	T2-09
<b>Madaoua-Bitou</b>	<b>586.82</b>	<b>530.74</b>	<b>56.00</b>	<b>50.64</b>
Niger	413.96	346.13	63.89	53.42
Burkina	172.87	184.61	43.22	46.16

Note: 1 US\$ = 450 FCFA.

Graphic 2: Change in the level of bribery for the 2 periods analyzed


**B**ribery on the corridor declined 10 percent compared to the results obtained in the first quarter of 2009, with US\$530.74 collected (in T2-09) against US\$586.82 (in T1-09), or a variation of US\$56.08.

The only decrease was noted in Niger, with a drop of 16%, from US\$413.96 (T1-09) to US\$346.13 (T2-09) or a variation of US\$67.82. On the other hand, Burkina saw a 7% increase compared to the first quarter of 2009.

### IV.3. Change in average inspection times per trip, by state crossed

Table 4:

Corridor	Delays (minutes) per 100 km	
	T1-09	T2-09
<b>Madaoua-Bitou</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>
Niger	11	11
Burkina	11	12

Graphic 3: Change in inspection times, per 100 km

### Delays

**T**he progression of inspection times on the corridor in Niger has not changed compared to the previous quarter (with a delay of 11 minutes per 100 km each quarter).

An increase in inspection times of 10% in Burkina was recorded, from 11 minutes to 12 minutes, or 10%.

**T**he “Onion Trade Corridor” should be normalized, conferring data collection of the corridor to IRTG focal points in Burkina and Niger. Awareness rising proportionate to the problems cited should be undertaken directed at uniformed services and inspection agents.

## ANNEX 2: Overall table of results of surveys conducted on the Onion Corridor, Jan. 1 to June 30, 2009.

Table 6: Synthesis table of global results obtained from analysis of data collected from surveys on the onion corridor, Jan 1-March 31, 2009

IRTG Results, Jan. 1-March 31, 2009																
Checkpoints, Bribes, Delays																
Country	Number of trips	Distance traveled (km)	Average number of checkpoints by service						Bribery by service						Delays (minutes)	
			Police	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipal Union	Total	Per 100 km	Police	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipal Union	Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km
Madaoua-Bitou																
Niger	61	648	9.3	10.3	9.1	1.1	29.8	4.6	104.88	178.38	109.98	20.71	413.95	63.88	72	11
Burkina	61	400	3.7	5.4	4.2	0.8	14.2	3.5	32.39	89.33	35.30	15.85	172.86	43.22	45	11
Par corr,	61	1048	13	16	13	2	44.0	4.2	137.27	267.70	145.28	36.56	586.81	55.99	117	11

Table 7: Synthesis table of global results obtained from analysis of data collected from surveys on the onion corridor, April 1-June 30, 2009

IRTG Results, Jan. 1-March 31, 2009																
Checkpoints, Bribes, Delays																
Countries	Number of trips	Distance traveled (km)	Average number of checkpoints, by service						Average bribery by service						Delays (minutes)	
			Police	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipal, Union	Total	Per 100 km	Police	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipal, Union	Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km
Madaoua-Bitou																
Niger	75	648	6.7	9.1	7.1	0.9	23.9	3.7	65.38	176.09	87.78	16.88	346.13	53.42	69	11
Burkina	75	400	3.6	5.7	3.9	0.7	14.0	3.5	40.06	93.56	35.17	15.82	184.61	46.15	47	12
Par corr,	75	1048	10	15	11	2	37.9	3.6	105.44	269.64	122.95	32.70	530.74	50.64	116	11

## **ANNEX 3: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The IRTG initiative recognizes the numerous people who have contributed to the writing and publication of this report and deeply thanks them. We thank the truck drivers who complete the data sheets, the transport companies and the transport unions. The initiative maintains excellent relationships with economic operators, the media and civil society organizations as well, with a view to undertake actions against road harassment on the corridors.

