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Evaluation of Rule of Law Programs In Liberia

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DISCLAIMER

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ACRONYMS

AFELL	Association for Female Lawyers of Liberia
ASHDI	Association for Self-help development initiative
BYA	Bong Youth Association
CHPR	Center for the Protection of Human Rights
CJPS	Center for Justice & Peace Studies
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEN-L	Development Education Network – Liberia
FIND	Foundation for International Dignity
FOHRD	Foundation for Human Right Development
FORD	Forum for the Restoration of Human Rights Development
GBV	Gender-based Violence
INL	Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
IVA	Inter Visionary Artists
JPC	Catholic Justice & Peace Commission
LACC	Liberia Anti Corruption Commission
LJSSD	Liberia Justice Sector Support Division
LNBA	Liberia National Bar Association
LPW	Liberia Prison Watch
MOJ	Ministry of Justice
MYA	Muslim Youth Association
NICE	Nimba Initiative for Crime Education
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
PFL	Prison Fellowship of Liberia
RAL	Rescue Alternative Liberia
RHRAP	Rural Human Right Active Program
UL	University of Liberia
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugee
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
WIPNET	Women in Peace Building Network

CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
KEY FINDINGS.....	2
<i>Progress and Overall Programming Impact</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Main Reasons for Limited Rule of Law Progress and Impact.....</i>	<i>2</i>
KEY RULE OF LAW RECOMMENDATIONS	3
INTRODUCTION.....	4
PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF WORK.....	5
METHODOLOGY.....	5
OVERVIEW OF RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS IN LIBERIA.....	6
RESULTS FROM THE DONOR MAPPING EXERCISE	6
RESULTS OF CSO SURVEYS.....	9
EVALUATION FINDINGS	14
DONOR COORDINATION.....	14
MONITORING & EVALUATION	15
REPORTING	16
CAPACITY-BUILDING VERSUS INSTITUTION BUILDING.....	16
EVALUATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ROL PROGRAMS.....	18
JSSL/PAE.....	18
<i>Program Description.....</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Key Findings: Strengths and/or Weaknesses of Program</i>	<i>18</i>
<i>Best Practices and Lessons Learned.....</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>Stakeholder Impact.....</i>	<i>21</i>
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION.....	21
<i>Program Description.....</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>Key Findings: Strengths and/or Weaknesses of Program</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>Best Practices and Lessons Learned.....</i>	<i>23</i>
<i>Stakeholder Impact.....</i>	<i>23</i>
USDOJ/OPDAT.....	23
<i>Program Description.....</i>	<i>23</i>
<i>Key Findings: Strengths and/or Weaknesses of Program</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Best Practices and Lessons Learned.....</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Stakeholder Impact.....</i>	<i>26</i>
CARTER CENTER	27
<i>Program Description.....</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Key Findings: Strengths and/or Weaknesses of the Program.....</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Best Practices and Lessons Learned.....</i>	<i>27</i>
<i>Stakeholder Impact.....</i>	<i>28</i>
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS	29
MEETING BENCHMARKS.....	29
SUSTAINABILITY	29
IMPACT	29
COST-EFFECTIVENESS	30
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS	31
APPENDICES.....	40
APPENDIX A: SCOPE OF WORK.....	41
APPENDIX B: PERSONS CONTACTED.....	47
APPENDIX C: SURVEY INSTRUMENT	52

APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL MAPS	62
APPENDIX E: RULE OF LAW.....	65
PROGRAMS MATRIX.....	65
APPENDIX F: REFERENCES	78

MAPS

Map 1: Liberia ROL Programs by Sector.....	6
Map 2: Liberia ROL Programming by Issue.....	7
Map 3: Bong County.....	63
Map 4: Montserrado County	63
Map 5: Nimba County.....	64
Map 6: Margibi County	64

FIGURES

Figure 1: Survey Question 1a	9
Figure 2: Survey Questions 8a and 9a.....	10
Figure 3: Survey Question 15	10
Figure 4: Survey Question 6b.....	11
Figure 5: Survey Question 18.....	12
Figure 6: Forum Usage for Civil Disputes (Carter Center).....	13
Figure 7: Forum Usage for Criminal Disputes (Carter Center).....	13
Figure 8: Average Outcomes by Forum (Carter Center).....	13

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following the first free and fair democratic elections in Liberia after 14 years of civil war, the USG launched a broad-based, multi-faceted rule of law program designed to help plant the foundation for rebuilding Liberia's decimated justice system and her shattered economy. The USG is currently in the process of planning a new phase of stepped-up rule of law programming and has asked the QED Group to evaluate its initial efforts.

During this same period, UNMIL and the Norwegian Rescue Committee (NRC) have also played important roles monitoring and reporting on human rights abuses in Liberia. However, their programs are in their final phases. This means that UNMIL's national human rights monitoring and reporting network of over 50 justice sector advisors and monitors and the NRC's national network of 400 human rights monitors through the Contact Group, is now uncertain.

Another important programmatic development is the soon-to-be released report on the traditional justice system by the United States Institute of Peace, the Carter Center, UNMIL and Oxford University (planned release June 2009). This report includes a national user-oriented survey and novel research on many important issues related to the traditional and formal justice system. It will quantify, for the first time, that most Liberians choose to use this system of justice because they know it and have ready access to it at the community level.

These important programmatic developments along with Liberia's recent adoption of a national Poverty Reduction Strategy that includes clear benchmarks make this report and the USG's program plans very timely.

This Evaluation has multiple USG objectives, including highlighting and documenting:

- the progress, effectiveness and impact of USG-funded rule of law programs;
- the key rule of law related activities that other donors and the GOL are supporting and
- ideas for future rule of law programming.

This report provides an assessment of ROL programs implemented by USAID and other US government agencies and provides recommendations for the future. It also presents an overview of the ROL-related activities currently underway in Liberia with the support of other donors and the GOL.

At the outset, it bears noting that, whenever possible, QED made repeated efforts to quantify as many of its findings and recommendations with solid accurate data. However, the Evaluation Team found that only piece-meal justice sector data, information and benchmarks were available from governmental and non-governmental sources. Thus, the scant data available has been supplemented by independent research conducted by the QED Evaluation Team through surveys and structured implementer-oriented questionnaires.

The findings presented in this report are based on an analysis of reports published since 2004 on the status of rule of law activities in Liberia that were completed by various governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as structured and open-ended interviews with approximately

100 key rule of law stakeholders operating in Liberia, including over 30 representatives of civil society groups, 20 high level government justice sector officials in Montserrado, Bong and Nimba counties and over 50 anonymous responders to questionnaires focused on rule of law issues that were developed and implemented by the QED Evaluation Team.

In general, overall funding in the Liberian rule of law sector by all donors is estimated to be at around \$12 to \$13 million annually. The USG contributes approximately half of this amount and various UN agencies and the Peace Fund contributes most of the remainder. Other notable rule of law donors include the Norwegians, the British, the Swedes, the Danes and the Open Society Institute.

KEY FINDINGS

Progress and Overall Programming Impact

In general, over the last three years most rule of law programming implemented in Liberia by both the USG and other donors, appears to have had limited impact on citizens' access to fair, effective and efficient justice. There are multiple factors that explain this programming conundrum.

Main Reasons for Limited Rule of Law Progress and Impact

- lack of political will for reform by high- level GOL officials in all three branches (limited political buy-in, conditionality or accountability for most rule of law programming);
- legal gaps and deficiencies in the law (outdated criminal, civil and administrative laws, sanctions and weak enforcement mechanisms);
- lack of administrative, management and enforcement capacity of key justice institutions to implement legal reforms;
- inability of justice sector officials and the public to access the law itself (both the laws and court decisions are virtually inaccessible for most Liberians and many rural Liberians cannot read English);
- lack of legal rights awareness and societal consensus on reform priorities and issues (including how to reform “competing” justice systems formal, traditional and tribal justice systems);
- limited access to transparent, fair and efficient justice in either the capital or rural counties (lack of law school graduates, private lawyers, county attorneys, public defenders, paralegals and qualified judges);
- the high cost of accessing the justice system for most impoverished Liberians (court fees and time and expenses traveling to distant courthouses);
- lack of a focused rule of law strategy within post-conflict Liberian context;
- lack of donor coordination and collaboration;
- unchecked endemic corruption throughout the justice sector and
- lack of accountability within the justice sector.

The inability to gauge the impact of rule of law programming in Liberia is exacerbated by the lack of data related to rule of law. There is no baseline data available that can be used as a comparison to the current situation. Nor were there any benchmarks developed against which to monitor and report on reform progress. In the aftermath of the war, in an attempt to help a fledging government Liberia achieve a democratic society, many justice reform implementers spent a great deal of resources providing day-to-day general advisory and capacity building activities. These activities focused on providing basic judicial training and mentoring to a wide range of institutions and commissions but were not focused on the justice sector. In addition, most implementers had unclear lines of programmatic responsibility, open-ended action plans, and placed too little emphasis on monitoring and reporting and on developing and implementing targeted programs on targeted problems. All of these factors have made it problematic to ascertain whether any progress has been achieved in reforming rule of law in Liberia.

KEY RULE OF LAW RECOMMENDATIONS

New rule of law reform programs related to the Liberian justice system should be more targeted, balanced and linked to each other and to broader socio-economic goals that affect Liberians in both Monrovia and the rural areas. This includes:

- making the public more aware of their fundamental constitutional and legal rights;
- making the law itself more accessible to justice system actors and the public;
- making access to legal assistance and the justice system, including the formal and traditional systems, more accessible and affordable;
- making endemic problems, such as those related to the rights of pre-trial detainees, property and land ownership, contract enforcement, public procurement and labor and employment issues, higher program priorities;
- making open government laws, including access to information, conflict of interest, income and asset disclosure and whistle-blowing higher program priorities;
- making justice sector institution building in both Montserrado and the rural areas higher program priorities, including the establishment of the Law Reform Commission;
- making systematic impact monitoring and benchmark reporting higher program priorities;
- making social consensus development, information sharing and knowledge management higher program priorities;
- making corruption and integrity issues a cross-cutting programming element of every new rule of law program and
- making donor coordination, policy development dialogue and the use of MOU's in the rule of law area higher program priorities;
- making comprehensive reform of the criminal and civil codes a higher program priorities;

INTRODUCTION

After the extended period of civil war that Liberia endured, not only was the infrastructure systematically destroyed but the social fabric of the nation experienced severe strains, including the legal and justice systems. Most court buildings were destroyed beyond recognition and legal education activities were sporadic at best. Laws were not passed or updated during this period either. Many legal professionals had also fled to other countries, which meant there were few lawyers left to create a new, more democratic legal system.

During the reconstruction period after the war, the international community mobilized to bring security and safety to the countryside and begin re-building the country's systems and infrastructure. In the justice sector, some buildings were rehabilitated, including courts and prisons. Judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and law students have had multiple training efforts to build the capacity of a sector that has been through multiple changes in government, including flights of legal professionals to other countries, an almost total lack of financial or political support that has required individuals to, even with the best of intentions, seek to administer justice in wildly disparate manners, and a breakdown in procedural due process that has allowed for judicial and endemic government corruption to fester. The Liberian people have had no alternative but to use the traditional justice system and seek peaceful and sometimes violent alternatives to the formal justice system as a way to resolve disputes and protest human rights abuses.

At present, many of the actors in the justice sector either do not have the required level of education, with many being functionally illiterate, or there is not sufficient oversight in place by the justice sector institutions to ensure that people have proper guidance in performing their responsibilities.

The United States has been involved in supporting Rule of Law (ROL) efforts in Liberia for many years. In the late 1990s, for example, USAID funded the Carter Center to train human rights monitors throughout Liberia. From 2000 to 2004, USDOJ (through USAID funding) also had an intermittent Resident Legal Advisor posted in Monrovia. However, these efforts were on hiatus during the latter stages of the Charles Taylor presidency.

In 2005, following the first free and fair election in Liberia ever, the USG sent an interagency assessment team to Liberia to dialogue with the new GOL and other donors and develop recommendations for a range of USG-funded ROL activities. The USG subsequently launched a multi-faceted ROL program through the American Bar Association, the Department of State (PAE/JSSL) and the Department of Justice (OPDAT). In this program the DOS/INL gave resources to the USDOJ to place a Resident Legal Advisor (RLA) in the Embassy to work on corruption issues and resources to Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) for a team of on-the-ground legal advisors to assist various governmental institutions in their general efforts to build up capacity and institutional structures and policies. The Department of State/Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau subsequently awarded a competitive grant to the Carter Center for a program focused on traditional justice, mediation and public awareness issues in rural Liberia.

Until now, there has been no evaluation of USG-funded rule of law efforts in Liberia; likewise, there has been no updating of the 2005 interagency rule of law assessment or action plan. It should be noted that since 2005, a number of new rule of law initiatives have been undertaken by various UN

agencies, the Open Society Institute, the GOL, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, to name a few.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF WORK

The objectives set forth in the Scope of Work (SOW) for this Evaluation of Rule of Law Program in Liberia included:

1. Evaluate the progress made by ABA, JSSL and the other USG-funded ROL programs based on established benchmarks.
2. Focus on gathering data indicative of the success or failure of specific USG funded ROL activities, both in terms of accomplishing their immediate objectives as well as impact on the legal system as a whole.
3. Provide a basic donor mapping matrix of ROL program in Liberia, for all stakeholders.
4. Evaluate cost effectiveness of the USG programs.
5. Assess performance monitoring systems in place; disaggregating of data by gender, socio-economic status, ethnic minorities and other disenfranchised population.

METHODOLOGY

The QED Evaluation Team conducted fieldwork in Liberia March 9 – April 8, 2009. The QED Evaluation Team used both qualitative and quantitative methods to complete this evaluation of rule of law programs in Liberia. QED's methodology included : (i) informant interviews with key rule of law governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, experts and donors; (ii) expert informal focus groups representing the formal and traditional justice sectors, donors and academics; (iii) independent research and document reviews from a wide range of sources and (iv) observation, including interviews with justice officials and NGOs and CSOs at the national, county and city levels and field work in three counties selected in close consultation by USAID. In Liberia, the team met with over 92 individuals, representing the GOL, the justice sector, civil society organizations, organizations implementing USG-funded rule of law programs, and implementers of ROL programs funded by other US-based and international donors and organizations.

Although the Evaluation Team originally planned to use reliable justice sector data maintained by the Government of Liberia (GOL) and quantitative benchmarks and indicators of ROL program implementation progress maintained by the USG program implementers, QED discovered that such data was not available. Despite repeated requests for data from all key Rule of Law stakeholders and donors, no data was ever received, although it was often promised. As a back-up measure, QED designed structured surveys that were completed by Liberia ROL stakeholders and representatives of Civil Society Organizations (CSO). The quantitative data collected with the survey was used to supplement data obtained through and analysis of existing ROL program reports and interviews to produce the findings discussed in the following sections of this report.

OVERVIEW OF RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS IN LIBERIA

The ROL Maps and QED stakeholder strategic surveys illustrated and discussed below help present much of the current big picture rule of law story in present day Liberia. Overall, they paint a picture of a broad, unfocused, Rule of Law program that is centered mainly in Montserrado County. Based on a review of program documents and responses to surveys provided by ROL stakeholders, it appears that current program, implemented by both the USG and other donors are primarily centered on the formal justice sector with an emphasis on capacity building and targeted human rights awareness activities that have a notable gender-based violence-oriented bent. A similar picture emerged from the Team’s structured stakeholder interviews with both governmental and non-governmental actors, as well as our abbreviated attempt to assess the overall state of the ROL.

RESULTS FROM THE DONOR MAPPING EXERCISE

During the evaluation QED made multiple efforts to collect information from all key donors. We have included all of the accessible information in this report. Unfortunately most donors and implementers were able to provide limited information and others provided none. Therefore, the overall portrait of the status of ROL reform in Liberia presented within this report, represents the best that can be provided with the available data.

For analytical purposes, the ROL programs currently operating in Liberia can be classified into five broad categories: (i) Public Awareness – media programming and public community outreach activities; (ii) Advocacy – direct legal representation; (iii) Capacity Building – training; (iv) Institution-Building – building or renovating, equipment, supplementing salaries, mentors and advisors and creating new commissions, working groups or specialized units within ministries and (v) Access to Justice (legal-oriented or general assistance of any type within the court system).

Liberia

Total ROL Programming (est): \$25,545,505

Sub-Sector:	Approximate Funding: †	National-Level Organizations:
Public Awareness	\$4,804,805	PFL, UMHRM, UNDP, UNMIL, Carter Center, NED, NRC
Advocacy	\$651,000	FIND, PFL, UMHRM, National Bar, NED, NRC
Capacity Building	\$11,339,700	AFELL, CCJRE, UNDP, UNMIL, Carter Center, World Bank
Institution Building*	\$5,333,000	UNIFEM, UNDP, UNHCR, World Bank
Access to Justice**	\$3,417,000	UMHRM, UNMIL, OSI, Carter Center, NED

† Funding amount includes all programs, not just those operating at a nation-wide level.

* Institution-Building includes expensive construction and renovation projects.

** More than 80% of Access to Justice funding is for legal assistance, not legal representation.


NB: These maps and figures represent only a partial list based on limited access to information, and program cost estimates.



est. population: 3,334,587

Map 1: Liberia ROL Programs by Sector

Overview of National ROL Programming in Liberia



Map 2: Liberia ROL Programming by Issue

First, the mapping exercise clearly revealed that most rule of law programming, in terms of volume and dollars, has occurred in Montserrado County and that the vast majority of funding, at least within the past year, has been spent on capacity building, with institution-building and public awareness virtually tied for distant second.

In comparison to Montserrado County, Bong, Nimba and Margibi receive limited ROL programming dollars. (Margibi is not highlighted on Map 2 because the evaluation team did not have the opportunity to visit, survey and interview CSOs and officials there). Furthermore, while there are a number of programs that are supposed to have national reach, as noted on the first map, our cursory analysis found their substantive scope and resource base appeared to be quite limited.

Second, across the five categories of ROL program currently operating in Liberia, substantially more programmatic activity is focused on Public Awareness and Capacity Building than on the others. Most programs in the Capacity Building category relate to on-going training programs in various justice institutions in Montserrado County, although a few relate to episodic national training programs.

Third, the other three categories, Advocacy, Institution Building and Access to Justice, all have about the same number of programmatic activities (about 15). However, in terms of funding, institution building programs, which are much more costly, comprise a much larger category than the other two. (Within Liberian context, Institution Building includes new facilities, salaries, equipment, advisors and staff related to all justice institutions, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Judiciary and independent commissions and task forces).

Fourth, within the Access to Justice category, it is worth noting that most programming relates to providing general legal advice or guidance and not actual legal representation.

Fifth, within the Advocacy category, it is worth noting that most programming relates to human rights issues on the criminal law side of the aisle, not Rights issues related to commercial, property or contracting or administrative disputes against the government.

The Team also categorized the existing ROL programs according to the social issues on which they focused and found that they were the high priority issue specific categories, included: (i) Gender; (ii) Children; (iii) Poverty; (iv) Human Rights and Pre-Trial Detention. As this Map 2 illustrates, the clear focus of most programming is invested on a broad range of human rights oriented activities.

About \$9 million of ROL dollars are focused on issues related to human and gender rights issues. However, the majority of these dollars were focused on gender rights programming such as the monitoring and reporting of gender-based violence (GBV). Indeed, the Team found that only gender programming cut across all five categories (Map I) of human rights or ROL programming activities. At least 25 national and county specific programs spent close to \$5 million in this area last year.

While this programming phenomena needs further verification, research and analysis, if it is somewhat close to accurate it may be explained in part by the fact that the gender issue problem in Liberia, including rape and GBV, is among the worst in the world. Most people interviewed for this evaluation reported that they believe the prison population data (the large number of men arrested, detained and charged with related crimes, compared to other crimes) and medical admissions (the large number of women seeking medical attention for physical injuries) substantiated the scope of the problem. For example, on the day of the Evaluation Team's visit to the Monrovia Central Prison, 105 out of 600 pre-trial detainees were there on the charge of rape and another 33 on the charge of assault. The next highest numbers were for embezzlement (88), armed robbery (66), theft (55) and murder (48). Only 58 people out of the 700 there had actually been convicted and sentenced.

While the QED surveys support the notion that there is clearly more public awareness of the scope and nature of rape-related cases, and while more people are now being arrested and jailed (rape is a non-bailable offense), partial success on one human front (gender rights) seems to have uncovered another serious set of human rights problems: those related to the right to due process, a lawyer and a fair and speedy justice. Indeed, all of prisoners that were randomly interviewed in prison, in both Montserrado and Bong counties, stated they had never been told they had a right to a lawyer at any time during their arrest or incarceration and none of them knew how to even contact anyone for any kind of assistance. These prisoners were all indigents charged with various crimes, including rape, who stated they could not afford bail or a lawyer.

In general, despite its narrow focus, the overall effect of current ROL programs in Liberia has been to promote human rights as well build up demand for the ROL from various stakeholders. However, the Evaluation Team believes this programming must now be expanded to include more emphasis on the rights of those arrested and detained, particularly the poor and disadvantaged. Existing ROL programs, with their multi-faceted, rights-specific approach, could serve as a potential model for work in other priority justice reform areas and could, at the same time, enhance political will for reform.

RESULTS OF CSO SURVEYS

As noted in the Methodology section of this report, QED also developed structured strategic surveys designed to elicit as much data as possible on key Liberian-oriented ROL issues during our stakeholder meetings. All of the survey questions and answers are included as an addendum to this report. We discuss and illustrate in charts below several of what we believe to be among the most interesting and revealing survey responses.

In total, we received survey responses from 54 individuals representing approximately 30 CSOs working in the ROL area either nationally or in Montserrado, Nimba and Bong counties. Almost all were Liberian CSOs.




Figure 1: Survey Question 1a

The survey responses revealed that while Nimba and Bong county respondents were largely satisfied with the access to information given by the government, respondents from Montserrado (which is the largest county, the nation's capital and where there is more of a donor and CSO presence) were far more likely to describe their access as "Unsatisfactory".




Figure 2: Survey Questions 8a and 9a

The survey response to regarding perceptions of corruption in CSOs and in the donor community clearly reveal that somewhere between 80% and 90% of the respondents who answered these questions believe that corruption within both civil society and among donors is a serious problem.




Figure 3: Survey Question 15

Across all three counties surveyed, there was a general lack of confidence in the ability of the state to provide security and ensure order for its citizens, although the CSO's in Bong County appeared to have the most concern.




Figure 4: Survey Question 6b

There appears to be general agreement among Liberians about the most serious problems facing Liberian women in the justice system, namely, the fair and effective enforcement of court judgments, corruption within the justice system and public rights awareness, this survey also reveals that most respondents saw a wide range of problems within the Liberian justice system.




Figure 5: Survey Question 18

Both county respondents and ROL experts listed a wide array of ROL programs as being critical for Liberia to undertake in the next three years, although a clear consensus appears to exist with regard to the need to focus on promoting human rights. Interestingly enough, even though a number of CSO’s surveyed work on gender violence issues, most did not see this as a high priority reform area.

Finally, we were given special permission by the Carter Center to include several of their preliminary charts from their upcoming national survey in this report (release scheduled June 2009). This ROL-oriented research and report will be a very important information resource to use for purposes of analyzing and prioritizing justice sector issues during the upcoming program design exercise, as it is the first national survey and research to delve deeply into how the justice system actually works in practice at the community level.

The results of the Carter Center survey clearly support the notion that more attention needs to be given to reform of the traditional justice system in Liberia. The survey responses depicted in the tables below reveal that most Liberian’s, particularly those in the rural areas, still use this system because it is the only one that is accessible. It is also the one they know and trust best.

Table 1: Forum Usage for Civil Disputes

	Number of Cases	% of All Cases Taken to:		
		No	Informal	Formal
		Forum	Form	Forum
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bribery/Corruption	14	57.1	28.6	14.3
Child Custody Dispute	21	61.9	38.1	0.0
Child/Wife Neglect	181	59.1	40.9	0.0
Debt Dispute	1,497	67.2	30.5	2.3
Divorce/Separation	131	34.4	61.1	4.6
Family Or Marital Dispute	455	64.0	34.9	1.1
Labor Dispute	157	65.0	34.4	0.6
Land Dispute	430	31.9	60.0	8.1
Property Dispute	68	52.9	36.8	10.3
Total	2,954	59.1	37.9	3.0

Figure 6: Forum Usage for Civil Disputes (Carter Center)

Table 2: Forum Usage Criminal Disputes

	Number of Cases	% of All Cases Taken to:		
		No	Informal	Formal
		Forum	Form	Forum
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Assault	600	52.3	44.3	3.3
Domestic Violence	974	53.4	45.8	0.8
Murder	97	52.6	22.7	24.7
Property Destruction	548	78.3	18.1	3.6
Rape/Sexual Abuse	113	50.4	28.3	21.2
Theft	1,420	77.9	18.9	3.2
Witchcraft	227	55.5	41.0	3.5
Other Crime	303	54.8	41.9	3.3
Total	4,282	64.7	31.6	3.7

Figure 7: Forum Usage for Criminal Disputes (Carter Center)

Table 3: Average Outcomes by Forum

	Plaintiff			Defendant		
	None	Inf.	Formal	None	Inf.	Formal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Outcome was fair (%)	83.8	93.0	90.0	82.0	90.0	76.8
Any punishment (%)	18.5	26.9	68.9	56.9	47.9	69.2
Made to apologize (%)	16.9	20.1	57.0	54.0	33.6	45.2
Gave compensation (%)	0.4	2.1	5.5	1.9	5.5	8.9
Paid fine (%)	1.4	9.0	20.4	2.9	21.9	31.5
Fine amount (LD)	1,204	2,315	1,370	1,545	7,573	11,154

Figure 8: Average Outcomes by Forum (Carter Center)

EVALUATION FINDINGS

The USG-funded ROL development efforts currently underway in Liberia are based on recommendations provided in the 2005 Assessment report completed by a USDOJ-OPDAT team. This report is the most recent USG-funded effort, and, except for a 2006 UNMIL Report done by the present Minister of Justice, it is the most comprehensive analysis of and recommendations for justice sector needs in Liberia.

The 2005 Assessment recommended various activities, some of which the major USG-funded activities seek to address. These recommendations also included the formation of multiple Working Groups and a Justice Reform Commission to guide, monitor and help implement reforms. And while some justice sector data was included in the assessment, most of the data was not seen as accurate then or now. Thus, there is still very little baseline justice sector data to analyze, either for purposes of this report or for the upcoming program design exercise planned by USAID.

The major efforts currently funded by USG are: (1) the INL-contracted Justice Sector Support Project – Liberia (JSSL), which is being implemented by PAE as the contractor; (2) the Strengthening Justice in Liberia Project, which is being performed by the ABA through a USAID grant; (3) an INL-funded OPDAT-placed Resident Legal Advisor; and (4) [the Carter Center].

UNMIL has overall responsibility for development assistance to the Government of Liberia, and the USG-funded efforts should, in theory, be coordinated with UNMIL's multi-lateral role and/or fill in gaps in UNMIL's assistance to the Government of Liberia. However, as examined in greater detail below, the evaluation team found that coordination efforts between USG and UNMIL were not functioning well.

The Evaluation Team noted the following general implementation issues that are more-or-less common to all of the ROL reform efforts currently supported by USG.

DONOR COORDINATION

Little coordination exists among either international donors or implementers in the ROL sector.. Among the USG-funded actors the negative impact of this is ameliorated because of the relatively small numbers of actors and due to their willingness to informally work with each other on various but not all fronts. However, this approach has led to greater ad hoc activities in areas such as training and has diminished the creation and institutionalization of standardized training curricula in targeted areas and institutions.

UNMIL has been and remains the biggest rule of law player in Liberia, some of their programming is winding down. The USG is the second largest ROL actor. During the team's four week visit, we found it close to impossible, despite repeated formal and informal requests, to obtain concrete data from UNMIL, even though we were told they had recent data and information to share. However, we were basically told that they could only be share it with their Liberian counterparts and that it would not be appropriate for us to ask for it from them. We were also told by some we met with at UNMIL that even they could not obtain information and data generated by other units within UNMIL. It should be noted that even UNMIL acknowledged it had not been able to coordinate with the range of UN entities working in the ROL area in Liberia. They stated they are hopeful that with the recent adoption of UNDAF, which integrates UN rule of law and human rights activities

for the first time (UNMIL separates ROL and human rights activities), that they will be better able to share information with others.

The lack of coordination among rule of law actors results in an absence of a coherent reform agenda among donors, and stakeholders see little need to fully buy-into any one donor's programs. Lack of cooperation among donors also allows some officials and civil society groups to play actors against each other. Individuals interviewed for this evaluation also noted that lack of coordination among donors undermines capacity-building efforts because stakeholders do not prioritize their decisions in ways that would better focus and maximize the available development assistance efforts.

The nascent Judicial Institute seems to be one bright exception to this donor coordination problem. Yet it remains to be seen if this initiative will be able to hold the line on donor coordination, since everyone seems to want to be part of this initiative. It also remains to be seen whether this initiative, with its ambitious reform agenda, will be able to live up to its potential within current Liberian justice system context, since the problem of endemic judicial corruption has yet to be addressed.

The majority of individuals interviewed during in-country visits, including the Chief Justice of the Liberian Supreme Court and magistrates and civil society groups in rural counties, believed addressing the issue of judicial corruption and bribery was the biggest barrier to justice sector reform.

MONITORING & EVALUATION

There is no doubt that reporting requirements among USG-funded activities need to be revised if demonstrating impact is to be possible in the future. Only one of the implementers, the ABA, is required to show deliverables, but until recently this only included general output benchmarks instead of impact benchmarks.

Monitoring & Evaluation reporting assists implementation efforts in three ways: (1) it focuses efforts on discrete deliverables that have been pre-defined; (2) it helps build capacity with stakeholders because it forces them to focus on how to achieve results and not just activities; and (3) it can provide an implementer cover when dealing with a stakeholder if the implementer can say it is required to do something or it cannot work with the stakeholder.

True impact-reporting could be assisted through use of LFAs and/or MOUs with stakeholders to have them focus on what an implementer will provide and how the stakeholder will assist in the effort. MOUs are now only used by the ABA, and the two entities it has not been able to come to agreement with – the School of Law and the Bar Association – have complaints about the ABA's efforts that the Evaluation Team believes could have been at least partially circumvented by pre-defining the nature of responsibilities through MOUs.

The Evaluation Team recognizes that it is difficult for implementers to show the impact of their programs. Implementers need to act to show results for monies spent. This can cause a conflict of interest if a stakeholder is recalcitrant to work with an implementer as appears the situation in Liberia. At this point, political assistance may be needed to break an impasse.

REPORTING

While the ABA and the Carter Center adopted some benchmarks and procedures for tracking progress and reporting, the same was not true for either the OPDAT or JSSL/PAE programs. Reporting on these USG-funded efforts has not been sufficient to either track progress or assist in managing or adjusting programs when needed. In the case of the JSSL, the reporting scheme was insufficient in that they appear to have only submitted weekly reports to INL. In the case of DOJ/OPDAT, the reporting required in the funding agreement does not appear to have been followed, at least based upon the documentation we were given and our interviews. Even in the case of the ABA and Carter Center programs, which did make an effort to use indicators, impact reporting was not possible because most of their indicators were only output oriented.

What is most needed are realistic home-grown impact indicators, systematic and symbiotic reporting mechanisms, clear timelines and regular USG oversight meetings with both key implementers and Liberian officials at the highest levels. This will provide the information necessary to meaningfully discuss reporting results and to hold specific Liberian officials accountable at both the implementation and political levels. It will also allow for potential programming adjustments as new opportunities and problems arise.

We have learned from global experience that most ROL programs are highly political by nature and that they require close oversight and strong political support from donors and high level government officials alike. Toward this end, high level monthly or quarterly ROL meetings and agreed upon reporting frameworks between donors and high level government officials are also essential, at least on high priority reforms. In the case of USAID and State INL programming, we have learned this usually includes USAID Mission Director and Ambassadorial engagement with their country counterparts on an on-going basis. This kind of process is especially important when the highly sensitive issue of endemic corruption within the justice sector is acknowledged as the key barrier to long-term programmatic impact and sustainable reform.

This two-step monitoring and reporting process, first between implementers and their country counterparts and then between high level USG officials and their country counterparts, promotes both low level bureaucratic and high level political action and focused, result-oriented programming among implementers. However, in order for this process to be effective, reports built around practical, measureable impact home-grown indicators are key to meaningful stakeholder dialogue and programmatic success. These kinds of reports and meetings also allow for timely programming adjustments and problem solving and together they promote bureaucratic and political action. They also allow donors, implementers and government officials to ascertain and explain real-time progress toward reforms.

CAPACITY-BUILDING VERSUS INSTITUTION BUILDING

The main thrust of the efforts of many USG-funded efforts has centered on capacity-building of Liberian justice sector actors through training and mentoring¹. Though this has shown some anecdotal successes and was necessary given the dearth of lawyers in Liberia, a problem lay in that

¹ For instance, the ABA states that 50% of its present efforts go toward training. More than 50% of the JSSL's efforts go toward training/mentoring.

the efforts did not build strong institutional processes and systems that trained actors could go back to and implement the knowledge and skills they gained through the trainings.

This was not a fault of the implementers themselves since they, for the most part, were implementing pursuant to their funding agreements with USAID or INL. But the lack of institution-building and systems within the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court was a barrier to the programming achieving its intended results. Creating these systems and institution-building are critical from a national perspective is critical to rolling out reforms, knowledge and acquired skills to everyone in all counties in Liberia, not just Montserrado.