The IRTG team thanks particularly the National Coordinators of Focal Points in the following countries:

### **Burkina Faso**

- National Coordinator: *Direction Générale des Transports Terrestres et Maritimes*
- Focal Point: *Conseil Burkinabè des Chargeurs*

### **Ghana**

- National Coordinator: ECOWAS Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Cooperation and NEPAD.
- Focal Point: Ghana Shippers' Council

### **Mali**

- National Coordinator: *Direction des Transports Terrestres, Maritimes et Fluviaux*

### **Togo**

- National Coordinator: *Direction Générale des Transports*
- Focal Point: *Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Togo*

### **Niger**

- National Coordinator of the ATP Project

9th IRTG  
Report  
UEMOA

10 November

2009

*This report presents results of surveys collected from July 1 to Sept. 30, 2009, in two sections :*


*- The first section presents results obtained on corridors followed by the Improved Road Transport Governance initiative : Tema-Ouagadougou, Ouagadougou-Bamako, Lomé-Ouagadougou and Bamako-Dakar, with the financial support of the United States Agency for International Development and of the World Bank's Sub-Saharan Transport Policy program (SSATP), and in partnership with the West Africa Trade Hub based in Accra (Ghana).*

*- The second section presents results on the « onion corridor. » These results are obtained on interstate routes connecting Madaoua (Niger) and Bittou (Burkina Faso) by transporters and onion traders under the supervision of the Agribusiness & Trade Promotion project. This is regional initiative of USAID supported also by ECOWAS and UEMOA. It is based in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) and Accra.*

Survey  
Results  
from the  
3rd  
Quarter  
2009

## IMPROVED ROAD TRANSPORT GOVERNANCE ON INTERSTATE CORRIDORS

Results for the period July 1 to Sept. 30, 2009



### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 9th IRTG report presents survey results obtained from July 1 to Sept. 30, 2009. For the first time, it features results from surveys submitted for the Bamako-Dakar corridor, and shows some encouraging trends for the reduction of road harassment on along these corridors.

The number of checkpoints varies between 2 and 4 per 100 km. Senegal had the highest number of checkpoints, with 4 per 100 km, followed by Mali, which had 3.

The level of bribery per 100 km ranges from USD 3.42 in Togo to USD 10.22 in Mali. In Mali, bribery has fallen compared to the previous quarter by nearly 60%, dropping from USD 25.33 100 km to USD 10.22 on the Malian segment of the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor.

Delays caused by inspections at checkpoints per 100 km vary between 7 minutes in Togo to 23 minutes in Senegal with 17 minutes in Mali.

Awareness raising and advocacy campaigns undertaken by IRTG and its partners seem to have produced positive results during this third quarter of 2009.

## INTRODUCTION


The Improved Road Transport Governance (IRTG) initiative began in 2005 as a joint effort of UEMOA and ECOWAS financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank's sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program (SSATP) with the West Africa Trade Hub as its implementing partner. The objective is good governance along primary trade corridors in West Africa.

IRTG monitors trends in road harassment on the **Tema-Ouagadougou**, **Ouagadougou-Bamako**, **Lomé-Ouagadougou** and **Bamako-Dakar** corridors with the aim of eliminating the barriers, delays and bribes, which affect drivers along major interstate trade routes in West Africa.

Figure 1 below illustrates how the IRTG report contributes to efforts to reduce barriers along the corridors.

### What Happens to the Report

Advocacy plays an integral role in Improved Road Transport Governance initiative. Once written, the Trade Hub-UEMOA report is used to advocate for real change.



# Corridors monitored by IRTG

# RESULTS OF SURVEYS UNDERTAKEN ON IRTG-MONITORED CORRIDORS FROM JULY 1 TO SEPT. 30 2009

Road harassment indicators fell during the third quarter of 2009. Bribery fell by 3.7%, the number of inspection points fell by 10.8% and the inspection times fell by 22.3% compared to the previous quarter's results on all corridors except the Bamako-Dakar corridor which has produced its first results this quarter.

The data analyzed in this report was collected by focal points in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Senegal and Togo.

Table 1 below presents an overview of the results. Table 5 in Annex 1 provides detailed results of the surveys.

**Table 1**

IRTG Results: July 1-Sept. 30, 2009: Checkpoints, Bribes and Delays							
Corridor	Distance (km)	Average number of checkpoints by trip		Average value of bribes (US\$)		Delays (minutes)	
		Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km
Tema – Ouagadougou	1057	24.18	2.04	\$76.17	\$7.21	154	15
Ouagadougou – Bamako	920	35.88	3.40	\$116.26	\$12.64	167	18
Lomé – Ouagadougou	1020	22.14	2.05	\$44.23	\$4.34	92	9
Bamako-Dakar	1365	37.01	3.63	\$100.26	\$9.83	229	22

Note: USD 1 = XOF 450.