For example, if training systems, curricula and targeted training modules had been institutionalized as part of a larger strategic training plan with the City Solicitors, the program could have potential impact nationally instead of only on those trained in Montserrado county by the full-time international consultant. At the same time, an institutionalized strategy, system and oversight procedure for monitoring and supporting the activities of the Public Defender, with or without a full-time advisor to the public defender in country, would have also helped ensure that that office continued to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities (it is noted that when the last advisor to the Public Defender left there was strategic plan or workable institutional back-up plan in place.

We emphasize that, not only would an implementer need to be focused on implementing systemic reforms within an institution building strategic context, but such efforts would also often need strong political and concerted support by the Embassy and USAID, as well as other donors. At present, the implementers often do not have the ability to obtain the necessary level of buy-in to achieve systemic reforms and to reform or build new ROL institutions.

EVALUATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ROL PROGRAMS

JSSL/PAE

Program Description

The Justice Sector Support Project – Liberia began implementation in January 2006. To date, total funding for the JSSL has been \$10,932, 717, though \$2,800,000 remained unspent at the end of its most recent contract (March 25, 2009).² The Evaluation Team was informed that the JSSL received a no-cost extension for another six months to September 25, 2009.

This evaluation of the JSSL project focused on its five primary ROL areas of support to: (i) County Attorneys; (ii) Montserrado County City Solicitors; (iii) the Ministry of Justice; (iv) public defenders and (v) the Supreme Court. This evaluation did not review the JSSL's work with the Liberian National Police, because it was outside the scope of this evaluation, although it is noted this program includes two international full-time advisors in Montserrado County.

Key Findings: Strengths and/or Weaknesses of Program

In general, the JSSL project has been able to build strong collaborative relationships with other implementers, donors and their country counterparts and is well regarded by officials and other stakeholders. JSSL has also created a number of training materials on a wide range of fronts and has been very responsive to requests from their country counterparts.

Its main limitations seem to relate mainly to the fact that they have served as important advisors and mentors without a clear institutional reform strategy or prioritized workplan. The reality is that the entities they work with need to both reform and create new systems that can institutionalize the training and knowledge they have been given so that capacity can be enhanced internally and sustained over time. While mentoring and training on a wide range of issues is no doubt helpful and sometimes necessary, it has limited sustainable impact, particularly when the institutional structures to support training and implementation are not in place.

The vetting process should establish minimal professional qualifications to participate in training programs and attempt to cull out those not interested in or capable of learning the professional skills necessary to perform his or her job well. Participation in training programs should include bureaucratic incentives but it should be contingent on merit, gender sensitive and oriented primarily towards those who will be in government service for some time to come. While global experience in post-conflict countries tells us that any vetting process will be problematic, it will be especially difficult in Liberia where capacity and financial and human resources are extremely limited.

However, absent a lack of institutional structures within the stakeholders, the efficacy of the trainings is limited since training, whether in investigations or case management or human rights, will quickly evaporate if there is no institutional expectation that the substance of these trainings can or will be implemented and properly utilized.

² Approximately \$1.2 million of these unspent funds are dedicated to discrete projects – renovations to the Temple of Justice and support to judicial training – that the JSSL has been unable to spend due to demands or issues with GOL entities.

The evaluation team realizes that training and institutional reform do not progress at the same pace in reality. And the evaluation team recognizes that stakeholder institutions cannot be forced by a Rule of Law project implementer to make institutional reforms. However, it is clear that more emphasis needs to be placed on linking-up training priorities and trainees with high priority institutional reform issues. Having high level political dialogue and engagement with justice sector officials on this front would help establish this linkage and highlight the importance of these essential institutional reforms. .

The public defender component of the project has suffered for at least three reasons: (i) a lack of a culture that supports criminal defense; (ii) a lack of budgetary support and systematic oversight by the Supreme Court, and (iii) difficulties maintaining an Advisor in this area within the JSSL -- including problems related to working with public defenders outside Montserrado County. The Evaluation Team toured two prisons within Liberia, in Montserrado and Bong Counties, and found no detainee among the dozens informally interviewed who had met with or had access to a lawyer.³

The public defenders that the Evaluation Team met with had no discernible record-keeping system so that they could not show how many had been assigned to them nor did they possess any baseline approach to defending a criminal case, e.g., filing a Notice of Appearance, filing a Request for Discovery, files that noted dates that would allow proper tracking for when motions to dismiss should be filed.. The team was told that when JSSL had an Advisor, the Advisor had to do these things. In the absence of that Advisor, who was focused almost entirely on Montserrado County, this tracking and necessary processes for defending a criminal case evaporated.

The Evaluation Team attributes this not only to lack of capacity or will of the public defenders themselves, but also to the act that the public defenders for each county report directly to the Chief Justice. However, everyone acknowledges, including the Chief Justice himself, that he does not have the time or experience to either oversee the public defender program or to work directly with individual public defenders. The Chief Justice did tell the Evaluation Team that he valued the assistance of the JSSL Public Defender Advisor when one was on staff. However, he lamented the fact that this position had not been filled since October 2008.

The County Attorney Advisor position has spent a significant amount of time mentoring on a wide range of issues. The Advisor has benefited from the strong interest of the Solicitor General, who seems to truly want to work to bolster the capacity of the County Attorneys to do their job. The quarterly training for the county attorneys is organized by ILAC and the JSSL Advisor provides significant input. Though such trainings should be more standardized, planned and targeted on high priority issues, the Evaluation Team saw an opportunity to work more closely with the county attorneys than with the City Solicitors or magistrates because they are fewer in number and more qualified. These facts allow for a greater ad hoc approach to training depending on identified needs

³ Moreover, there were many detainees who were eligible for motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute filed. In Liberia, the Criminal Procedure Code requires that an indictment must be filed by the last day of the court term after the term in which a person is arrested (there are four terms of court in a twelve-month span). When the Evaluation Team asked the Montserrado County Public Defender about such motions, he informed the Team that he files such motion on behalf of numerous detainees in a single filing, e.g., akin to a class action. He did not understand that such a filing must be made in each case for a criminal defendant if only so that the case file has a record. Nor did the Evaluation Team understand how he could have known on behalf of whom to make these filings since no detainee had met with him nor did he have any record of representing detainees.

and available training expertise in Liberia. However, due to the lack of impact indicators, the Evaluation Team could only gather some anecdotal evidence related to outputs not impact, a reality underscored by comments from the Solicitor General himself. In short, there does not seem to have been a significant effort to create sustainable training systems focused on targeted justice sector actors or issues.

The impact of the Advisor to the Montserrado County City Solicitors is affected by: (1) the lack of capacity of the City Solicitors with most being functionally illiterate, and (2) the narrow focus on only the Montserrado County City Solicitors rather than on system-wide issues, including training needs and putting in place consistent processes. At this time, too much emphasis for this position is placed on mentoring. This is due in part to the focus of the Ministry of Justice and Solicitor General on the County Attorneys and also due to the fact that the JSSL Advisor's position is to focus on the Montserrado County City Solicitors, of which there are only 13, rather than looking at the needs of City Solicitors throughout Liberia.

The work of the Advisor to the Ministry of Justice has been negatively impacted by the fact that there has been no clear Strategic Plan for the Ministry, or for that matter, the JSSL program itself. The Evaluation Team reviewed a recent draft of the MOJ draft plan, but the Advisor noted they had not been able to make significant contributions to this plan because JSSL had not been invited to seriously engage the Ministry on this important document and process. It is noted that the experience of this advisor with the MOJ on this topic paralleled the experience of the RLA.

The current Advisor to the Supreme Court has made efforts to develop and put in place a case management system for some time. Indeed, this is JSSL's third attempt in as many years to assist the Supreme Court in this effort. The lack of a case management system affects all aspects of justice sector development because assessing impact is severely compromised by lack of information. While the Supreme Court has a draft Strategic Plan that calls for greater implementation of systems and a focus on court administration, it has yet to be formally adopted or implemented in practice. However, a recent order by the Chief Justice authorizing JSSL to move forward with this reform in a comprehensive manner has created a new opportunity to move forward with this important agenda.

Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Though the JSSL team is clearly dedicated and technically very knowledgeable in their respective areas, many members of the team had no prior international development experience before hitting the ground in post-conflict Liberia. One of the lessons learned is that in order to be effective and to know how to operate in a post-conflict environment, it is important to have international development experience. Many JSSL team members only had prior U.S. experience.

This fact may help explain why so much emphasis was placed on general mentoring and training rather than creating administrative and managerial systems and processes that were workable within Liberian context. When asked about their recruiting efforts and priorities, the Evaluation Team was told by PAE management that they had tried to recruit experienced attorneys but that there were a limited pool of such applicants. They also told us that even when they found interested and qualified applicants that they were often turned down because PAE salary levels were not sufficient to attract and maintain candidates with the international development experience necessary to promote long-term institution and capacity-building.

Another key lessons learned, consistent with the lessons learned in the ABA program, is that multi-faceted broad-based programs like JSSL need to be strategically focused, prioritized and linked-up very closely with the broader ROL reform agenda. And another lesson learned, consistent with the lessons learned in all of the programs evaluated, is that clear impact indicators of progress are needed in order to measure reform progress and make timely programming adjustments.

Stakeholder Impact

Enhanced capacity building. For the reasons listed above, the focus of future activities needs to be more focused on institution-building, alongside related capacity building. There are not many justice sector actors in Liberia. Only 15 County Attorneys and a few Assistant County Attorneys; approximately 100 City Solicitors; 20 Circuit Court Judges; 300-400 Magistrate Judges and less than 15 Public Defenders. Training/mentoring has accomplished much of what can be done at this point, absent structures to bolster and reinforce trainings and vetting mechanisms in place that promote minimal professional qualifications and integrity.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

Program Description

The ABA's "Support for Human Rights Culture in Liberia" program has had 10 areas of focus with two internationals. It started implementation in December 2005 and has had total funding of approximately \$11 million since 2005. The project reports that 50% of its efforts have been on training various justice sector actors. The most prominent present effort is with the Judicial Institute with one of the international staff's efforts almost wholly devoted to assisting the Supreme Court with organizing and creating programs for the Judicial Institute.

Key Findings: Strengths and/or Weaknesses of Program

Almost any one of the 10 areas that ABA focused on would be a full-time undertaking for any organization. Within a post-conflict setting like Liberia, it is understandable that early on in the life of the program that the ABA was often called upon to respond to numerous planned and unplanned needs of the GOL. The Evaluation Team believes, based upon our stakeholder discussions and a review of the voluminous reports and training materials, policy statements and draft laws produced by ABA, that it was probably as successful as any general provider could be in a country like Liberia in terms of responding to myriad ad hoc requests from numerous government officials. However, some of these requests were clearly more important than others and many served to detract from ABA's being able to effectively implement portions of its workplan.

The 10 areas made the project too much of a catch-all for activities and spread it too thinly to truly engage certain areas or manage certain activities. For instance, the Victim Support Officers hired by the project to assist women never gained traction and never seemed to find a role with existing efforts by other implementers or GOL institutions. Yet the effort was too small by the ABA to have critical mass to exist on its own.

Now that the country is moving from operating in a crisis stage to one more focused on broader development issues, the time to be more strategic and to stop trying to be all things to all people has

passed.. Consistent with this reality, the ABA recently negotiated with USAID, through a no-cost extension, a new more ROL program focused primarily on support for a new institution to train Liberian justice officials throughout the country (for the remainder of FY 2009).

One of the biggest weaknesses identified in the ABA's programming appears to have been not to have worked more closely with the law school and the Liberian Bar Association on a range of internal and external reform fronts. These two institutions are at the heart of a functioning justice sector and represent both the current and next generation of justice sector leaders. That said, the Evaluation Team understands well that many within these two institutions in Liberia are not supportive of either institutional or broader ROL reforms.

In some cases, this appears to be due to their desire to protect their monopoly over the legal profession and client base. In other cases it appears to be due to the fact that some are part of the broader corrupt political network that resists institutional reforms within the justice sector, as the best way to protect themselves from prosecution. In their world, more practicing attorneys means more legal competition. At the same time, more legal reforms, particularly those geared towards promoting judicial independence, will disrupt current working relationships and corruption inside the justice sector. Nonetheless, finding common reform ground and the necessary incentives to obtain the support of these institutions for ROL reforms is critical for justice sector reform to succeed in Liberia.

During our meetings with the LBA they expressed an interest in supporting reforms geared towards promoting the creation of a commercial court to resolve particular kinds of economic disputes, but they said they needed more guidance and support in how to engage in this reform and other targeted ROL reforms of particular interest to them. And during our meeting with the law school, the Dean stated he supported law school reforms but that both the law school and the university needed to be more involved in developing and implementing any law school reform agenda. In both cases, the LBA and the law school stated they often did not feel they had been adequately consulted on some of the reforms ABA was implementing that related directly to them. While the Evaluation Team did not have the time to pursue this issue with ABA, it appears that creating more mechanisms and incentives to enlist more institutional buy-in to future institutional and targeted ROL reforms of common interest to LBA and the law school would be a good programmatic investment.

Perhaps one of the greatest successes to date, at least from a long-term institution-building perspective, has been providing ABA's scholarship program. 15 scholarships have been awarded each year for third-year law students for internship placement within key GOL institutions. This program has been well received by the institutions we met with. So much so that the relevant ministries offered virtually all of the interns full-time positions and found the money within their own respective budgets to fund these new positions. For instance, the Ministry of Labor has an attorney now to assist individuals in labor disputes with their employers due. This attorney is well qualified, due to the efforts of the ABA, who both trained and placed the attorney in the Ministry for a year through the internship program. The Ministry then secured funding for the attorney to continue providing a much needed service.

The ABA has used MOUs to promote some of its programs, like the internship program, to a much greater success than the other USG-funded actors. It has or had in place eight MOUs with, e.g., the law school, the bar association, the Ministry of Labor, the Justice & Peace Commission. However, it

should be noted that it has not been as successful with MOU tool with either the LBA or the law school.

The ABA is now at the heart of assisting the Supreme Court with building the Judicial Institute program. These efforts are intensive and basically take up the time of a full-time international staff member. Supreme Court Justice Ja’Neh, who is overseeing these efforts, told the Evaluation Team that the ABA’s assistance is invaluable, and it appears that the ABA understands that the design of courses for the Judicial Institute will have wide-ranging effects than just training. For instance, the ABA staff member told the Evaluation Team that she and Justice Ja’Neh understand that in order to train court staff and judges on proper systems, the Judicial Institute will have to create these systems as it designs the substance of the training. Hence, not only will the Judicial Institute be a capacity-building entity, but it will assist in institution-building as well.

Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Of all the USG-funded ROL efforts reviewed, the ABA has the best reporting scheme and best benchmark indicators, particularly those it recently submitted to USAID. Its quarterly reports are written within a well organized framework of goals, indicators, successes, problems and opportunities. However, ABA acknowledges that some of the new indicators developed still need to be refined and be more impact oriented.

Stakeholder Impact

Enhanced capacity building. While there is little quantifiable data upon which to make meaningful impact evaluation judgments, most stakeholders agreed that the ABA’s efforts to respond to the myriad and diverse requests of key justice sector institutions over the last three years have been successful from an output perspective. Generally, their overall efforts are perceived as having enhanced the capacity of the MOJ and the Supreme Court to undertake its essential tasks, mainly through training programs on a wide range of issues and through a scholarship program that places talented law students in key government institutions. The ABA is also seen as having developed solid working relationships with most key actors in the justice sector, including a number of civil society groups working on ROL programs. This fact positions them well to implement future ROL programs, such as the Judicial Institute. Through this program, it now has an opportunity to further enhance capacity and to help professionalize the legal profession, by creating a sustainable institution capable of training all key actors within the justice system.

USDOJ/OPDAT

Program Description

Through INL funding, the USDOJ has a Resident Legal Advisor (RLA) in Monrovia. The position was funded at just over \$1 million for FY2004. The RLA is placed through OPDAT and this is a one-year seconded position due to the fact that the funding arrangement between DOS and DOJ provides only for funding one year at a time. As a USG staff member, the RLA is physically present in the Embassy unlike other USG-funded ROL implementers who work for contractors/grantees and have offices outside the Embassy. The present RLA has been in place since May 2008 and hopes her mission is extended for another year, though as of early April 2009 she was unclear if she

would be extended, in part because OPDAT did not yet know if INL would extend funding for another year. Nor does she know that if she is extended whether the focus of her assignment will be the same.

The RLA is tasked to work on anti-corruption issues with five specific areas of focus: (1) assist Liberia in building or bolstering legal and ethical infrastructure to prevent or diminish public corruption; (2) enhance through skills development Liberia's capacity to investigate and prosecute public corruption cases; (3) strengthen Liberia's capacity to investigate and prosecute public corruption cases through team building approaches; (4) increase public awareness about the effects of public corruption, and generate public support to aid in the investigation and prosecution of corruption; and (5) sustain results achieved through development of permanent structures for systematic capacity building in anti-corruption investigations and prosecutions.