In the analysis below, the number of checkpoints per 100 km has been rounded to the nearest whole number.

## I. NUMBER OF CHECKPOINTS

The Bamako-Dakar corridor showed the highest density of checkpoints with 37 stops per trip, or a ratio of 4 stops per 100 km. This is due to the Senegalese segment of the route, which had 26 checkpoints per trip compared to 11 per trip on the Malian segment.

The Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor had 31 stops per trip or 3 stops per 100 km.

The Lomé-Ouagadougou and Tema-Ouagadougou corridors had the lowest number of barriers this quarter with 21 and 22 stops per trip, respectively, or about 2 stops per 100 km on each.

In Senegal, the Gendarmerie operates the most checkpoints (15 per trip) followed by the Police (9 checkpoints per trip); the Customs service operates only one checkpoint per trip, according to the surveys submitted.

In Mali, the Gendarmerie operated the most checkpoints, followed by the Police and Road Tax agents (which extort fees based on overloading) and then customs.

In Burkina Faso and Togo, the Customs services operated the most checkpoints followed by the Police and the Gendarmerie.

## **II. BRIBERY PER TRIP**

The Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor has highest level of bribery with agents extorting USD 116.26 per trip or USD 12.64 per 100 km. Most of the bribes are collected along the Malian segment of the corridor with about USD 80.90 collected (of which USD 22.46 is extorted by agents purporting to assess penalties for overloading).

The Bamako-Dakar corridor, which submitted its first surveys, follows closely the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor with bribery reaching USD 100.26 per trip or USD 9.83 per 100 km. The Senegalese segment of the route is primarily responsible with USD 64.17 extorted per trip compared to USD 36.09 on the Malian segment.

The Lomé-Ouagadougou corridor has the lowest level of bribery with USD 44.23 per trip.

In the Ghana, the Customs service is the main culprit followed by the Police. Weighbridge agents at the entry to the route at Tema have considerably decreased harassment of drivers for bribes.

In Burkina Faso, the Customs service is the most incriminated for extortion, followed by the Police and the Gendarmerie.

In Togo, similarly, the Customs service again has the dubious distinction of leading extortionists, followed by the Police and the Gendarmerie.

The uniformed services that deal most harshly with drivers in Mali are, in decreasing order with the highest extortion first, the Police, the Gendarmerie and finally Customs.

Senegal's first road harassment surveys of drivers on the Bamako-Dakar corridor show the Gendarmerie extorting the highest level of bribes followed by the Police.

## **III. INSPECTION TIMES AND AVERAGE DELAYS PER TRIP**

Inspection times decreased during this corridor compared to the previous quarter. The results this quarter are encouraging.

- Bamako-Dakar, 1 020 km : 229 minutes, or 22 minutes of delay per 100 km
- Bamako-Ouagadougou, 920 km : 167 minutes, or 18 minutes of delay per 100 km
- Tema-Ouagadougou, 1 057 km : 154 minutes, or 15 minutes of delay per 100 km
- Lomé-Ouagadougou, 1 020 km : 92 minutes, or 9 minutes of delay per 100 km

## **IV. TRENDS**

The third quarter results engender some hope as decreases in the three indicators of road governance have fallen.


The results this quarter are compared below to those from the second quarter of 2009 and the third quarter of 2008 (one year ago).

## IV.1. Trend in the number of checkpoints, by trip and by state crossed

**Table 2:** Average number of inspections on each corridor

Corridor	Number of inspections per trip			Number of inspections per 100 km		
	T3-08	T2-09	T3-09	T3-08	T2-09	T3-09
<b>Tema-Ouaga</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
Ghana	15	18	15	2	2	2
Burkina	6	6	7	3	4	4
<b>Ouaga-Bamako</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>
Burkina	7	8	7	1	2	1
Mali	29	28	24	7	7	6
<b>Lomé-Ouaga</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
Togo	12	15	14	2	2	2
Burkina	6	8	7	2	3	2
<b>Bamako-Dakar</b>			<b>37</b>			<b>4</b>
Mali			11			1
Senegal			26			4

**Figure 2:** Trend in the number of inspections in each state



### Checkpoints

Compared to the second quarter of 2009, the total number of checkpoints has decline by more than 10% on the corridors taken together. The total fell from 83 to 74.