The RLA works by engaging directly with stakeholders, through coordination with other USG-funded ROL implementers, and with other internationals such as ILAC. The RLA also plays an informal role within the Embassy as a program advisor since the RLA is the only actual USG staff who is implementing ROL activities in Liberia.

Key Findings: Strengths and/or Weaknesses of Program

The RLA had a notable success in recommending to the MOJ that it create an anti-corruption task force, which the MOJ subsequently acted upon. However, important problems appear to exist with respect to the independence and integrity of the task force, as well as its capacity or willingness to coordinate with the LACC and other Liberian institutions. One of these issues relates to the selection of task force members. The RLA noted that she was not properly consulted on the final selection of task force members or the overall priorities or overarching responsibilities of the task force and that the qualifications and integrity of some of the task force members is in doubt. The selection of well qualified professionals with integrity is critical to the success of the task force and to addressing corruption in Liberia. It is clear that the RLA needs stronger support from the USG in order to be an effective interlocutor with her important counterparts and to help operationalize an anti-corruption task force with integrity.

To date, the RLA has not significantly interacted with the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC), although we were told this institution would likely become a new high priority, should the RLA position be continued. There appear to be at least two main reasons why there has been little interaction to date. The first is that the RLA focused most of her attention on providing assistance to the MOJ, who also has an anti-corruption mandate, because the MOJ has been the lead Liberian institution on the corruption front. The other is that the relatively new LACC has not yet become operational, although this situation, with new USAID support, appears to be slowly changing.

The main USG institutional interaction with the LACC to-date appears to be USAID's having recently brought a trainer from the United States to work with LACC investigators. During the trainer's visit the RLA acted as a legal consultant to the trainer and assisted in the development of the curriculum and in identifying trainees for the training program.

The RLA has also been involved in drafting and reviewing a number of policies and laws, and has been very engaged on a number of training fronts with various donors and implementers, not to mention the MOJ. Indeed, the RLA appears to have a very good working relationship with other key

implementers and country counterparts. The RLA noted that even though she drafted a draft Code of Conduct for Prosecutors, she lamented that it had yet to be adopted or implemented, mainly for reasons related to a lack of political will. Indeed, when the Evaluation Team asked the Solicitor General about the status of this draft code, he informed us that he would discuss this with the County Attorneys during their April 2009 quarterly retreat. Likewise, in a separate meeting, the MOJ informed us that he was not fully aware that a draft code existed or whether it had been internally reviewed yet. These responses to our questions support the RLA's view that there is a lack of political will to support reforms within the Solicitor General's and MOJ's office or to fully operationalize an anti-corruption task force with integrity.

Another indication of a lack of political will to reform within the MOJ was illustrated to us in another fairly recent occurrence. The RLA also pointed-out that the MOJ had a major ROL retreat in Ghana last October to develop a long-term strategic plan. However, apparently no USG-funded advisor was invited to join the MOJ and many other donors and organizations in this important exercise. The RLA also noted that someone who had minimal contact with the MOJ from the OECD was invited. At a minimum, this fact also supports the RLA's view that the MOJ is not making a serious effort to engage the USG or other key donors on a ROL reform agenda.

The Evaluation Team believes this situation underscores the need for the USG to become more engaged with high level Liberian officials at the strategic policy and priority setting levels. This kind of engagement will simultaneously support the implementation and oversight efforts of the RLA and other ROL advisors and implementers.

In addition to participation in various training workshops organized by others, e.g., ILAC, the ABA, JSSL, the RLA has also organized and presented targeted trainings to various GOL actors on her own, including the development of training materials and a workshop on corruption issues, investigations and prosecutions.

One of the barriers to the RLA's ability to work effectively on long-term institution building and integrity issues relates to the fact that funding for the RLA position is made year-to-year. This fact presents various challenges since the RLA never knows whether to commit to any program activities that may extend beyond the sequential one-year INL-OPDAT funding arrangement. The RLA noted this affects not only long-term activity planning and the ability of the RLA to build solid relationships with other implementers and Embassy personnel, but more importantly it limits the RLA's ability to build relationships with country stakeholders.

Another barrier to the RLA's ability to gauge progress, set priorities and make adjustments to programs when necessary is the fact that OPDAT does not seem to have clear programmatic priorities or any impact indicators. Consequently, the RLA is pulled in many different directions by many different stakeholders. However, the Evaluation Team does not see the lack of impact indicators so much as the fault of the RLA or OPDAT but rather with the vague reporting requirements established by INL. From everything we know, INL has not developed clear reporting requirements for OPDAT, including the development or use of indicators. However, it should be noted that INL informed the Evaluation Team that it is now moving in this direction in all areas of its programming and that they welcomed recommendations in this regard.

One way that the RLA took-on the responsibility of measuring the effectiveness of the training programs she organized and participated in was to ask participants to evaluate the training through

anonymous questionnaires. Most of the other implementers had not established such a policy or self-evaluation procedure. These questionnaires asked, among other things, whether the materials were sufficient, whether the course objectives were effectively conveyed and whether the course was organized to meet the trainee's needs. Generally speaking, a cursory review of these evaluation oriented surveys gave the quality of the training programs very favorable reviews, although the relevance of some of the substance of the training programs did not receive equally high marks.

With respect to reporting, the Evaluation Team was unable to fully ascertain exactly what reports OPDAT submitted to INL, and to what degree INL reviewed and commented on them formally. However, during our visit the Evaluation Team observed that INL appeared to maintain fairly regular contact with both the RLA and JSSL. We were also told that OPDAT had sent a number of written reports to INL, although we do not have the documentation necessary to comment further on this issue.

Best Practices and Lessons Learned

It is important that the role and focus of the RLA be very clear, including the RLA's work plan, the short and long term priorities and the impact indicators. In order to be fully effective, it is also vital that the RLA receive strong political and budgetary programming support from the USG. Working on programs in the criminal justice and corruption areas is difficult in any country, much less a post-conflict country such as Liberia with many basic infrastructure, human resource and institution-building needs. It is also important that the programming activities of the RLA be fully integrated into the broader ROL reform agenda.

In Liberia, the RLA's defined responsibilities to focus on addressing and preventing endemic corruption is of vital importance, since the RLA, as an official USG representative and is in the best position to deal with the political sensitivities of this crosscutting problem. As an attorney and official representative of the USG and the U.S Department of Justice, the RLA is also uniquely qualified and positioned to deal with the issue of endemic corruption within the justice system.

However, the fact that the RLA position is only funded and programmed one year at a time makes both the RLA's job and the development or evaluation of impact indicators even more difficult. In Liberia this short time frame further hampers the ability of the RLA to achieve measurable results, since not only does the individual RLA not know whether there will be an RLA in the future, but the RLA cannot make long-term plans with stakeholders. The result of this uncertainty is that by the time the RLA learns the political and legal landscape and establishes personal relationships with country counterparts and other stakeholders, the RLA has to begin winding-down program activities. This overall situation limits the RLA's ability to establish close-working relationships with key stakeholders and that are essential to development work.

Stakeholder Impact

Enhanced institution-building. While the RLA has been involved in many training and capacity building related activities, the RLA has played an important role in suggesting and facilitating the development of an important entity, the anti-corruption task force, to address the endemic and crosscutting problem of endemic corruption. While it is too early to evaluate the impact of this institutional development, it has the potential to either address or perpetuate corruption in Liberia.

It will be critical for the RLA and the USG to focus on the operations and integrity of this new institutional structure.

The RLA will need more high level USG support in order to work effectively with the MOJ on the important work of this new institutional entity. A clear scope of work for the task force, the selection and training of professional staff with integrity, the development of concrete anti-corruption priorities and a close working relationship with the LACC and other key Liberian institutions will be critical to the success of this task force and the government's overall anti-corruption efforts. This kind of support coupled, with the development of related impact indicators and a systematic monitoring and reporting plan will help promote the individual and collective efforts of the RLA, the USG and the Liberian government.

CARTER CENTER

Program Description

In 2007, the Carter Center was awarded a one-year grant for approximately \$1.1 million from the Department of State's Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau. The grant provided for resources in four activity areas: (i) legal drafting, support, training and capacity building for Ministry justice officials in Montserrado and targeted counties; (ii) a Carter Center MOJ public awareness campaign and mediation pilot program campaign focused on Rights issues in six counties; (iii) support for CSO engagement and public awareness on traditional justice sector issues public participation and public awareness with traditional leaders and the National Traditional Council and (iv) conducting workshops and launching a national dialogue and a pilot survey on the need to reform and harmonize the formal and traditional justice systems.

Key Findings: Strengths and/or Weaknesses of the Program

The key strength or success of the overall program primarily relates to the CC's efforts to raise public awareness and enhance cooperation and dialogue between key national and local stakeholders in both the traditional and formal rule of law sectors. This is not an easy or unimportant first step towards promoting the rule of law within Liberian context. The Center's efforts to work effectively with local leaders on these kinds of programs in rural areas – despite logistical hardships and political barriers, particularly in the Southeastern counties – was also seen as successful by many.

The Center acknowledged and the Evaluation Team agrees that their efforts to enhance the capacity of the MOJ to work on traditional justice issues and mediation were not as successful as their public awareness efforts. They attributed this occurrence to basic logistical traveling problems that have since been overcome, as well as the fact that the MOJ had no long-term rule of law strategy in place and no time or ability to institutionalize a long-term, focused training program.

Best Practices and Lessons Learned

Perhaps the best evidence of their success in awareness-raising among all key rule of law stakeholders is best illustrated by their pilot survey and research project in the traditional justice area. This project has raised traditional justice reform issues to a higher level of national dialogue among all key ROL stakeholders. It also planted the seeds for the Center to develop, in collaboration with

the United States Institute for Peace, UNMIL and Oxford University's Center for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), a larger national project that will serve to both inform and guide new rule of law efforts and promote a national consensus in important ways.

Their efforts to help forge consensus on the need for national paralegal profession in Liberia through another rural based pilot program, modeled on the TIMAP program in Sierra Leone, was also noted by many as another public awareness success story.

The Center noted that they have now learned how to address many of the community, logistical and human resource programming issues that arise when working in rural counties, including how to develop trust among local traditional and government leaders as well as the public. They noted this is largely a consensus building participatory time-consuming exercise that should be grounded in solid research and community buy-in on targeted issues of common concern, such as those that relate to corruption, property and land disputes and harsh justice without due process.

Stakeholder Impact

Enhanced public awareness. While the Carter Center has been involved in many ROL activities, its efforts to create public awareness on ROL issues and to work outside Montserrado County on cutting edge issues like reform of the traditional justice system and legal assistance programs through paralegals are viewed by many as important contributions to the ROL debate in Liberia. While measuring the impact of any public awareness program is always problematic, it is clear that the Center's programmatic efforts to help highlight and promote a national consensus on the need to focus more on the ROL, including traditional justice and paralegal assistance issues, has significant impact potential. A preliminary review of some of the Center's current ROL public survey findings on both the traditional and formal justice systems, as well as the data captured from QED's own stakeholder survey during the evaluation process, confirm the importance of integrating these issues into the justice sector programming agenda and the overall need to support programs that make the public more aware of their legal rights and how to access them.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

MEETING BENCHMARKS

Except for the ABA and the Carter Center, USG-funded activities had few, if any, meaningful benchmarks by which to measure progress or impact. Even the ABA's and the Carter Center's indicators were mainly in the nature of activities or outputs. In the beginning, this may have been understandable rationalized, given the difficulty of just being able to get programs off the ground in a post-conflict environment like Liberia. However, benchmarks are essential for stakeholders to understand whether a program is being implemented effectively or whether program adjustments or new strategies are needed to promote a targeted reform agenda.

SUSTAINABILITY

USG-funded efforts have been able to train many actors within the justice sector, at least in Montserrado County, but efforts to create sustainable, institutionalized, prioritized stakeholder-led training programs have not been very successful. While there are now some training materials that can be used by various government entities, there are still no institutionalized, sustainable training programs for key actors and institutions within the justice sector.

This situation will hopefully change over time, at least with respect to the judges, as the Judicial Institute becomes operational. Indeed, the building blocks for a sustainable training program are embedded within the Institute's workplan, so the potential for sustainable programming is there. However, the success of even this well-thought out initiative will be problematic at best unless the issues of endemic corruption within the justice sector and full stakeholder buy-in to the program are properly addressed on an on-going basis.

In short, most of the programs the Evaluation Team reviewed do not appear to be focused enough or have sufficient country support to be sustainable over the long-term. The reality is that none of the key justice institutions, including the Supreme Court, the Ministry of Justice, the Law School or the Bar Association have adopted and implemented serious institutional change policies or strategies.

IMPACT

Anecdotally, USG advisors, implementers and country stakeholders tried to relate the programmatic impact of the USG-funded efforts in the justice sector. However, without systematic monitoring and evaluation mechanisms and reliable reporting structures⁴ and impact indicators, the Evaluation Team cannot meaningfully comment on or quantify the impact of most USG funded programming over the last three years. What can be said is that USG implementers have literally engaged in 100's if not 1000's of discreet and diverse activities during this time frame and that some of them, either individually or collectively, hopefully enhanced the capacity of the MOJ to undertake some of its essential tasks. It can also be said that the because the issue of endemic judicial corruption has yet to

⁴ The Evaluation Team received reports from UNMIL regarding detainees and inmates in Montserrado County Central Prison (MCCP) in January and March 2009. The January report stated that only one person housed at the MCCP had been convicted and that the 800+ were detainees. The March report stated that 54 were post-sentence and that approximately 700 were detainees. The Evaluation Team did not find this data reliable.

be addressed and integrated into ROL programming, that most programming has not had significant impact on the quality of justice delivered to the Liberian people.

COST-EFFECTIVENESS

Cost-effectiveness is hampered by two things: (1) lack of formal coordination that would allow for greater efficiency in the utilization, prioritization, and assignment of resources and efforts; and (2) lack of emphasis on institutional reforms, including having the systems, policies, procedures, indicators and oversight mechanisms in place necessary to effectively monitor progress and link-up training programs with institutional reform and implementation efforts. Because no meaningful indicators have been used by any of the USG implementers, but for a few by the Carter Center and ABA, it is very difficult to evaluate and compare the cost effectiveness of USG ROL funding. However, in general, the Evaluation Team believes that within Liberian context the anecdotal evidence on cost effectiveness and impact points to programs that were related more to promoting public awareness, access to justice and advocacy than capacity building or institution-building (it should be noted that most institution efforts to date appear to have been focused mainly on basic infrastructure development).

While some of the reasons for this conclusion are explained in other parts of this report, the reality is that there is a lack of official political will and public demand for reform and corruption appears to be endemic across institutions. Thus, the enabling environment does not yet exist to justify a reform agenda primarily focused on capacity building. As noted in the QED donor analysis, twice as much money has been spent on capacity building as any other area. At the same time, relatively little has been spent on advocacy and access to justice programs, even though these programs, like public awareness programs, are collectively serving to both inform the public of their rights and provide access to them. Building-up the demand for reform and more transparency and accountability are some of the first programmatic steps that need to be taken in countries like Liberia, where key institutions and political will are very weak and where integrity within the justice system is a very serious issue.

However, this is not to say that cost-effectiveness can or should be measured by the amount of money spent on different kinds of programs. The real test is whether the quality and relevance of the capacity building programs are attune to country context. It is also not to say that capacity building is not extremely important within Liberian context, for without it access to justice means very little. However, because most of the capacity building to date has been done without integrating the corruption issue into its design, and because most of it has not been strategically focused or well coordinated among donors, it is not hard to question its cost effectiveness or impact.

In the case of Liberia, it is clear that time and money invested in capacity building needs to be very targeted and done through the prism of promoting both individual and institutional professionalism and integrity. At the same time, money and time invested in public awareness, advocacy and access to justice issues needs to also be focused on targeted issues that have resonance with the public and mechanisms and systems geared towards resolving high priority disputes and problems and protecting people's legal rights.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

Before moving into our recommendations, it is important to keep in mind that one of the most important findings and observations of the Evaluation Team is that almost none of the Liberian individuals or organizations we met with, particularly those outside of Montserrado County, either knew their basic legal rights or how to access and enforce them. Another important related finding is that most, including the thousands of pre-trial detainees awaiting trial in prisons throughout the country, could not afford either the official or unofficial cost of using the legal system and most did not have access to a lawyer.

Taken together, this reality, means future programs should be directed towards laying the foundation, building-block by building-block, for programs designed to promote and protect people's fundamental rights and those that will produce concrete fair results in a timely fashion -- all with a programmatic eye focused on making sure people understand what their basic legal rights are in a society based upon the rule of law. Practically speaking, this will require that programs be targeted on certain high priority issues and certain counties, and designed to promote official accountability. The most important programming idea advanced here is for programs to result in concrete action that will build confidence in the justice system and a rule of law culture.

Gaining the trust of the public and the business community will no doubt be a long-term undertaking, so having a short-term ROL agenda that produces concrete results on real world problems will be very important. That said, it will be just as important to place these short-term programs in a larger long term ROL strategic framework, with another programmatic eye focused on building institutions with integrity and systems, policies and processes that hold people and government officials accountable.

The short term goals for a significant amount of programming should therefore be focused on (i) making sure people know their basic legal rights and that they can access them and (ii) developing priority action areas and related mechanisms and procedures for resolving concrete problems and disputes fairly, efficiently and effectively. Beyond public awareness programming, a more comprehensive stakeholder ROL and anti-corruption assessment and holistic ROL strategy needs to be done before final long-term programming decisions are made.

However, while this comprehensive assessment process is underway, some of the high priority areas where resolution mechanisms and programming support are clearly needed now no doubt relate to programs geared towards resolving property disputes, programs providing people access to due process and their basic human rights and programs holding high level government officials and criminals engaging in serious crimes, including grand corruption, accountable to the rule of law.

Two of the areas where it is clear more programs are needed now are the same areas where a significant number of court cases are now pending and unresolved: land disputes and rape. The numbers of cases in these areas really tell the Liberia ROL story best and they also quantify where there is the most demand for legal reform and access to the formal legal system. These two kinds of cases also point to many of the underlying causes of social unrest, impunity and public distrust in Liberia, including dire poverty, illiteracy, the lack of information, irresolvable property and land disputes, gender and ethnic discrimination, gender violence and endemic corruption.

Indeed, the courts already have serious backlogs in both of these areas. Moreover, the prisons are overflowing with people waiting for a fair and timely trial for the serious crime of rape. And in both types of cases, the aggrieved party and those seeking justice are also waiting for the wheels of justice to turn but with little or no hope that it will ever even venture their way. An array of programs that help resolve disputes and cases in these two areas are desperately needed in order to demonstrate to the Liberian people that actually have rights and that the government is going to help protect and resolve them.

In rape cases this means programming should now be focused on not only helping bring those accused of rape to court but on making sure that the rights of both the victims and the accused are protected and adhered to by the justice system itself. So far much of the programming in this area appears to have succeeded in making men and women more aware of the law in this area but far less attention appears to have been focused on providing either the victim or the accused with actual legal or paralegal representation once an investigation or case is actually opened. The result is that in the vast majority of cases neither the victim nor the accused see the justice system operate fairly or efficiently; they only see its deficiencies and the degree to which corruption permeates it.

With regard to corruption, one of the best mechanisms to prevent or minimize judicial corruption from compounding the problems of both the victim and the accused is to provide them some form of legal assistance. Among other things, effective legal assistance programs serve as judicial watchdogs and they make legal rights on paper more real in practice through both their bark and their bite. At a minimum, they increase pressure on the justice system to be more transparent and to resolve high priority cases and problems in a timelier and fair manner.

With regard to land disputes, many of the kinds of holistic oriented programs now being funded related to rape and gender violence should be given serious consideration for possible replication. This includes programs related to (i) public awareness through the media; (ii) access to justice through the creation of special courts, commissions and task forces; (iii) institutional capacity building through targeted training programs; (iv) legal assistance through lawyers, counselors, mediators and arbitration through both formal and informal mechanisms and (v) the development and implementation of special laws and policies that give these cases priority standing in the courts.

In addition, and as previously mentioned, one of the main programming gaps in the rape and gender violence areas relates to legal assistance programming. This would be program area number (vi) and it would also need to be replicated in the land dispute area.

While other short-term programs focused in targeted areas should be explored during any program design exercise, the Evaluation Team also believes that programs designed to reform and provide access to the informal or traditional justice system, particularly in the rural areas where access to the formal justice system is practically impossible, should be part of the new reform agenda. As noted earlier in this report, the vast majority of people continue to use and rely upon the traditional justice system to resolve many disputes. This practice is no doubt going to be the norm for some time to come. And while some areas and punishments are arguably better and potentially more fairly managed by the formal justice system, the reality in Liberia is that most people, particularly at the community level outside Montserrado County, are going to continue to use this system to resolve disputes for many years to come.

In Liberia there is also the reality that most people can only afford and readily access this system in their own community. Thus, this system may have a comparative advantage over the formal justice system in terms of resolving certain kinds of civil disputes and family matters. The bottom line is that in Liberian post-conflict country context, it is very important that alternative mechanisms and systems be in place to resolve disputes and protect people's rights in a timely fair manner. This also includes the use of formal and informal arbitrators and mediators. There are a number of potential model programs being implemented in other post-conflict countries that could possibly be adapted to Liberian context. While we do not have the space in this report to outline these, some like the paralegal program from Sierra Leone are already being implemented in Liberia. A number of others, such as those designed to reform and harmonize the traditional and formal justice systems either together or separately, can be found in the articles cited in this report's Bibliography. Obviously this issue will be very important for any program design team to delve into in great depth.

Another important high priority programming area, related to both the short and long-term ROL reform agenda, is the need to rally and broaden civil society support for and oversight of the ROL reform agenda. Like their governmental institutional counterparts, civil society remains very weak. However, a growing number of civil society groups have recently become engaged on selective ROL fronts, such as gender-based violence. This fairly recent development presents new opportunities for some civil society groups to work alongside government on some ROL issues of common interest and other groups to act as ROL reform advocates and anti-corruption watchdogs. It also presents new opportunities to either expand or focus the scope of some organizations programs on various high priority ROL issues.

As mentioned, most long-term ROL strategies and programming decisions really need to be made after a comprehensive ROL and anti-corruption stakeholder oriented assessment have been undertaken. However, the Evaluation Team is comfortable in presenting at least one overarching, crosscutting programming idea for high priority consideration.

The main idea would be to focus as much on programming that builds justice, anti-corruption and oversight institutions with integrity and independence as programming that promotes capacity building. The global development community has learned the hard way that all of the capacity in the world is not going to have impact on the quality of justice if corruption within the justice system is endemic and if justice institutions are not independent. We have also learned that the best way to promote both sustainable capacity building and accountability is to promote more transparency and access to information within the justice system, with a keen focus on programs that emphasize support and incentives for reform-oriented stakeholders who have both integrity and professionalism.

This means program emphasis needs to be placed on integrity and vetting systems, the selection, promotion and dismissal process for public officials and the passage, implementation and enforcement of a range of open government laws, including access to information, whistleblower, ethics, conflict of interest and political party financing. Together these symbiotic laws and policies promote a more open government and more governmental and civil society oversight, and they lay the foundation for a ROL culture.

SUMMARY PROGRAMMING IDEAS

- In general, new rule of law reform programs related to the Liberian justice system should be more targeted, balanced and linked to each other and to broader socio-economic, good governance goals that will affect all Liberians in all walks of life, wherever they happen to live. This includes targeted programming in the cities and rural areas and within both the formal and informal justice systems. The key will be to match targeted areas of conflict with resolution systems that are accessible, fair effective and efficient.
- The former approach to reform of the formal justice sector might include programs that touch upon serious crimes, such as rape, murder, bribery and disputes related to property, land and employment. These appear to be some of the areas where the formal justice system has clear advantages and benefits over the traditional justice system, and these are the areas where there is demand for formal justice system resolution. However, it will also be important to reform and update key laws, such as those related to bribery and open government, to make sure that they are consistent with Liberia's legal obligations under various treaties, such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the African Union Convention on Corruption and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Passage and implementation of an access to information and whistleblower law are extremely important open government law to pass if corruption is to be addressed and prevented. A top-to-bottom review and comprehensive reform of the criminal and civil codes should also be a high program priority.
- The latter more non-traditional informal approach might include programs that touch upon problems related to family, divorce or inheritance disputes or violations and problems of a non-criminal nature. These appear to be areas where there is demand for informal or traditional justice system resolution. In short, a less traditional but more targeted step-by-step approach to justice sector reform would seem to be a more culturally appropriate and practical approach to providing all Liberians access to justice in areas of high public common interest.
- Strong support for a targeted range of capacity building programs is also important, but the Team believes this on-going effort should be focused primarily on training qualified professionals who have been properly vetted. Defining the criteria for and implementation of a comprehensive vetting process and related training program should be a high program priority.
- Strong support for the new Judicial Institute and its ambitious plans is also important, yet we know from global experience that this is largely a capacity building effort, and that unless its activities are closely linked to other interrelated ROL reforms that it will likely have limited impact on the overall justice system.. Indeed, professionals trained at the Institute should also be both qualified and fully vetted for integrity.
- Passage, implementation and enforcement of open government laws, such as those related to access to information, income and asset disclosure, conflict of interest and whistle-blowing, as well as those related to access to formal, traditional and alternative justice in targeted areas, are fundamental building blocks needed to promote a rule of law culture. Until Liberians and businesses have an anonymous whistleblower system in place, there is little likelihood that they will feel comfortable exposing corruption to the new LACC or any other institution.

- Beyond these inter-related building block programs, there is also a need to step-back and focus on several essential institution-building oriented reforms, such as those that ensure the law itself is readily accessible and that it is understood and accepted by the people of Liberia.
- A number of institution-building oriented programs can be found in the new draft Strategic Plans of both the Ministry of Justice and the Liberian Supreme Court (see attachments), as well as the strategic plan of the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission. However, one of the most important themes to emphasize in all of these new programs would be how to make justice sector institutions more independent, more professional and less corrupt. These foundation-building block programs include tasks such as building an internal and external communications system, a viable incentives and ethics oriented career, recruitment and retirement and disciplinary system, an information management system and strategic public awareness/education initiative and the development and implementation of transparent polices, regulations and procedures that are readily accessible to the Liberian people wherever they live.
- There was an overwhelming consensus among all of those we interviewed that support for programs and oversight mechanisms that promote both transparency and accountability was key and that addressing the endemic problem of bribery within justice sector institutions would be critical. Making sure that new programs have the proper incentives and disincentives to accomplish these important tasks would be the challenge.
- Increasing the capacity and reform efforts of the private Bar and law school by focusing on areas of common interest is also critical. Few ROL reforms can be passed, implemented or sustained without support from these key institutions.
- The Bar also needs support for a continuing legal education program for practicing lawyers and a transparent accountable disciplinary system for lawyers. At the same time, experience in post-conflict countries like Liberia, where there is a severe shortage of lawyers, tells us that the Bar needs to support a policy or law that allow lawyers who graduate from other countries (particularly those of Liberian decent) to practice Liberian law.
- The law school also needs support for full-time law professors, as well as the development of a reformed curricula and law school modernization strategic action plan. At the same time, the law school needs to allow its students who have completed their coursework, some over two years ago, to graduate and practice law.
- At the same time, the Ministry of Justice, which is primarily responsible for managing and policing all of the city counselors, investigators, police and county attorneys and enforcing the law, nor the Supreme Court, which is primarily responsible for managing and policing all of the magistrates, judges, defense attorneys and court personnel, should have a transparent, accountable disciplinary system and an accessible whistleblower system in place. Both of these systems are essential to promoting public trust in and integrity within the justice system.
- In addition, the courts, prosecutors' offices and defense counsels should have access to such basic rule of law tools as reliable, practical court recording equipment, the Liberian code and case law and an acceptable case management information system. The backlog of pending cases

appears to have never been prioritized or culled and important reform and resolution mechanisms, such as the long discussed Land, Law Reform and Independent Human Rights Commissions, have never been created or funded. These are fundamental tools to any ROL toolkit.

- Finally, a new ROL program should also focus on support for systematic monitoring and reporting by civil society groups and enforcement programs that ensure the State adheres to the rule of law itself. At present, the law is vague and the justice system is government-biased such it is virtually impossible to either bring a case or enforce a judgment against the state. We know from global experience that until the public sees public officials and state institutions accountable to the letter of the law they will never accept the law as their master either.

For further analytical and quick-reference purposes, we have tried to place these and other recommendations into one of the five categories of ROL programs used throughout this report (although many obviously cut across categories): **(i) Public Awareness; (ii) Access to Justice; (iii) Capacity Building; (iv) Advocacy and (v) Institution Building.**

And for thematic program emphasis purposes, we have also added the categories of **Transparency, Accountability and Integrity (T, A and I)**. Several law reform-oriented activities have been placed in into the Advocacy category, although they arguably also could be placed into a one of the other four categories. The point is not to debate the category so much as to find analytical tools that will help focus and link-up programming in high priority areas at any given point in time.

The Team believes this kind of categorical and thematic approach will help ensure that a certain percentage of ROL programs are geared towards making sure the Liberian people understand their rights and that they know how to access them. Building up the demand and political will for justice reform is a front and center issue for Liberia right now. Our research during our visit and our experience in other countries leads us to conclude that these two crosscutting and synergistic themes should be emphasized in future ROL programs and they are essential building blocks for Liberia's difficult journey down the ROL road.

Finally, the Team wants to emphasize that these recommendations and priorities should only be used as a potential guidepost for action. They clearly need to be fleshed-out, refined and further prioritized through a more comprehensive assessment and participatory program design exercise. With those caveats in mind, we believe that emphasis in any new ROL program should be placed on how to balance, link-up and develop synergistic programs.

SUMMARY IDEAS ORGANIZED BY THEME AND FOCUS

- **Public awareness (T & I):** making the public more aware of their fundamental constitutional and legal rights, such as the right to access: (i) the letter of the law (codes) and published court decisions; (ii) a lawyer (if they cannot afford one); (iii) judicial information such as official court fees, public court documents, arrest warrants, etc. and (iv) the right to a timely justice; (v) the right to bail; (vi) the right to a public hearing/trial and the right to a fair trial (including the right to a justice system with integrity) and (vii) rights and reforms under the traditional justice system.

- **Public awareness (T & I):** making the law itself more accessible to justice system actors and the public, including providing all judges, prosecutors, law schools, ministries, agencies and Commissions, the Bar and all courthouses with complete and up-to-date laws and up-to-date Supreme Court decisions (through written materials, CD RAMs and multiple Web sites, etc).
- **Public Awareness (T & I):** making donor coordination, policy development dialogue and the use of MOU's in the rule of law area as well as transparent donor coordination and information sharing with the public a higher program priority.
- **Institution-building (I):** making corruption and integrity issues a cross-cutting high program priority within the context of all key rule of law programs.
- **Institution-building (T, A & I):** making justice sector institution building and integrity building in both the capital and rural areas a higher program priority, including: (i) comprehensive civil service reform of the justice sector and better working conditions and retirement incentives; (ii) developing and implementing fair, transparent vetting policies and procedures that focus on the cross-cutting issue of promoting judicial ethics and integrity and addressing bribery); (iii) renovating and/or building justice sector facilities in every county; (iv) developing and implanting a fair, transparent disciplinary procedure for the justice sector and (v) developing and implementing a sustainable remedial and continuing legal education program for vetted justice sector officials; (vi) supporting transparent, accountable institutions, independent commissions and reform oriented and oversight mechanisms, such as the Independent Human Rights, the Law Reform and Justice Reform commissions and (vii) strengthening the law making and oversight powers of relevant Legislative committees.
- **Capacity Building (T & I):** making social consensus development, judicial integrity, information sharing and knowledge management among all key justice sector institutions and key CSO's a higher program priority.
- **Advocacy(A & I):** making fair, effective and efficient dispute resolution, public awareness and advocacy programs and addressing endemic, concrete problems, such as those related to basic Rights, a higher program priority, including (i) the rights of pre-trial detainees; (ii) the rights of property and land owners; (iii) the right to contract enforcement (iv) the right to have a fair and efficient public procurement system; (v) the right to resolve labor and employment disputes fairly, efficiently and effectively; (vi) the rights of juveniles and (vii) gender rights (including traditional justice resolution systems);.
- **Advocacy (T, A & I):** making passage and implementation of open government and anti-corruption laws with appropriate sanctions, a higher program priority, including: (i) access to justice sector information; (ii) conflict of interest; (iii) codes of ethics for public officials; (iv) income and asset disclosure; (v) anti-bribery and (vi) whistle-blowing systems.
- **Advocacy (T, A & I):** making comprehensive reform of the civil and criminal codes through a transparent, participatory process a high program priority.

- **Advocacy (A & I):** making systematic monitoring and impact benchmark reporting through governmental and non-governmental entities a higher program priority, including: (i) developing and implementing impact oriented country-grown PRS-oriented indicators in all rule of law programs; (ii) supporting civil society participation and oversight in the development and implementation of monitoring and reporting PRS oriented mechanisms and (iii) supporting public monitoring and oversight through the media, including newspapers, community radio, television, web sites and justice sector hotlines.
- **Access to justice (A & I):** making legal assistance and the justice system more accessible, timely and affordable a higher program priority, through: (i) permanent and qualified defense counsel (public defenders) stationed in all counties; (ii) traveling/mobile public defense counsels; (iii) private defense counsel (if needed in lieu of the unavailability of public defense counsel) and (iv) paralegals and community-based legal assistance providers providing assistance to indigents and vulnerable populations.