This decrease is due to changes on the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor, which saw a decline of almost 14% with 8.5% declines on the Tema-Ouagadougou and Lome-Ouagadougou corridors.

The Ghanaian segment of the route had the biggest drop – almost 17% - in the number of checkpoints, with 15 compared to 18 in the second quarter of 2009.

In Mali, four checkpoints disappeared, a 14% decline.

In Togo, one checkpoint was eliminated, a 7% drop.

In Burkina Faso, about one checkpoint disappeared during the quarter.

Compared to the same period one year ago, the total number of checkpoints where inspections were undertaken dropped by about 1.3%, in raw numbers, from 75 to 74. But the Tema-Ouagadougou and Lome-Ouagadougou actually saw a slight increase – 4.5% and 14.3%, respectively – in the numbers of checkpoints where inspections occurred


## IV.2. Trend in bribes extorted per trip and per state crossed

Table 3: (in USD)

Corridor	Bribes per trip			Bribes per 100 km		
	T3-08	T2-09	T3-09	T3-08	T2-09	T3-09
<b>Tema-Ouaga</b>	<b>31.11</b>	<b>69.79</b>	<b>76.18</b>	<b>2.89</b>	<b>6.60</b>	<b>7.21</b>
Ghana	20	49.72	54.54	1.11	5.64	6.19
Burkina	11.11	20.07	21.63	11.11	11.40	12.29
<b>Ouaga-Bamako</b>	<b>98.89</b>	<b>131.62</b>	<b>116.26</b>	<b>11.11</b>	<b>14.31</b>	<b>12.64</b>
Burkina	22.22	22.18	27.26	4.44	4.54	5.58
Mali	76.67	109.44	89	17.78	25.33	20.60
<b>Lomé-Ouaga</b>	<b>34.44</b>	<b>44.38</b>	<b>44.23</b>	<b>3.33</b>	<b>4.35</b>	<b>4.34</b>
Togo	20	27.04	25.50	2.67	3.62	3.42
Burkina	15.56	17.33	18.73	5.56	6.32	6.83
<b>Bamako-Dakar</b>			<b>100.26</b>			<b>9.83</b>
Mali			30.09			4.56
Senegal			64.17			9.76

Note: USD 1 = XOF 450; USD 1 = GHS 0.96

Figure 3: Trend in bribes



### Bribery

Comparing the third quarter results to those of the second quarter, bribes per trip have declined by almost 4% on all the corridors taken together (except Bamako-Dakar, which is reporting data for the first time). Total bribes fell from USD 245.79 in the second quarter to USD 236.67 in the third, a drop of about USD 9.

The greatest decrease – almost 12% - occurred on the Bamako-Ouagadougou corridor; the Lomé-Ouagadougou saw a 0.33% decrease.

Bribery in Mali dropped by almost 19%, dropping from USD 109.44 in the second quarter to USD 89 in the third, a USD 20.44 decline from the previous quarter to the current quarter. This decline supports the initiative's efforts undertaken with authorities to reduce road harassment.

Togo saw bribery decline by about 6%, but an increase in bribery was seen in Burkina Faso and Ghana.


Compared to one year ago, however, bribery is up by about 43% on the corridors connecting Ouagadougou to Bamako, Lome and Tema.

### IV.3. Trend in average delays caused by inspections by trip and by state crossed

Table 4:

Corridor	Delays (minutes) per 100 km		
	T3-08	T2-09	T3-09
<b>Tema-Ouagadougou</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>15</b>
Ghana	19	21	11
Burkina	48	65	32
<b>Ouagadougou-Bamako</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>18</b>
Burkina	6	6	8
Mali	35	28	30
<b>Lomé-Ouagadougou</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>
Togo	6	7	7
Burkina	11	12	15
<b>Bamako-Dakar</b>			<b>22</b>
Mali			10
Senegal			23

Figure 4: Trend in inspection times per 100 km



### Delays

Inspection times have dropped by 22.3% per 100 km compared to the previous (2<sup>nd</sup>) quarter of 2009 on all of the corridors except Bamako-Dakar (reporting its first data on road harassment in this report). Delays dropped, on average, by about 4 minutes, from about 18 minutes to about 14 minutes per 100 km.