PROGRAMMING IDEAS FOR CURRENT AND PAST IMPLEMENTERS

While QED does not know what USAID is planning in terms of a budget or programming mechanisms for a new ROL program, we have been asked to present “four or five” programming ideas for consideration. These ideas are mainly an attempt to align some but not all of the high priority programs recommended in this report to the implementers currently on the ground, on the assumption that some or all of these implementing mechanisms will be continued. Several ideas are new so we do not attempt to match-up programs with implementers.

Indeed, one of our recommendations would be the need to have more ROL implementers on the ground, based on the working assumption that the ROL program will be larger and geographically more broadly focused than the one at present. Providing more detail on the exact nature of these programs needs the benefit of a stakeholder-oriented program design exercise in consultation with other key donors. Thus, with the limited amount of information we have from an Evaluation, we are only able to point USAID in general programming directions at this time.

1. ABA – Support for operationalizing the Judicial Institute and making it accessible to all key justice sector actors; support for a range of reforms related to institutional reform of the law school and the Liberian Bar Association (including support for the development of advocacy programs designed to engage the LBA on targeted ROL reforms and continued support for scholarships and internships for law students (ABA) and support for the development of a Defense Bar Association (ABA).
2. JSSL/PAE – Support for implementation of a case management system for the Supreme Court, the County Courts and the Solicitor General; on-going support for a training program for all county attorneys and public defenders that is linked to the Judicial Institute; support for comprehensive reform and/or updating of the criminal and civil codes (at least in targeted high priority areas (such as corruption/bribery, open government laws, human rights, enforcement and effective punitive sanctions).
3. OPDAT/RLA – Support for on-going but targeted support to the LACC and the MOJ’s Anti-Corruption Task Force that is geared towards operationalizing and promoting interagency coordination, information sharing, integrity policies and standards and targeted capacity and institution-building within both entities.

4. Carter Center – Support for reforms related to the traditional justice system, paralegals and community based mediation in targeted geographic and issue oriented areas.
5. New Mechanism – Support for a targeted grants program to NGOs to work in targeted ROL and anti-corruption issue areas, such as monitoring and reporting, advocacy, public awareness and legal aid/assistance.
6. New Mechanism -- Support for a new anti-corruption program focused on targeted high priority issue areas, such as high level official bribery, theft and embezzlement, the public procurement process and natural resources.

APPENDICES

A. SCOPE OF WORK

B. PERSONS CONTACTED

C. SURVEY INSTRUMENT

D. ADDITIONAL MAPS

E. REFERENCES

APPENDIX A: SCOPE OF WORK

A.8 STATEMENT OF WORK

Evaluation Objective & Questions

The Objectives of the evaluation are as follows:

1. Evaluate the progress made by ABA, JSSL and other USG-funded ROL programs based on established benchmarks.
2. Focus on gathering data indicative of the success or failure of specific USG funded ROL activities, both in terms of accomplishing their immediate objectives as well as impact on the legal system as a whole.
3. Provide a basic donor mapping matrix of ROL programs in Liberia, for all stakeholders (not only USG). This must include program title, program objectives, sources and level of funding, program periods, geographic coverage, partner organizations and a summary of results.
4. Evaluate cost effectiveness of the USG programs.
5. Assess performance monitoring systems in place; disaggregating of data by gender, socio-economic status, ethnic minorities and other disenfranchised population segments, and make recommendations for means of verifying results.

Prioritize the activities in the current work plans in light of overall impact, feasibility and cost effectiveness, and in light of what other donors are supporting. Provide any recommendations for any changes in approach, activities or other means to maximize the effectiveness of the ROL programs for USAID, USG, ABA and GOL counterparts and NGO partners. What should be the follow on programmatic focus for USAID in the ROL area? What opportunities are there for continued assistance?

The evaluation team must use, but not be limited to the following key questions as a guide in formulating findings and recommendations as a result of this evaluation:

Meeting Benchmarks

1. Is the approach to improving the quality of USG funded ROL programs in meeting their goals on the right course or should adjustments be made given the changes in the overall assistance environment and country context?
2. Are there any significant or critical gaps in USG funded ROL program implementation that requires adjustment?
3. Is legal system reform a priority for the GOL? Is there a clear national reform strategy and plan and is it being followed?
4. Do the USG funded programs work towards meeting the ROL goals and objectives in Liberia's Poverty Reduction Strategy paper?
5. Did the assumptions established at the beginning of the programs prevail? If not, how could assumptions be more realistic?
6. Sustainability
7. Impact
8. Are processes, systems and management in place to ensure that the results and impact of USG-funded programs will be sustainable?
9. Do the programs create institutional capacity and fill gaps on behalf of the key beneficiaries?
10. What are the obstacles to sustainability?
11. Are the programs triggering creation of sustainable justice reform oriented networks or other constituencies for reform?
12. What evidence is there of GOL and other Liberian partners taking ownership of USG funded programs? Are beneficiaries aware that programs are USG-funded?
13. What measures should be taken to increase sustainability?
14. Have there been any systemic changes as a result of USG-funded programs? (legislative reforms, improved legal framework, changes in legal institutions, increased investment by GOL in the justice sector etc ...)
15. What are the factors limiting the impact of USG-funded assistance?

16. Is there an increase in the number of legal practitioners' knowledge about the legal system (process and procedures) and Liberian citizen's knowledge of their rights?
17. Have USG-funded programs been flexible to changing circumstances?
18. Cost-Effectiveness
19. What is the percentage of funds being used for administrative purposes?
20. What areas of the programs have provided the most value for US Government funds (i.e. what areas have provided the most impact i.e. reached the most beneficiaries for the least amount of funds)?
21. Are there opportunities to further leverage USG resources through increased collaboration with other USG and donor programs?
22. How can the project collaborate better with other USG ROL projects and the GOL?
23. How effective have the project's human rights public education/outreach efforts been in informing Liberians about the ROL?

Performance Measurement Systems

24. Is there a ROL strategy for Liberia, is it "understood" by implementing partners and is ROL assistance based on the strategy?
25. Do the monitoring systems effectively track, monitor and report on results attributable to program activities?
26. Do they utilize independently verifiable information?
27. Are the established PMP and standard "F" indicators that have been established reasonable given the current context? If not, how do they need to be modified?
28. Are partners/implementers sufficiently collecting data to measure program results?

Proposed Methodology

During the preparatory stage of the evaluation, the contractor will prepare and submit to the USAID and INL staff for approval, as a part of its work plan, a planned methodology for the conduct of all evaluation work, including explanation of specific methods to be used to collect information necessary to evaluate effectiveness of USG funded ROL assistance activities that have been undertaken in Liberia. It is the contractor's responsibility to assure that its findings and conclusions about the effectiveness of ROL assistance activities are based on available data that is both accurate and reliable, and that information gathered is representative of and reasonably reflects results actually achieved.

Emphasis will be on collection, where available, of reliable empirical data indicating success or failure as opposed to anecdotal evidence.

Examples of proposed evaluation methodologies include:

- Key Informant Interviews - to be held with beneficiaries; community leaders; local, regional, and national officials; other donors; other USG personnel in Liberia; implementing partners; and academicians.
- Focus groups - to be held with beneficiaries; traditional/customary and community leaders; local, regional, and national officials; other donors; implementing partners; and academicians, at the law school, the Liberian Bar Association and other key NGO's advancing ROL initiatives, including the faith based groups.
- Document reviews - assessments, reports, action plans, evaluations, and legal documents. Key documents on the programs will be provided to the team by USAID and other USG agencies managing ROL programs being evaluated, but the team is expected to research documentation from other sources/organizations as well.
- Observation - field work in at least five selected counties over a 4-week period. Interviews shall be conducted with civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and GOL; justice officials at the national, regional, and local level, as well as other donors working on justice reform issues shall also be interviewed. The Mission will provide input in the selection of these organizations and individuals.

Duration of Tasks and Level of Effort

The following descriptions of tasks for the evaluation are intended to serve as an illustrative guide for the respondents in developing a proposal for carrying out this evaluation. Respondents are

encouraged to submit proposals that will best meet the objectives of the evaluation and may propose alternative means for achieving them within the total proposed level of effort.

1. Desktop Review of Key Documents and Work Plan (10 working days):

Within ten working days of award and prior to any field work, the two expatriate members of the evaluation team will spend 10 working days (in the US), and the local advisor 5 days (in Liberia) 1) reviewing key documents and 2) developing a work plan.

Desktop review: The team will identify and review all available documentation describing ROL Assistance activities carried out in Liberia. The team will also conduct any required meetings with USG officials and implementing partners in the U.S. as required by the terms of the contract.

Documents for review include but are not limited to:

- I. Program descriptions, scopes of work and work plans of all programs implemented in Liberia by USG agencies
- II. USAID/Liberia strategy FY 2006-2009
- III. USAID/Liberia Operational Plans for FYs 2007 and 2008
- IV. ABA Quarterly Reports
- V. JSSL Quarterly Reports
- VI. DOJ/OPDAT Quarterly Reports
- VII. Justice Cluster reports
- VIII. Liberia's Poverty Reduction Strategy Report
- IX. Documentations describing ROL assistance provided by other assistance donors during the evaluation period.
- X. 2005 Interagency Justice Assessment Report

A substantial amount of material about ROL programs in Liberia has been assembled by the Mission and will be made available to the contractor for review. This documentation is not necessarily complete and it is the responsibility of the contractor to seek out and acquire any other documentation necessary to properly identify and evaluate ROL activities in Liberia.

The contractor will arrange to get background briefings from AIDIW officials in DCHAIDG/ROL, AFRIWA, AFRISD, DCHAICMM OTI; and STATEIINI, DOJ/OPDAT and other relevant staff/offices having knowledge of ROL activities in Liberia.

It is the responsibility of the contractor to gather and review all necessary documents before leaving for Liberia.

Development of Work Plan: The work plan must be approved by the CTO, with input from INL, prior to the expatriates traveling to Liberia. The contractor will prepare and submit to the Mission a proposed draft work plan for conducting the evaluation in the request. The plan will include a planned methodology for the conduct of all evaluation work, a proposed schedule for all field work to be conducted, proposed dates for submission of draft and final reports and a proposed methodology for the evaluation, consistent with the methodology agreed to between the Mission and the contractor. The proposed work plan will include a description of what specific ROL activities the contractor proposes to evaluate and how the contractor proposes to evaluate the impact of these (e.g. by interviews, review of statistical data or survey work etc.) .

The work plan must also indicate any areas of programming that the contractor believes does not merit review because of low levels of assistance, impracticality due to cost or other considerations. The work plan must be submitted to the Mission for review and comment after which a meeting will be scheduled to agree on a final plan prior to the start of field work, with a proposed itinerary with follow-up questions for the team's time in country.

2. Entrance Briefing:

Upon arrival in Liberia the Evaluation Team shall provide an entrance briefing to designated USG officials, at a minimum to include USAID and INL, at the beginning of the assessment trip to present to the Mission the Evaluation Team's objectives and discuss logistics, scheduling and any other issues. USAID and INL may assist coordination with stakeholders if necessary and provide additional suggestions for interviews.

3. Field Work (up to 4 weeks/24 workdays):

After the entrance briefing the evaluation team will then begin field work according to the evaluation methodology.

4. In-country debrief:

Upon completion of the evaluation and prior to departing Liberia, the contractor will provide an oral debriefing for the USAID Mission, INL and other interested Embassy staff on preliminary evaluation findings for Liberia.

5. Draft Report (10 workdays):

Within 10 working days of completion of field work and departure from Liberia, the contractor will provide a draft written report to the USAID/Liberia eTO who will forward the document to INL and the Embassy. This report will include the draft donor mapping matrix.

6. Final Report (5 workdays):

Within 5 working days of receipt of USAID and INL comments on the draft report, the contractor will provide a final written report (including the donor mapping matrix) to USAID/Liberia, INL and the Embassy on the results of the evaluation.

7. Washington Debriefing (1 workday):

Within five working days of submitting the final report, the evaluation team will meet with and orally debrief AIDIW ROL, AFRIWA staff and INL staff in Washington on the findings and recommendations of the evaluation. The USAID Mission and INL in Monrovia will participate via tele- or video-conference.

Additional guidance: In addition to the findings on the ROL assistance, debriefings will include a discussion of the methodology used, problems encountered and recommendations on how to undertake future evaluations of this kind.

The written final report shall not exceed 30 pages of text and will include:

- An Executive Summary
- Background discussion and rationale for the evaluation
- An explanation of the methodology used and field work done
 - Findings -empirical facts collected by the evaluation team; findings supported by relevant quantitative and qualitative data
 - Conclusions -Evaluators interpretations and judgments based on findings
 - Recommendations -proposed relevant and practical actions for management based on clearly supported conclusions
 - Unresolved issues -review of what remains to be done
- The report should also provide a detailed section mapping out other donor programs in ROL which include project timelines, amounts, objectives and geographical data.
- Annexes
 - SOW
 - Description of evaluation method used

- Data collection instruments
- Schedules
- List of persons interviewed
- Bibliography of documents reviewed
- Glossary of acronyms used

Team expertise and composition

The Team will be composed of a Team Leader, Senior Advisor, a Liberian-national Consultant, and optional Logistical/Administrative support. In addition, individual team members must possess the technical qualifications identified for their positions below. At least one member of the team must be familiar with evaluation planning and methodologies.

Team Leader - The Team Leader shall be responsible for coordinating evaluation activities and ensuring the production and completion of the evaluation report. He or she must have substantial experience managing and leading evaluations of complex democracy and governance and/or justice reform programs, as well as designing and implementing projects, preferably on ROL. He/she must possess excellent writing and interpersonal skills and must be familiar with USG-funded programs, objectives, and reporting requirements. At least 12 years of experience (with at least 5 years experience in international development work) managing and/or implementing justice reform programs in Africa, or post conflict countries confronting issues similar to those facing Liberia will be highly advantageous. An advanced degree in Law or a related field such as Court Administration, Political Science, International Relations or Public Administration is required.

Senior ROL Advisor - The Senior Advisor must possess a law or a Master's Degree in a law-related field such as Criminal Law, Court Administration, Human Rights law, Informal Justice Systems, Political Science, Public Administration, or related area and have at least 7 years of professional experience working on issues related to justice reform, legal education and/or court administration in Africa and experience in international development work. The Senior Advisor must be familiar with the operation of USAID and/or other international donor programs.

Host Country National Consultant - The contractor must propose a senior level Host Country National Consultant with at least 5 years of experience working on issues related to justice reform in Africa. Candidates for the Consultant position must hold a Bachelor's degree in a law-related field, such as Criminal Law, Criminology, Political Science, Sociology, International Relations, International Development, Public Administration, Human Rights or a related field.

Logistical/Administrative Support Staff - The contractor may add an additional team member for logistical/administrative support, but this is not a requirement.

In addition, USAID/Liberia and the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia may propose additional staff from USAID/Washington, USAID/Liberia or the U.S. Department of State to participate on the Assessment Team, for part or all of the assessment activities.

Logistical Support

The Evaluation Team shall be responsible for arranging air travel and local ground transportation and accommodation; and providing computers, printers, and other administrative services. Implementing partners, USAID/Liberia and the U.S. Embassy will provide assistance in arranging meetings with contractor staff, GOL and State representatives, program beneficiaries, and other key stakeholders. The Mission will make available all relevant documents. The Evaluation Team is responsible for its own transportation.

APPENDIX B: PERSONS CONTACTED

PERSONS CONTACTED

LIST OF PERSONS MET (OFFICIALS)

* SENATORS ARE REPRESENTED BY COUNTIES.