The Tema-Ouagadougou corridor is primarily responsible for this change, which is the only corridor to have seen a drop of nearly 50%. Delays were cut from about 29 minutes per 100 km to about 15 minutes. Delays dropped by about 48% and about 51%, respectively, on the segments of the route in Ghana and Burkina Faso.

The Bamako-Dakar corridor, with its first data submitted for the initiative, has the highest level of delays: 22 minutes per 100 km.

Compared to the same period one year ago, delays per 100 km have dropped by about 18% on the three corridors connecting Ouagadougou to Bamako, Lome and Tema. Delays are about 3 minutes shorter per 100 km dropping from 17 minutes in the third quarter of 2008 to 14 minutes.

## **CONCLUSION**

The third quarter of 2009 shows slight improvement compared to the previous quarter. The three primary IRTG indicators have dropped. Efforts undertaken by states and awareness raising and advocacy campaigns undertaken by civil society organizations in partnership with the initiative appear to explain the decreases. Nevertheless, the indicators are still worse than those reported one year ago for the same period.

Bribery dropped by almost 4% on the three corridors connecting Ouagadougou to Bamako, Lome and Team. The Bamako-Ouagadougou corridor showed the greatest decline, about 12%.

Still, agents of uniformed services on the Ouagadougou-Bamako corridor are extorting the most in bribes: about USD 116.26 per trip or USD 12.64 per 100 km.

The Bamako-Dakar corridor, a new addition to the IRTG initiative, appears to be as problematic for road harassment as the Bamako-Ouagadougou corridor with a level of bribery measured to be USD 100.26 per trip, or USD 9.83 per 100 km. The Senegalese segment is largely to blame with agents collecting USD 64.17 per trip compared to USD 36.09 collected in Mali.

The Bamako-Dakar corridor has the highest density of checkpoints where trucks are stopped for inspection: 37 stops registered per trip, or about 4 per 100 km. The Senegalese segment of the corridor explains this statistic: it has about 26 checkpoints doing inspections compared to 11 in on the Malian segment.

Generally speaking, the Police (greatest bribe takers) have the most negative impact on the corridors as far as extorting bribes from drivers is concerned, and the same could be said for the Gendarmerie. The Customs service in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali and Togo should copy Senegal's example: The Senegalese Customs service operates just one checkpoint on the Bamako-Dakar corridor. As for the agents purporting to collect penalties from drivers for overloading their vehicles, the data this quarter shows the problem abating except along the Ouagadougou-Bamako and Bamako-Dakar corridors where the value of bribes these agents collected represented 25% and 19%, respectively, of the total bribes collected on these corridors. This return to normal should be followed by the effective enforcement of UEMOA's axle-load rules.

The initiative invites Member States to intensify their awareness raising and advocacy efforts in order to substantially reduce road harassment that slows the movement of goods and people on the interstate routes.

## ANNEX 1: Overall results of surveys submitted for the period July 1 to Sept. 30, 2009

Table 5: The table presents overall results obtained during the period.