	Name	Title	Organization	Address/ Email/Cont #
1.	Alison Jolly	Deputy Chief Human Rights & Protection Section	UNMIL	Monrovia – jolly@un.org / 05319898
2.	Cllr. David A.B. Jallah	Dean, Law School	UL	Monrovia – dab19512002@yahoo.com /06510982
3.	Cllr. Frances Johnson-Morris	Chairperson	LACC	Monrovia – fjmorris2000@yahoo.com / 06917528/077829864
4.	Cllr. Philip A.Z. Banks III	Minster	MOJ	Monrovia – pbanks3d@aol.com /06498893
5.	Atty. Johannes Zlahn	Special Asst. / Minister	MOJ	Monrovia – attorneyjzzlahn@yahoo.com /06944406/05783716
6.	James Verdier	RoL Officer	UNDP	Monrovia – 06627754
7.	Joseph Acquoi	Commissioner for Finance	LACC	Monrovia –
8.	Z. Molly Reeves	Commissioner for Enforcement	LACC	Monrovia –
9.	Hannah Brent	Senator / Chair – Gender Committee	NL	Montserrado -
10.	Frankline Siakor	Senator	NL	Bong Co. -
11.	Clatus Wotorson	Senator	NL	Grand Kru
12.	Theodor Momo	Senator	NL	Grand Cape Mount co. -
13.	Gbesongar Finley	Senator	NL	Grand Bassa Co.
14.	Cllr. Johnny N. Lewis	Chief Justice	JUDICIARY	Monrovia -
15.	Cllr. Francis Kporkpor	Justice	JUDICIARY	Monrovia –
16.	Cllr. Karbinah Janneh	Justice	JUDICIARY	Monrovia –
17.	Moiffee Kanneh	RoL Officer	UNMIL	Monrovia – 06516123
18.	Chelsea Payne	RoL Officer	MOJ	Monrovia –

	Name	Title	Organization	Address/Cell #
19.	Kamudoni Nyasulu	Director-LJSSD	UNMIL	nyasulu@un.org
20.	Davidetta L. Kotty	Exe. Asst.-Chief Justice	Judiciary	dkotty_2003@yahoo.com
21.	Sharon J. Cooper	Officer in Charge	UNHCR	cooper@unhcr.org-06552086
22.	Mamadou D. Balde Sr.	Protection Officer	UNHCR	balde@unhcr.org-06362245
23.	Sikajipo Wollor	Circuit Judge	Judiciary	Gbarnga (Bong Co.)
24.	Patrick Williams	Public Defender	Judiciary	Gbarnga (Bong Co.)
25.	Alfred Manigbolor	Magistrate	Judiciary	Gbarnga (Bong Co.)
26.	Johnson Flomo	Dpt. Superintendent Central Prison	MoJ	Gbarnga (Bong Co.)
27.	Cllr Milton Taylor	Treasurer	LNBA	06556656
28.	Cllr Cyril Jones	Vice President	LNBA	06515495
29.	Cllr Micah W. Wright	President	LNBA	micah542003@yahoo.com-06518103
30.	Cllr A.Kanie Wesso	Sec. General	LNBA	06518474
31.	Cllr Sarah M. Jegede	Exe. Council Mem.	LNBA	smjegede@gmail.com-06519644
32.	Cllr Othello S. Paymah, I	Exe. Council Mem.	LNBA	06550788
33.	Cllr J. Dakn Mulbah	Exe. Council Mem.	LNBA	06558592
34.	George Sagbeh	County Atty Judiciary	Nimba Co	06513226 gsagbeh@yahoo.com
35.	Geillian Daie	Director	DFID	
36.	Magrette Smith-Johnson	Program Director	OSIWA	
37.	Elizabeth Mulbah		Good Governance Commission	06517901/077517901
38.	Arthur T. Johnson	RoL Officer	Planning Ministry	06537713
39.	Fedrick Cherue	Senator	National Legislature	Rivergee Co.06912296
40.	Corpu Barclay	Representative	National Legislature	Montserrado Co.
41.	Cllr Elijah Y. Cheapo	Public Defender	Judiciary	Montserrado Co. 077088598
42.	Saba Massa	Special Asst/Commissioner	LACC	06522379
43.	Dr. David Kialain	RoL Officer	Good Governance Commission	kialaind@yahoo.com
44.	Tom Ewert	Country Director	American Refugee C'mtee	tewert@arc-Liberia.org / 06520278

Civil Society Organizations – Montserrado
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1.	Cllr T. Dempster Brown	Exe. Director	CPHR	06534612
2.	Patrick A. Wai		LPW	06608098
3.	Selma S.Gibson		CHUDLES	06513927
4.	Sando M. Kpehe		PFL	06490213
5.	Dixon Psio Gblah	Exe. Director	LPW	06548533
6.	JeffersonB. Knights	Director		06572914
7.	Jacob G. Hinneh	Empowerment Coordinator		06565918
8.	Alfred Quayjardii			077523847/ hrliberia2005@yahoo.com
9.	Uriah T. Jallah	Director		06574917
10.	Jerome Vanjahkollie			06414915
11.	Rapheal G. Gray		FOHRD	06833062
12.	Wellington G. Bedell		CHUDLES	06520226
13.	Patrick A. Junuba			077027246
14.	Mamai J. Dukuly		LAWCLA	06526447
15.	Roosevelt Sackor		LINLEA	06525109 /rsackor58@yahoo.com
16.	Molly K. Kolsee			06752263 / pheto12molly@yahoo.com
17.	Benjamin Tarnue		NACCSOL	06411629/naccsolsecretariat@yahoo.com
18.	Cllr. J. Augustine Toe	Director	JPC	Monrovia -
19.	Atty. Zero Daylue Bernard	Vice president	AFELL	Monrovia – zdbernard2007@yahoo.com /077041681
20.	Rev. Francis Kollie	President	PFL	Monrovia – unitedchristianassembly@yahoo.com/06566720
21.	Martin N. Toe	Asst. Director/ Media Advocacy	FOHRD	Monrovia – martin2008@yahoo.com / 06549348
22.	Daniel Johnson	Program Officer	FIND	Monrovia – 06666255

**QED MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
ORGANIZATION IN GBARNGA (BONG COUNTY) LIBERIA MARCH 25, 2009**

1.	Name	Title	Organization	Adress/ Email/Cont #
2.	Emmanuel V. Kwenah	Program Officer	Carter Center	Gbarnga – 06852455
3.	Robert N. Gbarbea	Rule of Law Officer	UNMIL	Gbarnga – 06519851
4.	Gerald S.Dolo	President	Bong Youth Ass.	Gbarnga – 06440594
5.	Aaron G.V. Juakollie	Program Officer	FIND	Gbarnga – 06957728
6.	Winston Kerkula	Program Coordinator	RHRAP	Gbarnga – 06453746
7.	James F. Wannpaye	Program Officer	RAL	Gbarnga – 06306935
8.	Cerue M. Liyeen	Program Coordinator	WIPNET	Gbarnga – 06472746
9.	Terry Hall	Program Officer	CJPS	Gbarnga – 06902459
10.	Chester Kwennah	Program Officer	DEN-L	Gbarnga – 06590527
11.	Karmu B. Yorose	-----	HOFO-UN	Gbarnga – 05319866
12.	Livingstone Karints	Sector Administrator	UNMIL	Gbarnga – 05319875
13.	Nathan Solepah	Program Officer	FOHRD	Gbarnga – 06409076
14.	J. John Luckie	Program Officer	JPC	Gbarnga – 06410250
15.	Sheik Mark S. Bowgay	Program Officer	FORD	Gbarnga – 06773126
16.	Amos Gbanyan	Program Officer	ASHDI	Gbarnga – 06426458

GANTA – NIMBA COUNTY MARCH 26, 2009

1.	Zawolo Z Zuagela	Secretary	NICE	Ganta -
2.	Milton Gbatu	Project Officer	Concern Women	Ganta -
3.	Anita Quoi	Dietician	Concern Women	Ganta -
4.	Jesco C. Davil	Project Officer	JPC	Ganta -
5.	Offece N. Kpokoh	-----	City Council	Ganta -
6.	Nyahn Flomo	Project Coordinator	NRC	Ganta -
7.	Korkesi Jabateh	President	MYA	Ganta -
8.	Justin W.Z. Paye	Project Officer	IVA	Ganta -
9.	O. Morris Turay	Project Officer	CJPS	Ganta -
10.	B. Wainet Yoko	Project coordinator	CJPS	Ganta -

APPENDIX C: SURVEY INSTRUMENT

**Voices from Liberian Rule of Law-Oriented
Civil Society Organizations**

An Informal Anonymous Survey Sample

**March 2009
(Montserrado, Nimba and Bong Counties, Liberia)**

I am: Male Female (circle one)

INSTRUCTIONS: Please fill out the following questionnaire and return it to the USAID Justice Sector Evaluation Team without your name or organization noted anywhere on it. This is an anonymous, informal questionnaire that is only being used to help identify high priority needs and opinions of the state of the justice sector by the Justice Sector Evaluation Team. Thank you for your cooperation.

1a. To what degree your organization has access to information from government officials needed to achieve your organization's programmatic objectives? (Check 1).

- Satisfactory
- Somewhat satisfactory
- Unsatisfactory
- Unable to obtain any information

1b. What do you see as the three biggest obstacles to promoting justice and the rule of law in Liberia? (Check the top 3).

- Political interference from high level governmental decision makers (executive and legislative branches)
- Political will for reform among high level governmental decision makers (executive and legislative branches)
- Corruption among high level governmental decision makers (executive and legislative branches)
- inadequate funding for the justice system
- Unqualified judges
- Unqualified magistrates
- Unqualified prosecutors
- Unqualified police/investigators
- Unqualified court staff/clerks
- Corrupt judges
- Corrupt magistrates
- Corrupt prosecutors
- Corrupt police
- Corrupt court staff/clerks
- Lack of laws
- Poor enforcement of the laws
- Citizens public awareness of their legal rights
- Lack of official accountability within the justice system
- Lack of transparency within the justice system

- Lack of ability to access the justice system and the courts
- Lengthy delays within the justice system
- Poverty
- Literacy
- Other (write)_____

2a. How important is access to government information among the other needs that you have as a civil society organization? (Check 1).

- Very important
- Important
- Somewhat important
- Not important

2b. What are the three main causes of the lack of justice and the rule of law in Liberia? (Check the top 3).

- Inability to resolve property rights disputes
- Inability to resolve contractual disputes
- Inability to protect individual human rights and civil liberties
- Lack of official accountability and government impunity
- Lack of independent government institutions
- Weak government institutions (capacity)
- Weak civil society institutions (capacity)
- Low government salaries
- High cost of the justice system
- Serious bureaucratic apathy
- Serious public apathy
- Inadequate access to the justice system
- Endemic corruption within the justice sector
- Society-wide corruption
- Other (write)_____

3a. Does your organization conduct systematic regular monitoring and reporting supported by concrete data on reform progress, high priority issues and problems related to your program's objectives? (Check 1).

- Yes
- Somewhat
- No
- Not sure

3b. What are the three most important changes that could realistically be undertaken to promote justice and the rule of law in Liberia? (Check the top 3).

- Increase the number of qualified judges
- Increase the number of qualified prosecutors
- Increase salaries of justice officials
- Reduce corruption within the justice system
- Raise public awareness of peoples' rights

- Fair and effective enforcement of the law and peoples' rights
- Provide more support to professionalizing the Liberian Bar
- Provide more support to legal aid clinics
- Provide more support to the law school
- Address judicial corruption
- Address governmental corruption
- Address society-wide corruption
- Other (write)_____

4a. Does your organization have the technical expertise to undertake this kind of monitoring and reporting on a regular basis? (Check 1).

- Yes
- No
- Somewhat
- Not sure

4b. How important is promoting justice and the rule of law in Liberia compared to other key problems Liberia is facing? (Check 1).

- The most important problem
- Among the most important problems
- Some what important than other problems
- Not a very important problem compared to others

5a. If your organization advocates for reforms, does it have the financial resources it needs to undertake effective advocacy in the areas you are involved in? (Check 1).

- Yes
- No
- Somewhat
- Not sure

5b. What are the three biggest problems facing the fair and effective enforcement of the human rights laws in Liberia? (Check all that apply).

- Lack of human rights laws
- Uneven enforcement of human rights laws
- Not enough qualified judges
- Corrupt judges
- Not enough qualified prosecutors
- Corrupt prosecutors
- Not enough qualified police
- Corrupt police
- Gender violence related issues
- Other (write)_____

6a. Is your organization working closely together on a joint program with any other civil society organization or a government institution? (Check 1).

- Yes
- No
- Somewhat
- Other (write) _____

6b. What are the three biggest problems faced by Liberian women in the Liberian justice system? (check 3).

- Laws are not sufficient to protect women's rights
- Police do not investigate complaints made by women
- Prosecutors do not prosecute crimes
- Courts do not enforce laws fairly and effectively
- Effective advocacy on behalf of women's rights
- Public awareness of women's rights
- Corruption within the justice system
- Other _____

7a. Does your organization have a strategic reform agenda with established priorities? (Check 1).

- Yes
- No
- Somewhat
- Not sure

7b. If you had a dispute over your property rights under Liberian law, would you go to the Liberian courts or use an alternative way or an unofficial or informal way to resolve the dispute? (check 1).

- Courts
- Unofficial or informal system
- Mediation or Arbitration
- Other (write) _____

8a. Do you believe that corruption within civil society organizations in Liberia is a serious problem? (Check 1).

- Yes
- No
- Somewhat
- Not sure

8b. What form of corruption is the biggest problem within the Liberian justice system? (Check the top 3).

- Judges accepting money (bribes) related to a case
- Judges taking political orders related to a case
- Police investigators accepting money (bribes) related to cases
- Police investigators taking political orders related to cases

- Prosecutors accepting money (bribes) related to cases
- Prosecutors taking political orders related to cases
- Court staff/clerks taking money not allowed by law
- Other (write) _____

9a. Do you believe that corruption within the donor community in Liberia is a serious problem? (Check 1).

- Yes
- No
- Somewhat
- Not sure

9b. If you have an opinion, how significant a problem is lack of coordination between the Liberian government and international donors on legal reform programming? (Check 1).

- Very significant
- Significant
- Somewhat significant
- Not significant

10a. Does your organization have in place policies and procedures to effectively prevent and address corruption by your staff? (Check 1)

- Yes
- No
- Somewhat
- Not sure

10b. If you have an opinion, how significant a problem is lack of coordination between international donors on the legal reform front? (Check 1).

- Very significant
- Significant
- Somewhat significant
- Not significant

11a. What are the three most important needs for implementing a rule of law program? (Check 3).

- Legal training in the law
- Training on monitoring and reporting
- Financial resources
- Liberian experts
- International experts
- Access to Liberian lawyers
- Access to Liberian law from government agencies
- Access to information related to prisoners
- Access to information related to court cases

- Access to government officials working in this area
- Access to the legislative committees working in this area
- Access to the media reporting on legal reforms and legal problems to the public
- Other (write) _____

11b. What do you believe the three most important problems are in terms of using the courts in Liberia? (Check the top 3).

- Official cost is too high
- Unofficial (bribes or extra legally unsanctioned court fees) cost of using the courts is too high
- Court decisions are influenced by corruption in various forms
- Judges not qualified
- Court process takes too long
- Court process too complex
- Court decisions do not matter because decisions are poorly enforced
- Courts are located too far away
- Court decisions are not fair
- Other (write) _____

12a. Do the laws and regulatory policies, such as those related to taxes and registration for NGOs, support the active development and growth of civil society groups in Liberia? (check 1)

- Yes
- No
- Somewhat
- Not sure

12b. Are there sufficient programs in place to development a strategic development plan for the Liberian National Police? (Check 1).

- Yes
- No

If yes, then what is the stage of development? (Check 1).

- initial
- intermediate
- advance

13a. How significant a problem is lack of coordination between NGOs in Liberia and international donors on NGO activities? (Check 1).

- Very significant
- Significant
- Somewhat significant
- Not significant
- No opinion

13b. What are the 3 main focus areas of the plan? (Check the top 3).

- Recruitment
- Training
- Incentives and opportunities
- Conduct and discipline
- Infrastructures
- Equipment and supplies
- Relationship with the public
- Police Administration and operations

14. What would you indicate as the top 3 challenges faced by the police and intelligence community in fulfilling their responsibility to the State, Citizens and Residence? (Check the top 3).

- Recruitment
- Training
- Incentives and opportunities
- Conduct and discipline
- Infrastructures
- Equipment and supplies
- Relationship with the public
- Police Administration and operations

15. On a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest), where would you place the ability of the State to provide security and ensure order for its citizens and residents throughout the country? (write number 1-5)_____

16. What would you indicate as the top 3 challenges faced by the Ministry of Justice in prosecuting crime and combating corruption? (Check 3).

- Recruitment of lawyers
- Incentive and opportunities lawyers
- Training - Staff development programs
- Prosecutorial Administration
- Resource materials and access - research and statistic
- Infrastructure,
- Equipment and supplies
- Conduct and Discipline of prosecutorial lawyers

17. How important is it, compared to other judicial reform priorities, to operationalize the Judicial Institute so that judges, prosecutors, magistrates and other court officials can both learn and how to enforce the law better?

- Very important
- Important
- Somewhat important
- Not important
- Other (write)_____

18. What are the three most important rule of law programs that Liberia should undertake over the next three years?

- Promoting enforcement of basic human rights
- Addressing gender violence
- Addressing reforms needed in the traditional justice system
- Building-up the capacity of the justice system (including training)
- Physical infrastructure including building and renovating justice buildings
- Promoting and protecting peoples' property rights (including enforcement of economic and commercial law rights)
- Enhancing the professionalism and qualifications of the legal profession
- Promoting better access to the justice system through more public defenders and legal clinics
- Promoting better access to quality justice through more qualified judges and prosecutors and magistrates
- Providing more support to the law school programs and students

19. To your knowledge, have you received any assistance or training sponsored by any of the entities below (check all that apply)?

- American Bar Association
- United States Department of Justice DOJ
- The Carter Center
- PAE

20. If you checked any of the above assistance, what kind(s) of assistance did you receive (check all that apply)?

- Basic training
- Specialized training
- Law drafting
- Individual expert advice
- Construction or renovation
- Office equipment
- Communications technology

21. Did you find the assistance useful (check one)?

- Very useful
- Somewhat useful
- Not very useful
- Not useful at all

22. If you received more than one type of assistance, which did you find most useful to you: _____


23. Did you find the assistance provided to be worth the time you took to participate?

- Yes
- Somewhat
- No
- Other: _____

APPENDIX D: ADDITIONAL MAPS

Bong County

Total Number of Organizations: 22



est. population: 328,919

Public Awareness:

AFELL, FIND, PFL, UMHRM, NHRCL, CRALL, JPC, UNDP, UNMIL, NED, Carter Center, NRC

Advocacy:

FIND, PFL, UMHRM, CHURDLES, National Bar, NED

Institution-Building:

UNMIL, UNIFEM, UNDP, NRC, World Bank

Capacity-Building:

AFELL, CLHRE, CCJRE, NCCSOL, UNDP, UNMIL, GoL (Ministries of Social Welfare, Health and Welfare, and Gender), World Bank, Carter Center

Access to Justice:

UMHRM, CHURDLES, UNMIL, OSI, NED, NRC, JPC

Note: This map represents only a partial list based on information available during team's visit.

Map 3: Bong County

Montserrado County

Total Number of Organizations: 33



est. population: 1,144,806

Public Awareness:

PFL, UMHRM, CRALL, UNDP, UNMIL, CCJRE, ACOHD, NED, NRC, DFID, Sweden, Norway, Carter Center

Advocacy:

FIND, PFL, UMHRM, NCCSOL, CCJRE, CHURDLES, National Bar, NED

Capacity-Building

AFELL, CLHRE, CCJRE, NCCSOL, UNDP, UNMIL, GoL (Ministries of Social Welfare, Health and Welfare, and Gender), ABA, PAE, OPDAT, Carter Center, World Bank

Institution-Building:

UNDP, UNMIL, UNIFEM, ABA, PAE, UNDP, The Judiciary, NRC, Scott Fellows, World Bank

Access to Justice:


AFELL, FOHRD, JPC, UMHRM, ACOHD, CHRP, CHURDLES, UNMIL, OSI, NED, NRC, EQUIP

Note: This map represents only a partial list based on information available during the team's visit.

Map 4: Montserrado County

Nimba County

Total Number of Organizations: 20



est. population: 468,088

Public Awareness:

AFELL, PFL, UMHRM, NHRCL, UNDP, UNMIL, ACOHD, NED, Carter Center, NRC

Advocacy:

FIND, PFL, UMHRM, CHURDLES, National Bar, NED

Institution-Building:

UNMIL, UNIFEM, UNDP, NRC, World Bank

Capacity-Building:

AFELL, CLHRE, CCJRE, NCCSOL, UNDP, UNMIL, GoL (Ministries of Social Welfare, Health and Welfare, and Gender), World Bank, Carter Center

Access to Justice:

UMHRM, CHURDLES, UNMIL, OSI, NED, NRC, EQUIP

Note: This map represents only a partial list based on information available during team's visit.

Map 5: Nimba County

Margibi County

Total Number of Organizations: 23



est. population: 199,689

Public Awareness:

PFL, UMHRM, NHRCL, CRALL, UNDP, UNMIL, CHRP, ACOHD, NED, NRC, Carter Center

Advocacy:

FIND, PFL, UMHRM, CHURDLES, National Bar, NED

Institution-Building:

UNMIL, UNIFEM, UNDP, NRC, World Bank

Capacity-Building

AFELL, CLHRE, CCJRE, NCCSOL, UNDP, UNMIL, GoL (Ministries of Social Welfare, Health and Welfare, and Gender), World Bank, Carter Center

Access to Justice:

CHURDLES, UNMIL, OSI, NED, NRC, UMHRM, FOHRD

Note: This map represents only a partial list based on information available during team's visit.

Map 6: Margibi County

APPENDIX E: RULE OF LAW PROGRAMS MATRIX

Rule of Law Mapping Matrix - Liberia

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
AFELL	Bong Lofa Nimba Grand Gedeh	FOHRD FIND NHR	ICCO Dutch Govt UNICEF	\$109,000	Oct. 08 – March 2011	Active	To create awareness on Inheritance & Rape Laws
	Grand Gedeh	FIND LDI FOHRD Dent Ell	Finnish Govt	\$27,000	Jan – Oct. 09	Active	To expose and bring to Justice perpetrators of Sexual & Gender Based Crimes
	All 15 counties	FIND LDI FOHRD NHR YWCA	Danish Govt	\$1,000,000	June 08 – June 10	Active	Workshops for prosecutors and solicitors on Gender Based Violence
	Sinoe River Gee Grand Gedeh Montserrado Montserrado	LDI FIND FOHRD	FGHR DUTCH Govt	\$20,000 \$300,000	Jan – June, 09 Continuous since 2003	Active On-going	To associate with GoL in the Prosecution of Rape Cases Operation of Legal Aide Clinic at its Head Offices in Monrovia
PFL	All 15 counties	Methodist and other churches in Liberia	US Embassy Global Fund for HIV/AIDS	\$100,000	Renewed annually since 2004	Active	Rehabilitation of inmates through awareness of their civil and human rights and the rights of others
	All 15 counties	Various churches faith based organizations	East West Institute UNMIL	\$100,000	Renewed each year since 2004	Active	Interventions with the MoJ and Public persecution offices to ensure speedy trial of indigents defendants

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
FIND	Grand Gedeh Grand Kru Gbarpolu River Gee Lofa Bong		ICCO UNDP	\$271,000	2009 & 2010	Active	To create public awareness on Advocacy & Governance issues
	All 15 Counties		NED FGHR	\$43,000	Aug. 08 – Aug. 09	Active	To encourage and expose community leaders on human rights advocacy issues
	Sinoe Maryland Grand Gedeh Grand Kru River Gee	JPC AFELL	TAERC	\$150,000	Jan.- Dec. 09	Active	To create an environment for respect and protection of Human Rights
	Montserrado Margibi Lofa	AFELL CEIP WIPNET	ARC	\$29,000	Jan. – Oct. 09	Active	Teaching Gender awareness to men as a targeted group
UMHRM	All 15 counties	Liberia Marketing Association	US Embassy	\$20,000	One years since 2008	Active	Raise public knowledge of civil , political and human rights
	All 15 counties	Various churches faith based organizations	General Board of Churches	\$22,000	Has been renewed each year for the last 3 years	Active	Interventions against abuse of vulnerable people's human rights
	All 15 counties	Focus LMA	US Institute of Peace Mercy Corps	\$45,000 \$30,000	Two years since July 2007	Active	Provide pro bono legal representation for indigent defendants

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
NHRCL	Grand Bassa Nimba Bong Margibi Grand Gedeh	CRALL	Norwegian Human Rights Fund	\$24,000	Two years since June 2007	Active	Promotion of human rights awareness
	Grand Gedeh Nimba	Episcopal Church CRALL	Prascal-UK	\$60,000	Three years since Jan. 07	Active	Traditional Justice – women’s rights
	Bong Margibi Grand Bassa	JPC	Comic Relief-UK US Embassy	\$100,000	Three years since Dec. 2007	Active	Teaching civil rights to women to increase 30 percent representation in legislature
CRALL	Bong Bomi, Margibi Grand Bassa Montserrado	.	US Embassy US Justice Dept	\$10,000		Active	Promote awareness on the unfair treatment of the indigent defendants
	Bong Bomi, Margibi Grand Bassa Montserrado	.	US Embassy US Justice Dept	\$15,000		Active	Intervention on behalf of indigent defendants.
CLHRE	Margibi Sinoe	NCCSOL	NED	\$8,000	Two yrs from Dec. 09	Active	Human Rights awareness
	Grand Gedeh Bong Nimba	NCCSOL	NED	\$52,000	Two yrs from Dec. 09	Active	Organizes and convenes workshops for community and traditional leaders on human rights concerns
	Margibi Sinoe Bassa Nimba		NED	\$50,000			

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
UNDP	All 15 counties	Carter Center	UN-PBF	\$583,805	Two years from April 2009	To start soon	Traditional Justice Reforms
	Montserrado	Anti-corruption Commission	UN	\$750,000			Support to the Anti-Corruption Commission
		MoJ	UN-PBF	\$1,099,106			Sponsorship of MoJ Strategy Plan
		Judiciary	UN-PBF	\$ 750,000			Improving Prosecution Support to the MoJ Sponsorship of Judiciary Strategic Plan
Legislature				Strengthening Public Defence Sponsorship of Legislative Strategic Plan Rehabilitation of several police sub-stations in various communities through quick impact projects Rehabilitation of the Monrovia Central prison Logistical and procurement assistance to the Liberia National Police Academy			

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
UNDP	Montserrado	Governance Commission	UN-PBF	\$750,000			Governance Commission - Land dispute Resolution / Land Commission
	All 15 counties	JPC	UN-PBF	\$1,152,700	Two years, from May 2009	Starting	Strengthening capacity of community, civil rights and Human rights Organizations
	All 15 counties	MoJ	UN-PBF	\$783,000	One year	To start April 2009	Strengthening MoJ prosecution of SGBV cases
CCJRE	Montserrado		NED				
	Montserrado		NED	\$50,000			
	All Counties	FORHD Civic Initiative CEDE FLY PUL YMCA	NED	\$46,000	Renewed annually since 2003	Active	To assist in transforming the criminal justice system by education of police on human rights issues
Carter Center	All 15 Counties	MOJ	USAID	\$500,000			Public awareness, institution-building, traditional justice
Ministry of Gender	All 15 Counties	Women's Groups	GoL		Continuous		To curb gender based violence
UNMIL	All 15 Counties		UN	\$100,000	Annually since 2003	Active	Public Outreach through radio talk shows and radio drama
	All 15 Counties		UN	\$100,000	Continuous since 2003	Active	Intervention on behalf of victims of Human rights abuse and miscarriage of justice
	All 15 Counties	MoJ Judiciary LNP	UN	\$1,000,000	Continuous since 2003		Training of county attorneys, city solicitors, clerks of courts, defence attorneys, police, Immigration and Correction officers

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
UNMIL	All 15 Counties	MoJ Judiciary LNP	UN	\$500,000			<p>Participation in all National RoL task force</p> <p>Technical assistance in preparation of various project proposals for the Judiciary, MoJ, the Legislature and RoL civil society organizations.</p> <p>Facilitation and coordination of various RoL initiatives and programs with other partners and stakeholders</p> <p>Assistance in the setting up of various RoL reform and associated commissions</p> <p>Assistance in improving the lawmaking capacity of the legislature Legislative through revitalization of the legislative Drafting Bureau, Research Bureau Archive, Library</p> <p>Co-sponsoring traditional Justice Reform forums</p>

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
UNMIL	All 15 Counties	MoJ Judiciary LNP	UN	Continuation of information from above			<p>Monitoring and reporting on RoL & Human Right performance nationwide Participation and support to GBV Task Force</p> <p>Court profiling- personnel and assets</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Serious crime research - Pre-trial Detention Review - Docket Review <p>Construction of three magisterial courts through the quick impact program</p> <p>Placed nearly 50 RoL monitors and advisors throughout the country.</p>
	All 15 counties	MoJ Judiciary	UN	\$200,000	18 months	completed	<p>Paid 15 prosecutorial and defense attorneys to increased access to justice</p> <p>Prepared and submitted project proposals with UNDEF for ALAP- \$495,000 and Paralegal Consortium -\$50,000</p>

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
CHRP	Bassa Margibi Bomi		Global Witness Norwegian Funds for Human Rights	\$50,000			
	Grand Bassa	JPC	Norwegian Fund for Human Rights		On-going for 8 years since 2003	Active	Targeted groups – Women and Juveniles
	Margibi Bomi	Judiciary Police MoJ	Global Fund for Human Rights	\$21,000	18 months from Jan. 08	Active	Exposure of law enforcement officers to Human rights issues
	Montserrado		Global Fund For Human Rights	\$18,000	Two years , since Nov. 2008	Active	Legal representation of Indigents and vulnerable defendants
ACOH	Montserrado Grand Kru Nimba		UNDP NED Norwegian Funds for Human Rights	\$50,000			
	Grand Kru	FIND	Norwegian Fund for Human Rights	\$15,000	3 years from May 2007	Active	Abuses of traditional injustices
	Nimba	AGENDA	FGHR	\$12,000	12 months	Complete	For women and children protection education programs
	Montserrado	JPC	NED	\$12,000	Two years from March 08	Active	Legal representation to indigent defendants
National Bar	All 15 counties						
NCCSOL	Montserrado Grand Bassa	CLHRE CCVRE	NED		Three years from Dec. 07	Active	Intervention on behalf of vulnerable women.
	Bong	CLHR CCVRE	NED	\$12,000	Two years from Aug. 08	Active	Provide lecturers to groups involved with the training of women's groups in traditional justice

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
GoL- Department of Social Welfare, Ministry of Health & Social Welfare	All 15 counties	THINK Don Bosco	GoL	\$50,000	Continuous		To facilitate Juvenile Justice – positioning of Juvenile Parole officers in each county
The Judiciary	Montserrado Barpolu River Gee		GoL	\$1,050,000	Continuing since 2007		Construction of three circuit court complexes
CHURDLES	Montserrado Bong Margibi Lofa Bassa Nimba			\$30,000			
	Montserrado Margibi Bong Nimba Lofa				Continuous since 2004	Active	Legal Representation in both Criminal and Civil cases for vulnerable, and disadvantaged persons
EQUIP	Montserrado Nimba			\$1,000,000	One year	concluding	Legal/Paralegal And Prosecutorial Assistance; Representation in Nimba County
UNICEF	Montserrado	UNMIL & LNP	UN	\$300,000	On-going		Training of Liberia National Police in Child Rights and Protection

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
UNIFEM	Montserrado	UNMIL, MoJ & LNP	UN	\$200,000	On-going		Training of Liberia National Police in women Friendly programs
	All 15 counties			\$1,000,000			<p>GBV Victim Support through psycho-social programs by provision of safe homes for traumatized and distressed victims- implemented by THINK</p> <p>Development of a strategic plan aimed at targeting GBV through investigative and judicial reform programs – implemented by MoJ and assisted by the National GBV Task force</p> <p>Access to Justice programs by training and deployment of paralegals and RoL monitors nationwide – Action Aide implements</p> <p>Review of the Rape and Inheritance Law</p>

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
ABA	Montserrado	Judiciary	USAID	\$1,000,000	One year		Technical Assistance in the setting up of the Judiciary Institute (JI), Support to Ministry of Justice, Supreme court
PAE	Montserrado	MoJ	USAID	\$5,000,000	Three years	To commence April 2009	Support to County Attorneys and City Solicitors, Police departments, Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court
JPC	Bomi Cape Mount Gbarpolu Bong		FGHR	\$150,000			Monitoring of Justice and Human right Issues nationwide
	Bomi Cape Mount Gbarpolu Bong		FGHR	\$150,000	Has been renewed annually since 2007	Active	To monitor courts, prisons and detention cells to identify prolonged pre-trial detainees for legal assistance
	Montserrado Grand Bassa Margibi		NED	\$24,000	Has been renewed each year since 1992	Active	To provide pro bono legal representation to indigent defendants
UNHCR	All 15 counties			\$200,000	On-going		Initiated various micro programs aimed at curbing sexual and gender-based violence through investigative and judicial processes
	Montserrado Sinoe				On-going		Provision of stationeries and other supplies to magisterial courts

Organization	County	Partners	Donor	Value-US\$	Duration	Status	Objective
Norwegian Refugee Council			EU Norwegian Govt	\$850,000	Closing down		Monitor and evaluation of RoL (Justice and Human Rights issues) nationwide wit deployment of nearly 400 monitors
FOHRD	Montserrado Grand Bassa Margibi	Watch Law Chambers Tulay & Associate Law Firm	USAID/Creative Associates	\$150,000	Jan.- Dec. 08	closed	To curtail illegal detention and prison congestion
Global Rights	Lofa					On-going	
NED	All 15 Counties		NED/USG	\$650,000			Civil society building, public awareness
OSI	All 15 Counties			\$1,000,000			Civil society, public awareness, anti-corruption, legal assistance
DFID	Montserrado			\$500,000			Mentoring; GBV programs, public awareness
Sweden	Montserrado			\$500,000			Mentoring; GBV programs, public awareness
Norway	Montserrado			\$500,000			Mentoring; GBV programs, public awareness
Scott Fellows	Montserrado			\$500,000			Institution building, Ministry of Justice, Supreme court

APPENDIX F: REFERENCES

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