IRTG Results : July 1 to Sept. 30, 2009																				
Checkpoints, Bribes, Delays																				
Country crossed	Number of trips	Distance covered	Average number of checkpoints by service								Average bribes (USD) by service							Delays (minutes)		
			Police	Border police : immigration	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipal, Unions, Health Agents, Tema Motorway	Other ***	Total	Per 100 km	Police	Border police : immigration	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipal, Unions, Health, Tema	Other ***	Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km
<b>Tema – Ouagadougou</b>																				
Ghana**	139	881	5.85	0.77	8.20	0.01	0.06	0.09	14.98	1.70	17.96	0.76	34.85	0.04	0.06	0.88	54.54	6.19	98	11
Burkina	139	176	1.01	0.95	3.58	0.90	0.09	0.03	6.57	3.73	3.54	3.41	9.84	4.17	0.40	0.26	21.62	12.29	56	32
Par corr,	139	1057	6.86	0.86	11.78	0.91	0.15	0.12	21.55	2.04	21.50	4.17	44.69	4.21	0.46	1.14	76.17	7.21	154	15
<b>Ouagadougou – Bamako</b>																				
Burkina	55	488	0.98	0.78	4.20	1.02	0.05	0.00	7.04	1.44	4.16	2.99	15.58	3.60	0.93	0	27.25	5.58	38	8
Mali	55	432	5.96	0.98	4.45	6.56	1.25	5.02	24.24	5.61	20.61	4.81	18.26	20.12	2.75	22.45	88.99	20.60	129	30
Par corr,	55	920	6.95	0.88	8.65	7.58	1.31	5.02	31.27	3.40	24.77	7.80	33.84	23.72	3.68	22.45	116.25	12.64	167	18
<b>Lomé – Ouagadougou</b>																				
Togo	204	746	3.75	0.97	6.72	2.88	0.08	0.01	14.41	1.93	8.06	2.38	8.67	6.35	0.05	0	25.50	3.42	51	7
Burkina	204	274	1.60	0.95	3.00	0.99	0.00	0.00	6.54	2.39	5.33	3.27	6.02	4.11	0	0	18.72	6.83	41	15
Par corr,	204	1020	5.35	0.96	9.72	3.87	0.08	0.01	20.95	2.05	13.38	5.65	14.69	10.46	0.05	0	44.23	4.34	92	9
<b>Bamako – Dakar (new corridor)</b>																				
Mali	154	792	3.52	0.02	1.51	3.91	0.00	2.52	11.47	1.45	10.78	0.06	9.00	9.51	0	6.74	36.09	4.56	80	10
Senegal	154	657	8.51	0.95	1.01	15.06	0.00	0.00	25.53	3.89	22.76	2.47	2.80	36.13	0	0	64.16	9.76	149	23
Par corr,	154	1020	12.03	0.48	2.51	18.97	0.00	2.52	37.01	3.63	33.54	2.53	11.80	45.65	0	6.74	100.25	9.83	229	22

Notes: \*USD 1 = XOF 450 and USD 1 = GHS 0.98. XOF is the currency used for analysis. \*\* There is no Gendarmerie in Ghana.


Other\*\*\*: Bribes collected for alleged axle-load violations, charged without issuing of receipts, along certain corridors.

# **The Onion Corridor**



## SURVEY RESULTS FOR THE ATP CORRIDOR: MADAOUA (Niger) – BITTOU (Burkina Faso)

July 1-Sept. 30, 2009



### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Bribery along the Onion Corridor is the rule and very common. This quarter, the number of checkpoints varies from 2 to 3 per 100 km, the maximum occurring in Burkina Faso.

Bribery per 100 km varies between USD 45.05 in Burkina Faso and USD 46.42 in Niger. This high rate of bribery almost certainly is due to the nature of the product being transported (onions). The level of bribes is about four times higher than the level on other IRTG corridors.

Delays vary between 6 minutes per 100 km (in Niger) and 16 minutes (in Burkina Faso). Here again Niger scores slightly better and a 45% reduction in delays was seen this quarter compared to the previous quarter, dropping from 11 minutes per 100 km to 6 minutes. But delays in Burkina Faso increased by 33%, rising from 12 minutes per 100 km to 16 minutes.

## INTRODUCTION

Data analyzed in this report was collected in Niger and Burkina Faso by onion transporters and traders under the supervision of agents at USAID's Agribusiness and Trade Promotion project.

Based in Accra and Ouagadougou, the Agribusiness and Trade Promotion project is a regional USAID initiative supporting the ECOWAS and UEMOA effort to implement a regional agricultural policy that :

- In general terms, grows the value and volume of intra-regional agriculture in West Africa
- In specific terms, improves agricultural productivity.

The Onion Corridor is a minefield for drivers: it has numerous checkpoints, the level of bribery is very high and delays are long.

By monitoring this corridor in particular, IRTG aims to report the extent of harassment that transporters suffer, whether they are operating legally or illegally, and, at the same time, raise awareness among uniformed services in order to reduce harassment which is negatively impacting the local and regional economies.

Survey results for the third quarter of 2009 are presented below and compared to results obtained during the first and second quarters of the year.

Table 1 presents an overview of checkpoints, bribes and delays on the corridor. Annex 1 includes a detailed presentation of survey results.

**Table 1**

Results for July 1-Sept. 30, 2009: Checkpoints, Bribes, Delays							
Corridor	Distance	Average number of checkpoints		Bribes (USD)		Delays (minutes)	
		Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km
Madaoua-Bittou	1048	27	2.58	481.02	45.90	104.12	9.94

*In the analysis that follows, the number of barriers per 100 km has been rounded to the nearest whole number.*

## **I. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHECKPOINTS**

There are 3 checkpoints per 100 km on the Madaoua-Bittou corridor.

In Niger, Customs agents operate the highest number of checkpoints (10 stops per trip), followed by Police (4 stops) and the Gendarmerie (2 stops). This order is the same in Burkina Faso.

## **II. BRIBERY**

Bribery on the Onion Corridor is high – USD 481.02 per trip – due to the perishable nature of onions. This is largely due to bribes collected in Niger, where USD 300.82 is collected per trip (of this total, USD 205.07 is collected by Customs agents, or 68% of the amount collected in Niger). This sets a new record for bribery along monitored corridors in West Africa well ahead of Burkina Faso, which along the same corridor shows USD 180.20 in bribes per trip.

In Niger, Customs is particularly implicated, followed by the Gendarmerie and the Police. Customs in Burkina Faso is similarly first followed by the Police and then the Gendarmerie.

## **III. AVERAGE INSPECTION TIMES AND DELAYS**

Given the perishable nature of onions, delays should be minimized. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Delays of 10 minutes per 100 km were reported, for a cumulative total of 104 minutes on the corridor. In order of magnitude, the delays noted are (in minutes per trip):

- In Burkina Faso, 400 km section: 66 minutes, or 16 minutes per 100 km
- In Niger, 648 km section: 39 minutes, or 6 minutes per 100 km

## **IV. TRENDS**

During the third quarter and in comparison to the two previous quarters of 2009, the three indicators have decreased.


Below, the results for the third quarter (T3-09) are compared to those obtained for the first quarter (T1-09) and for the second quarter (T2-09) of 2009.

### **IV.1. Trends in the Number of Checkpoints and by State Crossed**

**Table 2:** Average number of checkpoints on the corridor

Corridor	Checkpoints per trip			Checkpoints per 100 km		
	T1-09	T2-09	T3-09	T1-09	T2-09	T3-09
<b>Madaoua-Bittou</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>2.58</b>
Niger	30	24	16	4.6	3.7	2.47
Burkina	14	14	11	3.5	3.5	2.75

Figure 1: Trend in the average number of inspections during the three quarters analyzed



## Checkpoints

**C**ompared to the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 1st quarters of 2009, the corridor showed decreases of 28.95% and 38.64%, respectively

The number of checkpoints dropped by 33.33% and 21.43%, respectively, in Niger and Burkina Faso, compared to the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2009.

Compared to the 1st quarter of 2009, checkpoints decreased by 46.67% and 21.43%, respectively, in Niger and Burkina Faso.


## IV.2. Trends in Value of Bribes Collected and by State Crossed

Table 3: in USD

Corridor	Bribes per trip			Bribes per 100 km		
	T1-09	T2-09	T3-09	T1-09	T2-09	T3-09
Madaoua-Bittou	586.82	530.74	481.02	56.00	50.64	45.90
Niger	413.96	346.13	300.82	63.89	53.42	46.42
Burkina	172.87	184.61	180.20	43.22	46.16	45.05

Note: 1 US\$ = 450 FCFA.

Figure 2: Trend in average bribes for the three periods analyzed



## Bribery

**B**ribery is decreasing, compared to the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2009, by 9.37%, dropping from USD 530.74 to USD 481.02 per trip, or a decrease of USD 49.72. Still, the level of bribery remains very high.

The two countries have apparently made some progress in reducing the level of bribery, with a 13.09% drop in Niger and a 2.39% drop in Burkina Faso compared to the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2009.


Compared to the 1st quarter of 2009, the corridor saw an 18.03% decrease in the value of bribes collected.

### IV.3. Trend in Delays per Trip and by State Crossed

Table 4: Delays in minutes by corridor

Corridor	Delays (minutes) per 100 km		
	T1-09	T2-09	T3-09
Madaoua-Bittou	11	11	9.94
Niger	11	11	5.95
Burkina	11	12	16.40

Figure3: Trend in inspection times, per 100 km



### Delays

**D**elays have decreased by 9.64% compared to the two previous quarters.

Niger saw the greatest decrease, reducing inspection times by 5 minutes per 100 km, dropping from 11 minutes per 100 km in the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter of 2009 to 6 minutes in the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2009, a 45.91% decrease.

On the other hand, delays in Burkina Faso have increased by 36.67%, increasing from 12 minutes per 100 km in the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter to 16 minutes in the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter, or 4 more minutes per 100 km.

## CONCLUSION

The 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of 2009 shows modest improvements compared to the previous quarter. Road harassment has declined on the Onion Corridor. Awareness raising and advocacy campaigns undertaken by civil society organizations may explain this progress. The will of public authorities to address the problem, which is negatively affecting economic development, also played some part.

Greater political will is necessary to properly address this issue, which is one of the more serious problems affecting the region's economic integration and economic development.

IRTG proposes that Member States increase their efforts to ensure the free movement of people and goods and vehicles on primary trade corridors.

## ANNEX 2: Detailed overall survey results on the Onion Corridor, April 1 to June 30, 2009

Table 6: Overall results obtained, April 1 to June 30, 2009

Results : April 1 to June 30, 2009																
Checkpoints, Bribery, Delays																
Country	Number of trips	Distance traveled	Average number of checkpoints per uniformed service, per trip						Average bribes extorted by service						Delays (minutes)	
			Police	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipality, Unions	Total	Per 100 km	Police	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipality, Unions	Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km
Madaoua-Bittou																
Niger	75	648	6.7	9.1	7.1	0.9	23.9	3.7	65.38	176.09	87.78	16.88	346.13	53.42	69	11
Burkina	75	400	3.6	5.7	3.9	0.7	14.0	3.5	40.06	93.56	35.17	15.82	184.61	46.15	47	12
Par corr,	75	1048	10	15	11	2	37.9	3.6	105.44	269.64	122.95	32.70	530.75	50.64	116	11

Tableau 7: Overall results obtained, July 1 to Sept. 30, 2009

Results : July 1 to Sept. 30, 2009																
Checkpoints, Bribes, Delays																
Country	Number of Trips	Distance traveled	Average number of checkpoints per service, per trip						Average bribes extorted by service						Delays (minutes)	
			Police	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipality Unions	Total	Per 100 km	Police	Customs	Gendarmerie	Municipality Unions	Total	Per 100 km	Total	Per 100 km
Madaoua-Bittou																
Niger	100	648	4	10	2	0	16	2.47	25.82	205.07	62.96	6.97	300.82	46.42	38.54	5.95
Burkina	100	400	3	6	2	0	11	2.75	46.04	97.19	35.67	1.30	180.20	45.05	65.58	16.40
Par corr,	100	1048	7	16	4	0	27	2.58	71.87	302.26	98.62	8.27	481.02	45.90	104.12	9.94

## **ANNEX 3: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

The IRTG initiative recognizes the numerous people who have contributed to the writing and publication of this report and deeply thanks them. We thank the truck drivers who complete the data sheets, the transport companies and the transport unions. The initiative maintains excellent relationships with economic operators, the media and civil society organizations as well, with a view to undertake actions against road harassment on the corridors.

The IRTG team thanks particularly the National Coordinators of Focal Points in the following countries:

### **Burkina Faso**

- National Coordinator: *Direction Générale des Transports Terrestres et Maritimes*
- Focal Point: *Conseil Burkinabè des Chargeurs*

### **Ghana**

- National Coordinator: ECOWAS Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Regional Cooperation and NEPAD.
- Focal Point: Ghana Shippers' Council

### **Mali**

- National Coordinator: *Direction des Transports Terrestres, Maritimes et Fluviaux*

### **Senegal**

- National Coordinator: National Direction of Road Transport
- Focal Point: Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Senegal

### **Togo**

- National Coordinator: *Direction Générale des Transports*
- Focal Point: *Chambre de Commerce et d'Industrie du Togo*

### **Niger**

- National Coordinator of the ATP Project